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This thesis addresses the question of how and why the function of regional 
organisations varies in different areas of the world. It contributes with insights from 
the post-Soviet space. A theoretically informed empirical study examines how two 
former Soviet republics conceptualise the function of two regional organisations: 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Organisation for 
Democracy and Economic Development – GUAM (GUAM). The literature agrees 
that the two like other organisations in the post-Soviet space do not produce 
integration or other forms of regional governance. Nevertheless, the member states 
continue to actively participate in these organisations. The thesis inquires to which 
end the states continue their membership. 
The analytical perspective examines how the member states’ conceptualisations of 
an organisation’s function depend on the domestic political regimes. The thesis 
considers two members of the CIS and GUAM. One, Azerbaijan, has a hybrid regime 
with an authoritarian shape. The other, Ukraine, has a hybrid regime with stronger 
affinity towards democracy. It is argued that policy-makers conceptualise the 
function of a regional organisation according to the patterns of rule in their 
domestic political regimes. The ruling elite’s conceptualisation may diverge from the 
stated function of the organisation, if the stated function is not compatible with the 
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NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION 
The transliteration of Russian and Ukrainian letters in this thesis follows the Library 
of Congress system.1 The rules for Russian letters, which do not find an equivalent 
in the English alphabet, are outlined in table 1. Table 2 and 3 contain the respective 






                                                          
1
 See: http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpso/roman.html 
2
 The transliteration follows the suggestions of: Imranli-Lowe, Kamala (2012), The First Armenia 
Republic and its Territorial Conflicts with Azerbaijan. PhD, Birmingham University. 
 
Table 1: Transliteration of Russian Letters 
Russian Letter English Transliteration 
ж zh 





















Table 2: Transliteration of Ukrainian Letters 




















Table 3: Transliteration of Azerbaijani Letters 
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Over the last 70 years, regional organisations have increasingly come to structure 
the international landscape. States from all areas of the world are active in one or 
more regional organisations. The academic literature widely explains state 
engagement in these organisations in terms of a commitment to strengthening 
security and welfare in the region through integration or other collective solutions1  
Immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet 
republics also started founding economic and security-oriented regional 
organisations. They created about ten such organisations in the period of 1991-
2012 of which the following five are active in 2013: the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisations (CSTO), the Organisation for Democracy 
and Economic Development – GUAM (GUAM)2, and the Customs Union between 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in the framework of EurAsEC (CU).3 By working 
together within the framework of regional organisations the former Soviet 
republics, thus, followed a global trend. The organisations also reflect global trends 
in their design, which strongly reflects internationally well-established models such 
                                                          
1
 Two strands of literature determine the debate. Integration theories argue that the integration of 
liberal democracies in regional organisations increases societal welfare and stabilises the region. See 
one of the fathers of this idea: Mitrany, David (1975), The Functional Theory of Politics. New York: 
St. Martin's Press. The new regionalism literature sees regional organisations as a response to the 
challenges of globalisation. A core representative of this school is Björn Hettne. See: Hettne, Björn 
and András Inotai (1994), The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and 
International Security. [Helsinki]: UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research. 
2
 This organisation has changed its name several times according to the member state composition. 
From 1996-1998 it was called GUAM – the acronym for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In 
the period 1999-2005 Uzbekistan was a member of the organisation, which became GUUAM. In 2006 
it was re-launched as GUAM with the amendment ‘Organisation for Democracy and Economic 
Development’. For the sake of simplicity, however, this thesis uses only the acronym GUAM. In case 
it is necessary the thesis will explicitly indicate that certain developments took place when 
Uzbekistan was part of the organisation.   
3
 The others are, for instance, the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) founded in 2005, the 
Caucasus Four in 2000, the Single Economic Space (SES) found in 2003 and the Customs Union of 
1996. None of these has formally been dissolved. In addition, the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organisation was initiated in 1996 and merged into EurAsEC in 2006. Further, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) are mostly 
composed of former Soviet republics. Since they involve states beyond the post-Soviet space, the 
thesis does not treat them as regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. 
2 
 
as the EU or NATO.4 Furthermore, the proclaimed agenda of these organisations, 
namely to reach different degrees of integration in order to provide regional 
governance, is in line with what Western actors in  particular promote 
internationally as a function of regionalism.5  
Despite this adjustment to global trends, none of the organisations in the post-
Soviet space has so far performed the above listed aims. Their observable function 
significantly deviates from the expectations discussed by the literature on old and 
also new regionalism.6 The old regionalism school argues that regional organisations 
act as a framework for integration. Integration processes lead political actors to 
subordinate national policies to the supranational jurisdiction exerted by regional 
organisations.7 The new regionalism shifts attention from integration towards 
collective solutions of a formal or informal nature. These should protect societies 
against the negative externalities of globalisation. It argues that the pressure of 
globalisation leads to regional governance in varying forms.8 The literature on 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space, however, agrees that none of the 
                                                          
4
 The CSTO resembles the structure of NATO. The CIS, EurAsEC, GUAM and the CU reflect to varying 
degrees the EU structure.  
5
 Jeschke, Anja and Tobias Lenz (2013), Does Regionalism Diffuse? A New Research Agenda for the 
Study of Regional Organisations. Journal of European Public Policy,Vo. 20, No. 04, p 628. 
6
 The literature uses the term old regionalism to summarise the theories that were developed with 
regard to the regional organisations which emerged in the so-called first wave of regionalism after 
the Second World War. They are strongly EU centred. New regionalism describes a strand of 
literature which discusses regional organisations as a response to globalisation. A third strand of 
literature is comparative regionalism, which aims at enhancing the old and new regionalism debate 
through studies of individual regional organisations. For this distinction see inter alia: Warleigh-Lack 
and Ben Rosamond (2011), Studying Regions Comparatively. Back to the Future? . In: Warleigh-Lack, 
Alex, et al. (eds.), New Regionalism and the European Union. London: Routledge, p 19; Jeschke and 
Lenz, Does Regionalism Diffuse? A New Research Agenda for the Study of Regional Organisations, 
626. 
7
 This thesis depicts early constructivist, functionalist, neo-functionalist and liberal and realist 
intergovernmentalism schools as part of the old regionalism school. The given definition roughly 
reflects that of Ernst B. Haas. It is discussed in detail in chapter 2.2.1. See: Haas, Ernst B. (1961), 
International Integration: the European and the Universal Process. International Organisation,Vo. 15, 
No. 3, p 366. 
8
 The concept of new regionalism has been strongly developed by authors like Björn Hettne. Case 
studies on regional organisations that emerged after the 1980s, when the influence of globalisation 
increased, indicate that a number of the organisations do not comply with the above mentioned 
core argument. See chapter 2.2.2 for a lengthy discussion. Marchand, Marianne et al. (1999), The 
Political Economy of New Regionalism. Third World Quarterly,Vo. 20, No. 5, pp. 900-9; Hettne, Björn 
et al. (1999), Globalism and the New Regionalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
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organisations have managed to assume regional governance functions.9 Overall, the 
organisations appear to have exercised little stabilising effect over the region. These 
observations induce most analysts to deem the organisations irrelevant and to 
widely ignore them.10 If studies devote attention to the regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space they tend mainly to discuss the failure of integration.11  
There is, however, an aspect to which the literature pays little attention. The 
majority of the organisations continue to exist, despite the fact they allegedly do 
not produce any meaningful impact. Yet, a glance at the intra-organisational 
processes shows that they are actually far more active than often assumed. Neither 
the CIS, the CSTO nor GUAM have stopped their activities. They have rather 
enhanced their profile. Most of the former Soviet republics participate in the CIS, 
for instance, more consistently and with greater commitment than the public 
statements on the foreign policy orientation of the countries indicate. This applies 
in particular to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and to Ukraine.12 Against this 
background, the question arises as to why former Soviet republics continue their 
membership in organisations which do not lead to integration or multilateral 
governance of the post-Soviet space. Only a few member states, namely 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Georgia, have withdrawn their membership from 
                                                          
9
 See for example: Kubicek, Paul (2009), The Commonwealth of Independent States: an Example of 
Failed Regionalism? Review of International Studies,Vo. 35. Chapter 2.3 will discuss in detail the 
assessment of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space by the literature. 
10
 Studies analyse international relations in the post-Soviet space predominantly from a bilateral 
rather than a multilateral perspective. The predominant analytical perspective focusses on Russia’s 
relations towards the former Soviet republics. Some representative studies are: Buszynski, Leszek 
(2005), Russia's New Role in Central Asia. Asian Survey,Vo. 45, No. 4; Godzimirski, Jakub (2007), 
Russia and the CIS: Spaces, Paradigms and Patterns. In: Dusseault, David (ed.), The CIS: Form or 
Substance? Helsinki: Aleksanteri Institute; Kjærnet, Heidi (2010), Azerbaijani-Russian Relations and 
the Economization of Foreign Policy. In: Overland, Indra, et al. (eds.), Caspian Energy Politics. 
London: Routledge. 
11
 Kubicek, The Commonwealth of Independent States: an Example of Failed Regionalism; Wilson 
Rowe, Elena and Stina Torjesen (eds.) (2008), The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy. 
London: Routledge. 
12
 This group of states ranks as rather anti-CIS in the literature. See for example: Nikitin, Alexander 
(2007), The End of the ‚Post-Soviet Space’. The Changing Geopolitical Orientations of the Newly 
Independent States. Russian and Eurasia Briefing,Vo. 7, No. 1, p 6; Willerton, John and Mikhail 
Beznosov (2007), Russia's Pursuit of its Eurasian Security Interests: Weighing the CIS and Alternative 
Bilateral-Multilateral Arrangements. In: Malfliet, Katlijn, et al. (eds.), The CIS, the EU and Russia. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, p 60. 
4 
 
some of the organisations.13 Are the organisations, indeed, dysfunctional if the 
member states continue to actively engage in them? The recent debate on 
comparative regionalism suggests this conclusion to be too short sighted. Case 
studies on regional organisations in various areas of the world testify to the fact 
that the member states alter the function of the interaction in these organisations 
according to their regional and domestic environment.14 The debate encourages a 
shift away from the integration and regional governance paradigms described 
above in favour of an open investigation of the organisations’ actual function.15 The 
thesis aims at exploring the actual function of regional organisations in the post-
Soviet space, in order to add to the knowledge about these organisations. The 
following sub-section will specify the research interest and its relevance. 
1.1. RESEARCH INTEREST AND RELEVANCE  
As indicated above the existing literature gives only a limited account of the 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. The contributions primarily indicate 
what the organisations do not do and how they ought not to be understood; 
namely as efficiently triggering integration. Weak evidence is, however, given about 
what they actually do. Accordingly, little discussion exists on the factors that cause 
this alternative interpretation of the organisations’ function. This thesis is 
committed to closing this research gap for two core reasons.  
Firstly, a better understanding of the role and the potential of regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space adds to the knowledge about how the former 
Soviet republics shape their relations with their formerly Soviet neighbours. A 
differentiated picture of the organisations helps to adequately assess the existing 
                                                          
13
 Georgia has withdrawn from the CIS in 2009. Turkmenistan has reduced its membership to an 
associated status and de facto suspended it in the period of 2005-2007. Uzbekistan has left GUUAM 
in 2005 and has withdrawn from the CSTO in 2012.  
14
 See for example: Aris, Stephen and Andreas Wenger (eds.), (2013), Regional Organisations and 
Security: Conceptions and Practice. London: Routledge; Börzel, Tanja (ed.), (2012), Roads to 
Regionalism. Farnham: Ashgate; Warleigh-Lack, Alex (2008), Studying Regionalisation 
Comparatively. A Conceptual Framework. In: Zimmek, Koeseler (ed.), Elements of Regional 
Integration. Baden-Baden. 
15
 Börzel, Tanja (2011), Comparative Regionalism. A New Research Agenda. KFG Working Paper, No. 
28, p 27; Warleigh-Lack, Alex (2006), Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: Bridging 
'New Regionalism' and 'Integration Theory'. Review of International Political Economy,Vo. 13, No. 5, 
p 762; Goltermann, Lukas et al. (2012), Roads to Regionalism. In: Börzel, Tanja (ed.), Roads to 
Regionalism. Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 6-9. 
5 
 
and prospective effects of the organisations. This is relevant with regard to the 
political connotations that accompany the development of some regional 
organisations. In recent years the Russian leadership, in particular, has tried to 
frame the successful development of EurAsEC, the CSTO, the CU but also new 
developments within the CIS as symbol of Russia’s power to re-integrate the former 
Soviet republics.16 Some analysts and policymakers are also concerned that the 
processes of regionalism in the post-Soviet space exclude or compete with some 
states’ ambitions to associate or integration with the EU.17 An explorative analysis 
of the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space as envisioned in 
this thesis may improve the toolkit for evaluating these concerns.  
Secondly, additional insights on the function of regional organisations in the post-
Soviet space correspond to the research agenda of comparative regionalism. 
Authors engaged in this research strand call for a characterisation of the varieties of 
regional organisations. Especially the organisations in the post-Soviet space are 
strongly underrepresented in this debate.18 Some authors call for a more systematic 
investigation of why states interpret the opportunities and employ the instruments 
offered by regional organisations differently. In this regard the interplay of domestic 
political regimes and the member states’ interpretation of an organisation triggers 
specific interest.19 The summary of the analytical approach below will explain how 
the thesis intends to pursue the analysis of the function of regional organisations in 
the post-Soviet space and to explore the factors that shape this function. 
                                                          
16
 President of Russia (14 February 2013), Vladimir Putin Spoke at an Expanded FSB Board Meeting 
on the Results of its Activities in 2012. [Online]. 
17
 This primarily applies to Ukraine and the question its membership in the CU, which would rule out 
to sign the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU. But also new agreements in 
the CIS occasionally provoke these concerns. See: Sushko, Oleksandr (2004), The Dark Side of 
Integration. Ambitions of Domination in Russia's Backyard. The Washington Quarterly,Vo. 27, No. 2; 
Shumylo-Tapiola, Olga (2012), The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend or Foe to the EU? The Carnegie 
Papers, p 21. 
18
 Börzel, Comparative Regionalism. A New Research Agenda, 12. 
19
 Börzel, Roads to Regionalism, 22. Legrenzi, Matteo and Cilja Harders (2008), Introduction: Beyond 
Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East. In: Legrenzi, 
Matteo and Harders, Cilja (eds.), Beyond Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and 
Regionalization in the Middle East. Farnham: Ashgate, p 2; Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond, Studying 
Regions Comparatively. Back to the Future?, 22. 
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1.2. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
The research interest of this thesis concerns regional organisations that have been 
built by and between former Soviet republics. This thesis is, however, able to make 
an insightful contribution only by exemplary case studies. From the entire case 
universe of five regional organisations the thesis studies the function of two 
organisations. For reasons which the sub-section ‘empirical design’ will outline the 
CIS and GUAM serve as case studies. The decision how to study the function and the 
factors that shape the function have been informed by the literature on regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space and beyond. The following aspects sum up 
the core arguments that inspired the research focus.  
First, most of the literature concerning the post-Soviet space analyses the regional 
organisations according to their stated aims, structure, adopted agreements and 
their implementation. The majority of the literature evaluates these features 
according to the basic assumptions of integration theories and neo-realism.20 
However, as mentioned above, studies on regional organisations in different areas 
of the world indicate that states alter their interpretation and employment of the 
structures and interaction opportunities in a regional organisation according to their 
needs.21 Only a few contributions on the post-Soviet space, mainly on Central Asia, 
have picked up this assumption and have explored the rationales of the member 
states in the organisations.22 Therefore this thesis will analyse what function the 
regional organisations have in the eyes of two member states. The term ‘function’ 
requires some specification. The thesis argues that how the states conceptualise the 
organisations’ function is reflected in the aims which they pursue by participation in 
                                                          
20
 Chapter 2.3 will detail this statement. See for example: Obydenkova, Anastassia (2011), 
Comparative Regionalism: Eurasian Cooperation and European Integration. The Case for 
Neofunctionalism? Journal of Eurasian Studies, No. 2; Kubicek, The Commonwealth of Independent 
States: an Example of Failed Regionalism; Flikke, Geir (2009), Balancing Acts: Russian–Chinese 
Relations and Developments in the SCO and CSTO. NUPI Report. 
21
 Chapter 2.2.2 will dwell on this aspect. Examples of authors that interpret regional organisations in 
specific areas of the world respectively are: Nesadurai, Helene (2003), Globalisation, Domestic 
Politics and Regionalism. London: Routledge; Herzig, Edmund (2004), Regionalism, Iran and Central 
Asia. International Affairs,Vo. 80, No. 3. 
22
 Torjesen, Stina (2007), Understanding Regional Co-operation in Central Asia, 1991-2004. DPhil in 
International Relations, University of Oxford; Aris, Stephen (2011), Eurasian Regionalism. The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan; Collins, Kathleen (2009), 
Economic and Security Regionalism among Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Central 
Asia. Europe Asia Studies,Vo. 61, No. 2. 
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the organisation, and in the type of activities which they prefer for achieving the 
aims. The thesis explores how state officials and private economic actors interpret 
the organisations’ function.23  
The analytical focus is, secondly, inspired by the debate of how varying political 
regime characteristics inform the ruling elites’ conceptualisation of the function of 
regional organisations. There is a general consensus that democracies are more 
open to regional integration than authoritarian states. The literature, however, 
leaves some questions weakly answered. What makes regional integration 
unattractive for authoritarian regimes? What makes it nevertheless attractive for 
ruling elites in authoritarian regimes to participate in regional organisations? Which 
mechanisms induce them to alternatively conceptualise the function of regional 
organisations?24 The post-Soviet space provides a fruitful ground for studying these 
puzzles since it offers organisations with authoritarian and pluralist, albeit not 
consolidated, democratic members.25 Of specific interest with regard to the post-
Soviet states is how the ruling elite26 manages to perform virtual regionalism. 
Virtual regionalism indicates the ability to participate in regional organisations by 
avoiding any socialisation into intensive multilateral co-operation or integration.27 
In search of some answers the empirical study of this thesis compares how an 
authoritarian republic, Azerbaijan, and a pluralist one, Ukraine, conceptualise the 
function of the CIS and GUAM. The inductive analysis discloses two political 
                                                          
23
 For the sake of readability, the thesis still uses the collective term 'states' in the presentation of 
the research process and findings. The collective term is, however, used to describe the perceptions 
of policy-makers who represent the state in the organisations under study.  
24
Börzel, Comparative Regionalism. A New Research Agenda, 19.  
25
 An overview of the diversity of political regime types in the post-Soviet space may be given with 
reference to the Freedom House Nations in Transit Index. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan score as consolidated authoritarian 
regimes. Armenia scores as semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes and Moldova, Georgia and 
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regimes’ characteristics as relevant. The first is the foreign policy-making process. It 
determines which conceptualisation of regional organisations guides the states’ 
participation in the CIS and GUAM. Secondly, institutions, which guide domestic 
rule28, significantly shape policy-makers’ conceptualisations of the function of 
regional organisations. The analytical perspective outlined leads to the research 
questions below. 
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Overall three research questions emerge. The first two serve to identify how state 
officials conceptualise the function of the CIS and GUAM.  A third question explores 
the domestic origins of their conceptualisation. The thesis asks: 
 What aims do member states pursue by participating in these regional 
organisations? 
 What types of activities do they prefer for achieving the aims? 
 How do domestic patterns of rule shape the goals which are pursued and 
the activities that are preferred?  
1.4. THE CORE ARGUMENT 
It will be argued that policy-makers conceptualise the function of a regional 
organisation according to domestically established patterns of rule. If policy-makers 
do not have the power to alter the organisation’s stated function they may alter the 
de facto function of the membership and activities in the organisation according to 
their needs. Azerbaijan and Ukraine employ the regional organisations studied to 
consolidate their independence and sovereignty. The organisations primarily 
enhance the states’ ability to single-handedly respond to domestic and regional 
challenges. Only some policy-makers from Ukraine pursue collective solutions, 
which primarily build on non-formalised policy-coordination. The thesis highlights in 
                                                          
28
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four steps how policy-makers in Azerbaijan and Ukraine conceptualise the function 
of the regional organisations studied and where this concept originates.  It specifies 
the two sets of pursued aims, the preferred types of activities in the organisations, 
and the impact of domestic patterns of rule as follows.  
With regard to the pursued aims the findings suggest a need to distinguish between 
ultimate and intermediary goals. The thesis borrows this terminology from Arnold 
Wolfers who has discussed the need to differentiate between individual foreign 
policy goals. He argues that scholars need to define the scope of a foreign policy 
goal according to the specific situation. According to Wolfers, foreign policy goals 
are rarely remote goals. Mostly they serve as a means for other goals and are thus 
in his terminology intermediary goals.29 Discussing both type of goals separately 
allows the analysis to consider not only the aim pursued by the general membership 
in an organisation, but also of the goals pursued by committing to the concrete 
activities in the organisations. This helps to unveil the often puzzling relationship 
between the general goal to avoid policy co-ordination mentioned above, and the 
commitment to agreements that require policy co-ordination. As ultimate goals 
both states strive to strengthen their sovereignty through engagement in these 
organisations. With reference to Stephen Krasner’s notions of sovereignty, the 
thesis argues that Azerbaijan and Ukraine predominantly intend to consolidate their 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. The latter describes the states’ ability to 
exert authority domestically.30 In Ukraine policy-makers also search for means to 
consolidate their ability to control regional cross-border flows via these regional 
organisations. Krasner depicts this ability as interdependence sovereignty.31 What 
are the intermediary goals through which to approach the previously mentioned 
ultimate goals? Azerbaijan and Ukraine both intend to manage and minimise 
persisting interdependencies in the following three ways: 
 enhancing the country’s material and methodological capacity to 
independently tackle domestic and regional challenges; 
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 strengthening the country’s regional and international visibility and 
leverage;  
 and maintaining the organisations as a format for regional interaction.  
The regional organisations offer a variety of activities in support of these aims. It is 
insightful to cluster the activities according to the intensity of multilateral co-
ordination they require. Offering a multilateral environment is a core feature of any 
regional organisation. It is therefore decisive to understand how the member states 
exploit this environment. Both states prefer activities that require no or only 
temporary multilateral co-ordination. Permanent multilateral policy co-ordination, 
as required in integration, is not compatible with domestic patterns of rule. The 
political regimes in Azerbaijan and Ukraine resemble hybrid regimes in which 
informal practices dominate politics. The hybrid regime in Azerbaijan builds strongly 
on authoritarian patterns of rule, whereas pluralism and broader civic participation 
characterise the hybrid regime in Ukraine. These regime characteristics have the 
following implications for the ruling elite's conceptualisation of regional 
organisations.32 High-level officials in particular avoid commitments to long-term 
multilateral policy co-ordination, since domestic policy practices strongly rely on 
their ability to alter policies flexibly. The rule of law33 is weakly enforced and does 
not provide the necessary environment for creating stable and transparent policy 
practices that is accountable to external actors. Nevertheless, in both Ukraine and 
Azerbaijan low-level officials see potential for durable activities, which policy-
makers can activate for a temporary co-ordination of policies. These strongly build 
on non-formalised practices. The ability of state officials to promote such co-
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ordinated activities depends on the foreign policy-making processes. In Azerbaijan 
high-level officials prevent the development of collective solutions by top-down 
policy-making. In Ukraine low-level officials have more influence on policy-making. 
But insufficient policy co-ordination makes it impossible to take full advantage of 
these multilateral opportunities. The following paragraphs will detail the empirical 
and methodological design of the analysis. 
1.5. EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
As already mentioned, the empirical research focuses on two former Soviet 
republics and their engagement in two regional organisations. This small-N case 
study design intends to meet three challenges. Firstly, studying how policy-makers 
in the case-study countries conceptualise the regional organisations required 
original empirical data beyond official documents from the organisation or states 
concerned. The latter hardly reflect the actual intention of the countries.34 Thus 
data from interviews with policy-makers directly involved in the organisations from 
both countries appeared more helpful. The workload of such qualitative analysis 
made it necessary to concentrate on a low number of cases. Secondly, the validity 
of research findings increases with the number of cases considered.35 The analysis 
focuses upon the impact of political regimes on the conceptualisation of the 
function of regional organisations. On this basis it is proposed to compare varying 
political regimes.  
With reference to these arguments it was decided for the purposes of this thesis to 
analyse how policy-makers from Ukraine and Azerbaijan conceptualise the function 
of the CIS and GUAM. A comparison of the policy towards the two organisations 
allows one to discern whether a country’s policy is unique to a specific regional 
organisation or follows patterns which can be observed vis-à-vis other 
organisations. Comparing Azerbaijan and Ukraine makes it possible to explore how 
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the ruling elite in a hybrid regime with an authoritarian shape and a hybrid regime 
with affinity towards democracy conceptualise the function of the same regional 
organisations. In Azerbaijan the ruling elites under Heydar and Ilham Aliyev have 
since 1994 established an authoritarian regime in, for instance, Juan Linz’ definition 
of the term.36 The regime is characterised by limited pluralism, marginalisation of 
the political opposition and a lack of channels for the political participation of 
society.37 In addition, personalised relations and dependencies strongly determine 
politics in Azerbaijan and undermine or alter the formal polity. Economics and 
politics are strongly intertwined.38 Ukraine made a substantial turn towards 
democracy in the early 2000s but did not consolidate democracy. It is still a hybrid 
regime. Strong pluralism in form of competing parties and political and economic 
elites marks the political regime.39 Societal actors also have very significant room for 
political participation. Nevertheless, politics is still not primarily driven by formal 
political institutions and the consequent application of the rule of law.40  
Azerbaijan and Ukraine participate in a wide range of CIS and GUAM activities, 
which made a comprehensive study of their engagement difficult. Therefore the 
thesis investigates their policies regarding two selected GUAM and CIS activities. In 
order to deliver a better basis for a comparison the focus rests on GUAM and CIS 
activities in the same issue-area. These within-cases are activities in the issue-areas 
of trade and security. As trade-related activity the establishment of a free trade 
agreement is studied. With regard to security-related activities it is problematic to 
present congruent cases for Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Limited access to state 
agencies, especially those dealing with security matters, rendered it impossible to 
collect enough data on the same activities in the two countries. The empirical 
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findings for the security-related activities will therefore rest on CIS and GUAM 
migration activities in the case of Azerbaijan and anti-drug-trafficking activities in 
the case of Ukraine. Figure 1 visualises the case-study design. To provide a more 
pronounced idea about the case study components, two subsections shall now give 
a brief account on the political regimes in Azerbaijan and Ukraine and on two 
regional organisations under study.  
Figure 1: Overview of Empirical Cases 
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1.5.1. POLITICAL REGIMES IN AZERBAIJAN AND UKRAINE 
This section will argue that the concept hybrid regime describes the current political 
regimes in Azerbaijan and in Ukraine. A hybrid regime incorporates by definition 
elements of the ideal types 'authoritarian' and 'democratic' rule.41 Transition 
research introduced this term to cover the political regimes that experienced 
democratisation after the 1970s but have never consolidated democracy.42 This 
broad definition applies to both Azerbaijan and Ukraine, but the degree to which 
the political regimes of the two countries have incorporated democratic elements 
varies. As section 3.4.3 will detail, a core feature of hybrid regimes relevant to both 
case countries is that elections produce uncertainty.43 The incumbent cannot take 
political survival for granted. Elections do not meet the standards of being free and 
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fair as they ideally do in democracies. It is therefore not the outcome of voting that 
is the core driver of this uncertainty. Rather the event of elections may shuffle the 
loyalty of crucial social actors including the political and economic elites but also the 
wider population. This indicates that more important than formal institutions like 
elections are informal institutions of personalised relations between the incumbent 
and crucial economic, political and social players.44 
This section will proceed by giving a brief account of the hybrid regime in Azerbaijan 
which rests strongly on authoritarian mechanisms. It will then discuss the case of 
Ukraine where the transformation has introduced stronger mechanisms of civic 
participation which has paved the way for more political competition and pluralism.  
Azerbaijan’s first years of independence were marked by an unstable political 
leadership and political regime. The first president Ayaz Mutallibov foundered to 
consolidate power in the course of the developments of the conflict with Nagorno-
Karabakh and Armenia that developed into a war in 1991. After six months in power 
Albufaz Elchibey replaced him as president and tried to establish a democratic 
regime. The leading political power in this time was the independence movement 
Popular Front of Azerbaijan (APF). The democracy project failed, since the 
leadership lacked the monopoly of the use of force. In the course of a coup d’état, 
Elchibay went into exile in 1993.45 His successor Heydar Aliyev stabilised the 
security and political situation in the country by two means. In 1994 he negotiated a 
cease fire agreement in the matter of Nagorno-Karabakh. Secondly, Aliyev managed 
to form a power centre around his person and to marginalise meaningful opposition 
forces. From 1994-2003 Heydar Aliyev ruled the country and smoothly transferred 
power to his son Ilham Aliyev in 2003.46 The political regime in Azerbaijan after 
1994 can be described as hybrid regime with strong authoritarian features. The 
dominant appearance of the regime is an authoritarian one in, for instance, Juan 
Linz’ definition of the term.47 Limited pluralism, marginalisation of the political 
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opposition and a lack of channels for the political participation of wider society 
characterise political processes in Azerbaijan. 48 It is a hybrid regime, since the ruling 
elites have incorporated basic elements of a democratic polity in the constitutions. 
However, amendments in the 2000s have shifted the power increasingly to the 
president.49 The competitiveness of elections at central but also communal level is 
strongly constrained. At least, multiple parties and opposition candidates take part 
in the elections.50 Ilham Aliyev has so far been re-elected twice with an official turn-
out of about 85%, which indicates that his power basis is still relatively stable. 
However, certain uncertainty exists. Both in 2008 and in 2013 uprisings in Baku 
accompanied the election. Especially in 2013 the incumbent anticipated the unrest 
and made use of a repertoire of repressive actions to prevent the spread of riots 
that might lead to the overthrow of his regime.51 
However, regime stability does not primarily rest on repressions against opposition 
forces, but on the inclusion of strong economic and political players into a system of 
redistribution of economic gains and power. Analysts agree in describing the regime 
built by Heydar and inherited by Ilham Aliyev as massively reliant on informal 
institutions besides the formal institutions of the polity.52 Like the leaders of many 
other former Soviet republics Heydar Aliyev has used privatisation as a means to 
ensure the loyalty of potential veto-player.53 A personalised network has emerged 
which alters the function of the formal institutions in favour of the president and 
perpetuates the intertwining of economic and politics.54 Ilham Aliyev was forced to 
alter the network structure in order to marginalise actors who did not support his 
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presidency. However, the logic of rule remained the same.55 Ilham Aliyev's regime 
builds on the rents from oil and gas exports.56 They generate enough resources to 
satisfy influential elites. The income is only reluctantly invested into economic and 
infrastructure initiatives that would increase the economic welfare of the society.57 
The unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has become a tool for averting 
widespread internal unrest which would weaken the country's stability. The conflict 
is in 2012 still stuck in a 'no war, no peace' situation. The ruling elites in Azerbaijan 
as well as in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh perpetuate the line of conflict rather 
than promoting reconciliation.58 This creates a climate where even opposition 
actors play down demands for regime change in order not to weaken the ruling 
elites ability to manage the unresolved conflict.59 
The regime characteristics which the thesis argues to be most important for the 
question of how the ruling elites approach regional organisations can be 
summarised as follows. Informal institutions prominently shape politics in 
Azerbaijan and are thus crucial for the survival of Ilham Aliyev's regime. Aliyev has 
created a regime that relies on personalised networks. Non-transparent processes 
determine the ruling. He and other members of the ruling elite are therefore in the 
first instance accountable to powerful economic and political actors and only 
secondarily to the wider society. Sporadic investments in the increase of welfare 
and repressions against opposition forces have until 2013 been enough to prevent 
serious regime challenges. Another factor that contributes to pacifying regime 
critics is the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The next paragraphs will 
outline that the political regime in Ukraine is less authoritarian.    
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Ukraine's development after its independence has raised the expectation that the 
country will be one of the few to consolidate democracy.60 The political regime has 
not live up to these expectations, but is far more democratic than the political 
regime in Azerbaijan. Ukraine's first decade of independence was marked by 
authoritarian tendencies under Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and Leonid Kuchma 
(1994-2004). After the so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004 Ukraine made a 
substantial turn towards democracy. Since 2010 Victor Yanukovich (2010-2014) has 
developed a more authoritarian style of rule that ended in his overthrow in spring 
2014. All these political changes have been initiated by elections except for the 
overthrow of Yanukovich in 2014. However, analysts agree that the population, 
through their voting and protests, has rather functioned as resource for powerful 
elites to trigger political change than as the source of political change.61 Lucan Way 
and Heiko Pleines see fragmentations in elite circles as the main sources of political 
change. The turn of crucial actors in the elites from Kravchuk, who was considered 
as unpromising candidate in the 1994 elections, to Kuchma paved the way for the 
Kuchma's presidency.62 Differences between Kuchma, Yushchenko and Timoshenko 
have resulted in the creation of the democratic forces that have initiated the 
'Orange Revolution' in 2004.63 It was the defection of the heads of the security 
forces and the city government in Kyiv that have paved the way for a successful 
'Orange Revolution'.64 The capability of incumbents to directly rig elections has 
always been limited due to the existence of veto-players in the elite circles and the 
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emerging civil society in Ukraine. 65 The power struggle in Ukraine has therefore 
always been marked by a broad set of tools for influencing the competition prior to 
the elections. Among these are an uneven access of candidates to mass media, the 
fabrication of libel, corruption and rule by law, namely the creation and application 
of legislation in favour of the incumbent. 66 Under Kuchma blackmail and repression 
were part of the repertoire.67      
This toolbox indicates that formal institutions have in Ukraine a limited impact and 
are challenged or altered by informal institutions. The basic mechanisms are similar 
to the ones in Azerbaijan. Politics and economics are strongly interwoven in 
Ukraine. A number of oligarchs emerged from the process of privatisation. In order 
to stay in power an incumbent has to ensure the loyalty of the oligarchs through the 
distribution of economic and power incentives.68 In contrast to Azerbaijan the 
political and economic elites have always been fragmented and were competing.    
In his presidency Viktor Yushchenko managed to consolidate the competition 
between the oligarchs which ultimately inspired political competition.69 
Nevertheless, the interplay between economic and political players continued to 
predominantly shape the political processes. Core bodies of the polity had remained 
captured by economic interest groups. The parliament, Verkhovna Rada, for 
example served more the representation and influence of business elites than 
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functioning as an organ of representation for the people.70 The increase in political 
competition also paved the way for constitutional changes that reduced the 
presidential power. However, even Yushchenko has de facto never accepted these 
changes. His presidency was marked by severe power struggles between himself, 
the prime minister and the Verkhovna Rada.71 Informal practices remained 
dominant in Ukrainian politics. In the period 2010-2014 Yanukovich tried to reduce 
competition and to again centralise power in the hand of selected groups of 
economic elites.72 In the course of the Orange Revolution civil society actors have 
gained room for political participation. They have become a societal force which the 
incumbents have to factor in. However, biased media broadcast and dependence on 
financial resources makes them still strongly dependent on influential economic and 
political actors.  
The following regime features turned out to influence strongly the ruling elites 
policy towards regional organisations. The essence of the hybrid political regime in 
Ukraine is the intertwining of politics and economics which is managed by informal, 
thus, non-transparent processes. The incumbent is therefore strongly dependent on 
members of political and economic elite. Characteristic for Ukraine is strong 
competition between the various political and economic actors. The political leaders 
need to consider the demands of the wider society far more than in Azerbaijan. 
Ukraine can be described as a hybrid political regime with strong pluralism. 
This brief outline of the political regimes in Azerbaijan and Ukraine as it is discussed 
in the literature shall suffice for describing the societal background against which 
the ruling elites develop their regional policy and for justifying the use of the 
concept 'hybrid regime' for theoretically framing the regimes. The empirical 
chapters, but especially chapter 8 will based on primary data highlight how the 
above described mechanisms of rule are visible and impact the policy of the ruling 
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elites towards the CIS and GUAM. In order to introduce the reader to these two 
organisations, the next sections will provide a brief overview of the development 
and activities of the CIS and GUAM.  
1.5.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CIS 
The CIS was founded upon Russian initiative in 1991 by Belarus, Russia and 
Ukraine.73 In the following three years all former Soviet republics, except for the 
Baltic States, joined.74 However, the republics assume different qualities of 
membership. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are full members. In contrast, Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan are only associated states, since both states did not ratify the CIS 
charter in 1993.75 It is important to note that these legal nuances do not provide 
any constraints for the states’ participation in the CIS. In the period 1993-2009 
Georgia also belonged to the CIS.76 
The foundation of the CIS marked the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. This 
induces policy practitioners and analysts to dub the organisation an ‘instrument for 
the civilised divorce’ of the republics of the Soviet Union.77 Indeed, the CIS declared 
to aim at maintaining certain integrated Soviet structures. But it also announced 
from the very beginning to seek for more intensive integration.78 These intentions 
only partially materialised. The CIS was neither able to maintain the integrated 
market and defence structure as envisioned in the early documents nor to establish 
                                                          
73
 Russian Federation, Republic of Ukraine, Republic of Belarus, 8 December 1991, Soglashenie o 
sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Agreement on the Foundation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States]. 
74
 The thesis will always exclude the Baltic States when referring to the former Soviet republics, since 
the Baltic States from the very beginning distanced themselves from regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space.  
75
 CIS Council of Heads of States, 22 January 1993, Ustav Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv 
[Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States]. 
76
 After having left the organisation in 2009 Georgia is still party to several CIS agreements. CIS 
Council of Heads of States, 2 October 2009, Reshenie ob Uchastii Gruzii v Mezhdunarodnykh 
Dogovorakh i Resheniyakh Organov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Decision of Georgia's 
Participation in International Agreements and Decisions of CIS bodies] 2 October 2009. 
77
 Putin, Vladimir, 25 March 2005, Press Conference Following Russian-Armenian Talks  Solov’ev, E 
(2009), Faktor ’myagkoi sily’ v politike Rossiyskoi Federatsii na postsovetskom prostransve [Soft 
Power Factor of the Policy of the Russian Federation in the Post-Soviet Space]. Rossiya i Novye 
Gosudarstva, No. September 2009, p 2. 
78




institutions which would facilitate the declared integration. However, the 
organisation has enhanced its profile of sectoral activities in course of the last 22 
years. In 2012 it covered primarily various activities on trade and energy-security, 
projects concerning societal matters and education, non-traditional security 
challenges and, relatively weakly but nevertheless existent, military related areas.79 
Since 2007 the CIS members have expanded their agenda flexibly to deal with 
topical issues such as the global financial crisis.80 From the very beginning two 
diverging ambitions of the member states characterised the development of the 
organisation. Primarily Russia, but at times also Kazakhstan and Belarus have 
promoted integration, while most other states reject this idea. 
The organisational structure of the CIS mirrors these diverging ambitions. Due to 
repeated attempts of the above-named states to lure the CIS members into 
integration commitments and the widened range of activities, the organisational 
structure hypertrophied. It shall suffice to present only the core bodies and 
decision-making rules (Appendix 1 visualises the core structure and characteristics 
of the CIS). The Council of Heads of State, Council of Head of Governments, and the 
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs serve as core decision-making bodies. The 
highest organ is the first-named body, while the latter two are in charge of 
preparing and implementing the decisions of the Council of Heads of State.81 The 
Economic Council represents an attempt to pursue economic integration. It was 
founded in 2000 and originally envisioned as a supranational body, but never gained 
this status. Instead the council oversees the implementation of trade-related CIS 
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decisions.82 An Interparliamentary Assembly is set to advise the councils. About 68 
permanent and 14 temporary sectoral bodies (otraslye organy) represented in 2012 
the core sectoral activities of the CIS. They lack decision-making powers, but 
prepare the sector-specific work of the above-mentioned councils. Given their weak 
competences, studies on the CIS often neglect these sectoral bodies.83 According to 
the empirical findings of this thesis, however, the member states strongly value the 
activities in these bodies.  
When observing the CIS from a distance, its activities manifest themselves primarily 
in the approximately 1337 decisions that were in force in 2010.84 However, scholars 
estimate that about 90% of them exist merely on paper.85 This high number of 
inefficient agreements is facilitated by flexible participation options and weak 
enforcement structures. The so-called ‘multi-track and multi-speed principle’ 
permits flexible participation in CIS bodies and sectoral activities. The member 
states may opt to not sign an agreement, to withdraw from agreements or to join 
later.86 In addition, the states may sign agreements with reservations on specific 
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stipulations. To protect against negative externalities of treaties by means of such 
reservations is an international practice established in the Convention of Vienna. As 
Dragneva indicates, it is unusually excessively used within the CIS.87 The minority of 
CIS documents require domestic ratification.88 This makes it easier for the CIS 
members to adopt and put in force agreements, at least formally. Apart from these 
elements, the lack of significant implementation monitoring bodies triggers a 
volatile attitude of the member states when it comes to implementing CIS 
documents. Two bodies are in charge of arbitrage and conflict resolution. The 
economic court interprets agreements in case of conflict, if the affected parties 
agree to have the court involved. In any case, it has only recommending powers.89 
The final instance for conflict solutions is the Council of Heads of State, which being 
a political not a judicial body has little impact.90 Most strikingly, despite the 
agreements having little impact, the CIS has not stopped negotiating and adopting 
new potentially binding agreements. The case studies will provide some explanation 
as to why such agreements are nevertheless attractive. For the moment, this sub-
section will sketch the core parameters of the two sectoral activities that serve as 
within cases: trade and migration but also drug-trafficking related security matters.  
The CIS has always devoted much attention to trade issues, as the large share of 
trade-related documents in the legal acts corpus of 28% indicates.91 Since 2004, 
efforts to put core trade agreements into practice have increased.92 The most 
comprehensive tool for this since 2008 has been the ‘Strategy for the Economic 
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Development of the CIS until 2020’. The strategy is an umbrella document that co-
ordinates all CIS economic activities, a large part of which concern free trade. It 
stipulates general goals and co-ordinates working groups and action plans.93 A 
separate working body co-ordinates the implementation of the strategy. Its flagship 
project has been the new free trade agreement (FTA), which has been prepared by 
a special working group on expert level. It follows two previous but unsuccessful 
attempts. In 1994 most CIS member states adopted and ratified an FTA. Russia, the 
actual initiator of the document, opted out of ratification. Being the most important 
trade partner for the former Soviet republics, Russia’s defection stalled efforts to 
implement the agreement.94 Some five years later Russia again initiated the 
negotiation of an amending protocol to the FTA, which basically re-wrote the entire 
FTA text. The protocol shared the fate of the 1994 FTA. Russia’s third try in 2008 
finally resulted in an FTA adopted in 2011 and ratified by Russia in spring 2012. It 
became effective in 2012 for three of the eight signatories and for five more in 
2013.95 
Activities concerning drug-trafficking and migration are not concentrated in one 
significant agreement. Several bodies, including the Office for the Fight against 
Organised Crime, are in charge of anti-drug-trafficking activities. About 40 
documents define the broad lines of the priorities and programmes in this field. 
Most of them concern methods for measuring and combatting drug-trafficking, joint 
standards for inter alia customs controls. Some stipulate the development of model 
legislation concerning these issues.96 The CIS itself does not undertake joint anti-
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drug-trafficking operations, but some member states participate in operation 
‘Kanal’, which the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) organises 
annually.97 Since 2007 CIS migration activities have been co-ordinated by the 
Council of Heads of Migration agencies. While this body primarily discusses visa 
regulations and labour migration, in matters of irregular migration it receives 
support from various councils, including that of border guards and customs services. 
The CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre, which was founded in 1999, provides additional 
support, even though it primarily focuses on matters of international terrorism.98 
CIS migration activities concentrate on exchanging information, harmonising 
legislation, developing integrated monitoring instruments and establishing an 
integrated labour market.99 Chapters 6 and 7 in particular will discuss how 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine exploit the opportunities provided by these sectoral 
activities. 
1.5.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF GUAM 
The second organisation of interest to this study is the ‘Organisation for Democracy 
and Economic Development – GUAM’. It unites Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova with the proclaimed aim of enhancing regional security by intensified 
economic and security co-operation and integration. GUAM substantially 
distinguishes itself from the CIS in terms of organisational design and type of 
activities. As this sub-section will show, GUAM has a trim structure and produces far 
less multilateral legalised agreements. It, however, concentrates on the same issue 
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areas as the CIS with the exception of military activities. The diverging approaches 
to shared fields of activity render a comparison GUAM and the CIS intriguing. The 
comparison is also promising in terms of the insights provided into the types of 
activities which Ukraine and Azerbaijan prefer in a multilateral context in the post-
Soviet space. Both states significantly contributed to establishing the organisation. 
GUAM, hence, reflects an organisation in the spirit of Azerbaijan and Ukraine, while 
the CIS tells about how the states adjust to pre-defined structures. 
GUAM emerged at the sidelines of the OSCE review conference of the Treaty on 
Conventional Forces in Europe in 1996 with a security focus. The Azerbaijani 
delegate spontaneously persuaded the other former Soviet republics, which face 
existing or potential secessionist threats, to jointly express their concern over 
remaining Russian forces in the post-Soviet space.100 After several additional 
meetings Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine established GUAM as 
consultative forum (Konsul’tativnyi forum GUAM). In 2003 GUAM developed into a 
union (Ob”edinenie GUUAM101) with administrative structures and a charter. Only in 
2006 did the members establish the fully-fledged regional organisation with a new 
charter as it exists in 2013.102 GUAM elicited Uzbekistan’s interest as a forum of 
former Soviet republics not associated with any other security organisations.103 
Accordingly, Uzbekistan joined GUAM in the period 1999-2005.104 With its 
organisational structure GUAM also widened its activity profile.  
Already in the first years the member states extended GUAM’s fields of activity 
from matters of the secessionist conflicts to economic, other security and societal 
issues. In 2012 it covered trade, energy, tourism, technology, transport, education, 
organised crime, drug-trafficking, irregular migration, the illicit proliferation of 
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nuclear substances, emergency situations and international terrorism. GUAM 
declares that it approaches these matters with less orientation towards integration 
than the CIS. It seeks to establish an integrated free trade area and integrated 
instruments in its issue areas, but primarily intends to support the members in 
integrating into the more relevant European and Transatlantic structures.105 
However, until 2012 GUAM failed to position itself as link between the member 
states and the EU, NATO or similar organisations. Also, its achievements in terms of 
integrated measures in the defined issue-areas are still weak. But an increasingly 
sophisticated structure of sectoral bodies should improve GUAM’s performance.  
Similar to the CIS three councils constitute the decision-making structure. The 
Council of Heads of State functions as highest decision-making body. Second in the 
hierarchy is the Council of Foreign Ministers, which since 2009, after GUAM 
summits of Head of State stalled, has been the de facto leading body. Both councils 
are intergovernmental bodies that take decisions only by consensus. As a rule 
GUAM pursues only activities to which all four members agree. This principle is 
widely interpreted when it comes to GUAM agreements. Nearly half of the adopted 
agreements are treated as valid, even though they lack Moldova’s signature.106 The 
council of so-called ‘national co-ordinators’ prepares the work of these two bodies. 
In 2004 the GUAM Interparliamentary Assembly enhanced the organisational 
design. It consists, however, only of up to four members of parliament per country 
and does not carry much weight. The strongest drivers of GUAM are ten sectoral 
bodies. They lack decision-making competences, but specify and enhance the 
activity profile. The daily routines are managed by the GUAM secretariat in Kyiv, to 
which each country except Moldova delegates a representative.107  
GUAM’s activities themselves are not necessarily reflected in multilateral 
agreements. This makes an assessment of the organisations’ performance at a 
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distance difficult. About 25 agreements pave the way for the GUAM activities, but 
GUAM hardly adopts new and strongly legalised multilateral agreements. The 
existing GUAM agreements primarily indicate the parameters for developing 
activities in a specific issue-area. Accordingly, the organisation also lacks arbitrage 
and implementation monitoring mechanisms. Instead of agreements, GUAM 
engages in a number of joint operations in the spheres of security, joint transport 
and tourism projects. The activities usually start at a very practical level, are 
relatively small-scale and have little structural outreach. In the course of their 
development they may touch upon legal aspects, which are then ideally discussed 
at higher ministerial level. One of the few at least theoretically binding and precise 
agreements is the FTA adopted in 2002.108 Its implementation is as difficult as in the 
CIS, as the paragraph below will show. The GUAM FTA has been initiated in 2000, 
signed in 2003 and ratified by the last parties in 2005. 109 It legally entered into force 
for most GUAM states in 2003.110 Analysts argue that the FTA has from the very 
beginning ailed due to the members’ inertia regarding the adjustment of domestic 
legislation to the document.111 GUAM officials can indeed refer to a growing trade 
turnover between the GUAM countries after the FTA establishment in 2003.112 This, 
in the first place, is a correlation without much causal effect. At least policy 
practitioners, economic actors and analysts stated that in 2011 they had not seen 
any practical impact of the FTA.113 GUAM’s lack of arbitrage bodies is, according to 
staff from the GUAM secretariat, problematic for the implementation of the FTA. 
The secretariat therefore lobbies for establishing arbitrage mechanisms. Given the 
weak implementation of the FTA, GUAM has developed other projects that aim at 
converging member states economically. A larger project is the GUAM transport 
                                                          
108
 GUAM, Compilation of the GUAM Documents, 86-96. 
109
 Ukraine and Georgia discussed this option during a meeting in 2000. See: Newsline RFERL, 
Ukrainian Premier Visits Georgia. 7 August 2000; ibid. 
110
 As one of the basic documents for an efficient FTA a first version of the rules that identify the 
origin of goods and assess their eligibility for the preferential trade arrangements has been adopted 
in 2006. According to GUAM_Official_3, an up-dated version was pending in 2011. 
111
 Japaridze, Tedo (2008), The Organization for Democracy and Development - GUAM: A Road Map 
to Relevance?  . Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 51-52, p 82. 
112
 According to a GUAM document, the trade turnover between the GUAM states doubled from 
2063 to 4500 million US dollars in the period 2006-2011. See:  GUAM, 2012, Zona Svobodnoi 
Torgovly GUAM [Free Trade Zone GUAM]. 
113
 Except for GUAM_Official_1, GUAM_Official_3 and AZ_MFA_7 all interviewees who discussed the 
FTA agreed to this assessment.  
29 
 
corridor that envisions building a trade bridge between Asia and Europe.114 One of 
the early subprojects of this corridor has been the Odessa-Brody Pipeline for oil 
shipments. Ukraine built this pipeline in the late 1990s and strove to gain 
Azerbaijan’s commitment to fill the pipeline with oil shipped from Azerbaijan via 
Georgia to Odessa and from there to Poland.115 However, this project was cut from 
the GUAM agenda in 2003. In 2005 a proposal named ‘Trans-Danubian Energy and 
Transport Bridge’ was discussed in GUAM. The project was envisioned as the 
lynchpin of GUAM, since it was envisioned to accelerate realising the GUAM 
transport corridor.116 Due to the reluctance of Moldova to participate the concept 
was taken off the GUAM agenda.117 Ever since, GUAM has developed smaller 
projects. One of these is the GUAM ‘Tourproduct’ with the aim to foster tourism. It 
has little outreach, since it is not more than a tourist tour through all four countries 
designed by tourism companies from all GUAM states for foreign tourists. The 
project has, however, initiated the discussion of infra-structure, border transit and 
other legal aspects, which potentially impact the tourism landscape beyond this 
product. The GUAM activities in the second within-case, security matters, have a 
broader outreach but are similarly driven by practical interactions.  
GUAM’s flagship body, which co-ordinates security activities, is the GUAM Virtual 
Law Enforcement Centre (VLEC). Its portfolio includes combatting terrorism, drug- 
and human-trafficking and other forms of organised crime. VLEC was set up in 2002 
                                                          
114
 The transport corridor concept initially included an energy transport grid, including gas, oil and 
electricity transportation. 
115
 The pipeline has been built in 2002. Until 2004 Ukraine did not manage to find a hydrocarbon 
supplier. In 2004 after a contract with Russia was achieved the pipeline was used in inverse direction 
until 2012. In 2012 Azerbaijan started to supply the pipeline. See: Balmaceda, Margarita (2004), 
Ukraine's Persistent Energy Crisis. Problems of Post-Communism,Vo. 51, No. 4, p 40; Ukraine 
Reverses Odessa-Brody Pipeline Flow.  (2012), Oil and Gas Eurasia [Online]. 
116
 A core idea was to develop joint co-ordination and enhance the electricity power stations and 
grids in the GUAM countries to facilitate the export of electricity via GUAM to Europe and Asia. Rada 
Natsional'noi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy, 2006, Ekonomichnyi proekt GUAM 'Pridynaiskyi Energo-
Transportnyi Mist' Initsiativy Ukrainy [Economic Project GUAM the 'Trans-Danubian Energy- and 
Transport Bridge]. 
117
 The project would have involved the reactivation of a power plant in Moldova. Ukrainian 
representatives who attended negotiations on this project refer to the fact that most of the 
electricity infrastructure in Moldova is in the hands of the Russian Electric Power Company RAO UES. 
(UA_NSDC_2) To the disappointment of an interviewee who had been strongly involved in the 
formulation of this concept, only few parts of it had been realised; none of it in the framework of 
GUAM. (UA_Analyst_3)  
30 
 
in collaboration with the US.118 VLEC provides the opportunity to share information 
and jointly engage in law enforcement operations.119 Since 2009 the GUAM states 
have agreed to install devices for cryptographic protection that allow the exchange 
of ‘top secret’ intelligence data. In 2011 all legal barriers were resolved and the 
states waited for the equipment.120 VLEC itself provides the opportunity to share 
information and jointly engage in law enforcement operations. Specific working 
groups manage the activities related to drug-trafficking and irregular migration. 
They prepare and evaluate the annual GUAM operations ‘Perekhvat’ on human-
trafficking and ‘Nakostop’ on drug-trafficking.121 An additional security-related 
activity is worth mentioning as it is relevant for Azerbaijan. GUAM tried to increase 
international awareness of secessionist conflict in the GUAM states through 
speeches and submitting draft resolutions to the UN General Assembly. A draft 
resolution submitted in 2006 has not been adopted yet, but due to efforts of the 
GUAM members was still under discussion in 2012.122 The GUAM states prepared a 
new resolution in 2011 but did not submit it, since Ukraine withdrew its support.123 
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 After the September 11 terrorist attacks, when GUAM put the fight against international 
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Armenia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General. 
123
 AZ_MFA_2 reported in 2011 that Georgia suggested a GUAM draft resolution on the situation in 
Georgia after the war with Russia in 2009. Azerbaijan has been relatively open towards the 
31 
 
Appendix 2 provides an overview of the structure and development of GUAM. Some 
reflections on the data collection and analysis methods in the following section will 
complete the discussion of the empirical study.  
1.6. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS METHODS 
Main data for this study were collected in the period 2010-2012. The thesis covers 
developments from the countries’ independence in 1991 to 2012 in so far as it 
contributes to enhancing the picture and data are available.  
The empirical findings build strongly on qualitative data collected by field research 
in the case countries. These are primarily data from qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with state officials involved in CIS or GUAM matters, but also policy 
analysts and private economic actors. The study focussed on these three groups of 
interviewees, since they provide different and often competing perspectives. The 
different perspectives facilitated a critical evaluation of the validity of the interview 
narrative. Data acquisition took place during two research stays in each country 
between 2010 and 2012. During a stay of eight weeks in each country 40 interviews 
were conducted in Ukraine and 34 in Azerbaijan. Additional data include documents 
of the states or regional organisations and articles from Azerbaijani, Ukrainian and 
Russian newspapers. In addition, the study uses quantitative economic data from 
the UN comtrade data base124 as background to the within-case on free trade 
matters. The data analysis followed principles steps of the Grounded Theory 
research procedure.125 The qualitative data analysis software NVIVO facilitated a 
systematic, reproducible and therefore controllable interpretation of the data.  
1.7. THESIS OUTLINE 
The following paragraphs will explain how the individual chapters will present the 
above summarised analytical approach and the findings of the empirical study. They 
will provide an overview of the content and core argument of each chapter. The 
thesis is structured in three parts. Chapters 1-4 will detail the analytical approach by 
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outlining how the research may enhance the existing literature, by developing the 
guiding theoretical assumption accordingly and, finally, by identifying the 
methodological tools. In the second part, four empirical chapters will present the 
findings on how policy-makers in Azerbaijan and Ukraine conceptualise the function 
of the CIS and GUAM and whence these conceptualisations originate. Each chapter 
will devote attention of one of the in section 1.2 outlined dimensions that 
constitute the conceptualisation of the function. Chapter 5 will analyse the ultimate 
goals, chapter 6 the intermediary goals, chapter 7 the instruments and chapter 8 
the impact of foreign policy-making and implementation practices. The third part, 
chapter 9, will link the theoretical reasoning and empirical findings and spell out the 
research results in more abstract terms. The objective thereby is to make the 
findings accessible to future research on the function of regional organisations in 
the post-Soviet space and beyond. It is the overall aim of the analysis to highlight 
the commonalities and differences in how policy-makers from Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine conceptualise the function of the CIS and GUAM. To this end the thesis 
does not present the studies on Azerbaijan and Ukraine independently, but rather 
compares the results for the individual dimensions discussed in the empirical 
chapters.  
Chapter two reviews how different strands of the literature discuss the functions of 
regional organisations. The chapter takes the literature on old and new regionalism 
and case studies on regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and other areas 
of the work into consideration. The chapter identifies the analytical focus and the 
research gap to which the thesis intends to contribute. The thesis aims at 
understanding the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. 
Expanding the knowledge supports not only the research on the post-Soviet space 
but also on comparative regionalism. It suggests an empirical study of how policy-
makers in the former Soviet republics conceptualise the function of the 
organisations, including their proposed policy instruments. 
Chapter three narrows the previously defined analytical perspective down into the 
analytical framework of this thesis. It defines the core theoretical concepts 
employed in the thesis. The chapter also develops a heuristic tool for studying 
33 
 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet area. It draws on an amalgam of 
theoretical approaches including concepts of sovereignty, neo-institutionalist 
assumptions and theories which focus on domestic and foreign policymaking in 
non-democratic states. Outlining the analytical framework will facilitate the reading 
of the empirical chapters and pave the way for the translation of the empirical 
results into abstract theoretical terms. 
Chapter four explains the empirical research design for studying the research 
questions. The aim is to make transparent the criteria informing the empirical 
design and the proceedings shaping data interpretation. This should enable the 
reader to adequately evaluate the quality of the research data. It presents the 
empirical design as an explorative case study building on a qualitative coding and a 
re-constructive analysis of expert interviews, which are triangulated by 
governmental documents and economic data.126  
Chapter five makes an initial step in the analysis of the function of the CIS and 
GUAM by spelling out which ultimate goals policy-makers pursue in the CIS and 
GUAM. Empirically the ultimate goals are derived from the aims the policy-makers 
associate with the general membership in both organisations. The analysis argues 
that the states’ involvement in the regional organisations serves the consolidation 
of independent statehood: namely, the consolidation of what Stephen Krasner calls 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. Ukraine, to a greater extent than 
Azerbaijan, seeks to also consolidate control over cross-border flows. To this end 
both countries intend to re-organise and reduce persisting unfavourable 
dependencies and to create new favourable dependencies on the part of other 
former Soviet republics on Azerbaijan or Ukraine respectively.  
Chapter six spells out which intermediary goals policy-makers pursue in the sectoral 
activities for advancing the ultimate goals identified in chapter five. A minor aim, 
especially relevant in Ukraine, is to maintain stable structures for exchange and co-
operation in economic and security matters that affect domestic stability. More 
relevant is the ambition to improve leverage in the post-Soviet area. The third aim is 
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Oaks: Sage Publications, p 40. 
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strengthening the country’s position in the international community. Finally, actors 
from both states intend to keep the CIS and GUAM alive in order to achieve aims 
two and three.  
Chapter seven identifies the types of activities instruments which policy 
practitioners in Azerbaijan and Ukraine prefer in CIS and GUAM. It discusses how 
strongly these activities build on multilaterally co-ordinated actions. The chapter 
argues activities are preferred that build on weak or temporary multilateral co-
ordination. Ukraine, more than Azerbaijan intends to build durable structure for 
regional interaction that can temporarily be activated. Activities that require 
permanent co-ordination are avoided. Overall the states opt for activities that 
increase the states’ capacity to independently respond to domestic and 
transnational challenges but avoid intensive multilateral co-operation.  
Chapter eight highlights how established foreign policy practices in the case 
countries lead to the approaches to CIS and GUAM analysed in chapters five to 
seven. Policy-making processes in Azerbaijan and Ukraine as well as common 
practices to regulate security and economic interaction between former Soviet 
republics receive attention. The analysis reveals that policy-making processes in 
Azerbaijan allow policymakers to maintain active membership in regional 
organisations and not to aim for multilateral solutions to shared transnational 
challenges. In the case of Ukraine, multilateral solutions are supported by a higher 
number of officials. But due to inefficient policy co-ordination they cannot 
sufficiently exploit the potential of some multilateral instruments. However, also in 
Ukraine most multilateral practices do not comply with the needs of the 
policymakers.  
The concluding chapter nine synthesises the findings of chapter four to eight into 
an abstract frame of the conceptualisation of the function of regional organisations 
in the post-Soviet space. It suggests that the empirical findings may inform the 
heuristics of future studies on regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and 
other non-democratic environments. The chapter argues that the analytical tools 
may improve on-spot analyses of developments in regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space. They also facilitate a systematic exploration of the nexus 
35 
 
between the varying concepts of regional organisations and domestic political 
regimes.  However, it argues that further research on regional organisations in the 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW: VARYING FUNCTIONS OF REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
This chapter introduces the literature on regional organisations in different parts of 
the world, and specifically in the post-Soviet space. It highlights how this thesis 
intends to contribute to the debate. It is argued that the thesis will provide 
knowledge on the function and mechanisms of regional organisations in an area of 
the world that is understudied in this regard. This knowledge will sharpen 
understanding of regional similarities and differences in the global phenomenon of 
‘regional organisations’ and will advance assumptions about the potential global 
impact of regional organisations. The chapter will outline the research gap upon 
which the thesis focuses by discussing the insights and shortcomings of three 
debates.  
The chapter consists of two sections. The first section will reflect on the questions 
driving the general study of regional organisations in order to pin-point the 
relevance of the research interest. It will be argued that in academia and policy 
circles the prevailing discussion of regional organisations as global governance 
players calls for research into the varying functions of regional organisations. The 
second section will examine how contributions to the old and new regionalism 
debate, as well as case studies on regional organisations inform the analytical focus 
of this thesis. The thesis will be presented as a contribution to the comparative 
regionalism debate on the function of regional organisations and its nexus with the 
domestic environment in the member states. The focus draws on consideration of 
the impact of the domestic environment of the member states given by authors of 
the old and new regionalisms and on insights into the diversity of functions of 
regional organisations provided by case studies on regional organisations. Especially 
stimulating are studies on regional organisations in South-East Asia, Latin America 
and Africa. The third section devotes attention to the literature on regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space. It will highlight the intention to add to this 
strand of the literature by turning attention from integration to the search of 
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alternative functions of these organisations. A concluding section will summarise 
how the thesis intends to contribute to the mentioned strands of literature.  
2.1. REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
This subsection argues that studies, like this thesis, on the varying function of 
regional organisations in specific areas of the world constitute a relevant 
contribution to the discussion of the global role of regional organisations. This claim 
draws on the gap between the normative assumptions that drive the debate and 
the empirical evidence given on the function of regional organisations. Both the 
integration theories of the ‘old regionalism’ and contributions to the ‘new 
regionalism’ literature promote the vision of regional organisations as regional and 
global governance actors.1 However, empirical studies on individual regional 
organisations have highlighted that hardly any of them managed to assume 
significant regional governance functions as, for instance, the EU has done. In this 
light, the thesis argues that the normative assumptions which pervade both 
academic and policy discourses require an adjustment to the actual function and 
capacity of the regional organisations. Analyses of the de facto functions of the 
regional organisations will produce a more valid picture.  
Different strands of the literature on regional organisations share the basic 
normative assumption that regional organisations produce stabilising effects for the 
member states and the regions concerned.2 The arguments invoke four 
mechanisms. Neo-realism explains regional organisations as protection from and 
bandwagoning with hegemonic powers.3 Functionalist scholars promoted the 
development of regional organisations after the Second World War as means to 
enhance peace between states.4 They argue that increasing global economic 
linkages require regional responses. Succeeding approaches such as neo-
                                                          
1
 The term governance denotes authority structures and processes that regulate how power is 
exerted and decisions are made in a given society. It may refer to the national, regional and global 
level. Chapter 3.3.4 gives a precise definition of the term.  
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 According to Rick Fawn, Robert Gilpin also identified malevolent forms of regionalism that would 
contribute to economic decline and encourage conflict. This variety of regionalism has never been 
strongly considered in the debate on regional organisations. See: Fawn, Rick (2009), ‘Regions’ and 
Their Study: Wherefrom, What for and Whereto? Review of International Studies, No. 35, p 18. 
3
 The theory assumes that no deep integration is possible under these conditions. Waltz, Kenneth 
(1979), Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House, pp. 126-28. 
4
 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 101. 
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functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and ‘new regionalism’ preserved and 
enhanced this assumption.5 Inspired by progressive globalisation6 these approaches 
emphasised that security aspects, the so-called ‘non-traditional security challenges’, 
also require regional co-operation and integration.7 They depict the turn of nation 
states to regional multilateral organisations rather as a maxim than as an option for 
the solution of fundamental governance matters.8 In particular, authors explain the 
third wave of regionalism after 1985, from which e.g. MECORSUR, APEC and the CIS 
emerged, in terms of the pressure of globalisation.9 Besides the accelerating 
processes of globalisation, the erosion of the bipolar power-structure of the 
international system after the Cold War led scholars like Barry Buzan and Ole 
Wæver to assume that regional units will increasingly determine the international 
arena.10 Their call to consider not only states but also regional organisations in 
matters of international security has strongly informed the academic debate.11  
The vision of regional organisations which interact internationally and shape world 
politics also shapes policy debates. The UN, for example, is a vivid proponent of 
strengthened co-operation between regional organisations, especially in matters of 
global security governance.12 The EU also promotes regional co-operation in its 
foreign policy. EU-related research therefore investigates its capacity to promote 
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regional organisations abroad.13 Like other regional organisations, GUAM, the CIS 
and the CSTO have incorporated the notion of regional organisations as global 
players in their rhetoric. They refer to the relevance of regional organisations for 
global governance in order to increase their international recognition.14 
The postulation at the root of this academic and political approach is a global shift 
towards ‘post-Westphalian governance patterns’.15 A glance at the regional 
organisations in different regions of the world, however, casts doubt on the validity 
of this postulation. In 2012 the EU is still the sole regional organisation to which 
member states have substantially transferred sovereignty. EU and NAFTA are the 
only regional organisations that assume comprehensive tasks of regional 
governance in economic and social regards.16 Hardly any regional organisation is as 
capable of serious regional security governance as NATO.17 This observation leads 
scholars to re-consider ‘what is the outcome of regionalism [including regional 
organisations] in the individual parts of the world’?18 This question indicates that it 
is necessary to improve knowledge about the actual function of the individual 
regional organisations in order to evaluate the potential of global governance 
through regional organisations. 
This puts the comparative study of the various regional organisations on the 
research agenda. In recent years, strong contributions have been made with regard 
to most areas of the world. The post-Soviet area is, however, hardly considered. It is 
                                                          
13
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documents is limited. See for instance: Cowell, Frederik (2011), The Impact of the ECOWAS Protocol 
on Good Governance and Democracy. African Journal of International and Comparative Law,Vo. 19, 
No. 2, p 341.  
18
 Börzel, Comparative Regionalism. A New Research Agenda, 5. 
40 
 
important to close this gap for two key reasons: First, about five regional 
organisations have existed in the post-Soviet space for a decade and more. These 
regional organisations picked up the organisational design of regional organisations 
in other regions of the world, but the intra-organisational processes distinguish 
them from these. So far little knowledge exists about the function of these intra-
organisational processes. Studying their specifics will contribute to the knowledge 
of varieties of regional organisations. Second, the organisations, especially the CSTO 
and GUAM, strive to intensify their interaction with other regional organisations in 
the UN framework or with NATO.19 An adequate assessment of the prospects and 
effects of such collaboration requires a sound knowledge about these organisations’ 
capacity. The comparative regionalism research provides inspiring assumptions for 
this research but is also marked by some shortcomings. The following section will 
outline which assumptions from this debate will guide the research and which gaps 
in the debate this thesis will focus on.  
2.2. INSIGHTS FROM COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM 
This section argues that the combination of the so-called old and new regionalism 
literature in the comparative debate is fruitful for the analysis of regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space. Its theories are not comprehensively 
applicable to the post-Soviet space, since they build on premises that do not 
resemble the developments in this space. Nevertheless, the comparative 
perspective offers some explanatory factors and a change of perspective concerning 
the organisations’ function. One is encouraged to reconsider existing 
interpretations of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and to enhance 
the comparative literature in the following ways. First of all, comparative 
regionalism emphasises the contingency of form and function of regional 
organisations on the societal characteristics of the member states. Secondly, it 
suggests considering other intentions besides integration, if the member states do 
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not cede sovereignty to supranational bodies and institutions.20 Thirdly, it 
challenges the paradigm of the welfare and security of the societies as the driving 
factors behind engagement in regional formats by pointing to the precedence of the 
survival of the ruling elite in non-democratic regimes. This thesis intends to advance 
the comparative regionalism literature in two regards. It will shed light on a 
geographic blank spot in the debate. Further, it intends to help unveiling the still 
weakly studied impact of the domestic environment of states on their 
conceptualisation of the function of regional organisations. The post-Soviet space 
promises insights into the role of sovereignty concepts for the engagement of non-
democratic states in regional organisations, since the regional organisations are 
built by states that only gained full sovereignty in 1991. It will also suggest some 
rationales behind an instrument that occurs in different world regions, namely 
‘spaghetti-bowl agreements’. The next two sub-sections will outline how old and 
new regionalism as well as case studies on regional organisations provide some 
guidance for the analytical focus of the thesis.  
2.2.1. GUIDANCE FROM OLD REGIONALISM  
The theories of the old regionalism developed with regard to the first wave of 
regionalism share the emphasis on regional integration as a long-term end and core 
mechanism of regional organisations. The strand comprises constructivist, 
functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches. As this section will highlight, 
their definition of integration is not applicable to the post-Soviet space, but their 
discussion on the driving and hampering factors of integration can inform the 
analytical focus of this thesis. Functionalist and intergovernmentalist theories in 
particular promote a concept of integration that builds on the states’ adherence to 
legalised multilateral institutions agreed in regional organisations.21 The thesis uses 
the term ‘legalised multilateral institutions’ to describe multilaterally agreed and 
formalised rules often of binding character that in many cases include mechanisms 
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 In this thesis institutions are depicted with reference to Douglass North as written and non-written 
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  Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 114-21. 
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to monitor and enforce their application and indeed determine the interaction 
between the signatories.22 According to Ernst Haas, the father of neo-functionalism, 
integration is achieved if national political actors ‘shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over pre-existing nation states.’23 Scholars agree that the 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space have so far not achieved a degree of 
interaction that resembles integration.24 While in most of these organisations it is a 
common practice to adopt multilateral legalised rules, these rules have hardly 
become institutions in the interaction between the signatories.25 None of the 
former Soviet republics has so far de facto ceded sovereignty to any of these 
regional organisations. Thus, the concept of integration is not applicable to the 
post-Soviet space, even though the term is often used when analysing regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space.26 Nevertheless, constructivist, functionalist 
and intergovernmentalist approaches offer some assumptions that are insightful for 
the study of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space as the following 
paragraph will show. 
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Constructivist approaches depict the emergence of a ‘security community’ as an 
effect of regional organisations.27 Karl Deutsch interprets interactions in regional 
organisations as ideally creating a shared sense of community, which ensures the 
absence of warfare in conflict situations. Both he and Emanuel Adler argue that a 
security community can be formed not only via legalised multilateral institutions 
but also by informal institutions that intensify the societal ties and collaboration 
between members of a regional organisation.28 This assumption guides this thesis 
to explore the effects of non-formalised practices within the regional organisations 
under study, since they lack legalised institutions.  
In the concept of functionalism David Mitrany introduces the idea of a spill-over 
from intensified interaction and co-operation between the member states to 
integration and from integration in some issues areas to integration in others.29 
From the point of view of this thesis, this assumption poses the question of why 
interaction within the regional organisations in the post-Soviet space does not 
produce any spill-over effects towards integration or other forms of collective 
solutions to shared problems. Arguments of neo-functionalism and 
intergovernmentalism suggest which factors might fruitfully be explored in the 
search for answers. All three approaches discuss aspects of the domestic politics of 
the member states as a potential obstacle or driver of interactions in organisations. 
The realist intergovernmentalism developed by Stanley Hoffmann argues that the 
readiness of member states to cede sovereignty to regional organisations is 
decisive. Due to the fact that the transfer of power to regional organisations erodes 
the nation state, a state would prefer diversity instead of integration.30 Hoffmann 
identifies national consciousness, the social and political system of a state and 
nationalist ideology as constraints to integration.31 Accordingly, concepts of 
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sovereignty may provide insights into how states conceptualise the function of 
regional organisations. In his neo-functionalist contributions Ernst Haas asks if the 
potentially established institutions in the regional organisation provide states with 
new conflict resolution instruments, since these may convince them to cede 
sovereignty to the regional organisations.32 By a similar token Andrew Moravcsik’s 
liberal intergovernmentalism pays attention to the preferences of national policy-
makers regarding the result of interactions in regional organisations. The costs and 
benefits of existing regional interdependencies strongly determine the national 
preferences.33  
In a nutshell, when leaving the integration-paradigm of the old regionalism aside 
the theories may inform the thesis in four regards: first, to focus not entirely on 
legalised multilateral institutions; second, to inquire about the potential capacity 
and constraints of the negotiated legalised multilateral rules for the member states; 
third, to explore the impact of the sovereignty considerations of the member states 
against the background of existing interdependencies; and, fourth, to ask why the 
interactions in the regional organisations do not lead to any spill-over in terms of 
collective solutions. To further narrow down the research focus the thesis, as the 
next subsection will show, consulted the new regionalism literature and explorative 
case studies on various regional organisations.  
2.2.2.  NEW AND COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM  
In the wake of globalisation and the emergence of regional organisations in the 
1980s, which hardly achieved integration, scholars re-interpreted the form and 
function of regionalism. The new regionalism literature promoted two assumptions 
that are insightful for this thesis. First, the school acknowledges the diversity of 
formats, structures and models of regionalism.34 Regional interaction is rather 
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vaguely conceived as the ‘tendency and political commitment to organise the world 
in terms of regions’.35 Secondly, the new regionalism argues that the function of 
regional organisations is wider than integration, and suggests a variety of at least 
two functions, namely to protect states against the negative consequences of these 
processes or to fuel integration into global processes, e.g. by improving the 
international competitiveness of domestic firms.36 However, the new regionalism 
argues that the erosion of the nation state through globalisation processes render 
finding collective regional solutions a must for nation states.37 While the 
assumption of varying functions of regional organisations provides some guidance 
for the study of the post-Soviet space, the assumption that the function is inevitably 
driven by the need to find collective solutions is less helpful. The CIS, GUAM, 
EurAsEC, the CSTO and the CU have matters provoked by globalisation processes on 
their agenda, but so far only the CU has produced some collective solutions.38 
Accordingly, the causational nexus from globalisation pressure to the states’ 
readiness for collective solutions is apparently less direct than the new regionalism 
debate initially assumed. By the same token, scholars who studied regional 
organisations in Latin America and South East Asia have criticised the new 
regionalism.39  
The observed gap between the assumed function of regional organisations and the 
empirically observable results of these organisations induced scholars of 
regionalism to call research on comparative regionalism. Region-specific studies will 
highlight the varieties of regionalism more precisely.40 Alex Warleigh-Lack and Ben 
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Rosamond call for lifting the divide between integration theories and new 
regionalism in search of a generalizable theory.41 Authors suggest various analytical 
categories for the study of regional organisations. The following two categories are 
understudied and hence of most interest to this thesis42: first, the identification of 
the ‘functionality’, which inquires for aims and mechanisms of the processes within 
regional organisations.43 Secondly, the impact of the domestic context on the 
state’s behaviour in regional organisations deserves more attention. Scholars 
demand a more systematic study of the functionality and theory-guided approaches 
on the interplay between the domestic and international environment.44 So far the 
post-Soviet space is particularly underrepresented in the debate. In particular, 
original empirical studies that would have the capacity to inform the debate are 
rare.45  
In this light the thesis is committed to exploring the function of regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space and investigating its domestic origins. 
Accordingly, the thesis places itself within the recent comparative regionalism 
debate and aims to gain more guiding insights from case studies on regional 
organisations in South-East Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Organisations 
from these regions of the world provide a good case for comparison, since their 
characteristics are similar to that of organisations in the post-Soviet space. 
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) also survived several decades without integration through legalised 
multilateral institutions and are still relatively active.46 Despite the similar weakness 
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of multilateral legalised rules some organisations, MERCOSUR for instance, strongly 
commit to the negotiation and adoption of such rules, as the CIS, EurAsEC or the 
CSTO do.47 Other organisations reduce this practice to a minimum, as GUAM does. 
Examples are the SCO, the OIC or ASEAN.48 A frequently invoked concern of scholars 
working on the post-Soviet space is that the organisations produce agreements that 
overlap with previous multilateral agreements, agreements adopted in other 
regional organisations or with bilateral agreements. Authors see this overlap as a 
core source of the weakness of such multilateral legalised rules.49 This resonates 
with observations in the above mentioned regions. Scholars have mainstreamed the 
term ‘spaghetti-bowl agreements’ for African organisations especially to stress the 
high number of competing and overlapping treaties.50 The security agreements of 
ASEAN are overlapping and weakly enforced.51 The pervasiveness of this 
phenomenon demands an explanation. The thesis intends to contribute with some 
insights on the function of this practice.  
The similarities described do not only raise the above mentioned sub-question for 
the research, but also deliver potential answers to the function of the interaction 
within regional organisations. First of all, ASEAN experts in particular have picked up 
an idea that has already been voiced by early constructivist approaches; namely to 
explore the non-formalised dimension of interactions. Most explicitly ASEAN 
promotes its own model of non-formalised co-operation, dubbed the ‘ASEAN-Way’. 
The term stands for ‘informality, organisations minimalism […] and intensive 
consultations […].52 Apart from that, some authors propose an alternative 
understanding of the function of regional organisations. Helene Nesadurai and 
David Arase, for instance, see ASEAN as a body for the defence of domestic 
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sovereignty.53 ASEAN offers the possibility to find solutions to conflict issues and to 
minimise military conflict in the region. In addition, Arase argues that the survival of 
the political regimes in the ASEAN countries requires a certain degree of economic 
welfare. States try to improve economic welfare via interactions in ASEAN.54 
Stephen Aris interprets the SCO as a mechanism to empower the domestic and 
foreign policy of the Central Asian states. It enables the reduction of bilateral 
tensions and fosters economic development.55 According to Edmund Herzig, Iran’s 
engagement in regional organisations is a chance to ideationally influence the other 
members.56 These interpretations offer valuable guidance for this thesis. They 
underline the utility of deducting the member states’ conceptualisation of the 
function of regional organisations, including their choice of instruments, from the 
ruling elites’ perception of domestic needs. Factors that have been presented as 
decisive by representatives of the old regionalism also play a decisive role in the 
above presented interpretations. Sovereignty concerns are for instance a crucial 
factor that decisively influences the states’ proneness to the idea of integration and 
their alternative interpretation of the functions of regional organisations. Also, the 
choice of instruments strongly depends on the preferences of the ruling elites in 
their specific domestic environment. The intention to enhance the welfare of the 
domestic society via regional organisations, as was promoted by the old 
regionalism, may well be part of the ruling elites’ agenda. However, the appropriate 
instrument is not necessarily integration. Finally, the comparative perspective 
shows that the function of both formalised practices such as the adoption of 
multilateral legalised rules and non-formalised practices should be investigated to 
grasp the relevant instruments offered by the organisations.  
As mentioned above, leading scholars of regionalism search for a comprehensive 
framework to explain the diversity. In order to further this aim the existing 
literature requires a more systematic analysis of the varying function of regional 
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organisations and the origins of the specific conceptualisations. So far the literature 
provides some suggestions but no framework that gives evidence about the 
underlying causal relations or conditioning factors and would therefore enable the 
application of the insights gained for one organisation in the study of other 
organisations. The link between sovereignty and the conceptualisation of regional 
organisations deserves more attention. Also, none of the contributions intensively 
engages with the actual instruments offered by the regional organisations to pursue 
particular aims, such as the defence of sovereignty. This thesis intends to contribute 
with insights on these aspects to the comparative regionalism debate. On the way 
to formulating a precise analytical focus, the next section shall discuss what 
arguments the literature on regional organisations in the post-Soviet space could 
contribute.  
2.3. STUDIES OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET 
SPACE 
Regional organisations are common phenomena in the post-Soviet space. About ten 
regional organisations emerged after 1991 of which the CIS, EurAsEC, CSTO and 
GUAM proved relatively durable. A new Customs Union emerged in 2010 and a 
Eurasian Union is planned in 2015. Nevertheless, studies of these organisations 
have, as already mentioned, hardly informed the comparative regionalism debate. 
In two sub-sections this section will discuss the origins of this underrepresentation 
and highlight what change of perspective the thesis may contribute to the debate 
on regional organisations as oriented towards the post-Soviet space. The first 
section presents the scant attention paid to the post-Soviet space as a reaction to 
how scholars framed these organisations. The majority of authors describe regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space as dysfunctional. The tendency to deem 
these regional organisations as a failure is in turn a consequence of the authors’ 
strong orientation towards old regionalism and a neglect of insights from 
comparative case studies. The second sub-section will highlight that only a few 
authors discuss an alternative explanation for the function of the regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space. Overall, the section will highlight that the 
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existing literature provides little explanation for why the allegedly dysfunctional 
organisations still survive and are even relatively active.  
2.3.1. THE PREVAILING INTERPRETATION: FAILED INTEGRATION 
Alexander Nikitin dubs regionalism in the post-Soviet space as an ‘alphabet soup’ to 
suggest that it is not more than an accumulation of multiple acronyms.57 His 
framing rests strongly on the observation that the CIS, EurAsEC, the CSTO, GUAM 
and the many other organisations that emerged between 1991 and 201258 all 
claimed to promote integration but failed to achieve it. As argued in section 2.1 
scholars of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space widely agree that none of 
the organisations had until 2012 produced substantial integration. They draw their 
convincing conclusion on the following characteristics which the regional 
organisations share.  
The organisations that have emerged in the post-Soviet space until 2012 are similar 
in their structures and in their declared integration aims. This applies especially to 
the CIS economic format, the SES of 2002, EurAsEC and the CU.59 The structure of 
GUAM differs, but the organisation also declared the intention of pursuing 
economic integration, though not beyond a free trade area.60 Except for GUAM and 
the CSTO all organisations intensively engage in the negotiation and adoption of 
multilateral agreements. The CIS for instance has adopted several hundreds of trade 
agreements, of which at least 90% exist merely on paper.61 The same applies to the 
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many EurAsEC and the fewer GUAM and CSTO agreements. None of the 
organisations have managed to establish multilateral legalised institutions. Some 
authors argue that the CU has some first achievements in this regard. Others argue 
that the limited economic effect which the CU has shown in 2012 primarily relies on 
bilateral concessions made by Russia and only weakly on the adopted multilateral 
legalised regulations.62 It is, in any case, too early to evaluate the degree to which 
the multilateral legalised rules of the CU indeed have produced integration. In line 
with their weak integration progress none of the organisations has set up 
supranational bodies. Prior to the creation of the CU in 2012, the CIS and EurAsEC 
were the only organisations with developed some rules of supranational character. 
Supranational institutions had, however, not been established in any of the regional 
organisations by 2012.63 The legal framework of the organisations, especially the 
CIS, is marked by ‘softly legalised’, namely weakly binding, mechanisms. In addition, 
a powerful conflict solution and arbitrage body is absent in all regional 
organisations.64 Inter-state relations in the post-Soviet space are also marked by the 
coexistence of bilateral and multilateral agreements which often overlap and 
compete.65 In addition, multilateral agreements in the individual regional 
organisations tend to cover similar issues. This creates a ‘spaghetti-bowl’ of 
agreements. Generally, analysts share the opinion that primarily bilateral, not 
multilateral, agreements have weight. In a nutshell, regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space have established organisation bodies, adopt formal multilateral 
agreements and nominally engage in harmonisation of law and integration without 
achieving tangible integration. These observations hardly allow for any other 
conclusion than recognising the absence of integration via these organisations.  
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Nevertheless, some authors with an academic background in Russia are eager to 
cast the organisations in a better light by identifying some integration progress. 
Tatyana Valovaya, for example, draws a picture of successful deep integration in the 
post-Soviet space on various levels. While the CIS is, in her eyes, at the first 
integration stage, namely the efficient free trade area, EurAsEC and the Customs 
Union have successfully moved to deeper integration.66 Given her professional role 
in the Eurasian Economic Commission, her article is more a political statement than 
a research contribution and fails to give evidence of the integration success. 
Denisov also stresses the relevance and strength of CIS integration.67 Others are 
more cautious. They admit the current weakness of the CIS, but stress the 
integration potential and its added value to the former Soviet republics.68 In support 
of Russia’s political efforts to institutionalise co-operation between the CSTO and 
NATO a number of authors emphasised the viability of the CSTO in the region, albeit 
without supplying much convincing evidence.69 
The majority of analysts, however, take the above described dynamics of the CIS, 
EurAsEC, CSTO and GUAM as evidence of these organisations’ failure. They often 
depict the CIS directly or indirectly as defunct, or as a presidential club or paper 
organisation.70 The CIS is ‘an attempt of economic and political integration, but […] 
does not reach much development in regional co-operation’.71 Some authors admit 
that the CIS has been effective in ‘facilitating the managed disintegration of the 
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USSR’, but not in ‘providing a viable framework for (re)integration’.72 Only a few 
authors name concrete CIS achievements during the disintegration, though. One is 
the continuation of the transnational service infrastructure like pensions 
regulations.73 However, these are in 2012 de facto not regulated on multilateral 
basis. Mark Webber and Richard Sakwa also stress that the solution of disputes 
concerning the Soviet nuclear weapons can ‘in part be accounted for by a process of 
multilateral diplomacy within the CIS.’74 Accordingly, analysts assumed that the CIS 
seen as a ‘mechanism for civilised divorce’75 would vanish, in particular with the 
emergence of GUAM, the Single Economic Space, the Central Asian Cooperation 
Organisation, the CSTO and EurAsEC in the late 1990s.76 With similar reasoning 
authors describe co-operation in GUAM, CSTO and the other formats basically as a 
failure.77 Libman and Vinokurov interpret GUAM as held together by a few shared 
problems rather than long-term co-operation objectives and forecast a rather 
unpromising development.78 Already in the early 2000s scholars saw GUAM as a 
non-starter with weak integration prospects.79 Since the political visibility of GUAM 
decreased, the organisation is hardly a topic in the literature.80 Examples of the 
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CSTO literature indicate that it is evaluated similarly. The CSTO has ‘failed to 
develop into a collective security organisation with a multilateral character’.81 Carol 
Saivetz argues that the CSTO still searches for a role.82 
These assessments mirror the integration results of the regional organisations 
under study very well. If their function is integration they have failed. However, 
when framing these organisations as dysfunctional or dead the literature did not 
consider a crucial empirical observation. All of the organisations turned out to be 
rather robust and had managed to survive for more than a decade by 2012. Some 
authors describe the continuation of the CIS with the words that it ‘hobbled on 
through the 2000s […]’.83 Analysts of GUAM also admit that the organisation has 
‘demonstrated an impressive durability’84 and is more vital than usually expected.85 
Indeed, these two organisations as well as the CSTO and EurAsEC not only survived 
until 2012, but also widened their profile of interaction. Despite the fact that 
adopted multilateral legalised rules have hardly become institutions, the member 
states have not ceased negotiating multilateral agreements. Only Georgia has 
withdrawn from the CIS, in 2009, and Uzbekistan from the CSTO, in 2011. The other 
former Soviet republics actively participate in the CIS, GUAM and CSTO activities 
even if they have, like Turkmenistan in the CIS, only observer status. These 
developments require some explanation. If the organisations are indeed 
dysfunctional, it would be irrational for the former Soviet republics to remain active 
participants in these organisations. Guided by a neo-realist perspective some 
authors argued especially in the early 1990s that the membership of some former 
Soviet republics in the CIS was primarily a result of pressure from Russia.86 The 
argument appears weak for the situation in the 2000s where Georgia managed to 
withdraw from the CIS without ‘punishment’. Withdrawing from an organisation 
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like the CIS is apparently an option. If the former Soviet republics stay in these 
organisations they presumably attribute a function to them. This reasoning induces 
the thesis to investigate the de facto functions of the regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space. The next section will discuss the way in which only a few authors 
have so far engaged in the endeavour to identify the alternative functions of the 
CIS, GUAM, EurAsEC or CSTO. Authors like Rilka Dragneva encourage such ambition. 
She has in recent years criticised the dominance of the ‘failure-success paradigm’ 
for glossing over the actual developments in organisations like the CIS.87 
2.3.2. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORGANISATIONS’ 
FUNCTION 
The above stated ambition to explore the function of regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space aside from the integration paradigm corresponds to the recent 
agenda of the comparative regionalism debate. This agenda has so far only weakly 
guided the contributions on regionalism in the post-Soviet space. This sub-section 
will discuss the few contributions that so far have discussed the function of the 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space in other terms than integration. It 
will highlight the angles that are insightful for the thesis and will present the 
concept of virtual regionalism as most thought-provoking.  
Despite the accepted assumption that the CIS, GUAM, EurAsEC and the CSTO have 
hardly lead to integration until 2012, many authors apply functionalist or 
intergovernmentalist arguments when assessing the organisations and 
recommending how to improve the efficiency of the regional organisations.88 Even 
rather recent articles devote primary attention to explaining the failure of 
integration instead of exploring their de facto or envisioned effect.89 Very few 
authors explain organisations like EurAsEC or GUAM by new regionalism arguments 
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and expect these organisations to offer protection against the negative externalities 
of globalisation.90 As sub-section 2.2.2 has already argued, the organisations in the 
post-Soviet space incorporated new regionalism arguments in their mission 
statements, but have so far hardly produced meaningful collective solutions that 
would support their striving for joint actions against challenges from globalisation. 
The bulk of the literature analyses the regional organisations from a neo-realist 
angle. This perspective depicts the organisations as tools for Russia’s politics of 
power. The idea is that Russia consolidates its power by (re-)integrating the former 
Soviet republics.91 Analysts therefore often label the CIS, the CSTO or EurAsEC often 
as ‘Russian multilateralism’.92 Indeed, the Russian foreign policy rhetoric after 2000 
supports this argument.93 The developments since 2000 gave evidence that Russia 
has certain power to drag some former republics to the CSTO, EurAsEC and the CU. 
This power strongly rests in bilaterally agreed incentives offered by Russia as reward 
for membership.94 Yet Russia lacks the willingness and economic capacity to bear 
the costs of (re-)integrating the former Soviet republics.95 Drawing on this debate 
Geir Flikke argues that the organisations serve as a platform for Russia to prevent 
the former Soviet republics from diverging from the Russian policies in the region.96 
Overall the neo-realist perspective gives a plausible explanation of how Russia 
conceptualises the function of the regional organisations. It also highlights the 
power-relations as working at systemic level in the post-Soviet space. However, it 
falls short of giving a good account of the perspectives of the other member states. 
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The member states do not integrate with Russia to the degree that power-relations 
in the international system would expect them to do. Proponents of neo-classical 
realism have observed limitations in the explanatory power of realism in other 
cases. They advise strengthening the analytical accuracy by taking into 
consideration that states translate the power-relations at the systemic level into 
foreign policy in various ways. The specific context needs to be taken into account.97 
The thesis borrows this argument and claims that we can learn more about the 
organisations, if we inquire how other members than Russia conceptualise the 
function of the organisations in the light of Russia's integration approach. With 
regard to GUAM, for instance, authors widely argue with reference to neo-realism 
that the organisation is meant to balance Russia’s influence and that integration is 
hampered by Russia.98 This argument may, however, not explain why the GUAM 
states are still active in the organisation after GUAM turned out not to have the 
power to balance Russia. What purposes does GUAM serve? 
In the light of the survival of organisations like the CIS and GUAM the following 
authors propose other functions to be decisive and suggest some factors, which 
alter the organisations’ function. Richard Sakwa, for example, stated ‘the CIS found 
itself a niche […]. Aspirations for regional unity […] may be more viable in the long-
run than we are accustomed to think.’99 He conceives this niche as expressing a 
certain commonality and managing minor tasks in the field of transport and other 
services, but does not give stronger explanations for how the CIS is expected to fulfil 
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this function. In a similar manner but more vaguely Keith Darden argues that the CIS 
has created a ‘substantial institutional architecture […] for taking joint decisions on 
a wide range of economic issues’.100 He does not provide substantial empirical 
evidence for this statement. Hence, further research on the CIS’ function and core 
mechanisms appears to be helpful for supporting these arguments. With regard to 
GUAM analysts emphasise the symbolic value of the organisation, which enables 
the members to demonstrate statehood and co-operation capacity for 
strengthening their sovereignty.101 The argument calls for an investigation of the 
origin and relevance of this symbolic values and its link to sovereignty concepts. 
Other authors also discuss the relevance of sovereignty concepts as decisive for 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. Sakwa, for example, argues that the 
principles of Westphalian sovereignty will continue shaping the order in the post-
Soviet space.102 They will thus also shape function of the regional organisations. 
Alexander Libmann and Evgeny Vinokurov go a step further in their concept of 
‘holding together integration’ (HTI) and name factors that determine the states’ 
concepts of sovereignty. These are state-building processes and the manifestation 
of interdependencies between the former Soviet republics. Instead of aiming for 
progressing integration, the states intend to keep a productive integration level and 
to build sovereign statehood at the same time.103 They use these factors to explain 
why integration processes often stagnate and hardly provide a more comprehensive 
framework for alternative functions of the regional organisations. The thesis will 
nevertheless include their emphasis of the two simultaneous but partly 
contradictory priorities to keep supportive interdependencies alive and to build an 
independent state. 
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The concept of virtual regionalism provides a more integrated perspective on 
sovereignty concepts and the function of regional organisations. The concept is 
thought-provoking, since it gives some account of why regional organisations are 
attractive for the member states, if they do not lead to integration. It builds on the 
neo-realist argument that power-relations matter and spells out how regional 
organisations may facilitate positive exploitation of regional power-structures. Roy 
Allison developed the concept of virtual regionalism for the Central Asian states 
with reference to Libman’s notion of ‘protective integration’.104 The term roughly 
denotes the establishment of integration structures without the intention to 
actually integrate. The states agree to integration bodies established by the regional 
hegemon, Russia, in order to gain the hegemon’s support in times of domestic 
unrest or economic decline. The membership in the integration bodies facilitate to 
bandwagon with Russia. It is motivated by political solidarity rather than interest in 
integration.105 Thus the integration structure provided by the organisations is re-
interpreted in a way that excludes integration. This reasoning raises three 
questions: how do the states employ the organisations for bandwagoning 
purposes? How and why do they prevent being socialised into integration-activities 
through the interactions in the regional organisations?  
Stina Torjesen and Cathleen Collins provide some answers by inquiring after the 
domestic origins of virtual regionalism in Central Asia. Collins refers to the 
reluctance of authoritarian states to surrender sovereignty.106 Torjesen digs deeper 
into the matter in her study, which is one of the very few that build on in-depth 
empirical inquiry in the member states.107 Her argument refers to the prevailing 
patterns of ‘indirect rule’, namely informal institutions and vested interests that run 
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counter to the effects of integration.108 King and Japaridze see weak state 
structures and absence of good governance as also crucial for other former Soviet 
republics.109 A few other studies also inquire after the domestic origins of the 
behaviour of former Soviet republics in the regional organisations.110 Ukraine 
attracted specific interest as very early on the country assumed a sceptical attitude 
towards the regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. The literature depicts 
Ukraine as state that pursues ‘selective’ integration.111 These studies have, 
however, hardly gone beyond the integration perspective or inquired after the gains 
resulting from interaction in the organisations besides some power balancing or 
alleged integration achievements. Deeper engagement with the domestic origins of 
behaviour in regional organisations is, therefore, necessary for all former Soviet 
republics in order to create a more distinct picture.  
The concept of virtual regionalism and the discussions of the domestic origins are 
thought-provoking. It is plausible that the newly independent states with non-
democratic regimes shape activities in the regional organisations according to the 
principle of Westphalian sovereignty. The existing literature creates only a blurry 
picture of the actual outcomes of the regional organisation activities, which is partly 
a consequence of the lack of empirical studies that include the member states’ 
perspectives. The questions remains what are the actual instruments for the former 
Soviet republics offered by the regional organisations? What benefits are offered by 
a multilateral format, if multilateral co-operation is not valued? Virtual regionalism 
seems to originate in weak state structures. But how is it actually entrenched and 
perpetuated in the political processes?  
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2.4. CONCLUSION: CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE 
The literature review has pointed out that the thesis intends to contribute to three 
debates on regional organisations. The first debate concerns the question of how 
regional organisations in different regions of the world may shape the global order. 
The findings will indicate that the post-Soviet space is another area where regional 
organisations are relatively robust but will hardly assume regional governance 
functions. The thesis aims to add some knowledge about the capacity of regional 
organisations to act as regional or global players. Since most of these organisations 
claim recognition as partners in global security governance matters such study is 
relevant. 
Secondly, the thesis will enhance the literature concerned with comparative 
regionalism through the study of crucial research questions raised by this literature 
in a geographic area that has been hardly considered thus far. The findings will 
enhance the search for a comprehensive understanding of variety in regionalism. 
They will broaden understanding of the diversity of functions and instruments in 
regional organisations. The thesis further digs deeper into the relation between the 
domestic environment and a states’ conceptualisation of the function of regional 
organisations. 
Third, the thesis fundamentally advances research into regional organisations in the 
post-Soviet space, since it goes beyond the widely-shared conclusion that the 
regional organisations have failed. The thesis shifts attention to explaining why 
many regional organisations are more vital than is often assumed, despite the fact 
that they do not produce integration. It inquires after the actual function of these 
organisations. By doing so, the thesis links the debate on regional organisations in 
the post-Soviet space to the current comparative debate. This will enhance 
understandings of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. It shows that the 
regional organisations are not the outliers of regionalism that have failed and do 
not require more study. Further, the thesis goes beyond the neo-realist Russian-
centred perspective, which presents a one-sided picture and is not interested in the 
actual processes in the regional organisations. It will examine the rationalities of the 
former Soviet republics in the regional organisations beyond the constrictive 
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scheme that interprets the rationalities as giving way to or resisting Russian 
pressure. The thesis builds on the shared observation that the former Soviet 
republics are not eager to cede sovereignty. But the study will go a step further by 
asking how the states shape their interaction in the regional organisations 
beneficially under these conditions. It will pay specific attention to the impact of 
domestic sovereignty concepts and policy practices on the states’ conceptualisation 
of the function of regional organisations. Chapter three will outline how the thesis 
turns this analytical focus into an analytical framework for studying regional 




3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter narrows down the previously identified research focus into an 
analytical framework. In other words, the chapter defines the theoretical concepts 
and approaches that enable an analysis of how former Soviet republics 
conceptualise the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and 
how this conceptualisation is rooted in their domestic political regimes. The 
framework serves two purposes. First, it will inform the reader about the concepts 
which the thesis uses to present the research findings. Secondly, it will formulate 
the research findings in abstract theoretical hypotheses in order to provide the 
reader with some guidance for the empirical chapters.  
As outlined in chapter 2, the recent comparative regionalism debate postulates 
theoretical pluralism.1 The conceptual framework therefore integrates various 
theoretical approaches. Chapter 2 has argued that studies on regional organisations 
in the post-Soviet space have intensively studied the applicability of old and new 
regionalism theories, but fall short of explaining the actual function of the regional 
organisations by such deductive approaches. Therefore the thesis has conducted an 
explorative, inductive yet theoretically-informed study that might best enhance the 
literature. The conceptual framework mirrors this methodological approach. It does 
not formulate hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical chapters. Testing 
hypotheses would necessarily have limited the analytical focus to predefined 
variables and their predefined variations.2 By doing so the study would have risked 
missing out insightful factors. The analysis has therefore been guided by a broader 
set of theoretical assumptions. The framework specified these assumptions with 
insights from the empirical findings. It provides the reader with a set of hypotheses 
that help to understand the empirical analysis presented in chapters 5-8. These 
hypotheses seek sufficient parsimony to be insightful for both the CIS and GUAM 
and be potentially transferable to other regional organisations in the post-Soviet 
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space. But they have not the parsimony that would allow the formulation of a 
general theory of the function of regional organisations according to varying 
domestic contexts. Nevertheless, the hypotheses intend to pave the ground for 
communicating the research findings to other scholars pursuing a similar research. 
In sum, the analytical framework considers the following theoretical perspectives 
for exploring conceptualisations of the function of regional organisations, indicated 
by the aims pursued in the organisations and the preferred instruments, and for 
discussing how the conceptualisations are rooted in the domestic political regimes. 
It takes an actor-centred institutional perspective and analyses the organisations’ 
function from a member state perspective. It disaggregates the states into societal 
actors and studies primarily the rationales of policy-makers. The framework argues 
that policy-makers derive the aims they pursue by membership in the organisations 
from their prioritisation of various aspects of state sovereignty. Practices 
established within the domestic political regimes determine which aims the states 
intend to achieve with concrete interactions in the organisations. The framework 
invokes assumptions regarding which instruments the states prefer for achieving 
these aims. It argues that internationally diffused ideas and established domestic 
practices determine the selection of instruments. Finally, the framework provides 
some assumptions about how policy-making processes in the varying political 
regimes influence which policy-makers can determine the state’s policy according 
to their conceptualisation of regional organisations.  
The chapter will proceed by presenting the analytical framework in four steps. It will 
first precisely formulate the research questions. Secondly, it will clarify the research 
object by defining the core concepts used in the thesis. The third sub-section will 
discuss the relevant theories that form the basis for reasoning how actors in states 
with varying non-democratic political regimes may conceptualise the function of 
regional organisations. The section will conclude with a set of hypotheses. The 
conclusion will dwell on the applicability of the analytical framework to other 
empirical cases.  
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3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This sub-section will present the research questions that specify the analytical 
perspective. Three questions emerge from the empirical puzzle, which has been 
sketched out in the introductory chapter, and the shortcomings of the literature as 
discussed in chapter 2. The research questions strive to change perspectives on 
understanding the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and 
where the understanding originates. The study intends to derive knowledge about 
the function from how member states define the aims they pursue and the 
instruments they prefer in these organisations. The following two questions will 
therefore guide the analysis of how the states conceptualise the organisations’ 
function.  
 What goals do member states pursue by participating in these regional 
organisations?   
 What types of activities do they prefer for achieving the aims? 
The literature review has outlined how scholars share the assumption that 
characteristics of the political regimes in the member states influence the states’ 
conceptualisation of the function of regional organisations. However, the nexus is 
weakly spelled out. Inspired by theoretical arguments and empirical findings, the 
thesis intends to contribute to this question by tracing back:  
 How do domestic patterns of rule shape the aims which are pursued and 
activities that are preferred?  
The analytical frame presented in section 3.5 will suggest hypotheses that answer 
these research questions concerning the studied empirical cases. Before the 
chapter starts developing the analytical framework, the way in which the thesis 
employs theory will be clarified in the next section, since this determines how the 




3.2. THE ROLE OF THEORY 
This section will briefly reflect upon how the thesis employs theory. Social sciences 
have developed a variety of understandings of theory. The approaches define the 
role of theory and the criteria for a ‘good’ theory differently. In order to ensure that 
the analytical framework developed in this thesis will be evaluated appropriately, 
this section will briefly delineate the use of theory in this thesis. The thesis uses 
theory as recommended by a moderate interpretivist epistemological perspective. 
This perspective argues that social phenomena can be discerned only as historically 
and culturally contingent. It rejects the neo-positivist claim that grand theories are 
able to adequately depict social phenomena.3 Accordingly, interpretivist studies do 
not depict theory-building as the ultimate research aim. In Max Weber’s 
understanding, theory is rather an instrument to discern empirical specifics and to 
make the findings accessible to successive research on the same phenomenon.4 The 
following paragraphs will specify how this conjecture informed the undertaken 
research. 
The thesis defines theories following Stephen van Evera as ‘general statements that 
describe and explain the causes and effects of […] phenomena.’5 Theory helps to 
explore the ‘set of meanings’ behind social action and to communicate the research 
findings.6 In order to do so, the Grounded Theory school suggests that theory needs 
to be ‘grounded in data’.7 Dobson points to the critical fact that ‘theory is both a 
way of seeing and not seeing’.8 On the one hand, so the argument goes, theory may 
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help to identify relevant factors and links between them. On the other hand, if an 
analysis is primarily determined by a predefined theory it may ignore relevant 
explanatory factors. Therefore, the thesis employed theory as recommended by 
proponents of Grounded Theory in a manner that informs but does not constrain 
the empirical analysis.9 That means that theories have been consulted prior to the 
empirical study to narrow down the research focus and after the empirical study to 
translate the empirical findings into abstract assumptions. In the first stage theories 
political sociology, political science and International Relations served, in the words 
of Herbert Blumer, as ‘sensitising concepts’, which informed the analytical focus.10 
These theories helped select an original and empirically investigatable research 
focus. They also provided preliminary assumptions about the potential rationale of 
the member states’ policy in the regional organisations and about the political 
processes in authoritarian and non-consolidated democratic regimes. In order to 
remain open-minded towards alternative factors that might impact upon the 
phenomenon under study, the insights from these theories have not been 
translated into testable hypothesis and measurable variables as a neo-positivist 
approach would require.11  
In the data collection stage, theory played only a minor role. It slightly influenced 
the interview questions. Theory came in again at a late stage of the data analysis 
with the aim ‘[of developing] analytical schemes of the empirical world with which 
the given research’ is concerned.12 First, the data were approached through the 
lenses of the previously selected sensitising theories.13 These offer a number of 
guiding questions for identifying relevant factors and perceptions in the empirical 
data. The analysis also identified factors that were not reflected in the sensitising 
theories. Both factors have been formulated in abstract categories. A second step 
linked these categories to existing theories and proposed coherent concepts and 
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theoretical assumptions.14 Concepts are ‘words that stand for ideas contained in the 
data; […] the products of analysis’15, which become elements of broader theories 
when linked by causal assumptions.16 Following the advice of Kathy Charmaz an 
analytical frame summarises the findings in abstract terms and formulates 
theoretical assumptions pertaining to the relevance of the concepts.17 It is a frame 
not a theory, since it ‘will provide guidelines for the search for explanations’18 
rather predict causal laws. The frame will guide the reader through the empirical 
study and is therefore presented before the empirical chapters. On the way to the 
analytical frame, the chapter will now proceed to specify the research object. 
3.3. DEFINING THE RESEARCH OBJECT  
Like any research strategy an interpretivist research endeavour has to be clear 
about its study object. Prior to the empirical part of the research the thesis has 
consulted literature on regionalism in search of an appropriate definition of the 
research object. A variety of concepts frame the meaning of ‘regional organisation’, 
its assumed function and instruments in the literature. The following paragraphs 
shall briefly present the meaning of terms which are helpful for delineating the 
study object and are, thus, employed in the thesis. These are the terms regionalism, 
regional organisation, regional governance, region-building, regional integration, co-
operation, compliance and commitment. The first two narrow down the 
organisations and processes in focus, the latter three consider potential interactions 
within regional organisations.  
3.3.1. REGIONALISM 
As the literature review has indicated, this thesis devotes attention to a matter 
widely described as regionalism. According to some authors, however, regionalism 
comprises phenomena beyond the research interest of this thesis. It is therefore 
necessary to define how the thesis approaches regionalism. Regionalism roughly 
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defines processes that link states of a geographic neighbourhood or states that 
share common interests. Integration theories conceived regionalism as the building 
of multilateral legalised institutions within regional organisations.19 Authors of the 
new regionalism incorporate transnational processes beyond regional organisations 
and define them as processes aiming at ‘establishing regional coherence and 
identity.’20 This thesis maintains the focus of the old regionalism by investigating 
regional organisations, but not other transnational processes as a new regionalist 
definition would suggest. However, the research requires a less normative 
definition of the processes within the organisations than that given by the old 
regionalism. It therefore refers to Rick Fawn who depicts ‘regionalism’ as processes 
of ‘co-ordination and co-operation among actors within a given region’ that vary in 
their purpose and quality.21 This study depicts regionalism as interactions of varying 
intensity and purpose within regional organisations. A definition of regional 
organisations will be presented in the next paragraph.  
3.3.2. REGIONAL ORGANISATION 
Most studies on regional organisations do not clarify the term and often equate 
regional organisations with ‘region’. A region is often defined by geographic 
proximity, increasing interdependencies as well as converging cultural and societal 
identities.22 Some of these criteria apply to the post-Soviet space. Yet it would be 
misleading for this study to equate regional organisations with regions, since it is 
not said that the studied organisations serve to build or maintain regions. Therefore 
an appropriate definition enabling the identification of the case universe of this 
study needs to focus primarily on the form. A modification of Ademola Abass’ 
definition seems helpful.23 Regional organisations encompass more than two states 
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that belong to a geographically close area. They set up organisational structures and 
formulate a common agenda. The following three paragraphs will define the 
potential aims of interaction in regional organisations. 
3.3.3. REGION-BUILDING 
The literature often uses the term ‘region-building’ to denote purposeful 
interactions that create a region. It emphasises the strategic decision of actors to 
construct a specific region according to their needs.24 Usually the core mechanism 
for doing so is depicted as increasing interdependencies between the parties of a 
region. Anssi Paasi criticises the fact that the term often denotes policy strategies. 
According to him, regions are a complicated constellation of agency, social relations 
and power that cannot be manipulated by a policy.25 This thesis nevertheless uses 
the term to describe the intention of actors to construct a region, since even though 
an actor might not be able to manipulate region-building, the actor may still aim at 
doing so. Region-building may hence be one of the intentions of membership in 
regional organisations.  
3.3.4. REGIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Various authors use the notion of ‘regional governance’ to describe the achieved or 
expected function of regional organisations. The thesis argues that regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space do not assume governance functions. The 
meaning of governance, therefore, requires some explanation. Among the diverging 
interpretations of governance that pervade the literature, the thesis concentrates 
on those with less normative dimensions. Governance roughly refers to how groups 
of individuals manage their common affairs and exert authority.26 Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye more precisely see governance as ‘the processes and institutions 
both formal and informal that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group. 
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Governance is the subset that acts with authority and creates formal obligation.’27 A 
component of transnational governance is, as the English school emphasises, the 
establishment of certain values and standards as guidance for the states and 
societies in a region.28 Regional organisations are one of the potential actors of 
regional governance. Scholars argue that organisations like the EU or NATO assume 
governance functions.29 The organisations in the post-Soviet space do, however, not 
fulfil these criteria. In the area of the world under study, the organisations appear 
to try to exert certain authority by establishing common rules. These are hardly 
recognised by the member states and therefore the organisations lack authority.30 If 
this thesis is at all concerned with regional governance, it rather asks how processes 
in the organisations indirectly affect regional governance.  
3.3.5. REGIONAL INTEGRATION, MULTILATERAL LEGALISED 
INSTITUTIONS, COMPLIANCE AND COMMITMENT  
Since the thesis explores also the intended function of activities within regional 
organisations, it needs to define a spectrum of activities with varying functions. 
Most intuitively scholars and policy practitioners describe activities in regional 
organisations with integration. This thesis defines the term according to Haas as a 
shift of loyalty and political activities from a national to a regional centre that 
‘demands jurisdiction over pre-existing national states.’31 The core engine of 
integration in the understanding of Haas and other representatives of integration 
theories is the establishment of a multilateral legalised institution. ‘Legalisation’ 
implies that the multilateral institutions rely on precisely formulated and often 
binding rules which define instruments for monitoring the rules’ implementation. 
The thesis distinguishes legalised rules from institutions by arguing in line with 
Douglas North that rules may become institutions, if they indeed shape the 
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interaction.32 According to Kenneth Abott, legalisation can take ‘hard’ forms, 
whereby all these criteria are met. Legalisation can also be soft, when rules are 
precisely formulated but are not binding or do not define monitoring instruments.33 
The integration literature usually explores the states’ compliance, hence the degree 
to which states implement the adopted multilateral legalised rules.34 This question 
implies that states establish multilateral rules with the aim of letting them regulate 
interactions between the signatories. The gathered empirical data and also the 
secondary literature suggest that the former Soviet states hardly implement the 
agreements adopted. The study should, hence, question the assumption that 
integration is the aim. The thesis has therefore searched concepts that allow the 
analysis to inquire after the signatory states’ intention when adopting a given set of 
multilateral legalised rules. The concept of ‘commitment’ takes up this question. 
Commitment denotes the states’ voluntary decision to solve regional matters via 
interactions in regional organisations.35 The thesis is, thus, primarily interested in 
the kind of commitment the members show in activities of the regional 
organisations. Since integration cannot be observed in the post-Soviet space, the 
thesis requires additional terms to describe the activities in the regional 
organisations and their intended function. 
3.3.6. CO-OPERATION AND CO-ORDINATION 
The empirical data indicated that it is important to differentiate activities in the 
multilateral frame of regional organisations according to the degree to which they 
bind the involved actors together. This helps to grasp for which type of activities the 
actors studied use regional organisations.36 International Relations scholars depict 
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the interaction between states within the spectrum of co-operation and conflict.37  
The activities of the in this thesis explored regional organisations certainly fall in this 
spectrum. The stronger focus on co-operative behaviour in International Relations 
since the 1980s has led to further differentiation between co-operation and co-
ordination. According to Keohane, ‘actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy co-ordination’ when 
they co-operate.38 Co-operation is effective, if states perceive the policy of a state 
as supportive to their ambitions. To co-ordinate their policy states take potential 
negative externalities of their actions for other states into account. The process of 
policy co-ordination may lead to co-operation or discord.39 Keohane, therefore, 
denotes a minimal mode of co-operation, namely to avoid harming other states as a 
result of a particular policy. This may include integration but also a less intensive co-
ordination of policies. Given the absence of integration in the post-Soviet space, it is 
of interest to this thesis to spell out the variety of co-ordination activities in the 
multilateral environment of a regional organisation. It assumes that the intensity of 
co-ordination of individual activities may vary. As mentioned in the discussion of the 
term regionalism, scholars often characterise regional organisations according to 
their primary activities, namely integration, regional governance or co-operation. 
Identifying the intensity of activities which prevail in the organisations in the post-
Soviet space will help characterising the organisations. 
3.3.7. CONCLUSION: RESEARCH AGENDA 
In sum, the thesis contributes to the study of regionalism by exploring the function 
of regional organisations. The latter are multilateral intergovernmental 
organisations with more than two member states. The study assumes that the 
organisations are not regional governance actors, since the member states do not 
invest them with the authority to regulate regional matters. It further assumes that 
region-building, in other words the re-organisation of (inter)dependencies, 
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potentially numbers among the intentions states pursue in the organisations. 
Drawing on the existing literature, the thesis suggests that the states do not engage 
in activities of the organisations with the aim of achieving integration. Accordingly, 
it is necessary to investigate what commitment guides the states to participate in 
these activities. The thesis suggests identifying this commitment by studying what 
the states actually voluntarily agree to manage in the regional organisations. In 
other words, what are the states' policy goals in the organisations? Further, what is 
the intended intensity of policy co-ordination. This will place the function of the 
activities on a spectrum between co-operation and discord. The following section 
will discuss which concepts facilitate the study of this research object.  
3.4. GUIDING THEORIES 
The previous section clarified that the study takes interest in the function which 
member states attribute to a regional organisation. Inspired by first empirical 
insights it suggested exploring what the states intend to achieve in the 
organisations and to spell out to the kind of multilateral interaction through which 
they pursue these aims. In order to be able to characterise the organisations, the 
thesis examines the degree of intensity of co-ordination required by the preferred 
activities. This section will discuss theories which offer guiding assumptions on the 
rationales of states in the organisations. First, the section will consult approaches 
that discuss what domestic and international factors may influence the states. 
Secondly, it pays attention to varying concepts of sovereignty that influence the 
states’ openness to co-operation. As a third factor, the section will discuss how 
established domestic practices shape the states’ choices of instruments in the 
regional organisations. Finally, it will investigate how the policy-making processes in 
the states determine to what degree co-ordinated activities are envisioned. The first 
section will argue that it strongly depends on the domestic environment of the 
states how they define their aims and the preferred intensity co-ordination in the 
activities. The factors discussed in step 2-4 spell out which features of the domestic 
political regimes influence these decisions. Section 3.5 will present an analytical 
framework which summarises the theoretical assumptions which after a repeated 
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consultation of the empirical material turned out to be most helpful for abstractly 
formulating the research findings. 
3.4.1. STATES AS ACTORS IN REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
As chapter 2 has outlined, the majority of contributions on regionalism in the post-
Soviet space take the regional organisations as the unit of analysis. They focus on 
the organisational structures, the adopted multilateral rules and established 
institutions. Such studies treat the member states in a neo-realist manner as unitary 
actors.40 The thesis is, however, driven by the empirical observation that the 
regional organisations under study do not develop in the manner anticipated. An 
exclusive focus on the international level, on the institutions and processes in the 
organisations, does therefore promise revealing insights. The thesis seeks instead to   
identify how the states conceptualise the organisations’ function and therefore it is 
necessary to disaggregate the state and consider the relevant domestic players. The 
study has chosen this focus with reference to strands of literature that claimed the 
state level to be decisive for a state’s foreign policy. First, the debate on neo-
classical realism provides rough guidance. Neo-classical realism acknowledges that 
the international level is constitutive for a state's foreign policy. However, the 
power-distribution on the international level does not directly translate into foreign 
policy. Foreign policy is ultimately an interpretation of the international constraints 
according to the policy-makers domestic situation.41 This gives priority to the study 
of foreign policy-makers, more precisely their perception of a given issue in 
international politics. Various authors propose a spectrum of domestic factors that 
influence the decision-makers perceptions and actions. These are, for example, the 
consensus of elites in the perception of the developments at systemic level and the 
reaction to it, a consensus between elites and other societal actors or social 
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cohesion42 or national identity.43 Neoclassical realism argues the specific 
manifestations of state-society relations to be decisive.44 Most crucial is the degree 
to which foreign policy-makers can act independently of intervening societal players 
in pursuing their preferred policy. It proposes that policy-makers’ independence 
strongly varies across different states.45 This argument has inspired the thesis to 
study which meaning policy-makers give to the engagement in regional 
organisations and to consider factors and actors that influence the foreign policy 
processes. Neoclassical realism appears more adequate for studying former Soviet 
republics than liberal theories do, since it depicts foreign policy-making principally 
as a top-down process initiated by the ruling elites. Societal actors are relevant but 
ultimately do not formulate foreign policy.46 This reflects the political regimes in the 
former Soviet republics more adequately than the focus on non-state actors of 
liberal theories does.47 Neo-classical realism has also been mostly employed to 
explain how states respond to shifts in the power distribution at international 
level.48 This does not allow the thesis to directly draw on its tool box. In addition, 
the reasoning of neo-classical realism does not provide a coherent theoretical frame 
for foreign policy-analysis.49 The thesis has therefore has consulted other 
contributions that discuss the nexus between the international level and domestic 
politics.    
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Another strand that emerged in the 1980s is oriented directly at state behaviour in 
international organisations. This strand of literature has developed the following 
three relevant arguments. Robert Putnam starts from the assumption that state 
leaders attend international negotiations with the aim of successfully adopting the 
agreement negotiated. He encourages consideration of the freedom of manoeuvre 
which domestic actors give state leaders to negotiate at international level. Putnam 
develops a rational choice model, the two-level game, to analyse the probability 
with which state leaders adopt agreements.50 In contrast to this model, this thesis 
questions whether adopting multilateral agreements is the main aim of state 
representatives in the organisations under scrutiny. It will therefore not employ the 
two-level game, but will consider that state officials acting in regional organisations 
are bound to domestic players. Graham Allison recommends deciphering the 
relevant domestic players and their impact on any kind of foreign policy formulation 
by tracing the bureaucratic procedure of foreign policy-making.51 Given that he 
developed his approach for the US, he primarily focusses on the varying impact of 
formal state bodies and the bureaucratic procedures connecting these bodies in 
foreign policy-making process. This thesis picks up Allison’s statement that foreign 
policy depends on the priorities of the state actors who participate in foreign policy-
making. The analysis will, however, not only consider the formal bureaucratic 
processes as defined by the constitution and the organisational design of the state 
administration. It will also take non-formalised institutions into account, since in the 
former Soviet republics these are often more relevant than the formal policy-
making procedures, as will the next paragraph discuss. By doing so, the thesis can 
refer to Jeffrey Checkel’s and Tor Bukkvoll’s research on the post-Soviet space. 
Checkel studied factors that influence Ukraine’s compliance with EU regulations and 
concluded that domestic institutions are relevant. He argued the actual power of 
state agencies in the policy-making processes and their foreign policy priorities to 
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be decisive.52 Tor Bukkvoll identified the interest of the political and economic elites 
in Kazakhstan and Ukraine as crucial for grasping the state’s policy in regional 
organisations. He recommends exploring to whom the policy-makers are 
accountable.53 Checkel and Bukkvoll made insightful contributions on the domestic 
impact on the states’ policy in matters of regional organisations. But they only 
weakly spelled out how policy-makers interpret the organisations according to their 
priorities rooted in the domestic political regime.  The thesis will enhance their work 
in this regard. Having stated that domestic state and non-state actors, their policy 
priorities and their power to influence policy-formulation is crucial for a state’s 
policy in regional organisations, the next paragraph will discuss how to analyse 
these factors.  
An actor-centred institutionalist approach appears adequate for the analysis of the 
rationales of relevant players in regional organisations and their domestic 
embeddedness. The approach depicts actors as rational, but their conceptualisation 
of rational action depends on their perceptions and preferences. The advantage of 
this approach vis-à-vis an actor-centred rational choice concept is that it does not 
define stable preferences according to generalizable and context-independent 
criteria. Instead the school suggests examining the attitudes and reasoning of the 
relevant actors, in order to learn about the rationales which guide their action. 
These attitudes define their policy or, in other words, their intentional actions 
through which they try to achieve specific aims.54 The actors’ attitudes and their 
capacity to pursue a policy defined by these attitudes depend on institutions. The 
thesis depicts institutions with reference to Douglass North as constraints that 
shape human action and reduce uncertainty in a society.55 They may consist of 
formally codified rules, but also always include non-written shared norms of 
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behaviour and practices.56 This study will refer to institutions only, if they indeed 
shape action. Where constraints are formally established but inefficient, they will be 
denoted as formal rules. The empirical study did not always manage to 
comprehensively discern the formalised and non-formalised elements that 
constrain an observable action. In this case the thesis will speak of established 
practices. The interview narratives implied that relevant institutions which shape 
the action of state representatives in regional organisations emerge from the 
regional and domestic environment of the states. In the course of data analysis 
literature was consulted that depicts characteristics of the post-Soviet space. 
Authors see the following concepts roughly characteristic for the regional and 
domestic environment of the former Soviet republics. Since 1991 the former Soviet 
republics have been concerned with state-building, namely the consolidation of an 
independent polity and economy.57 Having separated from the single polity of the 
USSR, they struggle to re-organise the remaining (inter)dependencies in a way that 
allows for the consolidation of state-building.58 In the light of state-building 
processes, authors argue that the sovereignty concepts of state actors influence the 
approach of the former Soviet republics towards regional organisations in the post-
Soviet space.59 The next section will therefore deliberate on the variety of 
sovereignty concepts and their origins. As regards the domestic environment, an 
amalgam of authoritarian and democratic political features is characteristic for the 
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former Soviet republics. Authors agree that politics in the former Soviet republics is 
strongly influenced by informal institutions which undermine or circumvent the 
formal rules of the polity.60 As section 1.5.1 has detailed, Ukraine ranks as a state 
with a democratic polity that is, however, constrained by informal practices.61 
Azerbaijan numbers among the authoritarian states in which politics are more 
dominated by informal institutions than by the formal institutions as defined in the 
constitution.62 Sub-sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 will theoretically elaborate how the 
domestic institutions in such a regime environment shape the state actors’ attitudes 
and aims in regional organisations.  
3.4.2. SOVEREIGNTY CONCEPTS AND THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
It was mentioned above that state building is a process that has determined the 
domestic and international politics of the former Soviet republics since 1991. The 
fact that they have pulled out of a common political unit, the Soviet Union, implies 
that gaining and maintaining sovereignty was a major concern after the 
independence. The question of sovereignty turned out to be frequently mentioned 
in the gathered interview narratives. It was therefore worth engaging with concepts 
that discuss the link between sovereignty and participation in regional 
organisations. As outlined in chapter 2, representatives of the old regionalism and 
experts on the post-Soviet space consider the state actors’ conceptualisation of 
sovereignty as insightful for their policy in regional organisations. The former Soviet 
republics have for the last 22 years been preoccupied with state-building and thus, 
inter alia, with consolidating sovereignty. Stephen Krasner argues that the domestic 
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and international environment of a state creates varying concepts of sovereignty.63 
This section details the varieties of sovereignty concepts that are relevant for the 
former Soviet republics. It will argue that these concepts shape the states’ policy in 
the regional organisations, since regional interdependencies challenge the 
consolidation of these dimensions of sovereignty. 
In the eyes of Krasner, states define concepts of sovereignty according to the 
challenges which the political regimes predominantly face. The implicit baseline of 
the argument is that ruling elites aim at regime survival. He distinguishes the 
following three sovereignty concepts, which refer to international and domestic 
challenges and are potentially relevant in the post-Soviet space. The first is the 
Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, which for several centuries has 
determined international relations. It denotes that states are political organisations, 
which exclude external actors from their authority structure.64 Accordingly, external 
actors do not have the right to interfere in a state’s domestic affairs. For the state-
building endeavour of newly independent states that have emerged from a single 
polity, such as the former Soviet republics, the consolidation of Westphalian 
sovereignty is a priority due to the potentially persisting (inter)dependencies. 
Despite the collapse of the single polity, the interdependencies remain strong. 
Especially, when a regional hegemon emerges from the disintegration it may exploit 
persisting interdependencies as channels to interfere in the newly independent 
states’ domestic affairs. This is a core issue for the former Soviet republics even in 
2012, since they are not only interdependent with but often dependent on the 
regional hegemon Russia. Protection from Russian interference in particular in 
domestic matters is thus a main aim for the former Soviet republics.65 Furthermore, 
persisting interdependencies with less powerful constituents of the former single 
polity may also collide with state-building processes. They may be in contradiction 
with ambitions to create a distinct national identity.66 The principle also implies 
recognition as an equal partner on the international arena, which, however, the 
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states need to establish in practice.67 Achieving such recognition is a priority for 
newly independent states, since it enlarges their international room for manoeuvre. 
These factors may thus induce the ruling elites to prioritise the consolidation of 
Westphalian sovereignty.  
Krasner names his second sovereignty concept ‘domestic sovereignty’. The term 
refers to the ability of the ruling elites to efficiently exert authority in the state.68 
Accordingly, domestic veto-players may threaten this sovereignty. Faced with the 
challenges of building independent statehood, consolidating domestic sovereignty 
becomes another priority for the ruling elites. The thesis argues that their strategies 
to handle matters of domestic sovereignty have two international components. On 
the one hand ruling elites from other former Soviet republics use persisting ties to 
the domestic elites of a republic to trigger domestic unrest and constrain the 
domestic sovereignty. On the other hand, as Libman has argued, the ruling elite of a 
country may turn to the regional hegemon when seeking support in consolidating 
its domestic sovereignty.69 The ruling elite may also be interested in maintaining 
favourable economic and security interdependencies, if these stabilise the domestic 
economy and security.70  
The third concept is ‘interdependence sovereignty’, namely the control over flows 
across the state border that potentially affect domestic security.71 The former 
Soviet republics face regional challenges to their interdependence sovereignty from 
two sources. The persisting intensive societal ties between the former entities of 
the USSR and the similarities of their political and economic regimes facilitate 
migration, capital, goods as well as criminal flows in the region that are hard to 
control. In addition, globalisation processes widen the origin of such transit and 
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incoming flows from the post-Soviet space to Asia and other distanced regions.72 
The attention paid by ruling elites to consolidating the state’s interdependence 
sovereignty depends on the extent to which elites perceive the political regimes to 
be vulnerable to such flows. 
The previous discussion of the varying concepts of sovereignty and their relevance 
for the former Soviet republics highlighted that Westphalian, domestic and 
interdependence sovereignty matter for this group of states and their mutual 
relations. Consolidating their sovereignty in these regards is one of the core aims of 
their regional policy. Their regional environment induces the former Soviet 
republics to reduce (inter)dependencies in order to stabilise their Westphalian and 
domestic sovereignty, but also to maintain and intensify (inter)dependencies as 
protection of their domestic sovereignty and their interdependence sovereignty. 
The regional environment, thus, creates contradictory incentives for dealing with 
persisting interdependencies when consolidating sovereignty. Which strategy the 
states chose depends on the sovereignty challenges to which the political regimes 
are most vulnerable. This vulnerability is also determined by characteristics of the 
domestic political regimes. The next section will show that domestic institutions are 
decisive in determining which sovereignty concept needs to be prioritised to ensure 
regime survival.  
3.4.3. SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERATIONS OF VARYING POLITICAL REGIMES 
The previous sub-section identified three regional policy aims for newly 
independent states like the former Soviet republics: consolidating their 
Westphalian, domestic and interdependence sovereignty. It is now of interest to the 
thesis how the ruling elites employ membership of and activities in regional 
organisations to strengthen one or all forms of sovereignty. The empirical data 
suggest that the ruling elites do not perceive the policy in regional organisations as 
an end in itself. It rather serves as a means for strengthening the states´ 
sovereignty. In order to work with a sound set of analytical tools the PhD thesis 
needs thus to distinguish policy aims according to their scope.   





In search of adequate terms for this purpose one comes across the notion of 
'national interest'. National interest is often used to describe the aim of a state's 
foreign policy. In his theory of realism Hans Morgenthau defines national interest 'in 
terms of power'. 73 Power means survival of a state in the international system and 
is therefore the utmost goal. Morgenthau opted for this very abstract category for 
the sake of parsimony. His intention was to create a theory that enables analysts to 
predict foreign policy rather than to explain empirical situations.74 The level of 
abstraction is indeed too high as to give us more precise idea of the foreign policy 
goals in the subject of study. A core question of foreign policy analyses remains, 
hence, what is national interest and is there more than one interest.75  
Theories like neoliberal institutionalism or interdependence theory also operate 
with survival as the principal foreign policy goals. However, from their perspective 
other goals determine foreign policy once survival is ensured.76 The theories suggest 
various factors at the international and domestic level as influencing the definition 
of foreign policy goals. The literature thus implies that there are foreign policy goals 
with different scopes. Only very few authors develop a terminology that reflects this 
assumption. Some authors speak of a general foreign policy orientation or 'grand 
strategy' to indicate that there is one goal to which others are subordinated. 77 The 
suggestion of Arnold Wolfers appears to be more precise and therefore more 
helpful. He admits that 'it is customary to distinguish between goals and means […]; yet it 
is impossible to draw a sharp line of demarcation between the two ideas. All means can be 
said to constitute intermediary or proximate goals, and few goals if any can be considered 
ultimate, in the sense of being sought as ends in themselves.'78 Wolfers suggests 
speaking of intermediate and remote or ultimate goals when analysing a historical 
instance. He, however, stresses that we cannot necessarily generalise this 
qualification of goals. In other instances a remote goal might be an intermediate 
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one.79 This limitation does not pose constraints for the use of his set of terms in the 
thesis, since the research is concerned with a specific empirical situation: the policy 
in two regional organisations in the period 2010-2012. 
This thesis will therefore employ the terms ultimate and intermediary goals. As 
indicated in the previous section, in the case studied an ultimate goal is 
strengthening sovereignty. The section will show in the following that it depends on 
the political regime types which concept of sovereignty the ruling elites prioritise. In 
a second step it will highlight the intermediary goals, which the states studied aim 
to achieve in support of the ultimate goal.   
As discussed above, the management of interdependencies is crucial for 
consolidating sovereignty. A closer look at how institutions in the different political 
regimes shape approaches to the management of interdependencies will allow one 
to discern the priorities concerning the concepts of sovereignty. Intermediary goals 
can also best be described as states’ strategies to manage interdependencies. It will 
be argued that hybrid regimes with strongly authoritarian features intend to 
minimise interdependencies with their regional policy in order to consolidate their 
Westphalian sovereignty.  They may aim to maintain existing interdependencies to 
a limited degree as an intermediary goal, if it helps to consolidate their domestic 
sovereignty. The more democratic the state, the more it aims at building fruitful 
new interdependencies that help to consolidate its interdependence sovereignty. 
The following paragraphs will substantiate the link between the regime type and 
the approach to interdependencies. 
As the previous section has discussed, the consolidation of sovereignty in all regards 
indicated by the three concepts is crucial for the newly independent states 
regardless of their political regime. However, if we look at what the sovereignty 
consolidation implies for the management of interdependencies it becomes evident 
that the political regimes can be argued to endow varying priority to the three 
concepts of sovereignty. The variation rests essentially on the mechanisms by which 
political regimes ensure their survival. The literature on political regime types in the 
continuum between the ideal types 'democracy' and 'authoritarianism' suggests the 





regime survival strategy to largely depend on two questions:  to which actors are 
the ruling elites accountable, and how do they manage this accountability. The 
thesis considers especially the broad literature on hybrid regimes. It offers analytical 
frames that resemble the empirical situation in both Ukraine and Azerbaijan. This 
strand of literature concentrates on identifying the dynamics on which regimes are 
built. It therefore offers insights on the question of accountability.    
The traditional delineation of authoritarian and democratic regimes provides basic 
information on the ruling elites’ accountability. Characteristic for democracies is 
strong societal participation in policy-making and therefore stronger monitoring of 
the ruling elites.80 Democratic societies hold the government accountable via 
formalised channels of political participation. Max Weber has summarised this 
mechanism in the concept of rational-bureaucratic authority.81 By contrast, ruling 
elites in authoritarian regimes are faced with weaker accountability structures. 
Decision making power is concentrated in the hands of the incumbent and wider 
elite circles.82 In order to gain more detailed insights on the group of actors to 
whom the ruling elite is accountable in authoritarian regimes and the underlying 
mechanisms of this, the thesis consults studies on hybrid regimes.  
Before discussing how these studies depict regime survival a few words shall explain 
why the concept of hybrid regimes is helpful. Contributions on hybrid regimes 
devote attention to political regimes that according to Terry Karl 'combine elements 
of both authoritarianism and democracy'.83 Scholars have introduced this rather 
broadly defined concept to grasp the regimes that emerged from the third wave of 
transition starting in the 1970s.84 This definition does not specify the degree to 
which or manner in which elements of the ideal types 'authoritarianism' and 
'democracy' manifest themselves in a new form of regime. The debate therefore 
soon called for more precise definitions of hybrid regimes. This evoked a wave of 
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classifications of hybrid regimes in the early 2000s. An enormous variety of sub-
types has emerged. Timm Beichelt divides the emergent literature on the one hand 
into terms like 'illiberal democracy' or 'defective democracy'85 that concentrate on 
manifestations close to liberal democracies. On the other hand there are concepts 
like 'competitive authoritarianism' or 'patronal presidentialism' with a strong 
affinity to the so-called 'closed authoritarianism'.86 These sub-types theorise the 
empirical reality of individual case countries that have experienced democratisation 
without achieving democracy. Some, as for example Henry Hales 'patronal 
presidentialism', focus more on the mechanisms at hand of the core political 
actors.87 Others, including Steven Levitsky's and Lucan Way's 'competitive 
authoritarianism' emphasise the leeway of opposition forces to challenge the 
incumbent.88The varying analytical angles allow scholars to subsume a regime 
under different labels. Some authors depict Ukraine since 1991 as competitive 
authoritarianism, others as patronal presidentialism.89 Azerbaijan ranks as patronal 
presidentialism, electoral authoritarianism or hegemonic authoritarianism.90 This 
incomplete enumeration shows that it is rather problematic to define a single ideal 
type for the intermediate regime type. What Andreas Schedler states for varieties of 
electoral authoritarianism applies to varieties of hybrid regimes in general: 'The 
limits of the authoritarian imagination are not logical, but empirical'.91 It is, thus, 
not useful to identify one type that fits to the empirical situation in our case 
countries in the period of 2010-2012. For gaining some insights on the survival of 
the political regimes under study it is more fruitful to draw conclusions from 
dynamics synthesised in different sub-types. This allows the thesis to consider the 
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multiple analytical perspectives. The theoretical reasoning takes especially studies 
into account that have been developed for the post-Soviet area. It will be the task of 
the empirical study to discuss to what degree the theoretical assumptions 
formulated in the following reflect the situation in Ukraine or Azerbaijan.  
A basic feature of hybrid regimes is the existence of elections that are not a mere 
façade. Opposition parties and candidates exist and the elections for the most 
important positions in the polity create a certain uncertainty over their outcome. 
However, unlike in the ideal type 'democracy' the uncertainty is not primarily 
created by the electorate. The voting is often directly rigged or beforehand 
manipulated by uneven access to media for the candidates and limited information 
for the voters. Core players are political and economic elites. They have a number of 
instruments at hand to manipulate the electorate in favour of or against the 
incumbent.92 The rationale of the electoral process is not primarily vote maximising, 
but also soothing powerful elites.93 As the 'colour revolutions' have shown, the 
mechanisms of regime change are not necessarily the election results. Crucial was 
rather the fact that large parts of the society did not accept the election outcome 
and opted to strongly react to it. Mass protests caused by electoral fraud or 
economic crises may challenge the incumbent. Several authors contend that the 
political and economic elites' decisions to support or not to support the incumbent 
are decisive for the success of mass protests.94 In a nutshell, in hybrid regimes 
incumbents are only to a limited degree accountable to the electorate, but strongly 
accountable to powerful political and economic elites. 
This shift of accountability stems from the importance of informal institutions in 
hybrid regimes. The literature agrees that the formal institutions of the polity 
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matter in all hybrid regimes.95 However, their function is often circumvented or 
altered by informal institutions.96 The essence of the regime is personalised 
relations between powerful actors in the polity and other powerful actors in the 
society as for example economic elites. Personalism, clientelism or patron-client 
relations are some of the terms that are often used to describe these relations. The 
authors use them to basically express the following. The incumbents have access to 
material and power resources. They distribute these resources to ensure the loyalty 
of powerful elites and other societal actors. A mutual dependency between these 
elites and the incumbent exists. The re-election of the incumbent depends on their 
loyalty. The elites' access to resources depends on the incumbent's readiness to 
reward the elites. As a result there is a strong intersection of politics and 
economics.97 Against this background the weak application of the rule of law is 
symptomatic of hybrid regimes.98 The literature describes these mechanisms with 
reference to the concept of 'neo-patrimonialism'.99 Analysts consider such patterns 
as constitutive for the former Soviet societies.100  
To sum up, in order to ensure regime survival, incumbents in hybrid regimes 
primarily have to avoid the defection of powerful social players, but they have also 
to keep up the support of the masses. In respect of both groups of actors it is 
important to ensure economic growth. It is crucial for the ruler to be able to 
distribute economic and power incentives in order to ensure the loyalty or to co-opt 
potential veto players.  
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The degree to which the incumbent faces challenges in hybrid regimes varies 
according to the degree to which democratic mechanisms have been established.    
Where the democratic institutions introduced have caused an increase in civic 
participation there are potentially more actors who challenge the incumbent than 
in an authoritarian regime where the incumbent can keep down veto player. The 
logic of hybrid regimes thus implies a specific approach to regime survival that, 
however, varies according to the degree to which it incorporates democratic or 
authoritarian institutions. This can be assumed to also influence their strategy of 
handling regional interdependencies for the sake of sovereignty. A reflection of 
these theoretical assumptions and of core results of the empirical studies 
undertaken in this research project suggests summarizing the ruling elites’ priorities 
as follows.   
Ruling elites in hybrid regimes where authoritarian mechanisms still prove effective 
in eliminating strong opposition players have the following set of priorities. They   
prioritise the protection of Westphalian sovereignty. In doing so their intermediary 
goal is to minimise interdependencies. Since the processes of rule are oriented 
towards reaffirming the loyalty of the domestic elite, it is crucial for the ruling elite 
to avoid external interference in domestic affairs. The ruling elite will, nevertheless, 
as a secondary priority, strive to ensure domestic sovereignty by the intermediary 
goal to maintain certain interdependencies that produce security and economic 
welfare. Finally, as long as the ruling elites have the capacity to manage the regime-
destabilising effects of global and transnational flows, they will hardly consider 
interdependence sovereignty in their regional policy. Even if so, they most likely 
intend to keep their interdependencies limited and not establish new ones, in order 
stay in control of all domestic processes, since any interdependency provides 
channels for external interference. These assumptions give an account of policy 
priorities in the case of Azerbaijan.  
When ruling elites in hybrid regimes have less capacity to eliminate veto players and 
have to consider the masses more strongly in their regime survival strategy they are 
likely to develop the following priorities. As long as domestic rule builds on informal 
institutions and the incumbent is dependent on the loyalty of economic and 
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political elites and non-elite societal actors, it is important to limit interference from 
abroad. Hence the main priority is again to establish Westphalian sovereignty by the 
intermediary goal of reducing interdependencies. However, given their stronger 
accountability vis-à-vis non-elite actors in society, this creates the following 
intermediary goals in support of the domestic sovereignty. It is on the one hand 
crucial to maintain interdependencies that support the states’ domestic 
sovereignty. These are interdependencies that increase societal security and 
welfare. Relationships that allow ruling elites to seek regime protection in situations 
of domestic unrest are also important.101 At the same time, ruling elites need to 
reduce interdependencies that allow external players to mobilise domestic actors 
against the ruling elite. Finally, ruling elites in such regimes pay more attention to 
interdependence sovereignty in their regional policy. They are more vulnerable to 
negative externalities of transnational flows. In order to ensure security and welfare 
they have to protect the society from negative impacts of such flows. The relative 
strengths of societal actors creates more pressure to find adequate solutions for 
such problems. The creation of new regional interdependencies in defence of 
threats from transnational flows is an option. But again, they will aim to avoid 
solutions that allow for external interference in domestic affairs.  
This reasoning suggests that the priority setting of both variants of hybrid regimes 
varies only slightly. The first ultimate aim in both cases is the Westphalian 
sovereignty, followed by domestic sovereignty. However, the more democratic a 
regime is and the more veto players it has to manage, the more emphasis is given to 
the question of domestic sovereignty. While interdependence sovereignty is hardly 
considered as a topic in the regional policy of more authoritarian hybrid regimes, it 
is an issue in the regional policy of more democratic hybrid regimes. The latter are 
also more inclined to keep existing interdependencies and to build new 
interdependencies if it supports their domestic and interdependence sovereignty. 
However, they do not want to compromise their Westphalian sovereignty by that.  
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These ultimate and intermediary goals pose the question as to how participation in 
a regional organisation achieves these goals. Like most regional organisations the 
two organisations under study, CIS and GUAM, claim to construct new linkages and 
increase interdependencies between the member states.102 How does this fall into 
line with the intermediary goals to if limit interdependencies? 
The next section will develop some arguments in response to this question.  
3.4.4. POLITICAL REGIMES AND PREFERRED MULTILATERAL ACTIVITIES  
The previous sub-sections hypothesised that the former Soviet republics seek as 
ultimate goal to consolidate Westphalian sovereignty primarily, domestic secondly 
and only thirdly interdependence sovereignty through membership in regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space. The intermediary goal is to do this ideally by 
minimising persisting interdependencies. Only hybrid regimes with relatively 
powerful democratic institutions appear open to intensifying interdependencies. 
Functionalist and intergovernmentalist approaches argue that states access regional 
organisations with the hope of strengthening what Krasner calls interdependence 
sovereignty and use the activities in the organisations to increase 
interdependencies through regional organisation.103 Since the cases under study 
appear to diverge from this logic, it is likely that they also develop a specific 
approach to the activities in a multilateral environment. In the course of data 
analysis the impression emerged that the acceptance of activities strongly depends 
on the degree of policy co-ordination which they require.   
To gain a theoretical perspective on this observation the following paragraphs will 
deliberate on what the nexus between the political regime types and the preferred 
management of interdependencies implies for the intensity of policy-coordination 
accepted as adequate in regional activities by the ruling elites under study.  They 
will spell out the intensity of activities which policy-makers in different political 
regimes prefer. It will argue that the ruling elites in hybrid regimes have, due to 
                                                          
102
 For the declared aims of CIS and GUAM see chapter 1.5.2. 
103
 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 115; Haas, International Integration: the European and 
the Universal Process, 368; Pierson, P (2004), Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social 
Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p 125; Moravcsik, Preferences and Power in the 
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach, 485. 
93 
 
their reliance on informal practices, little interest in intensively co-ordinated 
activities. If multilateral co-ordination is envisioned it has to be designed in a way 
that supports established domestic institutions of rule. 
As discussed in section 3.3, the co-operative interactions in regional organisations 
can be theoretically differentiated into varying intensities of policy co-ordination. 
Integration via legalised multilateral rules is one the most intensive forms. The 
other end of the spectrum is marked by uncoordinated activities. Institutionalist 
approaches indicate that ruling elites accept an intensity and form of international 
policy co-ordination, which complies with domestically established institutions. The 
assumption draws on the argument that established institutions are hard to alter 
and often survive policy and political leadership changes.104 Given that ruling elites 
are primarily bound to the domestic institutions, they tend to adjust the intensity 
and form of international interaction to the domestic environment. The regime 
characteristics outlined in the previous section allow for some conclusions on the 
intensity of multilateral interactions which hybrid regimes with a more 
authoritarian and a more democratic face prefer. The question to be asked for 
drawing conclusions is how multilateral activities and domestic practices interplay. 
The regime types discussed have in common the fact that domestic rule builds on 
processes which are not predominantly determined by the formal rules of the 
polity. They strongly rely on unwritten, informal rules that are non-transparent. 
Accordingly, the ruling elites presumably avoid multilateral legalised institutions. 
These institutions aim at creating the transparency and predictability of the states’ 
international activities. Enforcement mechanisms intend to constrain the states’ 
opportunities to defect from acting according to these institutions. This is rather 
contradictory to the informal practices and might challenge the ruling elites’ 
domestic survival. The ruling elites therefore most likely reject any intensive policy 
co-ordination as required by integration. With regard to less intensively co-
ordinated activities, the rationales vary in hybrid regimes with an authoritarian and 
a democratic face. The former do not only generally prefer uncoordinated or weakly 
                                                          
104
 Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson (2006), Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions. 
NBER Working Paper Series, No. 12108, p 2. 
94 
 
co-ordinated activities, since these are compatible with the strong informal 
component in the political processes. They also have the capacity to consolidate 
and enforce their authority domestically and to find independent answers to 
transnational challenges. Accordingly, they are able to pursue only uncoordinated 
or weakly co-ordinated activities in regional organisations. The more democratic 
hybrid regimes, in contrast, prefer uncoordinated or weakly co-ordinated activities 
due to the strong informal features. They, nevertheless, depend on regional policy 
co-ordination, since societal actors demand effective solutions to security and 
economic problems created by transnational flows. However, it can be assumed 
that they seek policy co-ordination that is compatible with the main characteristics 
of the domestic processes of rule: strong reliance on non-formalised rule and 
accountability primarily to domestic elites but not to international players. 
Within regional organisations the ruling elites of individual states often have only 
limited capacity to design the intensity and form of activities according to their 
needs. As chapter 2 has indicated, activities in regional organisations, including 
those in the post-Soviet space, often follow international role models. In concrete 
terms, this means they often establish legalised multilateral rules and search for 
intensive policy co-ordination. Concepts that help to explain why the ruling elite of 
some states participate in activities which potentially contradict institutions of the 
domestically established ruling are ‘social learning’ and ‘emulation’. They describe 
the impact of the international environment on domestic policies as postulated by 
Peter Gourevitch.105 The ruling elite may either develop the desire to alter domestic 
institutions according to these international activities through interaction in 
regional organisations.106 Or they may emulate commitment to these activities. 
They emulate when they participate in the activities, even though they are not 
willing to or capable of implementing them domestically.107 The proliferation of a 
certain format of organisations induces, according to John Meyer and Brian Rowan 
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other organisations to emulate their format, even though it might not be 
compatible with the adopting organisations’ function.108 According to Polillo and 
Guillen the states compete internationally for ‘economic, military, diplomatic, and 
political supremacy and survival.’109 This international competition sets standards of 
appropriate behaviour.110 Adopting these standards, even by means of emulation, 
may legitimise actors and may ensure the survival of the organisation.111 
Organisations like the EU and the UN internationally diffuse the idea of integration. 
Hence, emulating integration potentially fuels international recognition.112  
The successful emulation of international activities, however, requires at least two 
domestic conditions. Firstly, the ruling elites need to be able to participate in crucial 
stages of the activities, including the formal, not de facto, adoption of the outcome, 
without risking any unintended impact of the interaction. Such unintended impact 
may be that domestic players reject the adoption of multilateral legalised rules. 
Secondly, the ruling elites need to ensure that state officials who participate in the 
activities and are potentially socialised into these activities do not strive to alter the 
domestic practices accordingly. The domestic conditions that allow for emulation 
are rooted in policy-formulation processes. In hybrid regimes with effective 
authoritarian features policy-formulation rests in the hands of a small circle of 
ruling elites. These have the power to overrule the decisions of low-level state 
officials and of other institutions of the polity, like the parliament, that may veto 
decisions made on international level. Policy-making thus follows a strong top-down 
approach. If democratic institutions have paved the way for more bottom-up policy-
making a hybrid regime the room for bottom-up policy-making is larger. 
Accordingly, state officials who are socialised into internationally promoted 
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activities are more likely to strive for an adjustment of the domestic institutions to 
the internationally promoted ideas and practices. In the case of Ukraine, their 
freedom of manoeuvre is, however, constrained by the nevertheless preferred top-
down decision-making and uncoordinated policy-making of different players in the 
government structures. In lieu of a conclusion the next section will synthesize the 
core assumptions developed in this section into a set of hypotheses. By adding 
insights from the empirical studies of this thesis it will develop an integrated 
analytical framework. 
3.5. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The interpretation of the empirical study undertaken, which will be presented in 
chapters 5-8, has called for a specific set of analytical tools. It was the task of 
section 3.4 to discuss the theoretical background to this set of tools. The section has 
summarised the reasoning of two research steps. On the one hand, it has presented 
theories that have influenced the development of the research focus prior to the 
empirical study. These are theories that provide ideas on the linkage between 
foreign policy goals and political regime types. The section has, on the other hand, 
elaborated on the theoretical framing of certain phenomena, which the empirical 
data suggested to be relevant. Namely the conceptualisation of sovereignty, the 
differentiation between ultimate and intermediary policy goals and the foreign 
policy formulation processes in the different political regimes. The following will 
now both synthesise the most helpful elements of the discussed theories and 
specify the derived assumptions for the empirical cases under study. 
It formulates a heuristic framework for studying how former Soviet republics 
conceptualise the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space.  The 
framework uses the discussed theories to translate the empirical findings into a set 
of abstract theoretical terms and hypothesis. These theoretical tools helped 
organise the presentation of the empirical material and express the findings in a 
precise way. The findings of this empirical research cannot be widely generalised for 
other instances as section 4.5 will detail. However, the thesis formulates them in an 
abstract way with the hope to inspire upcoming research projects on similar 
instances. As previously indicated, the thesis argues that the following three 
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dimensions provide evidence about the function of regional organisations: the 
ultimate goals envisioned by membership, the intermediary goals envisioned in the 
sectoral activities, and the preferred types of activities of the regional organisation. 
After stating the main argument the section will present hypotheses concerning 
these three dimensions. Figure 2 summarises the framework as specified for 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. The framework reflects categories 
that emerged in the course of research from theoretical and empirical reflections.  
The following general argument draws on theories concerned with social actors, 
international relations, regionalism and regime types. Policy-makers conceptualise 
the function of regional organisations according to the patterns of rule in their 
domestic political regimes. The ruling elite’s conceptualisation may diverge from the 
stated function of the organisation, if the stated function is not compatible with the 
domestic political regime. In the post-Soviet space regional organisations serve, 
briefly stated, to consolidate the former Soviet republics’ sovereignty by reducing 
and re-organising persisting interdependencies to the former Soviet 
neighbourhood. The aim to reduce and preferably not increase interdependencies is 
driven by the regime survival considerations of the ruling elites. Patterns of informal 
rule and strong top-down policy-making induce hybrid regimes with an 
authoritarian face to minimise interdependencies and co-ordination with other 
former Soviet republics. Characteristics of democratic rule but also informal 
practices induce hybrid regimes with a more democratic face to strive to minimise, 
but in certain regards to intensify, interdependencies and coordination. The 
paragraphs below detail the conceptualisation of the function of regional 
organisations according to these hypotheses.  
The ultimate goal of the former Soviet republics of consolidating sovereignty 
through active membership in regional organisations can be differentiated 
according to the following priorities. The ruling elite in post-Soviet hybrid regimes 
with predominant authoritarian features is primarily oriented towards consolidating 
Westphalian sovereignty. They, secondly, strive to consolidate domestic 
sovereignty, but hardly consider consolidating interdependence sovereignty via the 
regional organisations. This priority setting finds the following explanations. 
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Authoritarian rule that builds on informal practices, a constitutive feature of hybrid 
regimes, seeks to avoid external interference in domestic affairs, since it may 
challenge regime survival. Authoritarian regimes need to provide basic security and 
welfare for their societies in order to substantiate their domestic authority. As long 
as the authoritarian elites are efficient, they have the capacity to independently 
enforce their authority in the domestic context and to independently control cross-
border flows. The ruling elite in post-Soviet hybrid regimes with an affinity towards 
democratic institutions also exploit membership in the organisations to consolidate, 
firstly, Westphalian, secondly, domestic and, thirdly, interdependence sovereignty. 
Informal practices of rule that compete with democratic institutions make the 
regime sensitive to external interference in domestic affairs. But in regional 
organisations the regimes more strongly seek support for their domestic and 
interdependence sovereignty, due to the following reasons. They need to answer 
stronger societal calls for security and welfare. This also creates a stronger demand 
to efficiently protect the society from negative externalities created by cross-border 
flows.  
The intermediary goals by which the former Soviet republics pursue their ultimate 
goals can be clustered according to the envisioned management of 
interdependencies. Ruling elites in hybrid regimes with an authoritarian face pursue 
their ultimate goals by intending to reduce the persisting regional 
interdependencies, avoiding new interdependencies but strengthening their 
capacity to act independently. Patterns of hybrid regimes require the ruling elite to 
strive for the loyalty of other elite members. The capacity to do so requires a 
flexibility to independently formulate and alter policies. Increasing 
interdependencies may therefore challenge regime stability. Ruling elites in hybrid 
regimes with a stronger affinity towards democracy intend to reduce persisting 
interdependencies but also to intensify them, if they increase the state’s capability 
to stabilise the domestic authority and control cross-border flows.   
The following three goals emerge from the empirical data as concrete terms in 
which the ruling elites of the two regimes studied use regional organisations to 
pursue their intermediary goals described above. The first is to enhance the state’s 
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capacity to respond to domestic and regional challenges. This will enable them to 
reduce the regional dependencies. The second goal is to enhance their regional and 
international leverage. This is intended to reduce existing dependencies and to 
establish fruitful interdependencies. Thirdly, they intend to maintain the regional 
organisation as format for regional interaction with the aim of monitoring the 
development of regional relations. 
The former Soviet republics regard activities that require varying intensities of 
international co-ordination as conducive to their intermediary goals. The choice of 
activities depends on the domestically established institutions for handling the 
regionally negotiated issues. Most intensive co-ordination requires the 
development of multilateral legalised institutions. The thesis assumes that hybrid 
regimes avoid such endeavours due to the principle of transparency and 
international accountability of regional multilateral legalised institutions. These are 
incompatible with the non-transparent and weakly monitored institutions in the 
hybrid regimes studied. If the ruling elite participate in multilateral legalised 
agreements, it re-interprets their function in a way that is less demanding in terms 
of co-ordination. The ruling elite in hybrid regimes with an authoritarian face prefer 
uncoordinated or weakly co-ordinated activities. In turn, the ruling elite in hybrid 
regimes with a stronger affinity towards democracy values more intensively co-
ordinated activities, if these activities support the domestically established 
institutions. The degree to which the ruling elite is able to not only participate in but 
also to alter the function of the activities according to their needs, depends on their 
ability to formulate a policy top-down without bottom-up interference from players 
in the society at large or the state administration. The ideas of bottom-up policy 
formulation might oppose ruling elites' ideas of the function of regional 
organisations, since they may have been socialised into internationally promoted 
ideas and practices of regional organisations. Strong authoritarian features in a 
hybrid regime facilitate the re-interpretation of activities in a way that avoids 
intensive co-ordination. They can avoid any impact of ‘social learning’ in the course 
of regional interaction. It permits the re-interpretation of activities in a way that 
avoids intensive co-ordination. The re-interpretation of the function of CIS and 
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GUAM activities according to the intermediary goals by the ruling elites in both 
regimes can be specified as follows:  
1. Intermediary goal ‘maintaining the regional organisation’: Bureaucratic 
procedures and negotiations keep an organisation alive. Adopted legalised 
agreements strengthen its external credibility. Joint activities may ensure 
the members’ interest in the organisation, since they potentially enhance 
expertise or foster exchange of experiences. Investment projects of capable 
partners may revitalise the interest of economically weaker members. They 
increase the organisation’s credibility by producing tangible results.  
2. Intermediary goal ‘strengthening state capacity’: Bureaucratic procedures 
generate information on developments in the neighbourhood that may be 
considered in domestic policies. They also allow the diffusion of domestic 
best practices and induce the partners in the organisation to adjust their 
policies accordingly. Negotiations allow states to potentially influence other 
member states’ legislation. Adopting agreements in one issue-area may 
enhance the negotiation leverage in other areas. Joint activities strengthen 
networks among state officials in the region and advance the capacity of the 
member states to independently tackle regional and domestic challenges. 
Investment projects stabilise the economic situation in the investing state 
and enhance the economy of the recipient. 
3. Intermediary goal ‘enhancing regional and international leverage’: 
Bureaucratic procedures signal alliance and commitment to ‘international 
standards of behaviour’, namely co-operation and integration. The initiation 
of agreements signals regional leadership and triggers acknowledgment of 
regional and international actors. Strong networks between state agencies 
also enhance a state’s regional influence. Improved domestic capacity also 
improves a state’s regional position. Investment projects increase 
dependence on the investing states. This affects the regional but also 
international visibility of the sender.  
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Figure 2: Conceptualisation of Regional Organisations in the Post-Soviet Space: Policy Goals, Instruments and 
their Function 
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4. METHODOLOGY: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
ANALYSIS 
This chapter outlines the methodological parameters of the empirical study. The 
structure of this chapter is subordinated to three aims. The first is to locate the 
study in the interpretivist research tradition. Highlighting the premises of the 
chosen interpretivist approach will ensure an appropriate evaluation of the 
theoretical and empirical research findings.1 The second aim is to spell out the 
empirical design, including the case selection and data collection. This will enable 
the reader to assess the strength of the empirical research design. The third step 
intends to inform the reader about the validity of the data interpretation and hence 
the research findings. 
4.1. INTERPRETIVIST METHODOLOGY 
This thesis dedicates itself to an explorative research endeavour with theoretical 
aspirations. The previous chapters outlined that the thesis is interested in grasping 
the specific interpretation of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space by their 
member-states. The research gap which the thesis seeks to close concerns the fact 
that existing theories fall short of explaining how the former Soviet republics 
conceptualise the function of the regional organisations. Accordingly, a theory-test 
as proposed by neo-positive schools seems less adequate to gain the intended 
knowledge. Gerring contends that in such situation an explorative approach 
focussing on few cases only supports the research interest more adequately.2 The 
empirical study therefore oriented itself to the interpretivist tradition and borrowed 
the research strategy from Grounded Theory. This section will briefly sketch the 
advantages and implications of an interpretivist approach for this thesis.  
Interpretivist schools seek to explain social phenomena, which appear in a certain 
time and space, to generate knowledge about social interactions. In contrast to 
their neo-positivist opponents, interpretivists reject the idea that ‘reality’ is 
                                                          
1
 Flick, Managing Quality in Qualitative Research, 136. 
2
 Gerring, John (2004), What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? . American Political Science 
Review,Vo. 98, No. 2, p 349. 
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discernible through grand theories of human behaviour.3 Interpretivists argue that a 
specific phenomenon has to be studied empirically and informed by previous 
research on similar phenomena.4 While neo-positivists define formulating and 
falsifying parsimonious theories as a research aim, interpretivists intend to highlight 
specific manifestations of an empirical phenomenon.5 As discussed in chapter three, 
they employ theory as a heuristic tool and translate empirical findings into abstract 
terms.6 Their core concern is, however, to avoid the theory putting blinkers on the 
empirical study. Therefore interpretivist research is not guided by a small set of 
predefined variables, but tries to identify relevant factors that determine a social 
phenomenon from a broad range of data. Such inductive approach appears 
adequate for tracing how the ruling elites in the countries under study 
conceptualise the function of regional organisations. Measuring variables defined 
beforehand would constrain the explanatory power of the research findings. 
As a second advantage interpretivist approaches do not only consider ‘objectively’ 
measurable data as valid. They ascribe explanatory power to perceptions of social 
actors. This understanding of how to study social phenomena empirically complies 
with the institutionalist concept of social actors defined in chapter 3. It is therefore 
appropriate for this study. It is, however, necessary to clarify that the study follows 
the assumption that perceptions are insightful, but it does not take a constructivist 
stance that focusses solely on ideas and values. Instead it follows a middle course 
suggested in Hebert Blumer’s social interactionism. He grasps social action as 
predominantly determined by symbolic action. Symbolic action is a deliberate 
                                                          
3
  The neo-positivist school was fundamentally developed by the ‘Vienna Circle’ in the 1920s. They 
depicted social sciences as ‘exact’ sciences that should identify valid theories on causal relations in 
the world. This approach reflected the well-established discipline physics. The fundamental idea is 
that human behaviour is like a natural phenomenon driven by universal laws. See: Giddings, Studies 
in the Theory of Human Society, 127--43.  
4
 A father of interpretivist approaches is Wilhelm Dilthey. In the 19ths century he distinguished 
natural sciences from social sciences. He rejected the idea of universal laws and defined the primary 
research interest as explaining specific empirical situations. See: Dilthey, Wilhelm (1864-1903), Logik 
und System der philosophischen Wissenschaften [Logic and System of Philosophical Sciences]. 
Goettingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p 127.  In this tradition a variety of so-called interpretivist or 
qualitative research approaches have emerged, including grounded theory, social interactionism, 
objective hermeneutics and constructivist schools. 
5
 On the procedure of falsifying theories see: Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 64. 
6
 See for instance: Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre [The Methodology of the 




(re)action driven by the interpretation of material objects and social action.7 Actors 
are able to change their patterns of action and thinking in the process of interaction 
with other actors, with objects or with themselves.8 They act rationally, but not 
according to universal preferences as objectivists assume. According to Blumer, 
interpretations define the meaning of the material and ideational world.9 Three 
factors may thus give evidence of social phenomena: action, material conditions 
and interpretations of social actors. It is, accordingly, crucial to consider the actors’ 
specific interpretation of conditions and interaction when exploring a phenomenon 
empirically. The thesis will take an interpretivist path that follows the above 
sketched line of research interest, use of theory and adequate data according to the 
methodology of Max Weber and grounded theory procedures.10 The next section 
will summarise how these methodological assumptions have driven the research 
process.  
4.2. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH PROCEDURE  
This section discusses how the thesis translated the above outlined epistemological 
considerations into methods for empirical analysis and theoretical reasoning. Figure 
3 below visualises that sensitising, in other words guiding, theories stimulate the 
research focus and an analytical framework finalises the research process. However, 
the study builds fundamentally on empirical data. While chapter 3 has already 
outlined how theory is used, the thesis owes the reader some explanation of the 
empirical research steps. The following two paragraphs will therefore detail the 
data collection and analysis. 
                                                          
7






 Grounded Theory is a ‘research style’ Breuer, Franz (2009), Reflexive Grounded Theory. 
Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, p 40. developed in the 1970s by Anselm Strauss/Barney Glaser and which 
focuses on non-standardised, inductive theory-building. 
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Grounded theory inspired the data collection and analysis. It appeared to give the 
most precise instructions for how to process a large amount of qualitative data in a 
structured way. The instructions facilitate the reproduction and revision of the 
individual analytical steps, which is necessary for generating valid findings. This is a 
condition for responding to the common critique that qualitative methods indulge 
in unreliable ‘analysis light’.11 The analytical steps proposed by grounded theory 
seem reproducible enough to minimise volatility and produce reliable findings. The 
paragraphs below will outline the implications of grounded theory procedures for 
designing the expert interviews, defining relevant data from field research and for 
analysing the primary data.  
Grounded theory advocates open and in-depth interviewing as the most fruitful 
method to gain valid original data. This means the interviewer guides the 
interviewee into the general topic but follows the structure of narration as 
proposed by the interviewee. The interviewer seeks to grasp the topic as 
interpreted by the interviewee. Proceeding thus may generate original perspectives 
that go beyond the prior assumptions derived from existing literature.12 In the eyes 
of grounded theory proponents ‘all is data’.13 Accordingly, the empirical study 
factored in insights from informal talks and observations into the analysis.  
                                                          
11
 Clarke, Adele (2005), Situational Analysis. Grounded Theory after the Postmodern Turn. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage Publications, p 28. 
12
 Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory. A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis, 14-25. 
13
 Breuer, Reflexive Grounded Theory, 60. 
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The data analysis followed the method of qualitative analytical coding.14 In a first 
step, interview data are interpreted and disaggregated into concepts. This means 
that passages of the text are coded, in other words labelled according to ideas that 
shape the phrases.15 A second step pools these concepts into more abstract 
categories. Some of these categories are derived from theories that have been used 
as guiding theories. Others emerge from the data.16 Finally, the analytical 
framework linked these categories into a coherent framework based on 
assumptions about their relationship as identified in the data.17 The next section 
will now specify this procedure for this thesis by highlighting the case selection, the 
interview sampling and analysis. 
4.3. EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES 
This subchapter first clarifies the case study design and case selection and critically 
reflects on the explanatory power of the case sample. It then discusses strengthens 
and pitfalls of the interview sample obtained. The last sub-section exemplifies the 
process of theory building. All three steps will bring aspects that determined the 
explanatory strength of the data to the reader’s attention; namely their outreach, 
their appropriateness to provide evidence on the phenomenon examined and the 
data triangulation undertaken. 
4.3.1. CASE STUDY DESIGN 
The thesis aims to provide an innovative understanding of how the former Soviet 
republics conceptualise the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet 
space. Accordingly, an appropriate case study design was needed in order to 
generate valid and original empirical data. Questions of representativeness and the 
depth of the data analysis results guided the decision-making process in this regard. 
A large sample of cases strengthens the generalisability of the research findings. 
                                                          
14
 The term has been coined by Lyn Richards, but the method builds on analysis strategies developed 
by the father of grounded theory, Anselm Strauss. See for the description of qualitative analytical 
coding: Richards, Lyn (2005), Handling Qualitative Data. A Practical Guide. London: SAGE 




 Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory. A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis, 46. 
17
 Corbin and Strauss, Basics of Qualitative Research, 113. 
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The broader the data pool, the more valid the results.18 On the other hand, a large-
n study requires substantial compromises in the openness and depth of the 
empirical approach, if time and financial constraints exist. A common strategy is to 
rely on already aggregated data, e.g. from indices or statistical data bases, or to 
narrow the research perspective to a small number of pre-defined variables.19 Both 
strategies substantially limit the attention to data that build on pre-existing 
interpretations, which constraints the innovative potential. The thesis therefore 
took the argument into consideration that an in-depth study of a few cases provides 
more valid findings than a superficial large-n comparison.20 Accordingly, it preferred 
a small-n study and analysed two cases. 
The intensity, with which small-n samples can be explored, promises to generate 
original empirical knowledge.21 The empirical study undertaken in the thesis has not 
only the ambition to understand the cases studied. It also intends to develop 
hypotheses which might shed light on the theoretical puzzle outlined in section 3.1. 
Such an analysis requires a great deal of theoretical reflection.22 An account of this 
has been given in chapter 3. As recommended by Harry Eckstein the empirical study 
does so by exploring the cases seriatim. If the findings of a case study are supported 
by other cases their plausibility increases.23 The study therefore treated the case as 
‘explorative single case’ studies. This implies that the analysis has processed the 
data separately for each country according to their inherent logic. This was done by 
a so-called 'thick analysis' that made it possible to consider detailed information 
and to inquire the meaning of human behaviour.24 Compared have been the results 
of the country-specific analysis.25 To gain deeper knowledge about the cases two 
within-case studies have been made. The intention was to focus on the same within 
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 Ragin, Charles C. (1987), The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press, p 10. 
19
 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 33. 
20
 Lijphart, Arend (1971), Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. The American Political 
Science Review, No. 65, p 685. 
21
 Thies, Cameron G (2002), A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study of 
International Relations. International Studies Perspectives, No. 3, p 354. 
22
 Rueschemeyer, Can One or a Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?, 332. 
23
 Eckstein, Harry (1975), Case study and theory in political science. In: Greenstein, Fred and Polsby, 
Nelso (eds.), Handbook of political science. 79-138, p 104. 
24
 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 249. 
25
 This decision was inspired by: Dobson, Approaches to Theory Use In Interpretive Case Studies – a 
Critical Realist Perspective; Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, 692. 
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cases for the case Azerbaijan and Ukraine in order to facilitate the comparison of 
the country-specific findings.  
Criteria of validity and pragmatic concerns determined the selection of the within 
cases. Within-cases for this study are regional organisations in the post-Soviet space 
of which the case countries are members. The literature review pointed to the 
similarities among the five more robust regional organisations. These, however, 
vary in their member state constellations and slightly their organisational design. In 
this light, comparing at least two organisations seems to increase the validity of the 
findings. Regional organisations as such are still blurry research objects. A clear 
picture emerges from the analysis of the states’ participation in the activities in 
various issue-areas. But varying dynamics determined the individual issue-areas. A 
comparison of activities across individual issue-areas will therefore give a broader 
picture of the states’ participation rationales. The study has picked two issue-areas 
as within-cases: trade and non-traditional security challenges. To trace interaction 
in these areas the data collection has concentrated on concrete activities. The 
activities that serve as within-cases have been chosen during the interview sampling 
process. Only if enough interview data has been collected on the state’s 
involvement in a specific activity can it then serve as a within-case. The case study 
design can be summarised as follows: it considers two case countries and their 
engagement in two regional organisations concerning two issue-areas. The research 
experiences have shown that this design constitutes the minimum for generating 
data that allow generalising, and a maximum for gaining in-depth data. The 
following description of the case selection will underscore this statement.  
4.3.2. CASE AND WITHIN-CASE SELECTION 
The next paragraphs will detail the case selection criteria and selected cases and 
within-cases, in order to highlight the degree to which the expected data may serve 
the research interest. The section will discuss the selection of case countries, 
within-cases and summarise the selected cases and discuss the strength of the 
sample in a final paragraph.  
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4.3.2.1. CASE COUNTRIES 
As indicated above, the case universe consists of any former Soviet republic that is a 
member in more than one regional organisation in the post-Soviet space. In 2009, 
when the empirical research started, eleven states conformed to these criteria.26 
The within-case design required the case countries to be members in the same two 
regional organisations. This criterion divides the former Soviet republics into two 
groups: Armenia, Belarus, the Central Asian states and Russia as members of the 
CIS, the Collective Security Organisation (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC), and Azerbaijan, Georgia,27 Moldova and Ukraine which 
gather in the CIS and GUAM. Figure 4 visualises these constellations.  
The ambition to enhance the picture of regionalism in this area of the world 
motivated the decision to select the second group. As the literature review argued, 
the research so far has mostly considered Russia and the Central Asian states; 
though with a different analytical angle. Thus it was intriguing to widen the regional 
perspective to Moldova, Ukraine and the South Caucasus. Except for Armenia, these 
states have an ambivalent attitude towards regional formats that strongly involve 
Russia. It is therefore revealing to identify what rationales nevertheless keep them 
as active members in the CIS. Further, it is enlightening to study how they shape 
regional interactions in a format without Russia, namely in GUAM. Two final 
observations led to the selection of Azerbaijan and Ukraine. First, these countries 
have been the most outspoken advocates of GUAM. In the study period of 2010-
2012 they appear to be among the most active GUAM members.28 The second 
argument refers to the case selection strategy suggested by John Gerring and Jason 
Seawright. They recommend selecting cases with strong variations on the matter of 
theoretical interest. The third research question pays interest to the impact of 
political regime types on the approach towards the regional organisations.29 As 
chapter 1.5.1 has already outlined, the two countries are the most different in their 
political regime among the GUAM members. The political regime in the two 
                                                          
26
 The Baltic States have never been members in any of these organisations. Turkmenistan is only a 
member of the CIS, but has suspended its membership several times.  
27
 Georgia left the CIS in 2010. 
28
 See chapter 5, section 5.2 and 5.3 for more details.  
29
 Seawright, Jason and John Gerring (2008), Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research. A 
menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly,Vo. 61, No. 2, p 296. 
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countries resembles a hybrid regime.30 However, they vary in their affinity towards 
authoritarianism and democracy. Ukraine has made significant progress towards 
democracy in the 2000s and is marked by political pluralism. Nevertheless, many 
formal institutions of the democratic polity are still undermined and the country is 
trapped in the struggle between authoritarian and democratically oriented ruling 
elites. The hybrid regime in Azerbaijan is on the contrary characterised by a 
relatively stable authoritarian rule. This variation promises thought-provoking 
insights on the impact of different institutions of the domestic political regime on 
the states’ conceptualisation of the function of regional organisations. The thesis 
refrains from narrowing down the research focus to specific variables related to the 
regime types. As chapter 2 has contended, the literature consulted does not suggest 
convincing hypotheses on which aspects of the political regime to focus primarily. 
The following open approach was therefore more adequate. The bulk of the data is 
interview data. The interviews did not contain questions related to characteristics of 
the regime types as section 4.4.1 will spell out. Instead the question if regime 
related issues play a role in the interview narratives guided the interpretation of the 
data. This implies that the thesis cannot give an account of how important regime 
characteristics are in relation to other factors. It, however, displays how regime 
characteristics impact the policy in regional organisations in the two cases studied.    
                                                          
30
 Constitutive for hybrid regimes is integration of democratic and authoritarian elements. With 
reference to empirical literature on hybrid regimes in the post-Soviet space and beyond the thesis 
considers the dominance of informal rule which is non-transparent and alters the function of the 
formal institutions as a characteristic of hybrid regimes. For a detailed discussion see section 3.4.3. 
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4.3.2.2. WITHIN-CASES: ISSUE AREAS IN THE CIS AND GUAM 
The selection of case countries also implied which regional organisations were in 
focus, namely the CIS and GUAM. As has been discussed in chapter 2, both 
organisations proved to be relatively durable and, on closer inspection, show 
relatively intense activities.31 They also share the majority of fields of activity. 
According to the agreements adopted, the CIS pursues activities in economy, 
society and education, military related areas and non-traditional security 
challenges.32 So does GUAM but without the military dimension. Areas in which 
both Azerbaijan and Ukraine are most ‘active’ qualify as within-cases. Their degree 
                                                          
31
 The review of literature on the CIS and GUAM in chapter 2 leads to this conclusion. 
32
  The adopted agreements and documents have been summarised into these five issue-areas 
according to the following criteria: economy (trade regulations, tax and customs, production, 
monetary and currency regulations, transport); societal matters and education (social security, 
higher education, specific social minorities, cultural activities and democracy promotion); military 
co-operation (border forces, peace building, military-industrial complex, military trainings); ‘non-
traditional security challenges’ (counter-actions against terrorism, organised crime, especially drug 
trafficking, irregular migration and human trafficking, information, environment). 
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of ‘activeness’ had to be determined in a pre-study by desk-research. Secondary 
literature and newspapers, even studies on Ukraine, give only a vague picture of the 
countries’ activeness in the CIS and GUAM. The most reliable source to inform the 
within-case selection has been CIS and GUAM documents. Adopted decisions and 
reports that count Ukraine and/or Azerbaijan among the signatories indicate at 
least that the countries take some interest in the documents adopted. The pre-
study has taken into account that these documents do not give evidence of the 
intensity of commitment or the actual intention of this activity. They nevertheless 
qualified as a starting point for further inquiry. Therefore, the pre-study quantified 
and compared the number of documents in each issue-area which have been signed 
by each country. The assessment of the country’s ‘activeness’ factored in the 
number of documents signed and the question, if the country proactively pursued 
an agreement. Areas in which the states signed more than 60% of the documents 
and ideally took initiative are possible within-cases. For Azerbaijan and Ukraine in 
both GUAM and the CIS these are ‘society and education’, ‘economy’ and ‘non-
traditional security challenges’. Figure 5 gives evidence of the quantitative 
distribution of Azerbaijan’s and Ukraine’s activeness in the CIS. A deeper glance at 
agreements in the field ‘society and education’ revealed that these mostly relate to 
projects with limited outreach and hence require low internal and regional policy 
co-ordination.33 In that light, activities related to economy and non-traditional 
security challenges promised a more fertile ground for the analysis. Both are 
additionally attractive, since scholars argue that these fields increasingly require 
regional solutions in times of globalisation.34 To intensively study these issue-areas, 
a concentration on selected activities is necessary. 
                                                          
33
 Various interviewees confirmed this impression. They explained the main activities as short-term 
or formal activities which qualify in the first place to increase the records of the organisation’s 
activities (UA_MFA_3, GUAM_Official_2). 
34
 Farrell et al., Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, 3. 
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Figure 5: Total CIS Agreements and Agreements Signed by Azerbaijan and Ukraine;  
in Total Number of Documents 
 
Source: compiled by the author according to information from www.cis.minsk.by, June 2010 
4.3.2.3. ACTIVITIES CONCERNING ECONOMY AND SECURITY  
On a closer look, activities in the selected issue-areas split into several activities 
within various fields of economic and security activities. In order to cope with the 
given variety, the study concentrates on one field of activity in each issue-area and 
ideally on one concrete activity of this field. But the study also consulted additional 
fields and concrete activities for the following reasons. While the diversity of fields 
of activity and concrete projects in CIS and GUAM interaction is high, the projects 
are often not deeply elaborated. That means the number of state officials involved 
is not necessarily high, neither is the number of observable implementation steps. 
Since it was not possible to arrange interviews with all relevant actors for one 
direction, some interviews were conducted with state officials involved in other 
directions. This required opening the focus up for additional fields or activities. The 
presentation of the findings in this thesis, however, concentrates on only two 
activities. Figure 7 summarises the case-study design and informs about the 
presented and the additionally considered within cases.  
CIS economic activities cover twelve fields of activity. The spheres in which 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine are party to more than 60% of general and specific 
agreements and participate in councils allow for an in-depth analysis. These are 













transport. The general economic strategy includes aspects of all economic 
directions and will therefore be excluded. The CIS happened to negotiate a new free 
trade agreement in the period 2009-2011, which was adopted in October 2011. 
Ukraine and Azerbaijan participated in the negotiations. Hence, this activity 
presented itself as an economic within-case for the CIS. The number of agreements 
within GUAM is too low to quantify the economic activities in a meaningful way. 
However, the free trade agreement is promoted as GUAM’s flagship project. 
Accordingly, the GUAM study is also oriented at free trade. However, two 
interviews were made with officials from the transport ministry in Ukraine. 
Additional information were gathered on Azerbaijan’s interest in CIS cross-border 
activities and three GUAM working group meetings on transport, banking and 
customs issues have been attended. This material helps to compile a more 
comprehensive picture.  
A common information space, anti-terrorism, anti-organised crime, anti-drug 
trafficking, migration, emergency situations and environmental protection are the 
pillars of CIS and GUAM initiatives concerning non-traditional security challenges. 
Figure 6 points out that Azerbaijan and Ukraine signed most CIS agreements on 
anti-terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration. A lack of data on GUAM 
activities in this area made it impossible to assess the countries’ ‘activeness’. Access 
to state officials from state security bodies in a foreign country is problematic in any 
case and even harder in a non-democratic environment. The final decision regarding 
which activities to focus on was therefore made during the field work. Interviews 
were conducted with actors involved in anti-terrorism, anti-irregular migration and 
anti-drug trafficking measures in both countries. But most valid data have been 
collected on the topic of migration in Azerbaijan and anti-drug trafficking in Ukraine. 
The thesis refers therefore to activities in these areas as security related within-
cases. The data collected do not allow presenting congruent security related within-
cases for Azerbaijan and Ukraine, but qualify to give valid insights for each country.  
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Figure 6: CIS Security Agreements Signed by Ukraine and Azerbaijan,  
in Total Number of Agreements 
 
Source: compiled by the author according to information from www.cis.minsk.by, June 2010 
4.3.2.4. THE CASE SAMPLE, ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES  
The intention of this section is two-fold. It will first summarise the different levels of 
the case sample in order to avoid confusion concerning cases and within-cases. A 
second paragraph will critically reflect on the explanatory power of the case sample. 
The empirical study of this thesis explores how state officials in two varying political 
regimes conceptualise the function of two regional organisations in the post-Soviet 
space. The study focuses on a hybrid political regime with affinity towards 
authoritarianism, namely Azerbaijan, and a hybrid political regime with a strong 
political pluralism, namely Ukraine. The analysis concentrates on the state's policy 
in the CIS and GUAM. To gain deep insights it examines two within-cases of the 
state's policy in the organisations. These are their policies in two issue areas. First, it 
will examine their expectations of and engagement in activities concerning free 
trade agreements. Second, Azerbaijan’s engagement in migration and Ukraine’s 
engagement in anti-drug trafficking activities will be analysed. The disparity of the 
latter within-cases for Ukraine and Azerbaijan is a consequence of the uneven 












Figure 7: Overview of the Considered Empirical Cases 
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 The selected cases show that the thesis has opted for a small-N case sample. The 
need to collect original empirical data in form of elite interviews for the study made 
it necessary to constrain the sample to two cases and two within-cases. The thesis 
has, thus, analysed not more than two out of 12 former Soviet republics, in two out 
five regional organisations and two of six possible issue areas. The part of the case 
universe covered by the research is too small to produce results that are generally 
valid for the regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. The thesis therefore 
has another agenda. The intention is to explore cases in-depth and develop   
hypotheses which future research may consider as possible answers to the 
empirical and theoretical puzzle. To recall, the empirical puzzle asks for the de facto 
function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space for the members. The 
theoretical puzzle asks if and how varying political regimes lead to varying policies in 
regional organisations.  
Since hardly any data on the policy of former Soviet republics in the organisations, 
let alone the issue areas, were available, the research strategy concentrated on the 
following. It chose two cases with substantial variations in the area of theoretical 
interest, namely the political regime type. The delivered results should therefore 
not be mistaken for proofs of the relevance of the variable 'regime type'. They just 
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suggest how and why political regime types influence the policies studied. The study 
proceeded on the basis of the decision not to specify variables in the regime types a 
priori and to test their relevance. The weak knowledge about foreign policy 
formulation in different political regimes suggested an alternative approach. In the 
research process data were collected that reflect how policy-makers give meaning 
to the foreign policy studied. The analysis has then studied if and how political 
regime aspects are a factor in the data. The absence of measurable variables made 
a comparative study design problematic. There were no variables to measure and to 
draw conclusions from their varying manifestations in more than one case. Instead 
the thesis has undertaken two theoretically oriented single case studies and has 
compared the result of these studies. This referred to the rationale that evidences 
derived from one case gain plausibility if another case suggests similar evidences. In 
neo-positivist terms the validity of the findings is low. However, in the absence of a 
theory that adequately explains the research puzzle such exploratory research is a 
necessary first step in search of theoretical explanations. The findings may inspire 
future research to test their validity by applying them to a broader set of cases. The 
research findings have to be stripped of empirical details in order to be applicable 
to other cases.  The thesis has done so in formulating the analytical framework and 
hypotheses in chapter 5 and 9. These hypotheses are thus not generalisation but 
rather abstractions from the small-N empirical studies the validity of which might be 
explored in future studies.  
Having summarised the case sample and the expectations concerning the validity of 
the results which the sample can generate the next section goes a step further. It 
discusses the validity of the gathered interview data. By doing so it makes a 
statement on the quality of the empirical research. 
4.3.3. INTERVIEW SAMPLE 
The empirical study builds on four periods of field research, two in each country. A 
two-week trip to Ukraine in 2010 enabled the conducting of a pre-test interview 
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series, honed interviewing skills and also narrowed down the analytical focus.35 A 
six-week stay Ukraine and one in Azerbaijan in 2011 followed this series. These 
stays provided the opportunity to conduct interviews primarily with state officials 
and to collect relevant documents and secondary literature from the countries. A 
short-term stay in Azerbaijan for ten days in 2012 completed the fieldwork. Overall 
40 interviews were conducted in Kyiv and 34 in Azerbaijan. The following 
paragraphs will consider three details that influence the strength of the interview 
sample and data. These are: how the field has been defined and interviewees 
chosen; challenges of the sampling process and the interview situations; and the 
validity of the interview sample in each country and the congruency of the sample 
in Azerbaijan and Ukraine.  
4.3.3.1. DEFINING THE ‘FIELD’ 
To recapitulate, the research is interested in the states’ engagement in CIS and 
GUAM activities on free trade, irregular migration and drug-trafficking. The ideal 
sample would cover all state officials who formulate policy in these areas and are 
directly involved in the respective GUAM and CIS activities. These include staff of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economics, the Customs Service, the 
Ministry of Interior, the National Migration Agency, the Ministry of National 
Security in Azerbaijan, the Security Service in Ukraine, Presidential Administration,36 
members of the parliamentary foreign policy committees, and the National Council 
of Security and Defence in Ukraine.37 In addition, government-related think-tanks, 
at least according to their brief, contribute to foreign policy-making. In Ukraine 
these are the National Institute for Strategic Studies38 and the National Institute for 
Issues of International Security.39 In Azerbaijan this is the Centre for Strategic 
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 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss recommend such a pre-test. See: Glaser and Strauss, The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory, 40. The research findings help to critically engage with the sensitising 
concepts and induce the search for alternative theoretical explanations.  
36
 Formally the presidential administration in Ukraine is not involved in foreign policy making. 
However, since the head of the administration often signs CIS agreements, some staff members can 
be expected to deal with CIS issues. 
37
 Identified by interviewees as foreign politically relevant body 
38
 The Ukrainian name: Natsional’nyi institut strategicheskykh doslidzhen’ 
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Studies under the President.40In both countries they serve as a mouthpiece for the 
government rather than having a substantial impact on governmental decisions.41 It 
was nevertheless intriguing to explore their line of argument in the subject under 
study. The aim was to also include non-state actors who deal with transnational 
economic activities and measures against irregular migration and drug-trafficking, 
since they may provide an alternative view. These are private economic actors, non-
governmental organisations and analysts.  
Access to the field was attempted by official bureaucratic means and also through 
mediating individuals, as recommended for elite interviewing.42 These were analysts 
from independent political and economic think tanks, who in Ukraine are mostly 
related to political circles. In Azerbaijan the University under the foreign ministry 
facilitated most meetings. The following paragraph will highlight some challenges of 
the sampling process.  
4.3.3.2. CATALYSTS IN THE SAMPLING PROCESS: MUTUAL BENEFITS 
AND TRUST 
Neither Azerbaijan nor Ukraine government agencies publicly disclose departments, 
staff and the respective contact details. In consequence, I had to rely on 
knowledgeable actors in the countries. Arranging interviews with state officials in 
Ukraine was a highly bureaucratic procedure. The affiliation to a Ukrainian think 
tank and a basic level of Ukrainian language increased the officials’ readiness to 
accept the interview request. The interviewees took this as a sign of real interest in 
Ukrainian matters and a readiness to go beyond stereotypical assumptions on 
Ukrainian policy. They hence regarded the interview as mutually beneficial. This was 
expressed in questions on whether I would be able to communicate my research 
results in policy making communities abroad. One interviewee contacted me again, 
after the interview, to ask for an assessment how the international community 
might react to a given political statement. By permitting access to a foreign student 
to the ministries, the state officials also intended to express ‘Western standards’ in 
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 The Azerbaijani name: Strateji Arashdirmalar Markazi 
41
 Assessment of AZ_Analyst_5, AZ_Analyst_7, UA_NSDC_1, UA_NSDC_2, UA_Analyst_1 
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 Odendahl, Teresa and Aileen M Shaw (2001), Interviewing Elites. In: Gubrium, Jaber F and 




the Ukrainian state administration. They often asked whether the access had been 
easier than would have been the case in the UK. One department asked for 
concrete co-operation: they needed access to international journal articles. My 
readiness to have a look for them was answered with: this is how international co-
operation actually works.43 Recommendations from ‘insiders’ played a role, but a 
minor one. Striking was the reluctance of state officials to arrange meetings with 
their colleagues, which foiled any significant snow-ball effect.44It conveyed the 
impression that the trust among the colleagues and between ministries is rather 
low.  
In Azerbaijan an official letter to the secretariat of each minister had to accompany 
the contact phase. However, it never opened access unless informal ways of making 
contact were initiated in parallel. The most relevant commodity appeared to be 
names of state officials and cell-phone numbers. Two ‘high-level’ insiders to 
ministerial structures and a section at the foreign ministry arranged most meetings. 
My influence on the sample in Azerbaijan was hence fairly limited, at least with 
regard to state agencies. The reciprocity of benefits was also relevant. They 
generally expected me to function as an advocate of the ruling elite in the West. 
Most interviewees mentioned that they hardly meet foreign researchers. They 
blamed foreign researchers for sticking to prejudices rather than engaging in a 
proper exchange. As the low effect of the formal request showed, the limited 
presence of foreign researchers might, however, be produced by access barriers 
rather than by a lack of interest. ‘Trust’ was the most important catalyst. With a 
well-integrated and to a certain degree powerful insider arranging meetings, my 
requests were hardly ever rejected. As soon as I received somebody’s cell-phone 
number and mentioned from whom I obtained it, the interviewees agreed to a 
meeting even without knowing the details of the research topic. In such situations, 
a few interviewees inquired with the ‘insider’ about my trustworthiness. The only 
official I contacted in the ordinary bureaucratic manner (having received the office 
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 Interviewee from the Ministry of Interior (UA_MoI_1) 
44
 Snow-ball sampling describes the collection of contact details and access to interviewees by 
personal recommendations given by one interviewee to another. Warren, Carol B (2001), Qualitative 
Interviewing. In: Gubrium, Jaber F and Hostein, James A (eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p 87. 
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number from the general secretariat of the ministry) accused me of espionage and 
obviously rejected a meeting. However, later this department received a consent 
letter from the secretariat of the ministry to give me an interview and asked for 
written questions. They indeed answered these questions and posted them to 
Birmingham some six weeks after my stay. This is an expression of the bureaucracy 
in Azerbaijan working well. 
As a consequence of this ‘trust based’ mode of interviewee selection, on which I 
had only limited influence, it was far harder to meet people from all relevant 
institutions. The sample is biased, since it includes mostly members of one circle of 
elites. Due to the lack of transparency in the elite circles, it is hard to assess if the 
bias is significant. Chances to balance it were provided by alternative information 
from economic and political analysts from the opposition camp.  
4.3.3.3. INTERVIEW SAMPLE AND DATA VALIDITY: UKRAINE 
It was possible to speak to the relevant departments of the foreign ministry and the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. I met in total seven foreign ministry 
staff members, of which two were currently members of the diplomatic service. 
Two interviews with state officials in charge of free trade issues in the CIS and 
GUAM have been made in the economics ministry. Additionally, two analysts were 
interviewed who had worked in the ministry until a few months before the meeting. 
Two officials from the State Service for Technical Regulations which deals with 
technical aspects of free trade agreed to an interview. Three interviews in the 
Ministry of Interior covered anti-drug, anti- illegal-migration policy. Apparently due 
to its fundamental re-organisation the National Migration Service was not 
available.45 Fortunately two interviewees were identified who had formerly worked 
in the state migration structures; one of them on the CIS. The Ministry of 
Infrastructure was available for two interviews on CIS and GUAM transportation 
issues. Two staff members of the National Security and Defence Council were 
interviewed. In addition, the interview sample includes four analysts from 
government- affiliated and nine from independent think tanks. 
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It was hard to discern the actual influence of the interviewees. Some interviewees 
confirmed that formal hierarchies are not necessarily congruent to de facto 
hierarchies.46 I hardly received background information about the interviewees and 
therefore had to rely on their self-presentation for judging how deeply they are 
involved in the processes and how deep their knowledge thus is. In total ten state 
bureaucrats were in a merely executive position. Three analysts had previously 
been in executive positions at a ministry. Five state officials reported that they had 
more decision-making competences. One interviewee from the National Council for 
Security and Defence was dealing with strategy development at a higher and one at 
a low level. One analyst from a governmental think tank can be considered as 
involved in strategy development. Three analysts previously functioned as policy 
advisors with close relation to the president and government. Ukrainian ministries 
often face a staff re-shuffle or a change of their portfolio. How well informed the 
interviewees were, therefore, depended on the time they stayed in the relevant 
position. Fortunately, 15 state officials had held the position for several years and 
only seven have been in charge for only a few years.  
The expertise on GUAM and the CIS is well balanced. 24 policy makers, analysts and 
private entrepreneurs were knowledgeable regarding the CIS and 23 regarding 
GUAM issues. But only eight state officials directly participated in GUAM, while 17 
had direct experience with the CIS. 18 interviewees had expertise on Ukrainian 
trade policy in GUAM (seven with direct involvement). Seven interviewees had dealt 
with Ukraine’s participation in security initiatives in GUAM, but only three of them 
directly. In contrast, of the 18 interviewees with expertise on trade in the CIS, 11 
had been directly involved in CIS meetings. Five interviewees had direct experience 
with security activities in the CIS. This balance is obviously not ideal. However, those 
interviewees who talked about GUAM and CIS security activities were directly active 
in one of the regional organisations and held this position for a longer period 
already. Against this background the sample is still considered as sound. The 
interview time of 30 to 90 minutes was sufficient to get substantial information and 
verify details.  
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4.3.3.4. INTERVIEW SAMPLE AND DATA VALIDITY: AZERBAIJAN 
The governmental agencies in Azerbaijan were as open as those in Ukraine. Eight 
current and three former foreign ministry staff members, three current and one 
former economics ministry employee, two employees from the Ministry of Interior, 
and two officials from the State Migration Service agreed to interviews. Some 
information concerning Azerbaijan’s stance on customs issues in GUAM were 
collected during a GUAM event in Baku. Two members of the parliamentary foreign 
affairs committee, five government-related and eight independent analysts 
complete the sample.47 A certain imbalance concerning expertise on GUAM and the 
CIS marks the sample. This mismatch is in large part a result of the ‘trust-based’ 
access to the ministries. The two ‘insiders’ who brokered the appointments had 
relations primarily with the departments that interacted with GUAM. Attempts to 
reach foreign ministry officials in charge of CIS issues succeeded only once.  
More strongly than in Ukraine some interlocutors stressed the incongruence of 
formal position and de facto influence in the state administration.48 A proper 
understanding of their power beyond executing bureaucratic tasks required insights 
into the interviewee’s relation to crucial decision-making actors in the state 
administration and government. Objective information was obviously not available. 
So I asked third parties how they would assess the influence of the interviewees and 
took notes in case some information on this popped up during the interview. The 
following picture emerged: Six interviewees are most likely part of the circles that 
shape foreign policy. Seven individuals appear to be in close contact with influential 
actors. They have valid information, but limited influence. Seven of the interviewed 
analysts are in rather distant contact with political elite and, hence, in some cases 
lack first-hand information on policy-making rationalities. Three of them do not any 
have constructive contact with members of the wider political elite. These analysts 
shared meaningful background information on state-society relations.  
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 The assessment of an expert being close to the government is not only based on formal affiliation 
but also on the degree to which the expert’s activities are in conjunction with state-institutions. 
‘Independent’ means not employed in state-related institutes and being weakly linked to state-
institutions.   
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 See also: Guliyev, Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An 
Attempt at Conceptualization. 
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Among the interviewees 11 individuals – eight of them state officials - had direct 
experience with GUAM but only ten were directly engaged with the CIS. Of the 
latter, only three individuals participated in CIS bodies. The remaining six played an 
active role in domestic co-ordination of CIS positions. No economic actor was 
interviewed on the CIS FTA, while three actors related their perception on the 
GUAM FTA. Their information also referred to general transnational trade practices 
in the post-Soviet space and therefore informs the study of CIS trade activities as 
well. About 15 individuals provided information on Azerbaijan’s trade policy within 
CIS and GUAM and about state-business relations in the country. Five individuals 
were directly concerned with CIS trade policy and three individuals with GUAM 
trade. In total only five interviews covered the issue of drug-trafficking and four 
interviews with state bureaucrats and one interviewee at GUAM concerned 
Azerbaijan’s regional migration policy. The number of interviews on these security-
related issues is low, but the interviewees had first-hand information. Regarding 
irregular migration additional first-hand information was added by two experts who 
had pursued non-governmental activities in this area for several years.  
4.3.3.5. ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS IN THE GUAM SECRETARIAT 
GUAM has its headquarters in Kyiv, which facilitated making contact with the 
organisation itself. The officials permitted me to attend four GUAM trade, transport 
and customs-related working groups. These facilitated background talks with 
delegates from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and four private 
economic actors (two from Ukraine, one from Azerbaijan and one from Georgia). 
Also, a US official who co-ordinates GUAM-US security programmes was available 





Figure 8: Interviewees and Their Degree of Knowledge about the Research Topic 
Azerbaijan 
Interviewees (Current or Former) State 
Officials/Parliamentarians/Go
vernment Related Analysts 
Non-State Actors Third Parties 
Information First-hand Mediated First-hand  Mediated   
GUAM Strategy 9 1 3 9 4 GUAM officials, 1 
Interviewee in 
Ukraine 
CIS Strategy 3 5 0 8  
GUAM Trade Issues 7 3 3 6 2 GUAM officials 
GUAM Tourism 
and Transport 
5 3 0 3 1 GUAM official 
CIS Trade Issues 5 2 0 7  
CIS Transport 2 3 0 3  
GUAM Security 
Issues 
4 1 2 Migration 
Policy 
0 2 GUAM officials, 1 
US interviewee 
CIS Security Issues 1 1  0   
Foreign Policy-
Making 




4 0 6 2  
Ukraine 
Interviewees (Current or Former) State 
Officials/Parliamentarians/Go
vernment Related Analysts 
Non-State Actors Third Parties 
Information First-hand Mediated First-hand  Mediated  
GUAM Strategy 11 5 2 3 4 GUAM officials, 1 
US interviewee 
CIS Strategy 11 8 0 6  
GUAM Trade Issues 2 6 3 5 2 GUAM officials 
GUAM Tourism 
and Transport 
3 1 0 0 1 GUAM official 
CIS Trade Issues 6 6 1 4  
CIS Transport 3 2 0 0  
GUAM Security 
Issues 
3 2 0 0 2 GUAM officials, 1 
US interviewee 
CIS Security Issues 3 1  0   
Foreign Policy-
Making 





5 2 3 4  
 
4.3.4. TOWARDS VALID INTERVIEW DATA 
The pre-test and the subsequently made interviews relied on different 
questionnaires. These questionnaires in any case only partially structured the 
interviews. However, I made sure that all questions were touched upon. Five 
interviewees asked me to submit the questions in written form before the 
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interview. The following clusters guided the interviews: open statements on 
perception of the organisation and the activity in focus; the relevance of 
membership in the organisation; description of the activities including negotiations; 
specific questions concerning the framing of impact, success, failure, or problems of 
co-operation; process of domestic co-ordination of the engagement in organisation, 
of positions in negotiations and of the implementation of signed documents;  direct 
request on the interviewee’s understanding of multilateralism and regional 
organisations. The questions generated episodic narratives and a framing of 
relevant ideas. Occasionally, I posed additional questions on the EU multilateral co-
operation within the Eastern Partnership, on BSEC and other organisations. This 
allowed testing if arguments were specific to the CIS and GUAM. 
Confidentiality was in both countries important for gaining valuable insights. As 
recommended for elite interviews I reduced the signs of formal interviewing.49 Most 
interviewees preferred to agree to ‘talks’ not to research interviews. A ‘research 
interview’ implied for them a greater responsibility. Fear of being held accountable 
for any quotes from the interviews would have made it problematic to request 
signing a letter of consent before the interview. Such a procedure would most likely 
have created distrusted and reduced the data quality. The ministerial working 
environment provides some explanation for this reluctance. In an environment 
where employees are dismissed easily, no state bureaucrat is eager to create 
written evidence of their conversation with researchers. Not by chance a low level 
official from the Ministry of Interior who had to report in writing about the meeting 
hardly shared any relevant information. The research tried to comply with ethical 
standards of interviewing by asking each interviewee to give explicit oral consent to 
the talk and the planned use of the interview data.50 To increase the likeliness of 
information beyond the official lines I promised to quote the interviewees only 
anonymously. Most interviews in the ministries were not taped.51 The data analysis 
is grounded on notes during the interviews and a full memo immediately after the 
meeting. In consequence this thesis cannot disclose precise information on the 
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 Odendahl and Shaw, Interviewing Elites, 310. 
50
 Basic standards concerning ethics in qualitative research are for instance presented in: Flick, Uwe 
(2006), An Introduction to Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publications, pp. 36-40. 
51
 Both strategies are recommended by: Warren, Qualitative Interviewing. 
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position and department of the interviewees. Alternatively appendix 3 provides 
some information on the expertise of the interviewees according to the following 
indicators: the hierarchical position, the duration of employment in the current 
position, direct or indirect contact to CIS and GUAM and interview topics.  
Finally, it is necessary to reflect on intercultural dissonances, since they often 
influence fieldwork.52 The interview questions were formulated openly, in order to 
avoid misapplications of concepts from different cultural backgrounds. Indeed three 
interviewees framed a positive connotation of ‘multilateralism’ as culturally specific 
to Europeans. Discussing this ‘intercultural difference’ produced valuable results. 
Certain barriers were created by the interview language. Most interviews were 
conducted in Russian, some in English. The language was chosen which allowed the 
interviewee to express him/herself freely. My broad passive and active vocabulary 
in the research sphere allowed for smooth conversations in Russian. Some 
difficulties in the understanding of technical terminology created minor obstacles 
only. After this detailed description of the quality of interview data some insights 
will follow, which give evidence of the quality of the data analysis. 
4.4. DATA ANALYSIS: QUALITATIVE ANALYTICAL CODING AND 
TRIANGULATION 
The study pursued content analysis only and neglected semantics, since most 
interviewees did not speak in their mother tongue. But the coding took structural 
narrative elements like repetitions, avoidance of answers or breaks into account.53  
4.4.1. FROM DATA TO THEORY: CATEGORIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
The first coding phase extracted descriptions of the following categories from 
interview texts and written field observations: expectations of GUAM and the CIS; 
connotations of other regional organisations; the envisioned structure of GUAM 
and the CIS; modes of participation; state practices in regional relations. These 
categories were inspired by preliminary theoretical assumptions but formulated 
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 See: Ryen, Anne (2001), Cross-Cultural Interviewing In: Gubrium, Jaber F and Hostein, James A 
(eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. Context and Method. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
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 Bazeley, Qualitative Data Analysis with NVIVO, 82. 
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broadly in order not to ‘force data into codes’.54 The first two categories gathered 
general perceptions on the CIS and GUAM. Statements on the activities and their 
co-ordination in the organisations were put into the category ‘mode of participation 
in GUAM and CIS’ and ‘envisioned structure’. These categories allowed cross-
checking the statements on perceptions with information about practical 
experiences. The category ‘governmental practices’ collected descriptions of 
policymaking processes, policy implementation, practices of rule and regime 
support.  
This process in which pre-defined categories served as basis created more specific 
categories.55 These helped to adjust the analytical focus to the most relevant 
aspects, as suggested in the grounded theory literature.56 The following categories 
arouse attention: relation between ultimate and intermediary goals, the 
differentiation of the function of activities from their apparent purpose, notions of 
multilateralism, domestic decision making processes, and the relation between 
activities in the regional organisations and established domestic practices. The next 
step set up relationships between the categories to construct a coherent analytical 
frame. The interviews provided initial assumptions about the relations. Empirical 
and theoretical literature motivated a final re-consideration of the categories and 
assumptions and facilitated the transfer of the empirical observations into already 
established abstract terms. The analytical frame presented in chapter three reflects 
the results of this process.  
4.4.2. TRIANGULATION: TESTING THE DATA VALIDITY  
Some words on how triangulation has minimised the risk of misinterpreting the 
interview narratives will conclude the discussion of the reliability of the data 
analysis.57 Triangulation is an answer to the fact that interview data are constructed 
in the interaction during the interview and primarily reflect individual 
                                                          
54
 Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 228. 
55
 The procedure has been recommended by Jan Kruse:  
56
 Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory. A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis, 46. 
Breuer, Reflexive Grounded Theory, 74, 92. 
57
 Uwe Flick defines the term as: ‘Triangulation means that an issue of research is considered […] 
from (at least) two points. Normally, the consideration from two or more points is materialized by 
using different methodological approaches.’ Flick, Managing Quality in Qualitative Research, 40. 
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interpretations.58 Four strategies triangulated the data. First, the consistency of the 
content and weight of individual concepts within an interview was checked. 
Clarifying questions often concluded the interview. In some cases a second 
interview at a later data served as a basis for comparison.59 Second, the position 
and access to first hand of information of the interviewee was considered. Third, 
the argumentation of interviewees was checked against the arguments of others. 
Fourth, the plausibility of statements was tested by comparison with other primary 
and secondary data. The sources were documents, UN comtrade data, newspapers 
and secondary literature. Having sketched measures to ensure the data validity, the 
question emerges as to the extent of their explanatory power. 
4.5. EXPLANATORY POWER OF THE DATA 
Interpretive research is often criticised for its bold claim to achieve valid insights 
into the behaviour of groups, in this case ministries and states, by exploring the 
rationales of only a small number of individuals. The previous reflections stressed 
that this thesis is aware of the limited explanatory power of the two explorative 
single case studies and also of the weaknesses of the data sample and potential 
biases of the collected perspectives. The research has dealt with the limited case 
number by studying two within-cases for each case. Anyhow, the hypotheses 
derived from the two cases do therefore not claim to explain the behaviour of all 
former Soviet republics or hybrid political regimes in regional organisations. They do 
no more than suggest some factors that influence Azerbaijan's and Ukraine's policy 
in the CIS and GUAM. Chapter 3 and 9, nevertheless, formulate the findings in an 
abstract way to make them accessible for researchers who study related cases.  
Several triangulation strategies strove to minimise the weaknesses of the data 
sample and the risk of biased perspectives. At any rate, the data delivered more 
insights than documents or statistics. Documents are often a policy instrument 
themselves and do not disclose the actual purpose of an action. Statistics give 
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 Breuer, Reflexive Grounded Theory, 39; Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory. A Practical 
Guide Through Qualitative Analysis, 35. 
59
 Kvale, Steinar (2007), Doing Interviews. London: Sage Publications, pp. 80-82. 
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evidence on a status quo, but not on meanings or causality. In this light, interview-
based data acquisition is an appropriate way to generate original data.  
An ideal sample including all primary actors that would strengthen the transfer from 
individual perspectives to the group behaviour is impossible to reach, especially in 
elite interviews. However, the number of interviews is relatively high in both 
countries and allows for the formulation of strong hypotheses. The number of 
interviews in Ukraine is higher. In exchange, the experience of the interviewees in a 
certain position is higher in Azerbaijan. A relatively balanced sample was collected 
in both case countries. Overall, the thesis can claim to build on sound original data 
that illuminate the research interest more than other data. It is now the task of the 




5. CIS AND GUAM MEMBERSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS 
This first empirical chapter devotes its attention to the first research question. It will 
highlight the aims which Azerbaijan and Ukraine intend to pursue within the CIS and 
GUAM. The analysis unveils these aims by investigating how Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine’s relations to the former Soviet neighbourhood shape their approach 
towards the CIS and GUAM. It specifically studies persisting (inter)dependencies. 
This analytical focus is rooted in the following assumptions based in the relevant 
literature. Regional organisations are an arena for states to interact and potentially 
enhance their domestic security. How states participate in an organisation strongly 
depends on their sovereignty concerns.1 Perceptions on challenges and remedies 
for domestic sovereignty stem from domestic considerations about domestic 
regime stability in the light of regional economic, security and power relations. The 
importance of persisting (inter)dependencies appears to be particularly strong in 
the post-Soviet space, due to the recent disintegration of a single polity, namely the 
USSR.2 As this section will show, the empirical data support this line of argument. 
Policy-makers describe the participation in regional organisations with reference to 
the regional dimension of the state’s sovereignty concerns.  
Literature on the post-Soviet space often depicts the sovereignty concerns of the 
newly independent states as an obstacle to their commitment to regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. For consolidating independent 
statehood the regional organisations are rather unattractive or hostile, so the 
argument goes.3 While it is evident that the states do not seek integration, the 
organisations appear to be more attractive than is indicated by this argument.4 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine did not turn away from, for instance, the CIS and GUAM, but 
are more active in these organisations than is often assumed.5 Apparently, despite 
                                                          
1
 The relevance of sovereignty has been discussed in chapter 3.4.2 and 2.2.2 with reference to inter 
alia: Hoffmann, Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western 
Europe. 
2
 Vinokurov and Libman, Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet Integration, 12. 
3
 Sakwa, The CIS: Conflicts of Space and Time, 300. 
4
 As chapter 2.3.1  discussed, neither the CIS, GUAM nor the CSTO and EurAsEC have thus far 
achieved integration in 2012.  
5
 The literature generally discusses these two states as reluctant and inactive CIS participants.  
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the sovereignty concerns, the regional environment also creates incentives for 
participation in regional organisations. As chapter 2.3 has discussed, the existing 
literature hardly satisfactorily explains how the domestic interpretation of regional 
challenges to sovereignty defines the states’ aims in the regional organisation.6 This 
chapter will therefore empirically explore this nexus in the case of Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. This analytical step will identify primarily what the analytical framework 
calls the ultimate goals of the case countries and will give first ideas about their 
intermediary goals.7 
The chapter argues that Azerbaijan and Ukraine pursue membership in the CIS and 
GUAM as a response to the regional dimension of sovereign statehood. To provide a 
differentiated picture, the chapter draws on Stephen Krasner and distinguishes 
Westphalian, domestic and interdependence sovereignty.8 Both states seek 
primarily support for their Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. Only Ukraine 
intends to gain support for its interdependence sovereignty. Policy-makers depict 
the CIS and GUAM as tools for reducing and re-organising existing 
interdependencies according to domestic security priorities. The following dilemma 
drives the specific involvement of the states’ in organisational bodies and sectoral 
activities: Westphalian sovereignty demands a reduction of interdependencies, 
challenges to domestic sovereignty induce to maintain productive 
interdependencies; finally, controlling cross-border flows calls for intensified 
interdependencies.  
The chapter derives its argument from studying how policy documents and policy-
makers frame the country’s interest in the organisations. But also how they design 
their membership in the organisational bodies and their participation in activities on 
                                                          
6
 The core argument, which has so far been developed in this regard, is that the former Soviet 
republics seek the protection of the regional hegemon or are forced into an organisation by the 
hegemon. See: Allison, Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia; 
Libman, Regionalisation and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: Current Status and Implications 
for Institutional Development.  
7
 The absolute aims reflect to what end the states' engage in the organisations under study. The 
relative aims indicate interim steps, which the states' accept on their way to the absolute aims. 
Chapter 3.4 discussed the analytical categories in detail.  
8
 ‘Domestic sovereignty’ refers to ‘the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within 
borders of their own polity’. Westphalian sovereignty emphasises the ‘exclusion of external actors 
from authority structures’ Krasner, Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, p. 9. For a discussion of the 
term see chapter 2.  
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specific issue areas. The thesis will speak about the latter as of sectoral activities. 
These indicators reflect the rhetorical and the practical dimension of CIS and GUAM 
policy. Comparing both dimensions allows conclusions to be drawn about the 
states’ ultimate goals. CIS and GUAM documents, Azerbaijani and Ukrainian foreign 
policy documents, interview narratives with state officials from Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine and staff members of the GUAM secretariat provided the necessary 
empirical insights. In addition, statistical background data reflect the strength of 
interdependencies with other former Soviet republics. The chapter concentrates on 
the years 2010-2012 but also adds insights from the period 1991-2010 to the 
analysis, since the long-term perspective provides a more accurate picture. 
Separate case studies on Azerbaijan and Ukraine will illustrate the arguments 
presented. The chapter will conclude by comparing the insights from Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine.  
5.1. AZERBAIJAN’S GOALS: CONTAINING AND EXPLOITING 
INTERDEPENDENCIES 
This section analyses Azerbaijan’s ultimate goals in the CIS and GUAM. It does so by, 
first, exploring how Azerbaijani policy-makers perceive the states’ regional 
dimension of sovereignty. A second step will investigate how this perception 
informs the way in which Azerbaijan designs its membership in the CIS and GUAM. 
The thesis may speak of ‘designing’ membership, since both organisations allow the 
states to choose the intensity of their participation and their individual sectoral 
profile.   
This section sheds light on the puzzling picture of Azerbaijan in the two 
organisations. The ruling elite has always voiced a rather distanced stance towards 
the CIS.9 Nevertheless, Azerbaijan has never been prepared to leave the 
organisation. On the contrary, Azerbaijan has gained the reputation of a partner 
                                                          
9
 The literature often sees Azerbaijan as part of the group of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan that has been rather sceptical towards the CIS from the very beginning, assumed 
membership later or did refrain from full membership and often announced to withdraw from the 
organisation. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan repeatedly withdrew from the CIS informally. In 2012, 
however, Turkmenistan assumed the CIS presidency. The foreign policy of Moldova shifted from the 
most distant policy possible toward the CIS until 1997 to far closer relations under president Voronin 
in 2001-2009. See: Bremmer, Ian and Alyson Bailes (1998), Sub-Regionalism in the Newly 
Independent States. International Affairs,Vo. 74, No. 1, p 137. 
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who is reliable, though reluctant concerning binding agreements. Azerbaijan is a 
core advocate of GUAM. This does not, however, mean that Azerbaijan engages 
more intensively in GUAM activities or accepts binding agreements. It is thus 
interesting to disclose the intentions that drive policy-makers in Azerbaijan to 
engage in such an ambivalent manner in the CIS and GUAM. The section argues that 
Azerbaijan intends to strengthen its Westphalian and domestic sovereignty via the 
CIS and GUAM. The intention is to mitigate persisting dependencies, primarily on 
Russia and Armenia, and prevent new interdependencies. This fosters ambivalent 
participation. Azerbaijan’s membership pattern appears, however, coherent if 
contemplated through the lenses of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty concerns.  
Three steps will spell out this argument empirically. A first sub-section will outline 
how regional interdependencies inform policy-makers’ framing of the states’ 
sovereignty concerns which guide participation in the CIS and GUAM. A second and 
a third sub-section will discuss how this perception determines membership in the 
CIS and GUAM.  
5.1.1. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF AZERBAIJAN’S SOVEREIGNTY 
Azerbaijani policy-makers depict the state’s Westphalian and domestic sovereignty 
as significantly linked to selected CIS members. In particular, dependencies on 
Russia and Armenia threaten Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. The narratives perceive 
Azerbaijan as relatively independent from the other CIS countries, but maintaining 
and intensifying security and economic relations with Georgia, Ukraine and the 
Central Asian states would impact positively on Azerbaijan’s struggle to consolidate 
its sovereignty. This background constitutes Azerbaijan’s interest in CIS and GUAM 
membership. The ruling elite intends to employ the organisations to monitor and 
minimise the undesired dependencies and to bind other attractive partners to 
Azerbaijan. Accordingly, Azerbaijan participates in CIS and GUAM sectoral activities 
in issue-areas in which dependencies create channels for neighbouring states to 
interfere in Azerbaijan’s affairs or where fruitful dependencies are easy to develop. 
These are trade, transport and security issues. In order to understand why CIS and 
GUAM activities in these issue-areas provide opportunities to tackle Azerbaijan’s 
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sovereignty concerns, the next paragraphs will detail Azerbaijan’s security and 
economic dependencies.  
5.1.1.1. SECURITY DEPENDENCIES  
More than 20 years after independence Azerbaijani policy-makers see the country’s 
Westphalian sovereignty directly threatened by external actors, namely through the 
secessionist conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The predominant interpretation in 
Azerbaijan draws the following picture of the conflict: the primarily Armenian 
population of Nagorno-Karabakh violated Azerbaijan’s international borders since 
1991 by claiming national self-determination and independence. With support from 
Armenia and Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh has established de facto independence.10 
Armenia and Russia, thus, pose direct threats to Azerbaijan. Consolidating 
Azerbaijan’s Westphalian sovereignty requires reducing both states’ potential for 
direct interference. An overview of how Armenia and Russia are involved in the 
conflict should disclose where they have opportunities to interfere.  
The question of the territorial belonging of the region of Nagorno-Karabakh started 
to simmer in the late 1980s and burst into full-scale war between Armenian and 
Azerbaijan from 1991-1994. Since the 1994 ceasefire, the conflict is stuck in a ‘no 
war no peace’ situation.11 A cease-fire agreement stopped the war in 1994, but 
does not prevent regular causalities at the borderline.12 The war caused 700,000 
internally displaces persons and refugees in Azerbaijan. These refugees are weakly 
integrated into society; the regular cease-fire breaches, public media and state 
rhetoric make sure that in 2012 the conflict is still strongly present in daily societal 
life.13 State-actors proclaim that only one solution for the conflict exists: Azerbaijan 
                                                          
10
 In 2012 the claimed territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic comprises 92.5% of the Soviet 
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic and five districts beyond: Agdam, Jabrayil, Fizuli, Kelbajar, 
Gubadly, Lachyn and Zanghila. Azerbaijani official sources speak of a loss of 20% of Azerbaijani 
territory. International sources assume a loss of 13.4%. International Crisis Group (2005), Nagorno-
Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground. Europe Report,Vo. 166.For more information on 
the conflict see: De Waal, Thomas (2004), Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and 
War. New York: New York University Press. 
11
 Shahnazarian and Ziemer, Young Soldiers' Tales of War in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1670. 
12
 Blakkisrud, Helge and Pal Kolsto (2012), De facto states and democracy: The case of Nagorno-
Karabakh. Communist and Post-Communist Studies,Vo. 45, p 143. 
13
 For the figures on refugees and IDPs see Yunusov, Arif (2007), Azerbaijan in the Early of the XXI 
Century: Conflicts and Potential Threats. Baku: ADILOGLU, p 12., De Waal, Black Garden. Armenia 
and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 285. An analysis of the government’s strategy to integrate 
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has to restore its territorial integrity by regaining control over Nagorno-Karabakh; if 
necessary by military means. Armenia is the aggressor in the conflict and Russia an 
ambiguous player. Russia acts as mediator in an international conflict resolution 
body, the OSCE Minsk Group.14 But Russia is also a quasi-direct conflict partner. 
Russia has supported Azerbaijan and Armenia in the war and became Armenia’s 
core ally in recent years. This ambivalent position raises mistrust in two regards. 
First, Azerbaijani policy-makers suspect Russia of exploiting its mediator position to 
distract the interest of the other OSCE Minsk Group members, the US and France. 
This would allow Russia to adjust the conflict negotiations according to its own 
regional aims. It would, for instance, imply that Russia can exploit its mediator 
position as leverage vis-à-vis Azerbaijan in economic matters and has little interest 
in solving the conflict. Indeed, Azerbaijani policy-makers perceive the US and France 
as leaving the OSCE Minsk Group to Russia.15 In case of the US they consider also 
the strong Armenian lobby as reason for the U.S. reluctance to support Azerbaijan’s 
position in the conflict.16 Secondly, policy-makers and analysts expect Russia to 
interfere on behalf of Armenia in any military action in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
The conflict setting implies the following regional policy priorities for Azerbaijan. 
First, given that the conflict is not permanently settled, Azerbaijan is eager to 
closely monitor Armenia’s military capacity. Secondly, the Russian-Armenian 
partnership requires monitoring. Thirdly, policy-makers are eager to distract Russian 
interest from Armenia by re-strengthening Russian political, economic and security 
ties with Azerbaijan. The CIS security-related and economic activities provide an 
arena for pursuing these three aims, as section 5.1.2 will discuss. A fourth priority is 
to gain the support of international players for Azerbaijan’s position in the conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
IDPs and refugees until 2010 is provided by Kjaernet, Heidi (2010), Displacement in a Booming 
Economy: IDP’s in Azerbaijan In: Overland, Indra, et al. (eds.), Caspian Energy Politics. London: 
Routledge. 
14
 The OSCE Minsk group has been active since 1995. It is co-chaired by a representative from the US, 
France and Russia with the objective of providing a framework for conflict-resolution in the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and promoting the peace process. See: http://www.osce.org/mg/66926, access: 
March 2012.  
15
 According to ministerial officials who also co-ordinate conflict related activities (AZ_MFA_2, 
AZ_MFA_1)  
16
 King, David and Miles Pomper (2006), Congress, Constituencies, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the 
Caspian. In: Shaffer, Brenda (ed.), The Limits of Culture. Islam and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, pp. 173-77. 
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An adequate framework for this is GUAM, which has developed significant co-
operation with the US. Chapter 6 and 7 will highlight how this aim informs 
Azerbaijan’s GUAM membership.  
Beyond this central conflict theme various non-traditional security challenges link 
Azerbaijan to its former Soviet neighbours. The example of migration suffices to 
exemplify how Azerbaijani state officials perceive these links. According to analysts, 
both regular and irregular migration flows to the former Soviet neighbours 
significantly support the domestic sovereignty of the political regime in Azerbaijan. 
In terms of regular, especially labour migration, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia are 
important target countries for Azerbaijani citizens. As Figure 9 indicates, official 
statistics indicate that 82% of Azerbaijan’s emigrants lived permanently in CIS 
countries in 2010. This does not include temporary or irregular labour migration, 
which is also estimated as significant.17 Factors like the economic 
underdevelopment of the Azerbaijani periphery and the consequences of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict fuel migration. Labour migrants, most of which are 
involved in vegetable trading or construction, often work on the verge of illegality in 
the post-Soviet neighbourhood.18 Trafficking of inter alia sex-workers is also well-
known in the poorer regions.19 This problem has never provoked strong 
counteraction by the government.20 These migration flows play into the hands of 
the ruling elites, since they reduce economic pressure on the regions. Remittance 
flows support the economic policy of the 2000s, which neglected the regions.21 
Outwards migration stabilises the domestic socio-economic situation. Hence, 
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 Figures from 2009 estimate there are between 500.000 and 1.100 000 Azerbaijanis in Russia, 
about 380 000 in Georgia, and 500.000 in Ukraine. See: Yunusov, Arif (2009), Migration Processes in 
Azerbaijan. Baku: ADILOGLU, pp. 81-113..    
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 This is primarily a consequence of the restrictive labour migration policy in the target countries. 




 An interviewee from an international organisation that deals with migration in Azerbaijan 
considered the existing state agencies for problems of trafficking as rather weak (AZ_Analyst_8). 
Even harsher criticism comes from NGOs. The government is blamed for trivialising this topic 
(AZ_Analyst_1, AZ_Analyst_4).   
21
 This argument was brought up in the talks with two analysts who work in migration-oriented 
NGOs. Both individuals hence have first-hand knowledge on the problems of irregular migration and 
governmental responses to it. Remittances from Russia to Azerbaijan haven been estimated at 
2billion U.S.D in 2011.  
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members of the state administration regard it as supportive of domestic stability.22 
The incoming irregular migration from Central and South Asia, which have been 
increasing since 1996, raises more concern.  Azerbaijani officials do not, however, 
consider it as a substantial challenge to Azerbaijan’s domestic stability.23 In that 
light, Azerbaijani officials show interest in CIS and GUAM migration-related 
activities. The aim is to facilitate migration to Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and other 
relevant former Soviet republics in order to ease domestic tensions created by the 
deteriorating socio-economic situation of large parts of the society. At the same 
time, Azerbaijan has little incentive to discuss incoming labour and irregular 
migration with the post-Soviet sending states. Since it is not perceived as a 
challenge to domestic stability, committing to regional arrangements on incoming 
migration would just create undesired costs. The following paragraphs will show 
how Azerbaijan’s regional neighbourhood also poses economic challenges and 
creates opportunities.  
Figure 9: International Stock of Azerbaijani Emigrants in 2010 
 
Source: Calculation based on World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2010. Data Accessed on 10 April 2013. 
5.1.1.2. TRADE INTERDEPENDENCIES  
Most vital ties with other former Soviet republics exist in the spheres of energy 
exports and agriculture.  Azerbaijan is excessively reliant on revenues from gas and 
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 When asked about migration issues in Azerbaijan, the three individuals who worked on migration 
in the MFA, the MoI and the State Migration Serves first discussed incoming migration. Neither 













oil exports. Energy exports constituted 95% of Azerbaijan’s foreign trade turnover 
and 55% of its GDP in 2010.24 The economy thus depends on energy markets and 
transit countries. Here Russia comes in. In the early 1990s Russia thwarted the first 
international production sharing agreement (PSA) until the Russian firm Lukoil got a 
share. The PSA was crucial for revitalising the energy industry.25 In the 2000s the 
relevance of Russia is threefold: Russia is a competitor in gas sales to Western 
markets, a sales market for gas and transit for oil transport to the Black Sea port at 
Novorossiisk.26 Russia is thus a vital and potentially destructive player for 
Azerbaijan’s most significant source of income. This fosters the desire to weaken 
Russia’s position and decrease dependency on Russia regarding energy transport 
routes, other trade and security issues.  
As mentioned above, the second trade sector that links Azerbaijan significantly to 
the former Soviet republic markets is agriculture and the food industry.27 It provides 
labour for 38% of Azerbaijani employees.28 In particular small and medium-sized 
businesses in the South rely on agricultural exports.29 72% of the gains from 
agriculture exports in 2011 came from trade with CIS members, primarily Russia, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.30 These countries also accounted 
for 56% of agriculture imports in 2010. Georgia and Ukraine are relevant but still 
not vital trade partners. Overall, the GUAM countries held a minor share of 4% of 
exports and 10% of imports in Azerbaijan’s agricultural trade in 2010. Figure 10 
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 Center for Economic and Social Development (2012), Azerbaijan’s Foreign Trade: Comparative 
Analysis. [Online]. 
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 Nabiyev, Rizvan (2003), Erdöl- und Erdgaspolitik in der kaspischen Region. Ressourcen, Verträge, 
Transportfragen und machtpolitische Interessen [Oil and Gas Policy in the Caspian Region]. Berlin: 
Verlag Dr. Köster, p 117. 
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 Lussac, Samuel (2012), New Regionalization for a New Regional Leader? The Role of Azerbaijan in 
the Southern Caucasus. In: Ivan, Ruxandra (ed.), New Regionalism or No Regionalism? Emerging 
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Source: World Development Indicators database. Available at: data.worldbank.org, accessed 20 
February 2013 
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 These figures are taken from the State Statistical Committee of Azerbaijan. 




 Despite its relevance for a large part of the population, the agricultural sector is underdeveloped in 
Azerbaijan. The lack of technology and the lack of capacity to achieve high production standards, 
geographic proximity and persisting trade relations from Soviet times render sales markets in the 
post-Soviet space important. (AZ_Gov_Analyst_2).   
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displays the agricultural trade developments until 2011. Overall, access to the 
above-mentioned former Soviet markets is important to ensure income for large 
parts of society. Since this primarily concerns the impoverished South, stable 
agricultural trade relations are a matter of domestic stability. At the same time, 
agriculture and food imports are regulated by monopolies in Azerbaijan.31 Such a 
structure limits the readiness of economic actors to be subordinated to multilateral 
trade arrangements, especially if these are strongly legalised.32 The economic 
dependencies described encourage the ruling elite to reduce energy transportation 
dependencies on Russia. They provide incentives to improve access to the relevant 
post-Soviet markets. This is, however, primarily attractive if it does not produce 
new channels for external interference in the domestic economic regime. 
Figure 10: Agricultural Exports and Imports of Azerbaijan, in Mio USD 
 
Source: UN Comtrade, commodities 02,04,05,07,08,09,10,12,16,17,19,20,22,52. Data accessed on 19 April 2013 
5.1.2. SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS AND CIS MEMBERSHIP  
The aim of this sub-section is to trace the degree to which the previously outlined 
perceived regional dependencies inform Azerbaijan’s CIS membership. The findings 
will provide some evidence that perceptions indeed have practical impact. They will 
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 Two economic experts describe the economic structures in Azerbaijan in 2011 in the same way as 
is discussed in the following contribution from 2008: Ibadoglu, Gubad (2008), Current State of 
Azerbaijan's Economy: Myth and Realities. Transit Studies Review,Vo. 15, No. 2. 
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 Several interviewees pointed to the vested interests of economic and/or political actors as core 
obstacles to significant free trade commitments in various international formats, including the WTO. 





























further sketch the room for manoeuvre which the CIS offers to tackle sovereignty 
challenges. As argued above, policy-makers perceive Azerbaijan’s Westphalian 
sovereignty as directly threatened by Armenia and Russia. Armenia occupies 
Azerbaijan’s territory and is a latent source of military aggression. Russia possesses 
various channels to interfere in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs. These are: the 
mediator position in the OSCE Nagorno-Karabakh negotiating structure; Russia’s 
support of Armenia in the conflict; the control over energy export pipelines, which 
constrains Azerbaijan’s energy export opportunities; and Azerbaijan’s dependence 
on Russia’s labour and sales market. At the same time, trade and migration 
relations with Russia stabilise the domestic sovereignty under the current political 
regime in Azerbaijan. The first two aspects advise mitigating dependence on Russia 
in order to consolidate Azerbaijan’s Westphalian sovereignty. At the same time, 
intensifying relations with Russia potentially re-directs Russia’s support from 
Armenia to Azerbaijan. Also, trade and labour migration relations with Russia have 
to be maintained or replaced by similarly attractive relations with other former 
Soviet republics for the sake of Azerbaijan’s domestic sovereignty. The section will 
show that in the eyes of Azerbaijani policy-makers the CIS qualifies as an arena to 
tackle these issues, since it includes relevant regional players and covers military, 
trade and migration issues. But the CIS is only attractive if it does not create new 
channels for Russia’s or the organisation’s interference in Azerbaijan’s affairs. To 
exemplify this reasoning the following paragraphs will discuss the rationales of 
Azerbaijan’s general membership and its participation in trade and migration 
related sectoral bodies.  
5.1.2.1. CIS MEMBERSHIP  
The background outlined above explains that the CIS has attracted the interest of all 
Azerbaijani presidents. It is also a matter of course that, except for the very first 
president Mutallibov, the ruling elite always had a distanced attitude towards the 
CIS.33 In this light, the CIS ‘multi-track and multi-speed’ principle described in 
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 President Mutallibov considered in 1991 to accept a reform of the Soviet Union into a new union 
of independent states. See: Goltz, Thomas (1998), Azerbaijan Diary. New York: M.E.Shape, 216. 
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section 1.5.2 came in very useful for Azerbaijan.34 It permitted the ruling elite to 
design the membership according to the maxim of preventing additional 
compromises to Azerbaijan’s Westphalian sovereignty but also seeking 
opportunities for managing the persisting negative and fruitful dependencies. As 
the following paragraphs will highlight, Azerbaijan designed its CIS membership by 
circumventing even weak supra-national structures, softening the legalisation of 
multilateral rules, and seeking as many opportunities for interaction as possible.  
Azerbaijan has held full CIS membership since 1994. The path to this status was, 
however, uneven. President Mutallibov led the country into the CIS by signing the 
1991 Almaty agreement.35 In 1993 the parliament, Millis Majlis, did not, however, 
ratify the CIS agreement, as necessary for gaining full membership status. The 
independence movement ‘Azerbaijani Popular Front’, which formed the 
parliamentary majority, feared that the CIS might increase Russia’s influence.36 But 
one year, one coup d’état and one president37 later, the Millis Majlis ratified the 
charter. The three succeeding presidents Mutallibov, Elchibay and Aliyev 
interpreted the opportunities given by the CIS divergently. But the primacy of 
sovereignty guided all three presidents’ CIS policy. Mutallibov was mainly 
concerned about the country’s Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. Given that 
Azerbaijan was already shaken by the tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh, he saw the 
integration into a strong CIS as a guarantee for potential protection from Russia and 
dialogue with Armenia.38 Another rationale concerns the international recognition 
of the Socialist Soviet Republics as independent states. Commitment to settle 
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 The CIS charter stipulates that any CIS member may signal disinterest in any agreement and may 
abstain from voting without influencing the validity of the agreement. CIS Council of Heads of 
States, Ustav Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv [Charter of the Commonwealth of 
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 The agreement stipulates the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the foundation of the CIS. CIS 
Council of Heads of States, Alma-Atintskaya Deklaratsiya [Alma-Ata Declaration]. 
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 From 1992-1993 the independence movement Popular Front of Azerbaijan was a leading political 
power in Azerbaijan. President Elchibay was part of the movement. Cornell, Azerbaijan since 
Independence, 60.  
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 The president Albufaz Elchibay was replaced by Heydar Aliyev in course a coup d’état provoked by 
army leader Surat Husseinov when the former Soviet, now Russian, army withdrew from Azerbaijani 
territory. See: ibid.,78.  
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 The idea was to limit the room for aggressive manoeuvres by Armenia and other states through 
the joint membership in an integrative format. The events quickly proved this hope wrong.   
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conflicting issues by cooperative means was demanded by US and European 
actors.39 Azerbaijani actors interpreted CIS membership as a fulfilment of these 
criteria.40 Elchibay came to power with the promise to consolidate independent and 
democratic statehood. His team was, accordingly, alarmed by the increasing 
integrative rhetoric in the CIS, described in section 1.5.2, but acknowledged the 
importance of the CIS for resolving urgent military, economic and social issues. To 
counteract additional domestic instability, which might have arisen from the 
disruption of the few meaningful relations with other former Soviet republic, 
Elchibay signed the charter and government representatives attended relevant CIS 
meetings.41 Heydar Aliyev opted for more visible CIS commitment by gaining full 
membership. This step was first of all a communicative act designed to underscore 
the re-launch of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.42 Aliyev replaced the foreign policy of 
Elchibay, which neglected Russia and concentrated on Turkey and Western players, 
with a multi-vector approach. Analysts often interpret Aliyev’s decision for full CIS 
membership as imposed by Russian pressure.43 Azerbaijani analysts, in contrast, 
frame it as a strategic decision with manifold aims. The CIS was seen as a chance for 
more personal meetings between Aliyev and the Russian president Boris Yel’tsin 
during and at the sidelines of multilateral meetings.44 The need to re-organise 
economic and security relations with the former Soviet republic was another 
argument for CIS involvement.45 Initially, policy-makers hoped to directly influence 
developments concerning the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh through the CIS. This 
ambition has soon been moderated to exerting some indirect influence on Russia 
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 Warbrick, Colin (1992), Recognition of States. The International and Comparative Law 
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Emergence of GUUAM, 82. 
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and Armenia, as chapter 6 will highlight. President Ilham Aliyev continues his 
father’s CIS policy but has opted for more active involvement in CIS bodies. 
5.1.2.2. PARTICIPATION IN SECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
Participation in the CIS decision-making and sectoral bodies builds on the ambition 
to create new opportunities for interacting with relevant neighbours, but avoids 
new channels for external interference in Azerbaijan’s affairs. Azerbaijan has 
avoided supra-national structures, but is involved in all areas of CIS activity, namely 
economic, societal and security matters. As a full member Azerbaijan participates in 
the three decision-making councils on presidential, prime-ministerial and foreign 
minister level.46 As discussed in section 1.5.2, these bodies do not have any supra-
national competences. Azerbaijani officials reject any arbitrage regulations and, 
thus, do not recognise the Economic Court. This reluctance towards potentially 
binding rules does not, apparently, constrain the interest in the wide range of CIS 
sectoral bodies that have developed since 1991.  
Azerbaijan is a member in 36 of the 68 sectoral bodies which cover economic, social 
and non-military security topics and leads five of them.47 The literature widely 
ignores these sectoral bodies since they hardly have any integrative effect, and 
refers to the CIS as merely a ‘presidential club’.48 But already this relatively high 
percentage of such bodies in which CIS-critical Azerbaijan is member calls for 
consideration of them. Azerbaijani state officials indeed argue that they take 
advantage from these bodies. Officials from various ministries framed it as a priority 
of CIS policy to attend meetings of all councils relevant for Azerbaijan.49 Even if a 
department has declined formal membership, representatives of this department 
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 See appendix 1 for detailed information on the competences of the CIS bodies.  
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 The following councils have their secretariat in Baku: the Co-ordinating Council for Heads of 
Taxation Agencies, the Interstate Council for Publishing Houses, the Interstate Council for 
Cooperation in Construction Business, the Council of Ministers of Interior and the Council for Youth-
related Activities.  
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 Sakwa, The CIS: Conflicts of Space and Time. Most articles on the sectoral activities of CIS are 
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Vinokurov, Mutual Investments in the CIS Banking Sector. Shishkov, Cooperation in the CIS Machine-
Building Sector: Decreasing rather than Increasing. 
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A frequent reason for the rejection of formal membership is that a department disapproves the 
body's statute. Ministerial officials who represent Azerbaijan in CIS activities and who delegate 
employees to CIS meetings named attendance of sectoral bodies among the policy priorities. They 
have not been asked directly for this. (AZ_MFA_7, AZ_MED_1, AZ_MED_2, AZ_ASMS_1, AZ_ASMS_2)  
145 
 
usually nevertheless regularly participate in the body upon invitation.50 Azerbaijan’s 
interest in sectoral activities is also reflected in the CIS agreements adopted. 73% of 
agreements of the highest decision-making bodies are signed by Azerbaijan. About 
20% of them are adopted with reservations, in order to prevent undesired 
consequences for national legislation.51 At the same time, officials hardly consider 
the content of CIS agreements legally relevant.52 
Azerbaijan’s profile in economic and security related activities complies with the 
perceptions of the trade and security relations with former Soviet neighbour 
outlined in section 5.1. The interest in Russia’s energy transport grid and 
Azerbaijan’s reliance on labour and sales markets in former Soviet republics triggers 
strong interest in CIS trade activities. But Azerbaijan avoids new dependencies on 
CIS members by not signing potentially binding trade agreements. Accordingly, 
Azerbaijan is present in the Economic Council and all agriculture- and trade-related 
councils. It signs trade-related agreements, which generally guide CIS activities, but 
do not stipulate legalised multilateral rules. Section 1.5.2 indicated that the 
Economic Council has been driven by the desire to establish supra-national 
structures. In line with the primacy of Westphalian sovereignty, Azerbaijan is only 
an observer in this council. Azerbaijan also participated in the negotiations of the 
2011 free trade agreement, but without signing it.  
The Azerbaijani leadership has always rejected military activities within the CIS.53 
Nevertheless, Azerbaijan is a member of the Council of Defence Ministers. This 
council, so the argument allows, monitors potentially relevant developments in 
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 An interviewee who deals with migration issues explicitly stressed that their department is 
represented in nearly all meetings of the Council of Migration Services, even though Azerbaijan is 
not a member of this council. A meeting of this council was even hosted in Baku in 2010. A 
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 The possibility to sign international agreements with reservations is stipulated in the Convention 
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to agreements published at www.cis.minsk.by in 2010.  
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 All interviewees from state agencies agreed on this. Some relevance was given to CIS frameworks 
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 At least two officials from the MFA interfered in the author’s sentence ‘Azerbaijan is CIS member’ 
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other ministries and by analysts. However, from 1994-1999 Azerbaijan has been a member of a CIS 
related military structure, namely the CSTO.   
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Russian-Armenian military relations.54 In the light of Azerbaijan’s reliance on labour 
markets in the region, state officials participate in all migration related CIS councils. 
But they declined formal membership in the committee on irregular migration.55 
This reflects the fact that the ruling elite is still weakly concerned about the effects 
of incoming irregular migration and is not willing to take measures against outgoing 
irregular migration. As argued above, outgoing irregular migration has rather 
stabilised the country’s domestic situation for the time being and incoming 
migration does not provide serious challenges. Azerbaijan has again adopted the 
core migration relevant documents, except for an agreement on a concerted 
migration policy that has not been signed though.56 This decision reflects the desire 
to have the opportunity to manage the respective interdependencies with CIS 
states but to prevent domestic interference through multilateral legalised rules.  
In a nutshell, the CIS organisational design permits Azerbaijan to be present in all 
decision-making councils and to be involved in all sectoral activities which concern 
Azerbaijan’s regional priorities, without demanding any sub-ordination to CIS 
structures. In addition, the CIS paves the way for more meetings with Azerbaijan’s 
most relevant former Soviet neighbours. Chapter 6 will analyse which concrete aims 
Azerbaijan strives to achieve in the CIS in order to consolidate its sovereignty 
concerns. Yet prior to this the next section will show how GUAM offers a similarly 
attractive organisational structure. Its member state constellation, however, 
induces Azerbaijan to consider the GUAM as an arena to indirectly tackle its 
sovereignty concerns.  
5.1.3. SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS AND GUAM MEMBERSHIP 
The overview of Azerbaijan’s economic and security interdependencies with its 
post-Soviet neighbourhood has indicated that the country is only weakly dependent 
on GUAM countries. There is, however, a sovereignty concern that makes these 
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 The more relevant regional body for Russian-Armenian military relations is the Collective Security 
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three countries attractive partners; namely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Section 
1.5.3 already mentioned that all three countries face existing or potential 
secessionist threats on their territory. This has induced Azerbaijan to pool these 
states together into a regional organisation. As the following paragraphs will show, 
Azerbaijani officials strongly contributed to designing the GUAM structure according 
to their needs. This means setting up stable, exclusively intergovernmental bodies 
that produce primarily non-binding results. Given that Azerbaijan considers the 
dependencies with GUAM states as weak, the country’s activity in the GUAM 
sectoral bodies is not driven by immediate security concerns. State officials rather 
depict these bodies as framework binding the partners to Azerbaijan.   
5.1.3.1. GUAM MEMBERSHIP 
Section 1.5.3 has presented GUAM as an organisation which bears the hallmarks of 
Azerbaijani policy priorities. Indeed, the administration under Heydar Aliyev and 
under Ilham Aliyev enshrined their rejection of supra-national bodies and 
multilateral legalised agreements in GUAM’s structure. Azerbaijan is therefore 
represented in all GUAM decision-making and sectoral councils.57 According to the 
interview narratives, Azerbaijani officials did not perceive the re-launch of GUAM as 
necessary for strengthening interaction within GUAM. The Azerbaijani side has, 
however, been eager to keep GUAM alive and supported the re-launch. In 2011 the 
GUAM secretariat proposed to expand the secretariat with additional co-ordinating 
committees. The Azerbaijani side, however, prefers to constrain GUAM’s 
administrative structure. Any enlargement is, first and formerly, perceived as letting 
the bureaucracy hypertrophy without improving the attractiveness of GUAM as an 
interaction platform.58 The argument mirrors the desire to prevent the secretary 
from formulating demands vis-à-vis the GUAM states. Azerbaijan has signed and 
ratified all GUAM agreements. These agreements do not constrain Azerbaijan’s 
domestic policy in any regard since they are weakly legalised. The only more binding 
rule in GUAM, which, as discussed in section 1.5.3, is in any case interpreted 
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 See appendix 2 for more information on the structure of GUAM and competences of its bodies. 
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 Officials in Azerbaijan share the opinion that over-bureaucratisation involves the risk of ruining the 
regional format. Their argument invokes the experience of the Soviet Union. The extensive 
bureaucracy of the Soviet Union has not been able to adequately respond to its domestic and 
international needs. An official predicted the same fate for the EU. (AZ_MFA_1)  
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flexibly, stipulates that GUAM may only assume activities to which all members 
agree. Azerbaijan accepts this rule, since it does not impinge upon its sovereignty. 
5.1.3.2. PARTICIPATION IN SECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
As section 1.5.3 indicated, Azerbaijani officials primarily promote GUAM as a tool in 
the resolution of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. It is, thus, envisioned to 
contribute to Azerbaijan’s Westphalian sovereignty. However, there is only one type 
of activity that directly concerns the conflict: the earlier described presentations 
and draft resolutions in the UN General Assembly. Azerbaijani officials nevertheless 
actively and reliably participate in all GUAM trade and security related activities. 
They depict their engagement in both areas rather as opportunity than as necessity. 
In terms of trade, Azerbaijan is interested in intensifying the turnover with Ukraine 
and Georgia. In particular, the officials intend to bind Ukraine and Georgia closer to 
Azerbaijan without making commitments that potentially constrain Azerbaijan’s 
domestic policy. Trade-related activities within GUAM provide a fruitful ground for 
this since Azerbaijan’s economic performance is, due to the petro revenues, far 
stronger than that of Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Intensifying the economic 
relations with these countries would help to re-organise Azerbaijan’s 
neighbourhood according to its needs. It potentially diversifies the GUAM countries 
trade relations and reduces the impact of Russia as a trade partner of GUAM 
members. Both aspects contribute to Azerbaijan’s Westphalian and domestic 
sovereignty. In that light, the delegate of Azerbaijan to the GUAM secretariat is 
responsible for promoting and monitoring trade and transport related activities. 
Representatives from Azerbaijan regularly attend meetings of the groups on 
transport, trade, energy and tourism. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan avoids 
binding agreements, it signed and ratified the GUAM FTA. This document is 
formulated as multilateral legalised rule, but does not have practical relevance. This 
situation obviously plays into the hand of Azerbaijani officials.59 
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Azerbaijan appears to be equally committed to activities against non-traditional 
security challenges. Representatives of the country reliably attend all meetings of 
the security working groups and sub-groups. At the same time, other GUAM actors 
describe Azerbaijan as being more open to new activities than for deepening 
activities by strengthened obligations.60 In this manner, GUAM activities are 
supportive of Azerbaijan’s domestic sovereignty, but do not challenge the country’s 
sovereignty in handling security challenges. Additionally, state officials present their 
engagement in these GUAM activities as a contribution to Azerbaijan’s Westphalian 
sovereignty. Chapter 6 will detail how Azerbaijan intends to pursue this aim. 
5.1.4. CONCLUSION: HANDLING AND RE-ORGANISING 
INTERDEPENDENCIES OF AZERBAIJAN 
According to the tenor of the previous three sub-sections, concerns over its 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty drive Azerbaijan’s state officials to maintain 
membership in the CIS and GUAM. In both organisations Azerbaijani officials avoid 
new obligations, in order to not constrain Azerbaijan’s ability to act independently. 
GUAM’s organisational structure is more suitable for this aim than the CIS. The 
general aim is to reduce existing dependencies and to increase the dependency of 
other member states on Azerbaijan. Among the CIS are member states on which 
Azerbaijan is dependent in economic and security matters. Within GUAM, 
Azerbaijan interacts with at least two states that are interesting but not vital 
partners. Therefore, the CIS serves primarily to manage and reduce existing 
interdependencies. GUAM has the potential to contribute to re-organising 
(inter)dependencies according to Azerbaijan’s needs. Both dimensions are hoped to 
impact positively on Azerbaijan’s Westphalian and domestic sovereignty.  
5.2. UKRAINE’S AIMS: MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCIES 
The following empirical study introduces the comparative case of Ukraine. The 
comparison is intriguing for at least two reasons. Ukraine is, like Azerbaijan, known 
as an opponent to Russia’s aspirations to re-integrate its neighbourhood. But 
various interdependencies tie Ukraine more strongly to Russia and other former 
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Soviet republics than Azerbaijan. Accordingly, Ukraine is more sensitive to regional 
sovereignty challenges. The analysis will spell out how the more strongly perceived 
(inter)dependencies define Ukraine’s interest in CIS sectoral activities. It will 
highlight that Ukraine’s ultimate goals, nevertheless, are marked by the desire to 
pursue its interdependence sovereignty within the CIS and GUAM more than 
Azerbaijan’s. By tracing Ukraine’s ultimate goals as formulated by policy-makers and 
reflected in the de facto membership, the section will also indicate that Ukraine 
actively employs the CIS and GUAM for its regional policy. Ukrainian policy-makers 
do not only endure the CIS as a Russian instrument of power, as analysts often 
argue.61 
It will be argued that Ukraine has a similar take on the CIS to Azerbaijan, but is less 
straightforward in its policy. It will highlight that Ukraine’s interest in the CIS is 
determined by strong economic and security (inter)dependencies with selected CIS 
members. Central is again Russia, but also Belarus, Moldova and the Central Asian 
states. Ukrainian officials purposefully employ the CIS to strengthen the country’s 
sovereignty. Ukraine’s policy-makers primarily strive to decrease dependencies on 
Russia via the CIS. The CIS is also welcome as arena for improving trade relations 
with relevant former Soviet neighbours as a means to consolidate its domestic 
sovereignty. In addition, Ukraine seeks to improve its control over cross-border 
flows via the CIS, which would strengthen its interdependence sovereignty. Within 
GUAM state officials primarily seek to establish new interdependencies for the 
consolidation of Ukraine’s Westphalian, domestic and interdependence 
sovereignty. Ukraine, however, responded sensitively to Russian hostilities vis-à-vis 
GUAM. Since 2007 therefore only ministerial representatives participate in GUAM. 
Three sub-sections will, first, discuss the core patterns of Ukraine’s 
interdependencies with CIS and GUAM partners. Secondly, they will discuss, how 
these interdependencies and the resulting sovereignty concerns inform Ukraine’s 
membership in the two organisations.  
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5.2.1. THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF UKRAINE’S SOVEREIGNTY 
Concerns over the country’s Westphalian sovereignty have determined Ukraine’s 
regional and international policy since 1991. Even in 2012 policy analysts and 
practitioners see Ukraine’s sovereignty as threatened by the country’s multifaceted 
ties to the powerful neighbour Russia. The sub-section will elaborate that these 
concerns rest on economic but also security dependencies. Ukraine maintains 
already significant economic relations with other CIS countries and is anxious to 
intensify these. This would reduce Ukraine’s dependencies on Russia and support 
the country’s economic performance at least in a medium-term perspective. 
Ukrainian state officials also perceive incoming organised criminal activities from or 
through the former Soviet neighbourhood as destabilising. They thus express the 
desire to counteract these challenges inter alia via interactions with their 
neighbourhood. The following paragraphs will outline the core interdependencies in 
economic and security matters. They will provide the necessary background 
information for grasping how Ukrainian officials have designed CIS and GUAM 
membership according to these interdependencies. The sub-section will start with 
economic aspects, since they are especially relevant for Ukraine’s Westphalian and 
domestic sovereignty.  
5.2.1.1. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCIES  
In economic terms Ukraine is trapped between sovereignty-threatening and 
productive (inter)dependencies with its former Soviet neighbourhood. More 
concretely, Ukraine is dependent on Russia, but maintains more balanced 
interdependencies with other CIS and GUAM members. Central trade flows from 
and to other former Soviet republic concern energy, heavy industry and agriculture. 
The Achilles heel of Ukraine’s economy is its almost complete dependency on 
imports and the transit of energy fuels. Electricity is the only energy source where 
Ukraine is a net exporter and has the capacity to expand these exports.62 Oil and gas 
resources on Ukrainian soil were almost entirely depleted under the Soviet Union.63 
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Ukraine strongly depends on Russia’s energy supply. This economic leverage 
provides Russia with a forceful instrument of power vis-à-vis Ukraine. Ukraine 
possesses gas transit pipelines, which are still crucial for Russia’s gas transport to EU 
countries. These are a crucial but not reliable tool for Ukraine in the gas price 
negotiations with Russia.64 The transit pipelines are an argument to haggle the price 
for gas imports from Russia. How long this trump remains in the hands of Ukraine is 
questionable though. Russia has developed two strategies to mitigate its 
dependence on these pipelines. The Russian gas monopolist Gazprom seeks control 
over Ukraine’s transit pipelines.65 Russia also is eager to build the South Stream 
Pipeline, which would circumvent Ukraine as transit country.66 In the last twenty 
years Russia has successively foiled Ukraine’s attempts to diversity its energy 
suppliers. Only after 2010 has substantial progress been made due to support from 
Azerbaijan and Venezuela, and improved technologies concerning liquefied natural 
gas and shale gas.67 But Russia seems to lose no opportunity to show that it still has 
leverage on Ukraine.68  
Apart from this, former Soviet republic markets are still significant for Ukrainian 
export and import of agricultural, food, chemical and heavy industrial goods. In 
2011 about 33% of export and 79% of import revenues are generated by trade with 
the CIS, primarily Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan. Figure 11 visualises the CIS and GUAM ratio in Ukraine’s trade profile 
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in the mentioned areas. These markets are less attractive for the modernisation of 
Ukraine’s economy.69 But due to the low production standards and costs which 
prevail in these countries, the former Soviet import and export markets are in 2012 
still a welcome alternative to EU or other global markets. They allow Ukrainian 
companies, which still produce according to GOST standards, to refrain from cost-
intensive technology modernisation, which would be necessary to compete 
globally. Favourable access to the former Soviet import and export markets thus 
reduces the pressure on especially middle-size companies in the agricultural sector 
but also on large-scale chemical and heavy industry. Large firms have, however, 
more resources at hand to adjust their production to the higher standards in other 
parts of the world.70 Two priorities emerge from this situation: to reduce the energy 
and other trade dependency on Russia, but to placate Russia at the same time; and 
secondly, to maintain productive trade relations with Russia and other former 
Soviet republics. The conflicting nature of these priorities calls for a complex tactical 
proceeding. This strongly shapes Ukraine’s membership pattern in the CIS and 
GUAM. Figure 11 also indicates that GUAM member states comprise only minor 
trade partners for Ukraine. In 1996 the share of GUAM in Ukraine’s world trade in 
agriculture, chemical and heavy industry and mineral fuels was 2% for exports and 
only 0.5% for imports. The export share levelled off at 7% until 2011 and imports 
increased up to 2%.71 Ukraine is the biggest GUAM market and has limited interest 
in the markets of other GUAM states. However, together with Azerbaijan, GUAM 
includes a potent alternative oil and gas supplier and with Georgia a crucial transit 
country for energy resources from Azerbaijan. Ukrainian policy-makers have 
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therefore in the 1990s and early 2000s hoped to establish GUAM as framework for 
diversifying the country’s energy supply.  
Figure 11: Ukrainian Exports in Agriculture, Chemical Industry, Mineral Fuels and Heavy Industry  
in 1996 and 2011, in 100Mio USD 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Data, commodities 02,04,05,07,08,09, 16,17,19,20,22,37, 28,29,52, 89, 88, 86, 83, 72. Data accessed on 
19 April 2013 
5.2.1.2. SECURITY DEPENDENCIES  
With regard to security, Ukraine faces two potential threats from Russia. First of all, 
the threat of Russian military interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs is even in 
2012 a vital topic for some analysts.72 The prime cause of concern is the Russian 
Black Sea Fleet which is planned to remain in Ukraine at least until 2040. This 
Russian military asset on Ukraine’s soil potentially compromises Westphalian 
sovereignty.73 While Russia probably will not use this basis to directly intervene in 
Ukraine, analysts see two other negative externalities of this base. First, it is a 
potential obstacle to NATO membership of Ukraine envisioned by some domestic 
forces. Secondly, it will involve Ukraine indirectly in any military operation, for 
which Russia deploys the base. Given Russian military on its territory, Ukraine is 
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eager to maintain channels of communication on military concerns but to avoid 
intensified interaction or new military dependencies.  
The second concern has been less topical in the study period, but is by some 
analysts perceived as a latent conflict: the secessionist ambitions in Crimea. In the 
early 1990s the Crimean elite claimed unification with Russia. This secessionist 
movement had, however, already been accommodated in 1996.74 Nevertheless, the 
risk of Crimean secessionism is still from time to time a topic in Ukrainian politics.75 
This latent challenge triggers Ukraine’s attention of the phenomenon of 
secessionism in the post-Soviet space.  
A minor but, nevertheless, perceived source of concern for some officials is 
transnational organised crime. It suffices to sketch the situation concerning drug-
trafficking. Ukrainian bureaucrats consider the country mainly as a transit country 
for drug-trafficking to Russia and Europe. Other sources argue that a large share of 
the 20m tonnes of opiates that annually enter Ukraine are, however, processed and 
sold in Ukraine.76 State officials see regional networks with actors from Belarus, 
Russian and Moldova as especially alarming. These networks make profit from price 
differences and diverging penal legislation in these countries.77 Accordingly, drug-
trafficking ranks as a security challenge that makes Ukraine interdependent with the 
policy of its former Soviet neighbours. The next section will highlight how these 
various concerns over Westphalian, domestic and interdependence sovereignty are 
reflected in Ukraine’s membership in the CIS and GUAM.  
5.2.2. SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS AND CIS MEMBERSHIP 
This section analyses how Ukrainian policy-makers have since 1991 designed the 
country’s CIS membership according to the perceived regional sovereignty 
challenges. To recall, according to Ukrainian officials, the existing energy and 
security dependencies on Russia make the country vulnerable to Russian 
interference. Accordingly, Ukraine seeks opportunities for managing and ideally 
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reducing these dependencies. A constitutive condition is that these opportunities 
do not create additional channels for interference from Russia. Intensifying 
especially energy and other trade relations with other former Soviet republics also 
potentially weakens Russia’s leverage. In addition, transnational security challenges 
constrain Ukraine’s ability to control flows across its borders. Strengthened security 
relations might therefore contribute to consolidating Ukraine’s interdependence 
sovereignty. This setting, thus, creates incentives to balance between reducing and 
intensifying Ukraine’s regional (inter)dependencies. In this light, Ukrainian policy-
makers can be expected to primarily seek an uncompromised Westphalian 
sovereignty by reducing existing dependencies, and only secondly to strive 
consolidating the domestic and interdependence sovereignty. Indeed, as the 
following paragraphs will outline, the Ukrainian leadership has since 1991 opted for 
membership in the core sectoral bodies but has never accepted any commitment 
that would bind Ukraine to CIS regulations. 
5.2.2.1. CIS MEMBERSHIP 
Ukraine’s CIS policy since 1991 appears at first glance to have been shifting between 
integration ambitions and indifference. The governments’ diverging rhetoric 
conveys this impression. However, a closer look reveals that the individual 
presidents have pursued similar priorities. They all rejected any moves towards 
supra-national structures and integration measures within the CIS. But they have 
found diverging answers to the question of where integration starts. This led to an 
ambivalent member status as this paragraph will outline. In 1990 the foundation of 
the CIS appeared to be a feasible alternative to the more intrusive new union 
treaty, which had been under discussion.78 Accordingly, president Leonid Kravchuk 
signed the CIS founding documents. The initial agreement stressed the sovereignty 
of CIS member states and was formulated with weak legal substance.79 It rendered 
the CIS a promising framework for re-organising Ukraine’s relations with the post-
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Soviet neighbourhood without jeopardising the newly gained sovereignty. However, 
the Ukrainian parliament, Verkhovna Rada, nevertheless perceived the CIS as 
potentially compromising Ukraine’s independence. Accordingly, the parliament has 
never ratified the CIS charter. Formally, Ukraine is thus only an associated CIS 
member. This is a formal nuance without any impact on the eligibility to vote, to 
assume leading positions in CIS bodies or on the financial contribution Ukraine is 
obliged to make.80 Therefore, the absence of a legal gradation according to the 
member-status in the CIS plays into the hands of Ukraine’s leadership. The 
associated membership allowed officials to pursue a self-paced policy in the CIS 
without stirring conflict with Russia. Additionally, a flexible interpretation of the 
Ukrainian-CIS relationship served as a rhetorical tool for voicing distance from and 
proximity towards Russia.81 For instance, in 2010 the ruling Party of the Regions 
discussed belatedly ratifying the CIS Charter.82 In the absence of any legal necessity 
for ratification this short debate has to be understood as a step to restore 
constructive relations with Russia.  
Despite their varying political rhetoric, all four presidents pursued a relatively stable 
CIS policy until 2012. None of the presidents launched measures to leave the CIS.83 
Neither has any leadership sympathised with subordinating Ukrainian domestic 
policy to CIS bodies and agreements. Uncompromised sovereignty has always been 
the maxim. Though, president Kuchma in his second term (1999-2004) and 
president Yanukovych (since 2010) were less rigid in judging which membership 
commitments were intolerable. In 2000 Kuchma took over the CIS presidency and 
actively pushed for the enhancement of CIS structures and even formally led the 
country into an economic integration oriented sub-format of the CIS, the Single 
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Economic Space.84 However, Kuchma never voiced interest in more than a free 
trade zone.85 His successor, Victor Yushchenko, revised this CIS rapprochement as a 
statement in support of his EU-integration oriented foreign policy. Since 2010 
president Yanukovych has repeatedly divided opinions with deliberations on 
entering the new Russian-led integration initiative, the Customs Union between 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.86 Interviews with ministerial officials who in 2011 
tried to promote CU membership testified that they did not aspire to full 
subordination to the CU rules. But they considered a selective involvement in 
beneficial processes without actual integration attractive.87 Regardless of this 
rhetorical wavering between CIS approval and disapproval in the period of 1991-
2012 Ukrainian ministerial structures continued to participate in a broad range of 
CIS bodies.  
5.2.2.2. PARTICIPATION IN SECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
Ukraine’s membership in CIS bodies gives an excellent example of how to elude 
legal consequences for domestic policies when opting for broad involvement in a 
regional organisation. The country is represented in all relevant CIS decision-making 
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bodies. In line with the principle of not subordinating to supra-national structures, 
Ukraine does not accept the Economic Court as an arbitrage structure. Ukraine, 
more than Azerbaijan, inclines to formally commit to the CIS sectoral bodies. The 
country is a member in 46 of the 68 sectoral formats and hosts the secretariat of 
four councils in Kyiv.88 Even in the Yushchenko period, where foreign policy 
statements expressed the utmost distance to the CIS, Ukraine became a member of 
new CIS councils. Officials explain that Ukraine is generally eager to attend all CIS 
sectoral bodies. If these, however, only duplicate existing structures or present an 
additional financial burden Ukraine refrains from formal membership.89 Regardless 
of the shifting foreign policy rhetoric, Ukraine continued to delegate officials to CIS 
meetings at different ministerial levels. Even when relations with Russia touched 
rock bottom in 2007 and president Yushchenko stopped attending CIS summits 
Ukraine was represented by the head of the National Security and Defence 
Council.90 Since 2010 Viktor Yanukovych has stressed Ukraine’s closeness to the CIS. 
This did not, however, according to statements of ministerial officials, provoke a 
noticeable intensification of the CIS related work in Ukrainian ministries. In general 
terms, the presidential CIS rhetoric has been rather detached from Ukraine’s CIS 
policy on ministerial level. It has rather been a yard stick for the quality of Ukraine’s 
relations with Russia and the EU. According to a Ukrainian official who has been 
working on CIS matters for several years, the high-political rhetoric did not influence 
the intensity with which Ukrainian delegates attended CIS sectoral bodies. They 
described the attendance of CIS meetings as a priority. Some interviewees depicted 
this priority as an order from above. However, officials involved in sectoral bodies 
often considered attendance as a beneficial contribution to their work.91 It is hence 
worth disclosing Ukraine’s profile in the sectoral activities.  
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According to CIS agreements, Ukrainian policy-makers opted to become involved 
mostly in transport, trade and non-military security agreements. Between 70 and 
80% of agreements in these fields are adopted and, if it was required, ratified. State 
officials explained decisions regarding which CIS activities to engage with, with 
reference to interdependencies in the post-Soviet space and their impact on 
Ukraine’s sovereignty. In line with Ukraine’s problematic energy dependencies on 
Russia but also its fruitful trade relations with Russia and other former Soviet 
republics that offer big sales and import markets, Ukraine has always prioritised CIS 
trade activities. As the within-case on the free trade agreement will detail in 
chapters 6 and 7, all presidents lobbied for or tacitly supported free trade 
arrangements in the CIS. Regardless of the degree to which president Yushchenko 
distanced himself vis-à-vis the CIS, this also applies to his presidency.92 At the same 
time any deeper integration was ruled out. Nearly all trade-related agreements 
were signed with the reservation that implementation is only considered, if it does 
not conflict with domestic law. Ukraine obviously manoeuvred between 
opportunities to improve trade relations with core CIS partners and to protect 
against domestic interference from the CIS or its member states.  
With regard to CIS security activities Ukraine was always more selective, but it 
attends all councils and agreements concerning non-traditional security challenges. 
After 1992 Ukraine abstained from military CIS activities. Only passive and low-cost 
measures, as the Collective Air Defence System, were continued for the sake of 
military-industrial co-operation.93 Military activities in the CIS are dominated by 
Russia. In light of the perceived threat of Russian military interference in Ukraine 
discussed in section 5.2.1.2, these activities are thus perceived as critical. Less 
problematic are non-military security activities. Ukraine is a member of the CIS Anti-
Terrorism Centre and has adopted agreements on organised crime, except those on 
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joint policy development.94 As previously indicated, Ukrainian officials consider 
phenomena like drug-trafficking as threats with a regional dimension. Ukraine has 
therefore signed the CIS anti-drug trafficking programmes since 2002 and is present 
in all drug-trafficking related bodies. The security agencies only rejected formal 
membership an additional body for the heads of all security agencies in charge of 
drug-trafficking issues, since this body would have duplicated existing structures. Its 
benefit was advertised as strengthening the hierarchies among the existing CIS 
bodies. In line with the already mentioned preference to keep CIS bodies weak the 
relevant Ukrainian officials did not welcome such body.95 However, Ukrainian 
officials attend this body upon invitation.96 Chapter 6 will analyse which aims the 
Ukrainian officials intend to achieve with participation in these bodies and 
agreements. The following section will demonstrate that Ukraine’s approach to 
GUAM differs substantially from Ukraine’s CIS policy, but is driven by similar 
rationales.  
5.2.3. SOVEREIGNTY CONCERNS AND GUAM MEMBERSHIP 
The brief overview of Ukraine’s core interdependencies in section 5.2.1 indicated 
that GUAM offers Ukraine an arena to interact with states on which Ukraine is not 
dependent. Two of them are attractive economic partners, namely the energy 
exporting Azerbaijan and Georgia as energy transit. The relations to Moldova are 
also relevant, since it is Ukraine’s immediate neighbour. Against this background 
the Ukrainian presidents have tried to take advantage of GUAM. Ukraine’s 
commitment has, however, not been as strong as to risk negative externalities for 
Ukraine’s regional policy. 
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5.2.3.1. GUAM MEMBERSHIP 
As will be highlighted in this paragraph Kuchma and Yushchenko have been eager to 
promote GUAM. But like Yanukovych they tuned their policy according to Russia’s 
hostility towards the organisation. Unlike in the case of the CIS, this did not result in 
an ambiguous membership status, but strongly determined the intensity of GUAM 
activities. After Azerbaijan gave the impetus for GUAM, Ukraine soon became 
anxious to take over leadership. The administrations of Kuchma and Yushchenko 
both saw in expanding GUAM structures a chance to take the lead. In 1997, Kuchma 
proposed to expand GUAM with a joint military structure. This enterprise was 
rather provocative, since it challenged the Russian claim to act as single regional 
security provider in the post-Soviet space. Accordingly, GUAM hardly seized on it 
and Ukraine concentrated on developing the economic structures. In the late 1990s 
the Ukrainian sides became reticent concerning GUAM. But in 2002 Kuchma 
pursued the re-organisation of the consultative forum into the Union GUAM. From 
2003 until 2005 the Ukrainian leadership again hardly took notice of GUAM. But 
after the ‘Orange Revolution’ President Yushchenko employed the organisation for 
his foreign policy agenda. Ukraine gave the impetus to establishing the Organisation 
for Democracy and Economic Development - GUAM. In the foreign policy paradigm 
of Ukraine this step was intended to emphasise the foreign policy re-orientation of 
Ukraine towards the West and to support Ukraine’s economic independence.97 At 
this stage the Ukrainian foreign ministry was eager to create sophisticated 
administrative structures in GUAM.98 It was the Ukrainian representative in the 
secretariat who substantially contributed to developing the GUAM sectoral bodies. 
Towards the end of his presidency President Yushchenko mentioned GUAM less in 
public statements.99 The presidential change in 2010 visibly created concerns over 
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Ukraine’s future in GUAM in the secretariat. President Yanukovych’s firmly Russia-
oriented foreign policy programme cast doubts about how the allegedly anti-
Russian organisation GUAM would fit into his agenda. Indeed Yanukovych 
expressed discontent with the ‘romantic policy of GUAM’ but confirmed Ukraine’s 
willingness to remain a member.100 At least until 2012, Ukraine continued to 
regularly participate in all GUAM meetings.  
Ukraine accepted membership in GUAM bodies, especially in the periods where 
little backing from the president was given, only if these bodies abnegated powerful 
decision-making structures.101 As argued in section 1.5.3, the member states 
designed the GUAM rules of procedure in a way that would not cause concern 
about supra-national institutions. Ukraine is, hence, a full member of GUAM and all 
councils. Until 2008 this membership was legally ambiguous, since the parliament 
had not ratified the 2006 GUAM charter. This went, however, without any de facto 
relevance. Ukraine’s membership in the GUAM Council of Heads of State became 
merely theoretical in recent years. President Yushchenko and his successor have not 
agreed to attend GUAM summits after 2009.102 Accordingly, the GUAM summits 
have stalled in the period 2009-2012.103 In the three other councils, Ukrainian 
ministers and delegates continued their activity. The Verkhovna Rada is also present 
in the Interparliamentary Assembly. Ukraine is party to all GUAM sectoral bodies.   
5.2.3.2. PARTICIPATION IN SECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
The section will argue that Ukrainian officials are reliable partners in all GUAM 
sectoral bodies, but describe the bodies’ relevance less enthusiastically than that of 
CIS sectoral councils. This is driven by the fact that in both trade and security 
matters mutual interdependencies play a minor role. Of the examples given, the 
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officials associate only anti-drug trafficking initiatives with an opportunity to 
strengthen interdependence sovereignty. Otherwise they depict GUAM sectoral 
activities as potential means to strengthen Ukraine’s Westphalian sovereignty.  
At first glance, Ukraine’s practical involvement in GUAM bodies appears to be 
similar to the policy towards the CIS: since the creation of the first sectoral bodies in 
the early 2000s, Ukraine was continuously represented in these formats. 
Commitment to sectoral activities is again largely independent of political support 
on the presidential level. Indeed, delegates to GUAM security and economic bodies 
regard the shifting GUAM rhetoric, described in the previous section, as hardly 
noticeable in their work. However, the permanent delegates to the GUAM 
secretariat complained about difficulties in the period of 2009-2010 to convince 
Ukrainian ministries to commit to newly established GUAM activities, for instance 
concerning transport and tourism.104 Generally, officials who are delegated to both 
CIS and GUAM sectoral bodies tended to be less satisfied with their assignment in 
GUAM than in the CIS. Staff from the Ministry of Interior hoped for broadened 
GUAM interaction, but ministerial economic experts reported to vote rather against 
enhanced GUAM trade structures. Nevertheless, they do not consider withdrawing 
attendance from the existing GUAM economic bodies.105 The discrepancy between 
the assessment of GUAM economic activities by experts on the ground and the 
assignments from the superior level is noteworthy. It indicates that economic 
rationale is not necessarily the driving factor of this policy. 
Ukraine has only selectively adopted GUAM agreements, even though these 
documents express only fundamental guidelines for GUAM activities. It did not sign 
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or ratify 6 of the 25 GUAM agreements.106 Analysts and ministerial officials explain 
this rather as a result of the absence of high-level officials at GUAM meetings in the 
late 1990s or as a general problem of getting the Verkhovna Rada to ratify 
treaties.107 They do not interpret it as absence of de facto interest in GUAM 
activities. As already mentioned, Ukraine in any case attends all existing branch 
bodies. Ukrainian officials often made proposals for new GUAM projects. However, 
these can often less directly be linked to Ukraine’s economic and security relations 
with GUAM partners, as the next paragraph will show.  
In the 1990s Ukraine made primarily initiatives in the field of energy and free trade. 
The focus did not shift much until 2008; only the proposals became more 
sophisticated. Since 2010 Ukraine has been most pro-active in security-related 
programmes. Among these initiatives two energy-related projects can be most 
directly explained by Ukraine’s regional dependencies. The first is the Odessa-Brody 
Pipeline described in section 1.5.3. In the late 1990s Ukraine started to construct 
the Odessa-Brody pipeline in order to diversify the country’s energy supply and 
transit capacity. Until 2003 Ukrainian officials were anxious to promote this pipeline 
as a GUAM project. Ukraine aimed for an oil supply contract with Azerbaijan to fill 
this pipeline. However, Azerbaijan did not agree to such a deal.108 The reduction of 
energy dependence on Russia was the driver behind Ukraine’s proactive 
engagement. The second is the ‘Trans-Danubian Energy and Transport Bridge’. 
Various governmental think tanks and ministries formulated the project proposal 
with the hope of significantly expanding Ukraine’s electricity export.109 Rents from 
electricity export would have contributed to stabilising Ukraine’s economy. These 
initiatives tell that Ukrainian officials attempted to employ GUAM as format to 
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constitute new regional relations to reduce existing dependencies. However, 
neither project ever materialised in the envisioned way. Until 2012 no new energy 
projects have been proposed by Ukraine.  Already in the 1990s Ukraine has been an 
advocate of free trade regulations within GUAM, even though the GUAM markets 
play still in 2011 only a limited role for Ukraine’s trade. From the very beginning 
president Kuchma was an advocate of free trade arrangements within GUAM. 
Ukraine also became a party to the GUAM FTA and attends the respective councils 
on a regular basis. However, the country’s continuing interest in free trade can be 
less easily explained by economic interests, in particular since the GUAM free trade 
activities for about ten years have led to modest increase of the trade turnover with 
the GUAM states.  
Compared to the economic activities, interest in GUAM initiatives on non-
traditional security challenges are more strongly driven by the idea to interact with 
already interdependent states. As discussed above, Ukrainian officials understand 
phenomena such as drug-trafficking as security threats with a regional dimension. 
Hence, they consider related GUAM activities supportive for Ukraine’s 
interdependence sovereignty. Ukraine shows interest in GUAM security activities 
even though these do not involved the neighbours that matter most for Ukraine in 
this regard.110 These are Russia, Belarus and the Central Asian states. Ukraine 
accordingly participates in GUAM’s anti-organised crime structure VLEC and also in 
the working groups on drug-trafficking. Since 2011 Ukraine has also initiated 
activities in two other fields of non-traditional security challenges; concerning the 
illicit trafficking of nuclear substances and emergency situations. The interest is, 
however, not primarily driven by the necessity to co-ordinate these matters with 
the GUAM states.  
The analysis has shown that Ukraine’s noticeable proactive role in GUAM is not, 
unlike in the CIS, immediately related to the country’s regional priorities. 
Accordingly, the main lines of political rhetoric concerning GUAM never emphasised 
the potential effects of GUAM’s sectoral activities. A quote of the former deputy 
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activities of both organisations were argued to be complementary. (UA_MoI_1, UA_MoI_2) 
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foreign minister, Andrey Veselovsky, exemplifies the core framing of the 
organisation: GUAM is a ‘symbol for the freedom we have to choose our future 
development according to our political will’.111 Improving Ukraine’s Westphalian 
sovereignty, which practitioners and analysts in Ukraine still perceive as challenged 
by Russia’s economic and military leverages, is central to Ukraine’s GUAM policy.112 
As chapter 6 will pinpoint, this explains Kuchma and Yushchenko’s interest in 
developing GUAM into a more visible structure, which appears to be quite excessive 
compared to the interest in sectoral activities.  
5.3. CONCLUSION: AZERBAIJAN’S AND UKRAINE’S ULTIMATE GOALS  
This chapter has analysed the aims with which the two former Soviet republics 
approach the CIS and GUAM in general. These ultimate goals were traced back with 
reference to narratives of state officials on the membership ambitions. In both 
cases state officials strongly linked CIS and GUAM membership to the republics’ 
sovereignty concerns. The chapter substantiated this proclaimed nexus by studying 
persisting regional dependencies and interdependencies and how these are 
reflected in the state’s membership profile in the CIS and GUAM. The findings 
revealed that both Azerbaijan and Ukraine aim to employ the CIS and GUAM 
primarily to strengthen the state's Westphalian sovereignty. Both states see their 
Westphalian sovereignty as threatened by security and economic channels of 
interference, primarily from Russia. Azerbaijan strives therefore to reduce its 
dependence on Russia by economic and security related activities in the CIS and in 
GUAM. Ukraine primarily pays attention to trade-related activities to do so. In 
addition, Azerbaijan and Ukraine devote attention to security and trade activities 
with CIS members in particular in order to strengthen their domestic sovereignty. 
The intention is to maintain or strengthen trade and migration flows to core former 
Soviet partners in order to improve domestic societal and economic stability. This 
will enable the ruling elites to efficiently exert domestic authority. Azerbaijani 
officials, in the first place, aim to bind other former Soviet republics to Azerbaijan 
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without creating mutual interdependence. Lacking the potential to do likewise, 
Ukraine appears to be eager to involve the other states in mutual ties which rather 
resemble interdependencies. Only Ukrainian officials considered it important to 
improve the state’s control over transnational flows such as drug-traffic via the CIS 
and GUAM. Accordingly, intensifying co-operation with its neighbourhood in these 
matters is acknowledged as desirable. Azerbaijan does not share this interest and 
defines undesired incoming flows as a matter to be handled domestically. 
These sovereignty concerns influence the state’s membership pattern in the CIS and 
GUAM in the following way. Azerbaijan consequently stays out from any structure 
that might gain supra-national competences and signs legalised agreements only if 
these cannot have binding effects. It, nevertheless, tries to participate in most CIS 
bodies in economic and non-military security areas. GUAM provides a more 
adequate structure in this regard, since it never discussed supra-national ideas and 
engages less in the formulation of multilateral legalised rules. Ukraine turned out 
more ready to accept formal membership in CIS councils but in general follows 
Azerbaijan’s membership pattern. The CIS involves more relevant former Soviet 
partners for Ukraine and Azerbaijan than GUAM does. Therefore the CIS provides 
for both states a better arena to directly tackle their sovereignty concerns. GUAM 
opens more indirect channels.  
A glance at theories of regionalism discloses that Azerbaijan and Ukraine define 
their ultimate goals in the CIS and GUAM in a ways other than those assumed by 
the theory. Integration theory assumes that states co-operate in regional 
organisations in order to enhance their domestic security and welfare. This touches 
aspects of the states’ domestic and interdependence sovereignty. In order to do so, 
they are ready to compromise their Westphalian sovereignty by accepting supra-
national structures and legalised multilateral institutions. Not so Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. It has been argued that these states have designed their CIS and GUAM 
membership by circumventing such elements. Neither do they prioritise the 
strengthening of their interdependence sovereignty through regional activities. New 
regionalism authors suggest that gaining control over cross-border flows via 
regional co-operation is the core driver of regionalism in recent decades. However, 
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in Ukraine this aspect ranks as third priority and Azerbaijan hardly consider it. So far 
integration and new regionalism theories have developed the most sophisticated 
concepts of what concrete aims states pursue in regional organisations in order to 
achieve their ultimate goals. Since Ukraine’s and Azerbaijan’s ultimate goals differ 
from what these theories expect, the intriguing question for this thesis is: by which 
intermediary goals Azerbaijan and Ukraine intend to achieve the above mentioned 
aims to strengthen their Westphalian, domestic and only thirdly interdependence 
sovereignty. The next chapter will therefore devote attention to this question. 
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6. GOALS PURSUED IN TRADE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES 
The previous chapter identified some initial insights into how policy-makers in the 
case countries conceptualise the organisations under study. It has been argued that 
they participate in the CIS and GUAM with the following aims: primarily to 
strengthen the state’s Westphalian sovereignty and, secondly, to consolidate 
domestic sovereignty. Ukraine additionally strives to improve its interdependence 
sovereignty. The empirical findings also gave first ideas about how the states intend 
to realise these aims. They intend to reduce existing negative dependencies. In 
addition, Azerbaijani envisions to newly bind other member states to Azerbaijan, 
but avoids getting involved in new interdependencies. Ukraine, by contrast, is open 
to establishing new fruitful and balanced interdependencies. The focus will now 
study these strategies more deeply. The guiding question is: how do Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine contemplate re-organising the persisting interdependencies to mitigate 
their sovereignty concerns? In the words of the analytical framework, the question 
enquires after the states’ intermediary goals. The answer to this question will tell us 
about the opportunities offered by the organisations. It will also give evidence 
about why the organisations qualify as a regional policy tool. These insights are thus 
crucial for gaining an appropriate idea of the states’ conceptualisation of the 
regional organisations. This chapter will therefore dig deeper into the intermediary 
goals of Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the CIS and GUAM.  
In order to do so, the analysis focuses on two issue-areas: free trade for both 
countries, and drug-trafficking for Ukraine and migration for Azerbaijan. The focus 
on two within-cases per country provides a clearer picture of how the states act in 
the sectoral activities. The in-depth study helps identify action patterns, as well as 
investigating which expectations the policy-makers have about these actions. This 
allows the analysis to directly link observable actions to their intended meaning 
and, thus, to unveil the intermediary goals. The analysis considered the following 
factors as indicators of how the states act in the CIS and GUAM. It, first, draws on 
the description given in chapter 5 of the states’ formal membership in the relevant 
councils and participation in relevant agreements. More important is, however, 
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how intensively the states use the multilateral arenas. To gain this insight, this study 
has examined whether state officials attend the sectoral bodies regularly, try to set 
the councils’ agenda, submit proposals concerning the issues under negotiation and 
passively or actively participate in discussions. This information is derived from 
expert interviews in the ministries of foreign affairs, economics and interior in 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine, the state migration service in Azerbaijan, and the GUAM 
secretariat. 
The chapter develops the following argument. Azerbaijan and Ukraine promote 
their intermediary goals in the CIS by a pro-active engagement in the sectoral 
councils. Within GUAM, Ukraine is a less pro-active but still relatively reliable 
partner. This involvement is informed by three goals: First of all, both states wish to 
increase their capacity to single-handedly respond to economic and security 
developments in their neighbourhood. They hence exploit the organisations in 
order to make their independent and mainly bilateral foreign policy more efficient. 
By means of this strategy, they may consolidate their domestic, Westphalian and 
interdependence sovereignty without creating new channels for external 
interference. Secondly, in support of their Westphalian sovereignty the states strive 
to improve their leverage in the region and the international arena. This enhances 
their freedom of manoeuvre vis-à-vis powerful regional players. Thirdly, both 
countries commit to certain activities just to maintain the organisation as a regional 
forum. The CIS serves to strengthen their regional leverage and enhances their 
impact on regional developments. Azerbaijan in particular considers GUAM as a tool 
to improve its international leverage. Ukraine pursues a fourth aim in the CIS and 
GUAM. It intends to build co-operation structures with the neighbourhood for the 
sake of its interdependence sovereignty. Two consecutive sections on Azerbaijan 
and Ukraine will illustrate the states’ intermediary goals, first with reference to CIS 
and GUAM trade and, secondly, concerning security activities. The conclusion 




6.1. AZERBAIJAN: IMPROVING THE COUNTRY’S POLICY CAPACITY 
By studying Azerbaijan this chapter first considers a former Soviet republic which, as 
chapter 5 spelt out, consistently rejects the creation of legalised multilateral rules 
but nevertheless pro-actively participates in the CIS and GUAM. The section will 
consider what Azerbaijan intends to gain from its pro-active participation in the 
sectoral activities of the CIS and GUAM. The analysis will also highlight that policy-
makers conceptualise the potential of CIS and GUAM activities differently. This is 
driven by the fact that, as mentioned in chapter 5, Azerbaijan’s relations to some 
CIS members rest on stronger dependencies than the relations with GUAM states. 
Therefore the organisations' sectoral activities serve different aims. The section 
argues that Azerbaijan employs CIS activities with a strong focus on players in the 
region. Thus the results of trade and migration activities are considered relevant for 
Azerbaijan’s economic and trade policy. GUAM activities have a more instrumental 
character. The results are strongly directed at an international audience. 
Accordingly, officials depict CIS trade and migration activities as contributing an 
efficient and independent domestic and foreign policy. They expect the activities to 
also produce additional leverage vis-à-vis Russia and Armenia. Activities in GUAM 
primarily aim to increase Azerbaijan’s international recognition. Neither the CIS nor 
GUAM is the main arena for tackling trade and migration issues. Since the 
organisations nevertheless support Azerbaijan’s policy in these issue-areas and 
beyond, Azerbaijan is eager to maintain its membership in the organisations. 
Empirical insights into expectations first vis-à-vis trade and secondly regarding 
migration activities will illustrate these arguments.  
6.1.1. CIS AND GUAM FREE TRADE ACTIVITIES 
A comparative study of free trade activities in the CIS and GUAM will highlight the 
following aspects. The CIS free trade negotiations attracted the intense scrutiny of 
policy-makers in the Ministry of Economics and Foreign Affairs. The negotiations 
provided opportunities to improve trade relations with core CIS partners and to 
strengthen Azerbaijan’s negotiating position concerning trade with Russia. From the 
very beginning Azerbaijani officials have considered it more important to participate 
in the negotiations than to sign the resulting FTA. As regards GUAM, Azerbaijan 
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committed to the FTA, above all, in response to the interests of the other member 
states. The aim was to ensure these states' support in more GUAM activities that 
are more vital for Azerbaijan. Additionally, an agreed FTA is a sign of an 
organisation’s success and therefore, in the eyes of Azerbaijani officials, important 
for GUAM. The sub-section will commence with a comparative summary of how 
intensively the ministries in Azerbaijan participated in the FTA negotiations in the 
two organisations. It will then separately discuss the expectations towards the CIS 
and GUAM FTA.  
Chapter 5 has already invoked two crucial parameters for Azerbaijan’s engagement 
in the FTA negotiations that apply to the CIS and GUAM. The ministerial officials 
attended all relevant working groups and rounds of negotiations. In contrast to the 
2011 CIS FTA, in 2002 Azerbaijan signed the GUAM FTA. The document does not 
envision powerful enforcement mechanisms. Being party to the FTA does not, thus, 
necessarily imply strong commitments. It is therefore does not tie Azerbaijan in to 
new interdependencies. Azerbaijan was able to get involved in the CIS FTA 
negotiations, since the CIS offered enough opportunities to protect the state from 
undesired consequences of the agreement. The Prime Minister signed, for example, 
the CIS Economic Strategy in 2008, which paved the way for the FTA negotiations, 
with the notification that Azerbaijan will only implement aspects that do not 
demand harmonisation with domestic policy.1 To signal that Azerbaijan is cautious 
with regard to regionally harmonised trade relations, the country entered the 
negotiations with another reservation. Azerbaijan declared that it would withhold 
the decision on whether or not to participate until the final draft was adopted.2 In 
autumn 2011 president Aliyev finally did not sign the agreement. A high-ranking 
ministerial official, who anticipated this decision already in 2011, emphasised, 
however, that the FTA negotiations were nevertheless not in vain for Azerbaijan. 
This assessment requires further explanation. Also, with regard to the GUAM FTA, 
ministerial officials, economic actors and analysts give an assessment that is, at first 
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glance, puzzling. They agree that the FTA lacks practical impact.3 A high-level actor 
from the foreign ministry presents the GUAM FTA as a relevant step, but does not 
support the idea of improving the FTA’s impact by additional monitoring structures. 
The following paragraphs will explain which relevance the CIS FTA negotiations had 
even though the FTA has not been adopted and why the inefficient GUAM FTA is 
relevant. 
6.1.1.1. CIS FTA  
If from the very beginning there was a consensus in the government concerning the 
FTA, it was to send Azerbaijani delegates to all working groups. Despite the 
previously mentioned reservations concerning Azerbaijan’s ultimate participation in 
the FTA, the delegates submitted several proposals for the FTA draft and for action 
plans. They also touched upon several conflicting issues in the negotiations. 
According to interviewees who attended the negotiations, they succeeded in 
transforming the draft into a text which would not cause harm to Azerbaijan. In 
spite of this engagement and success, two of the three interviewees involved never 
saw a reason to actually shift the trade regulations from a bilateral FTA to a 
multilateral one.4 They rather frame Azerbaijan’s pro-activeness as driven by other 
intentions than establishing the same liberal trade regulations with all CIS partners. 
The ambition of the Azerbaijani delegation was rather to ensure that Azerbaijani 
producers maintain favourable access to the core CIS markets: Russia, Ukraine, 
Georgia and the Central Asian states. These sales markets are attractive for 
companies which still produce according to the relatively low GOST standards. The 
export profile discussed in section 5.1.1.2 has shown that the agricultural and food 
industry rests strongly on the former Soviet markets. Against this background, an 
official from the ministry of economics saw no other way but to participate in CIS 
trade activities, even if the proclaimed aim of integration is incompatible with 
Azerbaijan’s concepts.5 The interview narratives highlighted that Azerbaijan can 
exploit such negotiations through the following two strategies.  
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A first set of activities is oriented at improving the foundations for the bilateral 
trade with core CIS countries.6 In concrete terms, Azerbaijan intended to convince 
CIS partners to exempt fewer goods from free trade than the existing bilateral free 
trade agreements do. It suffices to mention the most prominent example: to 
convince Russia to include energy transit in the free trade regulations. To be able to 
export Azerbaijani gas through Russia without duty fees or according to reduced 
and stable fees would support the main pillar of Azerbaijan’s economy. Success in 
this sphere would have increased Azerbaijan’s readiness to sign the FTA, since it 
would have allowed the officials to more directly use this stipulation. This would still 
not have implied that Azerbaijan would have been ready to comprehensively apply 
the agreement. The idea was rather to primarily refer to this provision in the 
bilateral negotiations with Russia.7 However, this endeavour failed. But, according 
to an official, Azerbaijan succeeded in persuading other trade partners to 
subordinate additional goods to the free trade regime. Azerbaijan hopes that their 
stipulation in the multilateral FTA will likewise pave the way for a re-negotiation of 
the exemptions in the existing bilateral FTAs.8 Another ambition was to shape the 
CIS trade environment according to Azerbaijan’s preferences. A crucial debate in 
this regard, which was touched upon on the margins of the FTA negotiation, 
concerned the production standards in the CIS area. The CIS Council for 
Standardisation agrees such technical production standards. Azerbaijan is not eager 
to follow these standards, but intends to steer the development of these standards 
in a way compatible with the Azerbaijan’s agricultural and industrial production. 
Influencing the development helps Azerbaijani companies to produce according to 
standards that prevail in many former Soviet republics and prevents new technical 
trade barriers.9 
A second strategy was to increase Azerbaijan’s leverage as a trade partner in the 
neighbourhood. Two ways of doing so will be presented. Azerbaijan pushed some 
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issues in the negotiations which have also been of interest to other CIS states. This 
applies not only to the previously mentioned demand to include energy transit fees 
into the FTA. Another example concerns the attempt of Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Russia to additionally consolidate the Customs Union through the FTA. The three 
states intended to enforce the demand that the CU is treated as single customs 
space. This requires that third-party trade partners consent to regulate their trade 
regime with all three countries in the same manner. Due to the strongly diverging 
economic power of, for instance, Belarus and Russia, levelling the customs regimes 
is no option for Azerbaijan and other CIS members.10 Azerbaijani officials 
accordingly strongly opposed claims made in this regard by Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. They presented their open engagement in these matters as a success in 
the following regard. It enabled Azerbaijan to present itself as a strong and reliable 
partner in CIS trade negotiations. As a relatively strong economic power, so it was 
argued, Azerbaijan had the courage to oppose Russia and the potential to facilitate 
compromises from which weaker CIS partners might benefit. Such an image might 
boost Azerbaijan’s attractiveness as trade partner in the eyes of individual CIS 
states.11 Another strategy was to use FTA-related councils for raising conflictual 
issues. The officials depict the CIS councils as additional and not as a primary 
platform for solving trade problems. The multilateral bodies basically enable 
Azerbaijan to increase the pressure on the conflict partner.12  
These narratives reflect little sense of interest in any collective solutions for trade 
issues. Only two officials hoped to facilitate trade relations with CIS partners in the 
course of the CIS activities on free trade. They tried to establish durable 
mechanisms for intergovernmental collaboration. The idea was to improve the 
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 The bilateral free trade agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus stipulate varying 
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have been again negotiated. The CU countries tried to ensure through the FTA that all FTA parties 
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trade conditions in Azerbaijan’s border regions, especially with Russia. Reportedly, 
their superiors did not share this interest and, hence, did not pursue it in CIS 
activities.13 The following paragraphs will discuss how Azerbaijan also strives to 
improve the country’s regional leverage within GUAM, with a different strategy. 
6.1.1.2. GUAM FTA  
As indicated above, Azerbaijan has continuously supported GUAM activities on free 
trade in an undiluted manner, in spite of the fact that ministerial officials frankly 
consider GUAM free trade as economically irrelevant for Azerbaijan. Since 2010 it is 
the Azerbaijani delegate to the GUAM secretariat who initiates and co-ordinates the 
trade activities. The mismatch between economic interests and a nevertheless 
relatively stable commitment to free trade activities becomes less puzzling if we 
disclose the underlying intentions that drive Azerbaijan. The core argument for 
Azerbaijan’s pro-active engagement in this field is to tie GUAM members to 
Azerbaijan. This intends to improve the ability to use GUAM for strengthening 
Azerbaijan’s regional and international leverage. 
The interview narratives describe Azerbaijan’s opportunities to enhance its 
reputation as regional power through the GUAM FTA in two ways. The FTA 
negotiations have been opened in the 1990s upon Ukraine’s suggestion. 
Accordingly, Azerbaijani officials frame the FTA, like other primarily energy trade 
related projects, as a response to Ukraine’s and Georgia’s GUAM policy. Azerbaijan 
has ratified the FTA without delay. It also agreed to make the negotiations about 
Azerbaijani oil sales to Ukraine via the Odessa-Brody pipelines a topic within GUAM. 
In exchange for accommodating Ukraine's trade interests the officials hoped to gain 
Ukraine's support in security matters that are more relevant for Azerbaijan. As 
economically far stronger player, Azerbaijan did not risk anything by promoting 
GUAM trade projects. A ministerial official even emphasised that GUAM never 
served as actual forum for negotiating oil sales to Ukraine.14 As chapter 1.5.3 
discussed, these negotiations have been on the GUAM agenda in the early 2000s. 
But in the eyes of Azerbaijan they fulfilled the instrumental function to tie Ukraine 
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to Azerbaijan and GUAM.15 Indeed, in certain periods this strategy has been 
worthwhile. In the early 2000s, for instance, the prospects of a successful oil deal 
with Azerbaijan prompted Kuchma, as president of Ukraine, to publicly support 
Azerbaijan’s position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.16 Later Azerbaijan accelerated 
Ukraine’s efforts to re-launch GUAM as fully-fledged regional organisation in 2006 
by supporting Ukraine’s main ambitions in GUAM. Four years later ministerial 
officials depict it as crucial to maintain and expand trade projects, in order to 
ensure that Ukraine remains in GUAM. As section 5.2.3 has indicated, president 
Yanukovych, stressed that Ukraine’s participation in GUAM should concentrate on 
economic initiatives.  
Thus in the last years Azerbaijan’s opportunities to build on Ukraine as a partner 
shifted from winning over the country as an outspoken supporter in matters vital to 
Azerbaijan’s security to ensuring that Ukraine stays within GUAM. For Azerbaijan’s 
reputation and freedom to promote a conflict resolution according to its 
preferences it is obviously more helpful to gain the explicit support of a large 
neighbour such as Ukraine. However, it is still supportive to simply keep GUAM as 
regional organisation alive. In GUAM Azerbaijan can appear as regional actor. 
Officials argue that the international visibility of a state increases, if the state is 
willing and able to assume regional responsibility. Especially for a small country like 
Azerbaijan, that only two decades ago has re-gained independent statehood, it is 
crucial to substantiate its international recognition inter alia by such a strategy.17 
Being recognised as mature international player may widen the scope for 
Azerbaijan to put across its stance on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Therefore 
Azerbaijan took in recent years some efforts to keep GUAM alive and active by new 
economic projects similar to the tourism project briefly described chapter 1.5.3.18 
The discussion has outlined that Azerbaijan’s engagement in GUAM trade activities 
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follows, like in the CIS, the aim of improving the country’s regional and international 
leverage. However, only from the CIS can Azerbaijan gain direct benefits for its 
trade with the neighbourhood. It may establish a better foundation for the bilateral 
trade with CIS countries. The next section will deliver a similar picture for the 
migration-related activities. 
6.1.2. CIS AND GUAM ACTIVITIES ON MIGRATION  
This second within-case study revealed that, as with trade, the CIS and GUAM 
migration activities are stepping stones for improving the country’s capacity to 
independently respond to migration challenges and for elevating Azerbaijan's 
regional and international leverage. Again, due to its member state constellation, 
the CIS is better qualified than GUAM to strengthen Azerbaijan’s migration policy. 
Policy-makers utilise the CIS to shape the CIS members’ migration policy according 
to Azerbaijan’s needs.19 They also use the CIS as an additional arena for discussing 
current migration conflicts.20 These strategies have basically been already spelled 
out in the example of the CIS trade activities given section 6.1.1.1. Therefore, they 
will not be repeated here. Instead the sub-section will explore more deeply the 
second intermediary goal: strengthening the country’s regional and international 
leverage. The following sub-sections will present the argument that Azerbaijan tries, 
in the framework of both the CIS and GUAM, to increase international awareness of 
the way in which the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict challenges the stability 
of the region. By doing so, policy-makers envision widening their leverage in the 
conflict resolution. They again approach the CIS and GUAM with different 
strategies. 
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 Azerbaijani officials interpret the multilateral interactions in the council and working groups as a 
basis for preparing the national security agencies for emerging hot spots regarding migration. These 
may be situations where CIS members play a lone hand in changing the visa-regulations. In this 
regard the officials especially watch developments in Russia to which, as discussed in chapter five, 
Azerbaijan sends strong labour migration flows. According to AZ_SMS_1 
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 The argument builds on an example provided by AZ_SMS_1, who himself discussed a minor 
conflict of changes in the Russia visa-regulation in the CIS Council of Heads of Migration Agencies. It 
is supported by the description in other interviews of conflictive incidents and the CIS’ potential role 
in their resolution. (AZ_MFA_3, AZ_SMS_2)   
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6.1.2.1. CIS MIGRATION ACTIVITIES 
Chapter 5 has already indicated that Azerbaijan is open to the core CIS councils on 
regular and irregular migration as well as the basic migration related agreements. It 
is at the same time evident that the country is not interested in establishing the CIS 
as a powerful player in migration matters. Azerbaijan has, for instance, never signed 
agreements that entitle the CIS to develop integrated migration approaches. Among 
the various councils that discuss labour and irregular migration, officials from the 
foreign ministry and the Migration Service value primarily the Council of Heads of 
Migration Agencies. The council deals in the first place with matters of visa 
regulation and labour migration, but considers irregular migration only marginally. 
As section 5.1.1.1 discussed, the ruling elite does anyways not prioritise irregular 
migration issues.21 But the council can be exploited for improving Azerbaijan’s own 
labour migration policy. However, the officials who participate in it present 
themselves as not necessarily pro-active in the council. They attend this and related 
councils regularly, but define the council’s agenda only sporadically.22 It is worth 
mentioning that the council’s results are hardly tangible for departments that are 
concerned with migration but are not in contact with the CIS. This indicates that the 
State Migration Service has limited interest in direct migration-related gains from 
the council.23 Indeed, another rationale prevails in the description of the value-
added benefit of this council.  
Azerbaijani officials rather use the council to present the protracted solution of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a topical security issue for the entire post-Soviet 
space. The topic of migration flows and the discussion of alleged efforts to 
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regionally co-ordinate migration issues help making such statements in the 
following way. Azerbaijan participates in negotiations on joint CIS migration 
regulations, even though it is not interested in signing them. The participation 
provides the opportunity to argue that Azerbaijan is not capable of actually 
committing to potential multilateral migration institutions until the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is settled. First of all, Azerbaijan cannot accept security 
regulations that include, in the form of Armenia, a state that violates Azerbaijan’s 
territorial integrity. Secondly, due to the conflict, Azerbaijan is not able to control 
about 20% of its territory. It cannot therefore guarantee that border controls and 
visa regulations are respected in this territory. In the current situation, they argue, 
Azerbaijan cannot ensure the comprehensive implementation of multilateral 
migration regulations.24 As described above, Azerbaijani officials in any case reject 
the notion of ‘co-ordinating any aspects of their migration policy with anybody’.25 
Thus, the argument employed is merely instrumental. The council provides an arena 
to persuade regional actors that the conflict is not a ‘frozen’ one and cannot be 
ignored, but has an impact on the everyday security matters of the entire region. 
Furthermore, given that Armenia and Russia sit at the negotiation table, it is one of 
many tools to exert pressure on the country’s approach to the conflict. A brief 
discussion of GUAM migration activities in the next sub-section will stress that 
migration activities within GUAM are even less directed at Azerbaijan’s migration 
policy.  
6.1.2.2. GUAM IRREGULAR MIGRATION ACTIVITIES  
GUAM explicitly focuses on matters of irregular, not regular migration. The CIS 
already covers mutual visa issues and the GUAM members depict core visa and 
migration topics in any case as a domestic affair. Hence, there is no reason to 
discuss such topics in GUAM. At the same time, as chapter 5.1.1.1 has pinpointed, 
Azerbaijani officials do not necessarily treat irregular migration as relevant. At least 
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 Both AZ_SMS_1 and AZ_MFA_3 elaborated this argument in length when asked about multilateral 
agreements. AZ_MFA_3 did not only refer to CIS agreements but also to similar acts within the 
cooperation with the EU.  
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 This point was stressed by all interviewees in charge of migration issues, including AZ_SMS_1 and 
AZ_MFA_3 who made the statement concerning the conflict. This narrative is not only employed in 
migration matters. AZ_MED_1 provided the same line of argument concerning the FTA.  
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until 2011 Azerbaijan had no problem handling incoming migration independently. 
Outgoing irregular migration hardly caused any disturbance.26 In this light, 
representatives from various migration-oriented departments are not enthusiastic 
about the GUAM activities, but nevertheless actively engage in them. The 
introduction into GUAM’s structures in chapter 1 has indicated that GUAM 
possesses three instruments in the field of irregular migration: a working group, the 
VLEC information exchange structure, and joint operations for detecting trafficking 
routes. Two officials involved in the GUAM activities presented themselves as quite 
active in this sphere. One staff member is most of the time on duty in VLEC and 
ready to receive and process migration-related requests from GUAM partners. 
Another official from the ministry of interior prepares the agenda of the working 
group meetings. Azerbaijan also devotes resources to the joint operations. At the 
same time, the officials had problems explaining the benefit of these activities for 
Azerbaijan’s policy against irregular migration. They explained the activities’ impact 
by referring to the following two aspects. 
Firstly, they presented engagement in multilateral measures against irregular 
migration as a must for the sake of regional and global security. They employed the 
argument spread by international actors like the UN that global flows of irregular 
migration challenge global security inter alia by supporting international terrorism. 
The officials drew on the assumption that human trafficking is an income source for 
international terrorist networks and that uncontrolled migration assists terrorist 
activities.27 They argued that a state like Azerbaijan that supports the US in the fight 
against terrorism is therefore obliged to fight global irregular migration flows. They 
presented it as a specific responsibility of Azerbaijan, since Azerbaijan potentially 
serves as a transit route for individuals with extremist background from Iran or 
Afghanistan.28 By appearing as a reliable partner in the fight against irregular 
migration Azerbaijan hopes to present itself internationally as responsible regional 
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 This has been stated by AZ_MoI_1 and AZ_MoI_2 but also by AZ_SMS_1.  
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 On Azerbaijan's support for the US: Oren, Ido and Robert Kaufmann (2006), Culture and Alliances: 
U.S. Portrayals of Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Kazahstan Before and After September 11, 2001. In: 
Shaffer, Brenda (ed.), The Limits of Culture. Islam and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press, p 142. 
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 Azerbaijan’s strategic geographic position is also emphasised by the following analysts from 
Azerbaijan: AZ_Analyst_1, AZ_Analyst_8. See also:  
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and global security player. The strategy also adds some substance to Azerbaijan’s 
stated commitment to the US fight against terrorism. After the 9/11 attacks 
Azerbaijan hoped to improve its relations with the US by voicing this support.29 The 
background is that until 2002 the US had not been willing to support Azerbaijan 
with governmental humanitarian and economic aid. Section 907 of the Freedom 
Support Act prohibited giving such aid to Azerbaijan due to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Azerbaijan's stated commitment to the fight against terrorism indeed paid 
off. In 2002 the prohibition was voided and the US-Azerbaijani relations have 
substantially improved. 
Secondly, officials refer to the link between irregular migration and international 
terrorism for making the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict a matter of international 
relevance. This builds on the argument which has already been discussed in the 
section on CIS migration activities. The secessionist conflict hinders Azerbaijan’s 
control over its territory and, thus, compromises the state’s ability to efficiently 
counteract irregular migration. Within GUAM this inability can, however, be framed 
as impacting not only on the regional but also global security. As long as Azerbaijan 
does not have control over Nagorno-Karabakh it cannot ensure that this enclave 
does not become a cradle of illicit activities that support international terrorism.30 
Via GUAM this message can be directly sent to the US, which is a core partner of 
GUAM and the main sponsor of the VLEC structures.31  In addition, GUAM is a 
channel to communicate this perception to the wider international community. 
Various statements on behalf of GUAM in the UN General Assembly since 2003 
have presented this argument.32  
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The examples presented in this section lead to the conclusion that it is worthwhile 
for Azerbaijan to participate in CIS and GUAM sectoral activities, even though the 
country has no ambitions to promote regional multilateral governance. The 
expected function of this participation is not necessarily linked to Azerbaijan’s 
concerns in the issue-area under discussion. If Azerbaijani officials are interested in 
the issue-area they strive to exploit the activities for influencing the other states' 
policy according to Azerbaijan's preferences. Another ambition is to improve 
Azerbaijan’s negotiation leverage vis-à-vis crucial partners such as Russia in trade 
and migration matters. In case the sectoral activities are not a matter of interest to 
Azerbaijan, state officials support these activities in order to promote Azerbaijan’s 
visibility as a regional actor. This is intended to strengthen Azerbaijan’s international 
reputation and to increase its capacity to pursue its own security strategy, in 
particular regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. It will be the task of the following section to 
highlight that Ukraine is more interested in results that directly impact on the 
state’s trade and security capacity. But Ukraine also strives for achievements that 
are more generally linked to its regional and international position.  
6.2. UKRAINE: ENLARGING THE POLICY TOOLKIT  
Ukraine is a country that seems to ascribe more relevance to multilateral legalised 
rules within the CIS. As chapter 5 has outlined, Ukraine is at least more ready to sign 
agreements such as the CIS FTA. But regardless of what policy-makers formally 
agree to, the state consequently rejects any idea of supra-nationality within the CIS 
and GUAM. Chapter 5 has also argued that this approach is driven by the 
(inter)dependencies that tie Ukraine to its post-Soviet neighbourhood. The 
perception of a destructive dependence on Russia and relevant interdependencies 
with other former Soviet republics induce Ukrainian policy-makers to seek active 
participation in both the CIS and GUAM. This section aims at substantiating this 
identified nexus by exploring what aims Ukrainian state officials ascribe to CIS and 
GUAM activities. It will be argued that, in contrast to Azerbaijan, Ukraine is 
determined to achieve benefits that directly improve its trade and security policy. 
This applies to both the CIS and GUAM. In particular activities on non-traditional 
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security challenges arouse more positive attention among Ukrainian state security 
bodies. According to Ukrainian officials, GUAM produces less tangible results for 
Ukraine’s regional policy than the CIS. They, therefore, approach the organisation 
less enthusiastically. The desire to maintain the organisation as an instrument in 
Ukraine’s regional policy exists, but is less pronounced than in Azerbaijan. Similar to 
section 6.1, the study on Ukraine will first dwell on trade and then on measures 
against drug-trafficking.  
6.2.1. CIS AND GUAM TRADE ACTIVITIES  
The intensity with which Ukraine participates in free trade activities and the framing 
of the expected results reveals the same set of intermediary goals as in the case of 
Azerbaijan. The CIS and GUAM FTA should increase leverage vis-à-vis regional and 
international actors and provide additional tools for successfully shaping Ukraine’s 
bilateral trade relations. Since 2010 trade activities in GUAM have been above all a 
means to stay in the organisation. This section will, however, highlight that 
Ukrainian officials associate different strategies with these intermediary goals from 
Azerbaijan. Regarding the CIS it has been more important to become a party to the 
FTA and to introduce international regulations to which Ukraine has committed in 
the agreement. In GUAM policy-makers have struggled to effectively improve 
Ukraine’s trade relations. In the 2000s, some policy-makers intended to employ the 
FTA as a means of establishing a link with the EU. 
Chapter 5 has indicated that since the 1990s the Ukrainian leadership has been an 
advocate of free trade arrangements in the CIS and GUAM. In the course of the 
1990s, the country has signed bilateral FTAs with all former Soviet republics, but 
nevertheless promoted additional multilateral FTAs in these two organisations. 
With this aim Leonid Kuchma even took a step that conveyed the impression of 
agreeing to integrate into CIS structures. He signed the treaty on the Single 
Economic Space.33 Interestingly enough, the endeavour of a CIS FTA was 
continuously promoted by high-level policy-makers, including the presidents, their 
administration and prime ministers. It also gained strong support from ministerial 
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 Zhalilo, Yaroslav (2007), Ukraine in the Single Economic Space: Benefits of Institutionalisation of 
Trade Relations. National Security & Defence,Vo. 91, No. 7; Bukkvoll, Private Interest, Public Policy. 
Ukraine and the Common Economic Space Agreement. 
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experts. Only in public has high-level support not always been pronounced. The 
endeavour of the GUAM FTA was, in contrast, primarily promoted by the 
presidents, specifically Kuchma and Yushchenko. According to an official from the 
ministry of economics, GUAM has produced a legal text far better than that of the 
CIS FTA. But the text itself does not fulfil any function in Ukraine’s trade policy. It is 
also not intended to do so in the future.34 Nevertheless, Ukraine actively 
participates in FTA-related activities in both the CIS and GUAM. But none of the 
agreements is meant to entirely replace the existing bilateral FTAs.35 The following 
paragraphs will discuss the rationale of this pro-active approach in the FTA 
negotiations that does not aim to establish multilateral trade institutions.  
6.2.1.1. CIS FTA  
Since 2007 the Ukrainian government has not spared efforts to substantially 
influence the CIS FTA negotiations. Two officials recounted that Ukraine has been 
pushing to re-negotiate the FTA which materialised in 2007, but only with Russian 
approval.36 Anxious to tailor the FTA according to Ukraine’s needs, a strong 
delegation from all ministries potentially affected participated in the negotiation 
and submitted several counter proposals to the initial draft.37 Thanks to successful 
negotiations the agreement was signed in 2011 and ratified in summer 2012.38 The 
narrative of three officials who prepared Ukraine’s negotiation strategy discloses 
that the endeavour intended to get the FTA signed by Ukraine and other core CIS 
partners, above all Russia, but not to comprehensively implement the newly agreed 
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 Some ministerial officials interviewed who were involved in Ukraine’s trade did not even know 
about the GUAM FTA.(UA_MFA_1, UA_MFA_2) Since the FTA lacks any function, Ukraine also tries to 
divert GUAM from establishing structures for implementing the FTA. (UA_MED_1) 
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 The core delegates to the negotiations from the foreign ministry were less outspoken about this 
fact. They, however, emphasised the means available to avoid unintended effects of the FTA on 
Ukraine and the relevance of the bilateral FTAs with CIS members. A staff member from the 
economics ministry made this point most directly. The interviewee explained how a partial 
application of the multilateral FTA may be feasible and how Ukraine may ensure that the bilateral 
FTAs remain in place at least for some time. (UA_MFA_1 but also UA_MFA_2)  
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 This narrative stems from interviews with officials at expert and decision making level from the 
foreign ministry and economics ministry. (UA_MFA_3, UA_MFA_2 and UA_MED_1) 
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 Officials from the following agencies were involved: the Ministry of Economics, finance, foreign 
affairs and customs agencies. The Ukrainian contributions concerned for instance conflict resolution 
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of bilateral agreements affected by the FTA. This incomplete overview was reported by staff from 
the Ministry of Economics, foreign affairs and the State Service for Technical Regulation.(UA_MFA_2, 
UA_MED_1, UA_SSTR_1)   
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 RIA Novosti, Ukraine Ratifies Free Trade Agreement with CIS. 30 July 2012. 
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FTA. They presented the CIS FTA as an addition to the existing bilateral FTAs, which 
should be employed in some points of conflict only.39 This assessment contradicts 
the official CIS line of argument according to which the FTA should replace all 
bilateral FTAs. In order to serve as an additional trade policy tool, Ukraine tried to 
integrate as many beneficial provisions as possible into the legal text, and to reduce 
potential harm to Ukraine’s independent domestic legislation. The following two 
ambitions guided Ukraine’s strategy.  
First, Ukraine intended to maximise its flexibility to respond to trade conflicts with 
selected CIS members. This is geared towards important partners like Kazakhstan, 
Belarus or Turkmenistan, and most decisively towards Russia. Similar to Azerbaijan, 
Ukraine has in this regard been eager to re-negotiate the number of commodities 
stipulated in the existing bilateral FTAs by individual trade partners. Again, the most 
crucial aim was to urge Russia to regulate energy export and transit fees via the 
FTA. Ukrainian officials depict the failure of this attempt as the strongest 
repercussion in the otherwise successful negotiations.40 However, inter alia Ukraine 
successfully insisted on a provision that permits gas and oil trading countries free 
access to the pipeline-grid in the signatory countries. Since the end of 2012, Ukraine 
has, so far unsuccessfully, tried to use this provision for convincing energy-rich CIS 
partners such as Kazakhstan to send oil via Ukraine to Europe.41 Further, the 
Ukrainian negotiators were eager to include provisions in the FTA that covered 
issues of current trade conflicts with inter alia Russia. To name just one instance, 
Ukraine urged the member states to negotiate the topic of sanitary-veterinary 
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 The core delegates to the negotiations from the foreign ministry were less out spoken about this 
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standards for food production. In the years 2006-2010 Russia repeatedly banned 
Ukrainian meat and dairy products with formal reference to breaches of sanitary-
veterinary or other production standards.42 The basic idea was to create another 
legal definition of these standards. These endeavours thus aimed to elevate 
Ukraine’s leverage in trade negotiations with its core trade partners. 
A second ambition was to spread certain trade regulations and production 
standards, which Ukraine has adopted from international actors such as the WTO 
and the EU, in the neighbourhood. In 2008 Ukraine became a member of the WTO. 
Since 2008 Ukraine has also negotiated a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement with the European Union. The question of its adoption is still pending in 
2013. These two international commitments require an adjustment of the bilateral 
trade regulations with the former Soviet republics. According to state officials, the 
CIS provides an environment to accelerate this process. The intention is to persuade 
member states to adjust the CIS regulations entirely or partially to these standards. 
This permits Ukraine to refer to the agreed provisions when re-negotiating existing 
bilateral trade agreements. The FTA does not lose this function, even if it is not fully 
implemented. The most crucial question concerned production standards. The EU 
demands production standards that are substantially higher than CIS standards. An 
adjustment to EU criteria might endanger Ukraine’s competitiveness on the CIS 
markets, since production according to EU standards implies higher costs. Ukraine 
thus proposed some changes to the CIS FTA in order to maintain good access to the 
CIS markets. An official from the State Service for Technical Regulation assessed the 
process as relatively successful.43 By this strategy Ukraine strove to pave the way for 
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 Since 2006 Russia has repeatedly banned meat and dairy imports from Ukraine. A most recent 
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vital changes in its bilateral relations with CIS partners. The following section will 
underscore that Ukraine has long pursued concrete aims in the GUAM FTA, are 
which oriented more at future trade relations rather than managing existing ones. 
6.2.1.2. GUAM FTA  
The introductory notes to the study of CIS and GUAM trade activities have already 
proposed that Ukraine never participated in the GUAM FTA for the sake of free 
trade regulations. The president’s eagerness to achieve a FTA stemmed rather from 
the desire to lay the foundations for selected large-scale trade projects and to 
express Ukraine’s regional and international ambitions. As was already indicated in 
chapter 5.2.3, GUAM is most attractive for Ukraine in economic terms. The 
organisation brings Azerbaijan and Georgia closer to Ukraine. Both states are 
potential partners in the diversification of Ukraine’s energy imports. Therefore, 
whenever Ukraine decided to push GUAM it referred to trade projects. For instance, 
Ukraine prepared the first draft of the GUAM FTA in 2001.44 In 2006, President 
Yushchenko provided the impetus to finalise the first protocol on the joint rules on 
the origins of goods, in order to provide the FTA with more substance.45 Two aims 
can explain this pro-active stance.  
First and foremost, the FTA should lay the groundwork for intensified trade 
relations with the South Caucasian members of GUAM. It provided the opportunity 
to establish working bodies on several trade issues through which Ukraine could 
promote its trade priorities more efficiently. As has been indicated in section 
6.1.1.2, Ukraine’s call for intensified free trade in the 1990s coincided with the 
country’s attempts to arrange the transport of oil from Baku via Supsa, a port in 
Georgia, through the Black Sea to the Odessa-Brody pipeline in Ukraine.46 Ukraine 
also raised this issue again in 2007, shortly after GUAM was revitalised as 
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190 
 
organisation for inter alia economic development.47 The pipeline project is, 
however, not the only initiative that Ukraine presented in the framework of the 
GUAM FTA. The most prominent example is the in section 1.5.3 presented Trans-
Danubian Energy and Transport Bridge, which was intended to substantially 
improve Ukraine’s electricity trade.48 Ukraine’s plans to trigger meaningful trade 
projects did not work out. Only parts of the Trans-Danubian Energy and Transport 
Bridge are in the process of being implemented, but not within GUAM.49 
Nevertheless, under Yushchenko Ukrainian policy-makers did not consider the 
GUAM FTA as entirely in vain, as the next paragraph will show. 
The second rationale in the period 2004-2008 was to raise European awareness of 
Ukraine’s ambitions to integrate into EU structures. In this period, Ukrainian officials 
were dissatisfied with the EU’s reluctance to offer Ukraine EU integration prospects. 
Ukraine therefore searched for a tool to underscore the fact that it is committed to 
adjusting to EU standards, and to promote EU regulations in the post-Soviet 
neighbourhood. GUAM appeared to provide an adequate platform for this. Foreign 
policy-makers advertised GUAM as an arena for the member states to mutually 
support each other in the implementation of EU best practice and model laws.50 
This ambition has never been realised in practice, since such details have not been 
discussed within GUAM. Also, the negotiations on the EU Association Agreement 
that have started in 2008 have rendered Ukraine’s strategy less relevant. However, 
GUAM still employs this argument with Ukraine’s support in order to promote 
GUAM as a regional player.51 
                                                          
47
 RFE/RL Report. 24 September 2002; Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 10 May 2007. 
48
 Rada Natsional'noi bezpeky i oborony Ukrainy, Ekonomichnyi proekt GUAM 'Pridynaiskyi Energo-
Transportnyi Mist' Initsiativy Ukrainy [Economic Project GUAM the 'Trans-Danubian Energy- and 
Transport Bridge]. RFE/RL Newsline, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Meets with Georgian Leadership. 1 
July 2005; RFE/RL Feature. 
49
 According to UA_Analyst_3 
50
 Kornilov, Konsolidatsiya usilii stran  GUAM na proektakh i programmakh vostochnoi politiki ES 
[Consolidation of the Efforts of GUAM Countries in the Projects of the Programm of the EU Eastern 
Policy]; Nazarov, Grigori (2008), Prioritetnye sfery i osnovnye izmereniya sotrudnichestva stran 
GUAM s Evrosoyuzom. [Priority Areas and Basic Dimension of the Co-operation between GUAM 
Countries and the EU]. In: Kornilov, Igor', et al. (eds.), 'Skhidnii Vymir' polityky ES: Materialy 'kruglogo 
stolu' [Eastern Dimension of the EU Policy: Round Table Statements]. Kyiv: NIPMB. See also: 
Gamova, Svetlana, Tranzitom Cherez GUAM. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 May 2006. 
51
 In a joint communiqué at the side-line of the Eastern Partnership Summit in 2011 the GUAM 
Council of Foreign Ministers promoted GUAM as vehicle to spread European values and to facilitate 
191 
 
Particularly since 2010 a third ambition triggers Ukraine’s continuing support for 
GUAM trade activities. Officials in the current Yanukovych administration decided 
to remain a member of GUAM in order to maintain the organisation as a potential 
tool in Ukraine’s regional policy toolbox. The GUAM headquarters in Kyiv may 
provide additional opportunities to present Ukraine as strong player in the region.52 
However, since Russia has always been rather hostile to the organisation, a pro-
active involvement in GUAM may cause problems in the Russia-Ukrainian relations. 
Therefore, Ukraine decided to focus on an ‘innocent’ issue-area, namely trade.53 
Accordingly, officials from the Ministry of Economics are advised to attend the 
respective GUAM meetings and to co-ordinate Ukraine’s GUAM participation in 
general. The primary idea is, thus, to keep GUAM alive through Ukraine’s 
participation. The following section will show that Ukrainian officials have in the 
field of security sought, even in the period 2010-2012, more concrete results not 
only in CIS but also in GUAM activities.  
6.2.2. CIS AND GUAM SECURITY ACTIVITIES  
In the field of security, Ukraine pursues the same aims in the CIS and GUAM, as the 
example of anti-drug trafficking measures will highlight. The idea of strengthening 
the state’s capacity to fight drug-trafficking through Ukrainian territory dominates 
the narratives. In addition, state officials depict the activities as proof of Ukraine’s 
capability to act as a regional security player. These ambitions require Ukraine to 
participate reliably in CIS and GUAM activities. This explains the pattern of 
participation described in chapter 5. The Ministry of Interior and the secret service 
(SBU) follow developments in both organisations. Ukraine is a party to all CIS 
agreements that are necessary for participating in ad-hoc working groups, which 
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develop joint activities and legislation.54 The situation is similar in GUAM. Here, 
Ukraine stood out as being the second state after Azerbaijan that established the 
VLEC structures.55 Compared to their activities in the CIS, Ukrainian officials are 
more reluctant to propose new drug-trafficking related activities in GUAM.56 This 
reluctance, however, is less rooted in a lack of interest than in the experience that 
GUAM practices often do not materialise into the envisioned results. The following 
two sub-sections will specify Ukraine’s core aims.  
6.2.2.1. CIS MEASURES AGAINST DRUG-TRAFFICKING 
In the eyes of officials from the Ministry of Interior CIS activities on drug-trafficking 
substantially support Ukraine’s anti-drug trafficking policy. The following 
paragraphs will detail that three opportunities make the CIS attractive. First of all, 
interactions in the CIS intensify Ukraine’s working relations with the relevant state 
security bodies in its neighbourhood. This fosters collaboration in the detection and 
apprehension of criminal organisations operating across borders. Mutual support is 
particularly welcome for uncovering drug laboratories, tracing the origins of the 
chemical substances in drugs seized and for identifying sales markets and 
distribution networks. Chapter 5 has already indicated that Belarus, Russia, 
Moldova as well as the Central Asian states are in Ukraine’s focus in this regard. 57  
Secondly, Ukraine intends to influence legislation on drug-trafficking in its 
neighbouring states. The officials, however, do not hope to achieve shared legalised 
rules in the CIS. According to their arguments, policy harmonisation in some areas 
would indeed be beneficial. An example is penal legislation on drug-trafficking. The 
severity of penal sanctions for drug-trafficking offences varies significantly across 
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 Two officials from the Ministry of Interior, one on expert and one on decision-making level, 
describe the priorities like this. According to them, Ukraine is an independent state that defines its 
laws individually and rather orients itself towards UN legal models, if necessary. However, it is 
beneficial to be actively involved in all CIS interactions on drug-trafficking. The reasons for this will 
be specified in the following subsection and also discussed in chapter seven. (UA_MoI_1, UA_MoI_2) 
The same is argued with regard to another non-traditional security challenge, namely cyber-crime 
and irregular migration (UA_MoI_3). The exclusion of legal harmonisation and unified customs 
methods are stipulated in the reservations Ukraine put in the documents.  
55
 This information has been given by GUAM_Official_1 and the representative of the foreign 
ministry UA_MFA_5.  
56
 According to GUAM_Official_3 it is, however, rather hard to convince the Ukrainian side to 
strongly commit to the security activities. 
57
 UA_MoI_2, who in the study period was concerned with improving methods for detecting drug 
laboratories, described this aspect at length.  
193 
 
the post-Soviet space. This allows criminals to avoid harsher sentences by settling in 
the former Soviet republic with shorter sentences if they suspect they have been 
detected. However, hoping for such legal harmonisation is a utopia. Therefore, 
Ukraine tries to influence the domestic legislation of core CIS states primarily 
through discursive means. For example, they advertise their own legislation as best 
practices in the councils.58 
A third objective of Ukraine’s commitment to the CIS councils on drug-trafficking is 
to improve the country’s recognition as a responsible actor in the international fight 
against drug-trafficking. A strong image in this regard is expected to boost Ukraine’s 
international standing in general. Like their Azerbaijani counterparts, officials refer 
to drug-trafficking as a financial source for international drug-trafficking and argue 
that their regional efforts in this sphere make Ukraine an internationally visible 
security player. Ukraine is involved, more strongly than other CIS members, in 
international formats on drug-trafficking issues. This puts the country in the 
position to promote, for instance, model laws of UN agencies in the region. In this 
regard, Ukraine presents itself as bridge between international practices and 
forums and the CIS member states. Improving Ukraine’s image as security player 
not only has an international impact. It is also said to strengthen Ukraine’s leverage 
vis-à-vis Russia in security matters and beyond.59 A look at Ukraine’s assessment of 
GUAM activities in the very same area will show that the GUAM activities conform 
to Ukraine’s ambitions, but they do not produce the expected results.  
6.2.2.2. GUAM MEASURES AGAINST DRUG-TRAFFICKING 
Ever since GUAM developed working groups on non-traditional security Ukraine has 
delegated representatives to these bodies. Nevertheless, officials from the GUAM 
secretariat reported difficulties in convincing the relevant ministerial departments 
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 UA_MoI_1 gave this as an answer to the question of how CIS drug-trafficking co-operation should 
ideally look. UA_MoI_2 and an official from the foreign ministry in charge of issues related to 
organised crime supported the desire to influence the neighbours in this regard (UA_MFA_7)   
59
 UA_MoI_2 discussed at length Ukraine’s commitment to UN anti-drug-trafficking efforts and how 
Ukraine reports and advertises this commitment in the CIS. Other CIS members, e.g. Russia, are also 
involved in these efforts but Ukraine is presented as the most outspoken advocate for the 
international activities and legal models. UA_MFA_7 described how it was the interviewee’s strategy 
during a CIS council on organised crime to stress that Ukraine may act as a role model with regard to 




and security agencies to intensify their involvement.60 The SBU, for example, 
became more open to GUAM only when a project concerning an exchange of 
encrypted information between the GUAM states came closer to realisation. This 
development shows that Ukraine’s participation in GUAM security structures was 
not born of the perception that GUAM necessarily provides an ideal forum for 
tackling drug trafficking matters. In 2005, the decision to establish these activities 
was rather pragmatic. Ukraine wanted to revitalise GUAM as regional organisation, 
not at least due to Ukraine's economic concerns. The country needed to build a 
common ground for co-operation that attracted all members. Azerbaijan, Ukraine’s 
most important trade partner in GUAM, demanded a strong security dimension in 
GUAM. In order to keep Azerbaijan in favour of GUAM, Ukraine committed to the 
security structures.61 Initially, the security activities, thus, served merely to 
consolidate GUAM. Over the course of the years the Ukrainian officials involved 
identified the following additional functions.  
As with the CIS, some officials strive to strengthen Ukraine’s reputation as a 
regional security player through GUAM. One interviewee presented Ukraine’s 
success in persuading Azerbaijan and Moldova to participate in a larger 
international framework on non-traditional security challenges as a success of 
Ukraine in GUAM. Through such initiatives the official also hoped to substantiate its 
relations with individual GUAM members to Ukraine.62 Additionally, Ukraine has via 
GUAM tried to improve the ties with international security players such as NATO or 
the EU. The idea was to gain funding for GUAM security projects from these actors. 
This, however, only worked out in the case of the UN and the US.63  
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 Reported by GUAM_Official_2, GUAM_Official_3 
61
 UA_MFA_6 reports that the establishment of these security structures was part of Ukraine’s plan 
to enhance GUAM in 2005. Also, another official from the foreign ministry and from the National 
Security and Defence Council and a policy advisor at this time concerned with GUAM identified the 
secessionist conflicts as crucial moment for consolidating GUAM. (UA_MFA_1, UA_NSDC_1, 
UA_Analyst_1) 
62
 The interview talked about the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism launched in 2006 by 
Russia and the US. The interviewee proudly emphasised that Russia and the US had not managed to 
get Azerbaijan and Moldova involved. It was presented as an example of how Ukraine may act as a 
hub between regional and global security initiatives. (UA_MFA_5)  
63
 An individual from the Ukrainian delegation involved in the GUAM strategy development, related 
this strategy (UA_NSDC_1).  
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Finally, in recent years state officials saw GUAM also as source for improving 
Ukraine's own policy substantially through the intergovernmental relations. They 
are especially positive about the rather practical approach which GUAM takes in 
security activities. Instead of discussing legal issues in vain, the working groups deal 
mainly with the joint anti-drug trafficking operations. Officials explain that these 
operations help identify emerging hot-spots in Ukraine’s neighbourhood. With this 
knowledge Ukraine could formulate adequate responses.64 Also, VLEC would ideally 
become an operative instrument. A specific incentive to commit to VLEC has been 
that GUAM agreed to use an encryption device that was produced in Ukraine. 
Ukrainian security agencies can, according to the domestic legislation, use such a 
device only if it is produced in Ukraine. The VLEC initiative has put Ukraine in the 
comfortable position to get a new and externally funded device and to sell the 
device to the other GUAM states. Plans exist to widen VLEC structures from the 
GUAM capitals to various regions. This would imply more orders for the Ukrainian 
producer. It is important that Ukraine is entitled to use VLEC for purposes beyond 
GUAM. In 2011, Ukraine planned to additionally use VLEC for security 
communication with Poland during the European Football Championship in 2012. 
However, until summer 2012 Ukrainian officials rarely exchanged information on 
drug-trafficking issues with the GUAM states via VLEC.65 This is puzzling, since the 
officials expressed their desire to intensify not only the information exchange but 
also collaboration in operative matters with the GUAM states. They explained not 
to rely on VLEC for two reasons. They have had the experience that VLEC is not 
always accessible in the other GUAM countries. At the same time, some Ukrainian 
officials have only insufficient information about the progress made in establishing 
VLEC in all GUAM states.66  
This study on Ukraine can be summarised by stating that Ukraine employs the CIS 
and GUAM activities examined as complementary tools for Ukraine’s trade and 
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 Interview with UA_MoI_1 who has represented Ukraine in this GUAM body for several years 
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 The idea is to establish a decentralized VLEC structure in several provinces of the GUAM countries 
in order facilitate a quick communication between the police and other security bodies at regional 
level in the GUAM countries. (GUAM_Official_3)  
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 Interview with UA_MoI_1. The staff member of the Ministry of Interior, who also deals with drug-




security policy. The CIS offers a better arena for this than GUAM, even though 
GUAM has developed activities that are more in line with Ukraine’s intentions. The 
CIS often focusses too much on adopting agreements. Ukraine tries to develop 
instruments to directly influence core partners according to its needs. On the other 
hand, state officials intend to boost Ukraine’s image as a relevant regional player. 
6.3. INTERMEDIARY GOALS IN THE SECTORAL ACTIVITIES 
This section will draw some comparative conclusions. The chapter started from the 
finding that Azerbaijani officials associate the country’s membership in the CIS and 
GUAM with the objective of consolidating Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. 
They depict the two organisations as arenas for mitigating dependencies on 
individual former Soviet republics such as Russia or Armenia, in order to weaken 
their ability to interfere in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs. Further, they expect 
membership in these organisations to create new dependencies which vitalise 
certain sectors of Azerbaijan’s economy and stabilise the socio-economic situation 
in the country. This would impact positively on the country’s domestic sovereignty. 
Ukrainian officials depicted the function of the organisations likewise, but 
additionally see it as an instrument to improve the country’s control over 
challenging cross-border flows. The CIS and GUAM, so the argument goes, might 
intensify interaction with crucial countries in the neighbourhood. Against this 
background, this chapter asked what aims Azerbaijan and Ukraine want to achieve 
as interim stages for consolidating their sovereignty? The thesis aimed to come 
closer to a comprehensive picture of how the function of the CIS and GUAM is 
conceptualised by disclosing function of the sectoral activities. Particularly intriguing 
was the question of how the states improve their sovereignty concerns through 
activities that could potentially create new channels for external interference in 
domestic affairs. From which perspective do they consider the negotiations, 
agreements and joint activities in the organisations as useful?  
The analysis revealed that both Azerbaijan and Ukraine indeed employ the sectoral 
activities for achieving concrete advantages for their trade and security policy in the 
region and beyond. Azerbaijan and Ukraine strive for the same three outcomes. 
First, they hope to improve the respective state capacity to respond to economic 
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and security challenges from the region. Secondly, they aim to improve the states’ 
leverage in the region and internationally. It is crucial that they seek doing so 
without binding the states to the multilateral context of the organisations. 
Azerbaijani and Ukrainian, however, promote varying interim steps as expedient. 
Azerbaijani actors value the process of concluding negotiations more than the 
outcome, as the framing of the FTA negotiations and interactions in the migration 
council have shown. Azerbaijan also appears more open to pro-actively 
participating in activities in the pursuit of goals that only secondarily relate to the 
issue under discussion. They heavily employ CIS migration and GUAM activities as 
stepping stones towards obtaining more leeway in solving the Nagorno-Karabakh 
issue. Ukraine, in contrast, values not only the negotiation but also the adoption of 
agreements. Officials also strive towards outcomes that rely on mutual support and 
collaboration, especially in the field of drug-trafficking. A third aim of both states is 
to maintain the organisations as arena for regional interaction and as a symbol for 
the states’ ambitions to act as regional security player. Azerbaijan is willing to 
commit more resources to this aim than Ukraine. The proclaimed aims of the CIS 
and GUAM appear not to conform to these intermediary goals. This conveys the 
impression of an incoherence that may hinder productive work within the 
organisations. According to the analysis, however, Azerbaijan and Ukraine appear to 
have relatively compatible ideas about the intermediary goals to which they employ 
the two organisations. This shared understanding may improve opportunities to 
efficiently exploit GUAM and the CIS. These insights suggest that the sectoral 
activities of the CIS and GUAM are more substantial than the literature often 
assumes.67  
The findings raise additional questions concerning the function of the organisations. 
They have revealed that the states avoid being bound to the multilateral 
environment when they employ results such as agreements, knowledge, technology 
or an improved reputation in their bilateral policy. But they rely on the multilateral 
environment offered by the regional organisations to produce these results. The 
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 Hardly any contribution discusses the sectoral activities of these organisations. One of the few 
exceptions for the CIS are the publications in the Eurasian Integration Yearbook, which aim at 
advertising the CIS. See for instance Shishkov, Cooperation in the CIS Machine-Building Sector: 
Decreasing rather than Increasing; Vinokurov, The CIS Common Electric Power Market. 
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crucial question is what is the advantage of the multilateral environment as 
compared to bilateral interactions for achieving these results? Chapter 7 will 
investigate this question and will complete the picture of the function of 




7. INTENSITY OF CO-ORDINATION IN THE CIS AND GUAM 
ACTIVITIES 
This chapter will dig deeper into the activities that policy-makers in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine prefer for achieving their intermediary goals identified in chapter 6. The 
analysis will outline which mechanisms the actors intend to use for achieving their 
aims. It asks how policy-makers take advantage of the multilateral environment. 
The results of chapter 6 have triggered the interest in this question. They revealed 
that the states strive to obtain benefits which they can employ independently of the 
organisation and its members. These benefits are rooted in multilateral interaction 
in the CIS and GUAM. The findings, however, provide only a blurry picture of the 
role of this multilateral environment. Since the multilateral environment is a 
constitutive feature of a regional organisation, it is crucial to explore its relevance. 
Otherwise it remains unclear why states consider regional organisations at all as an 
additional instrument to their bilateral foreign policy. When we look at the findings 
of chapter 6 through a theoretical lens, the question of co-operative behaviour pops 
up. According to authors such as Keohane, multilateral arrangements build a basis 
for states to co-operate.1 The analytical framework has disaggregated the term co-
operation into varying intensities of co-ordination. This guides the chapter to 
analyse what patterns of co-ordination are observable in CIS and GUAM interaction.  
For this purpose the chapter investigates how policy-makers argue that benefits are 
derived from selected activities in the CIS. The analysis will concentrate on the 
activities that the interviewees presented as most significant. These are council 
meetings, the negotiation and adoption of agreements, joint operations, 
presentations at international forums and bureaucratic procedures. Especially 
interesting is the multilateral impact on the negotiation of agreements, since 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine shape these agreements even though do not intend their 
comprehensive implementation. Which mechanisms in council meetings allow the 
states to influence other countries’ policy? And also, what produces the benefit of 
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 They provide the organisational and institutional background for multilateralism. Multilateralism is 
the 'practice of co-ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states.' Keohane, Robert 
(1990), Multilateralism: an Agenda for Research. International Journal,Vo. 45, No. Autumn, p 731. 
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joint activities for the individual policy? Tracing the most valued mechanisms in 
these activities will disclose many facets of co-ordination. Therefore the analysis will 
conclude by clustering these activities according to the intensity of co-ordination 
they require. This will enable the reader to infer how the multilateral environment 
constitutes the activities in the regional organisations. By analysing the desired 
mechanisms of co-ordination the chapter makes an original contribution to the 
literature. As chapter 2.3 argued, the literature on the post-Soviet space does not 
explore interaction in the regional organisations. 
The chapter will argue that both Azerbaijan and Ukraine build their strategies in the 
CIS and GUAM on activities that require temporary or no co-ordination. The 
following categories roughly describe the essence of temporarily co-ordinated 
activities: ad hoc coalition building, diffusing model laws or best practices and 
bandwagoning with the reputation of other member states. No co-ordination is 
required when using (potential) investments, development monitoring and 
bureaucratic procedures. Ukraine additionally strives for more durable structures 
that can be activated for ad hoc co-ordination. Personalised interactions with state 
officials from core partner countries should create such structures. The multilateral 
environment in the CIS provides similar benefits for trade as for security matters 
but has other advantages than the GUAM environment. Therefore, the separate 
studies on Azerbaijan and Ukraine will first characterise the benefits of CIS and then 
of GUAM activities.  
7.1. AZERBAIJAN: MINIMISING CO-ORDINATION 
Azerbaijani state officials and government-affiliated analysts present Azerbaijan as a 
self-sufficient and in all dimensions an independent country.2 This statement 
obviously does not mirror Azerbaijan’s links to its neighbourhood, as has been 
highlighted in chapter 5.1.1. But it describes the basis of Azerbaijan’s approach to 
multilateral interaction in the CIS and GUAM. Azerbaijan's commitment to CIS and 
GUAM activities conveys the impression that the country strives to minimise its co-
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 The most pronounced advocate of this stance was an analyst from a governmental think tank 
(AZ_Gov_Analyst_1). Similar statements were made by the majority of state officials not only 
regarding the CIS, but also concerning the World Trade Organisation, the EU or the OSCE.   
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ordination with other member states, which only an independent state is able to 
do. The way in which state officials explain the benefits of the varying activities in 
the organisations sustains this picture. However, the narratives also show that 
Azerbaijan’s policy in the CIS and GUAM relies on the other members’ support. The 
section will illustrate this with a spectrum of empirical examples. According to 
policy-makers, in the following three forms a multilateral environment has the most 
supportive effect. First, multilateral constellations have the potential to alter power 
relations between the members at least temporarily. They, secondly, reduce the 
costs of producing crucial knowledge about regional developments and of 
influencing them. Finally, they provide alternative strategies for communicating 
with international players. Azerbaijan takes advantage of all three forms. However, 
to trigger this support the country opts for the path that demands the least durable 
commitment. Policy-makers prefer to induce other states to support Azerbaijan’s 
position without asking for explicit coalitions. Only in some cases Azerbaijan 
explicitly forms a short-term coalition. In this regard coalitions are arrangements 
between states to jointly pursue a specific agenda item. Policy-makers also have 
developed channels to influence other states without getting involved in long-term 
interactions. Azerbaijan promotes initiatives that may bind other states to it, but 
employs only a repertoire of tools that weaken compromises made by Azerbaijan. 
Further, in international communications the state prefers instruments that only 
emulate commitment to co-ordination. Only selected players value interactions that 
require commitment to co-ordination. Two sub-sections, the first on the CIS and the 
second on GUAM, will spell out this argument. They will more deeply investigate 
the rationales behind the trade and security activities discussed in chapter 6.  
7.1.1. CIS ACTIVITIES  
The CIS is, in the eyes of Azerbaijani officials, an arena that offers various 
opportunities to gain the support of other members in matters that are crucial for 
Azerbaijan. There are several opportunities to gain the support of other states 
without arranging coalitions in advance. The thesis will speak of implicit coalition-
building in this case. Forming explicit temporary coalitions are rarely necessary. 
Both ways of coalition-building help especially to improve Azerbaijan’s tools in 
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bilateral relations with core partners and to shape the neighbourhood according to 
Azerbaijan’s needs. The following three paragraphs will explain this rationale.  
Examples from the FTA negotiations and from discussions in the migration council 
indicate how Azerbaijani officials draw on implicit and explicit coalitions in their CIS 
policy. Chapter 6 has argued that Azerbaijani officials planned to convince trade 
partners to regulate the trade of more commodities by the new CIS FTA than is the 
case under the existing bilateral FTAs. In advance of the negotiations, officials from 
the Ministry of Economics also analysed previous trade conflicts with the CIS 
members who committed themselves to the FTA. In the course of negotiations they 
tried to stipulate provisions in the FTA legal text that would formally proscribe the 
states from applying this action.3 It is noteworthy that the officials did not expect 
these provisions to have binding effects through the FTA. Taking their own stance as 
a starting point, the officials anticipated that other CIS states would also never 
accept such a document as legally binding.4 Nevertheless, even without being party 
to the FTA, Azerbaijan intended to use the adopted FTA as a reference point when 
negotiating bilateral trade arrangements. On the one hand, Azerbaijan could refer 
to concessions which its counterpart had just recently made in order to demand 
similar concessions in bilateral relations. On the other hand, the already agreed 
provision could be adopted in a bilateral protocol which would ease up the 
negotiation process. 5 The question is now what the advantage is to have the matter 
‘pre-negotiated’ in the CIS.  
First, the multilateral constellation alters the rational of core trade partners. The 
countries have to find a compromise that also respects trade relations with CIS 
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 An official from the Ministry of Economics gave an example concerning the trade relations with 
Tajikistan. The official did not mention the commodity, but explained that Tajikistan repeatedly 
omitted to deliver a certain commodity in accordance with the agreed conditions. Azerbaijan 
formulated a provision that would provide good foundations for monitoring and sanctioning such 
behaviour. (AZ_MED_1)  
4
 Several officials mentioned that Azerbaijan was sure that it would not sign the FTA without a 
reservation in order to mitigate the potentially binding effects of the agreement. They also accepted 
that trade issues are a matter for individual states and that the CIS states often protect their markets 
inter alia by withdrawing from unfavourable trade deals.  (AZ_MED_1, AZ_MED_2 and AZ_MFA_8)  
5
 This effect was mentioned by AZ_MED_1. The interviewee as well as an analyst described the 
potential employment of CIS legislation as presented above. Trade agreements are always stipulated 




members on which they depend. Hence, this consideration mitigates their 
eagerness to exploit the fact that other states depend economically on them by 
offering unfavourable trade regulations. In CIS negotiations it is not necessary to 
arrange explicit coalitions in advance when Azerbaijan wants to urge a state to 
some trade-offs that Azerbaijan would never achieve bilaterally. If Azerbaijan puts a 
particular item on the agenda it naturally triggers the individual, affected countries 
to demand a compromise from the state in focus. State officials report that they 
address conflictual issues in the CIS migration council with similar expectations. In 
particular, if Russia unilaterally were to change its migration policy to the detriment 
of Azerbaijan, it would be fruitful to turn to the CIS at an early stage. As indicated in 
chapter 6, Azerbaijan is rather dependent on Russia in migration issues, while 
Azerbaijan is not a vital trade-migration receiving country for Russia. In order to 
gain more weight in the negotiations, Azerbaijani officials reckon on the support of 
other CIS members affected. The pressure on Russia is multiplied by this. Also, 
better than in bilateral negotiations, Azerbaijan may refer to the more beneficial 
regulations Russia has agreed with, for instance, Ukraine and demand Russia to 
offer similar conditions to Azerbaijan. In both cases, state officials make use of the 
following fact: in multilateral negotiations a state cannot build its negotiation 
weight on the dependence or independence from Azerbaijan only, but has to factor 
in its relations with other CIS members. By the same logic Azerbaijan would never 
directly regulate these issues in a multilateral context. State officials are not willing 
to compromise their positions due to the demands of other CIS member states.6 
Accordingly, here the possibility of bringing a comparison of Russia’s policy across 
countries to the debate and to gain support from other countries are the most 
crucial advantages of the multilateral setting.  
In some cases, Azerbaijani officials explicitly arrange coalitions with other states. As 
already mentioned Azerbaijan endeavoured to push Russia to subordinate the 
matter of energy export and transit to the FTA. In this case the officials co-ordinated 
their strategy with the Ukrainian colleagues. Azerbaijan’s idea was to get with 
Ukraine a, for Russia, economically important CIS member on board. Due to 
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 Both AZ_ASMS_1 and AZ_ASMS_2 gave examples for this rationale. However, both remained 
rather general when it came to giving concrete examples of success.  
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Ukraine's relevant position as sales market for Russia Azerbaijan expected Ukraine 
to be able to exert more pressure on Russia in the CIS FTA negotiations.7 In this 
regard Azerbaijani officials assumed that Azerbaijan can more easily pursue its 
interest vis-à-vis Russia if it acts in concert with other CIS members. In the bilateral 
context Russia has always the chance to refer to issues where Azerbaijan is 
vulnerable and depending on Russia. This weakens Azerbaijan's power in the 
bilateral relations.8 The strategy is, hence, similar to the implicit coalition-building. 
But explicit coalition-building allows Azerbaijan to control the dynamics better.  
In other cases Azerbaijani officials aim at increasing increase pressure on a state to 
introduce or change a certain policy by raising awareness among other CIS states on 
this matter. An official from the State Migration Service explained that the exchange 
of information in the CIS migration council provides a good opportunity to gain 
insights on critical developments, for example, on irregular migration in Azerbaijan’s 
neighbourhood. A constant pillar in the council is the presentation of national 
statistics, which, however, provide an imperfect picture, since most countries do 
not want to share sensitive information.9 But informal talks with representatives 
from the individual countries generate more detailed information and compensate 
for this. If the information obtained triggers Azerbaijan’s concern officials make it a 
matter of discussion in the council. In cases where other countries share 
Azerbaijan's concerns, they will step in with demands and recommendations for the 
state in question. An official argued to have used this strategy especially with regard 
to irregular migration developments in the Central Asian states with which 
Azerbaijan has less intensive relations. Chapter 6.1.2 has also indicated that officials 
use this logic to increase pressure on Armenia and Russia to alter their policies on 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  
CIS negotiations in the field of trade and migration also offer channels of influencing 
the neighbourhood according to Azerbaijan’s needs without specific co-ordination. 
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 On Russia's interest on Ukraine see for example: Pifer, Steve (2009), Ukraine's Geopolitical Choice. 
Eurasian Geography and Economics,Vo. 50, No. 4, p 396; Wolczuk, Ukraine- A Partial, but Reluctant 
CIS Member, 134. 
8
 AZ_MED_1 mentioned this example as one of the very rare cases where multilateralism has 
advantages.  
9
 As an official at the end of the interview indicated, the State Migration Service itself also hardly 
shares sensitive information in this format (AZ_ASMS_2).  
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Even if Azerbaijan is not interested in co-ordinating policies on a specific topic 
within the CIS, Azerbaijani officials are mostly interested in attending and actively 
influencing the negotiations. It allows them to monitor crucial developments in the 
neighbourhood which might affect Azerbaijan’s trade or migration relations with 
these states. According to state officials, negotiations often reveal emerging hot 
spots in the neighbourhood or planned alterations to the domestic policy of 
individual member-states that would otherwise have remain undisclosed to 
Azerbaijan. In particular, if Azerbaijan has less intensive bilateral relations with a 
given CIS member, the CIS provides an arena for nevertheless monitoring the state’s 
domestic developments. Such multilateral councils also permit Azerbaijan to benefit 
from intelligence gained and discussed in the council by other CIS members. As 
already mentioned, informal encounters during the meetings improve the chances 
of getting reliable information. In a nutshell, the meetings reduce the costs 
associated with gaining crucial information about the neighbourhood. This 
information helps to adjust Azerbaijan’s policy to economic and migration-related 
changes in core partner states in a timely manner or to take measures to re-
negotiate certain aspects bilaterally.10   
A Second advantage of having matters 'pre-negotiated' in the CIS is the following. 
Azerbaijan takes such negotiations as an opportunity to install its domestic best 
practices in the legislation of CIS countries. It was mentioned in chapter 6.1 that 
Azerbaijan is eager to keep production standards in the CIS countries low in order to 
ensure that Azerbaijan’s less developed sectors, agriculture and food industry can 
access the markets. The country is also interested that the CIS countries have anti-
monopoly legislation that facilitates the access of Azerbaijani companies to their 
markets. In support of these ambitions, state officials develop legislative drafts on 
these matters and submit these in the negotiations.11 During the negotiations 
Azerbaijan has the chance to convince the CIS states to integrate the provisions into 
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 The official from the foreign ministry indicated that it is a priority to monitor developments in 
these countries, since they may affect migration flows to Azerbaijan. (AZ_MFA_3). AZ_ASMS_1, 
AZ_ASMS_2 specified how they intend to monitor and influence the developments.  
11
 This example was presented by an official who is also part of the ‘anti-monopoly’ working body 
but is not an expert on the legislation. Therefore no detailed description of the specific moments 
that the Azerbaijani side wishes to see in the CIS members’ legislation was given. (AZ_MED_2)  
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the agreement.12 This might have two effects. As already indicated these provisions 
may serve as a basis to demand an alteration of the bilateral agreements. Another 
idea is to convince the CIS states to adopt a certain regulation in their domestic 
legislation.13 Azerbaijan is also willing to create synergy effects between its 
domestic best practices and those of the CIS members. In the CIS migration council 
state officials, for instance, promote the Azerbaijani data base for outgoing and 
incoming migration as a technical solution for the envisioned joint migration 
monitoring system in the CIS.  The interviewees report Russia to be interested in the 
Azerbaijani model and are therefore sure that the joint database, once it is 
introduced, will be largely compatible to Azerbaijan’s data base. This compatibility 
would, even if Azerbaijan were not to adopt the shared database, facilitate the 
exchange of data through this system.14 The overall logic is to mainstream 
Azerbaijani solutions in order to shape the legislation of neighbouring states in a 
way that is favourable for Azerbaijan, without adjusting domestic legislation to any 
CIS suggestions.  
A third strategy that does not require any multilateral co-ordination is to exploit the 
format to advertise Azerbaijan’s capacity as economic and security player. 
Azerbaijan is interested in attracting foreign direct investment from powerful CIS 
members and in directing Azerbaijani money flows to promising CIS markets. The 
former strengthens its economy without creating costs for Azerbaijan and the latter 
is a means of preventing high inflation in the form of ‘Dutch disease’ effects. 
Negotiations in the CIS format provide a large audience to advertise the assets of 
Azerbaijan’s economy and its strength as potential opponent it the most powerful 
player, Russia. Azerbaijan intends to make use of other CIS members' persisting 
dependencies on Russia, in order to advertise itself as attractive alternative 
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 Several state officials and analysts saw it as necessary to monitor and influence the changes. 
References to productions standards were made by an official from the Ministry of Economics and 
by an analyst from a governmental think tank. (AZ_Analyst_3, AZ_MED_1, AZ_Private_Business_1, 
AZ_Gov_Analyst_2, AZ_MED_3) 
13
 Several state officials and analysts saw it as necessary to monitor the changes. References to 
production standards were made by an official from the Ministry of Economics and by an analyst 
from the think tank affiliated to the president. (AZ_Analyst_3, AZ_MED_1, AZ_Private_Business_1, 
AZ_Gov_Analyst_2, AZ_MED_3) 
14
 This example was provided in the State Migration Service (AZ_ASMS_1). 
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economic and security player.15 Furthermore, it is, according to an official, always 
beneficial to make the Russian side interested in Azerbaijan’s economic capacity, as 
it can be used as a trump card in conflict matters.16  
The last paragraph of this sub-section will finally mention a strategy desired by 
interviewees at lower ministerial level that has so far gained little significance in 
Azerbaijan’s CIS activities. The interviewees refer to ad hoc working groups that are 
set up in the course of negotiating a larger project within the CIS. An example is the 
cross-border working group that was founded in relation to the CIS economic 
strategy in 2007. The working group primarily provides facilitates meetings with 
officials from Azerbaijan and its neighbouring states. These meetings involve not 
primarily officials from the central state level but from the level of region or city 
administration. The meetings bring together not only high-level officials but 
representatives from minor administrative units in the bordering regions that are 
directly in charge of the discussed matters. These officials can establish reliable ties 
and identify shared problems and potential solutions. The efficiency of these 
meetings rests on building personalised ties. These may undermine barriers that 
exist in the central politics of the states and may mitigate intergovernmental 
bureaucratic barriers. One interviewee framed this as especially relevant with 
regard to the border to the North Caucasus Republic of the Russian Federation 
Dagestan.17 Making these relations work would require Azerbaijan’s commitment to 
mutually co-ordinate these meetings and the initiatives that emerge from the 
exchange. In sum, however, the majority of officials prefer the strategies that 
require only temporary or no co-ordination. The case of GUAM will show that 
Azerbaijan takes the same approach, but is forced to provide more resources to 
gain the support of GUAM members.  
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 A government related analyst developed this rationale. The interviewee mentioned Russia as an 
especially attractive market, and other interviewees added Ukraine to the list. In both states 




 The official of the economics ministry, who is represented on the respective committee, reports 
that the ties between officials at expert level from Dagestan have improved due to the programme. 
They know each other and are open to discuss emerging problems of the region. The ideas 
developed to foster the economic viability of the border regions include small, concrete projects, like 
opening joint markets in the centres of the region. (AZ_MED_2)  
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7.1.2. GUAM ACTIVITIES 
Azerbaijani officials take advantage of the multilateral environment of GUAM by 
various uncoordinated activities similar to that presented in the preceding 
discussion of the CIS. Compared to the CIS, however, the GUAM drug-trafficking 
activities allow Azerbaijani officials to gain more benefits for two reasons. First, the 
VLEC technology reduces the costs to Azerbaijan associated with attending all 
relevant meetings, since the meetings take place in the form of video conferences. 
These meetings are attractive, since the fact they are attended by only four parties 
gives them a relatively informal atmosphere. The annual operations to counter 
human-trafficking, ‘Perekhvat’, unveil various investigation methods used by the 
member states. This produces valuable knowledge which Azerbaijani officials 
consider in their domestic policy formulation.18 Accordingly, Azerbaijan is satisfied 
with these activities and does not support the GUAM secretariat in pushing for 
more intensively co-ordinated operative measures.19 Given that the GUAM states 
are less crucial trade partners for Azerbaijan, similar effects cannot be observed in 
the economic activities.  
The activities most relevant for Azerbaijan require a fair amount of co-ordination, 
but Azerbaijani officials ensure that no long-term co-ordination develops through 
these activities. The activities rely on other rationales than the co-ordinated 
activities in the CIS. Three examples will illustrate the variance. Chapter 6.1.1 stated 
that Azerbaijan participates in GUAM FTA-related activities mainly with the aim of 
binding the three member states to GUAM and Azerbaijan. With this aim in mind, 
Azerbaijan agreed to discuss core projects such as the Odessa-Brody-Pipeline in the 
GUAM framework. As previously mentioned, Azerbaijan, however, has refrained 
from realising the project. Hence, Azerbaijan committed to co-ordinate the 
negotiations within GUAM but declined to get involved in the long-term co-
ordination that such a project would require. There are nevertheless some 
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 Again, the two officials involved in these joint operations served as base for the analysis. 
(AZ_MoI_1, AZ_MoI_2).  
19
 The GUAM secretariat pushes the members to harmonise the operative methods in the field of 
drug-trafficking. It also proposes the use of the VLEC encryption device for on-going domestic anti-
drug-trafficking operations if individuals from the GUAM states are suspected to be involved. 
Azerbaijan rejects both initiatives. This was stated by AZ_MoI_1, who is involved in the strategic 
planning of Azerbaijan’s contribution to GUAM activities. 
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examples where Azerbaijan agreed to respond positively to Ukraine and Georgia’s 
desire for intensified energy trade. One example is oil shipments from Azerbaijan to 
Ukraine via Supsa-Odessa-Brody, which were settled in 2011.20 Another is gas 
supply from Azerbaijan to Georgia.21 These are promoted on the GUAM web-site as 
GUAM projects even though they are of bilateral nature. Moreover, an Azerbaijani 
official stated that these projects have been discussed but never seriously 
negotiated within GUAM. Any notes made in this regard by Azerbaijan in GUAM are 
part of a spaghetti-bowl of documents with a mainly communicative purpose.22 
Azerbaijan’s initiatives and power to attract GUAM members via economic projects 
rests, thus, rather on the country’s reputation as an economically potent player, 
rather than on its readiness to indeed pursue trade cooperation within GUAM. 
Another priority of Azerbaijan, which was previously discussed in chapter 6.1, is to 
communicate GUAM’s vitality to primarily Western international actors as the US or 
the EU. For doing so GUAM needs to produce visible results. According to 
Azerbaijani officials there is one way of ensuring such vitality without any co-
ordination with other GUAM states. This is to simply respond to the bureaucratic 
processes that have been set up by the GUAM secretariat. GUAM’s bureaucracy is 
slim so that these processes are not time consuming.23 However, bureaucratic 
activity does not necessarily convince Western international actors of GUAM’s 
capacity. This takes more tangible results which entail more co-ordination. 
Accordingly, Azerbaijan initiates and commits to flag-ship projects, like the already 
mentioned ‘Turprodukt GUAM’ in the tourism sphere. Azerbaijani officials also 
commit to transmitting information on irregular migration through VLEC upon 
request. As the following two paragraphs will illustrate, they, nevertheless, take the 
path of least co-ordination in both cases.  
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 Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen V. Milner (1997), The political economy of regionalism. New York 
; Chichester: Columbia University Press; Grieco, Joseph M. (1997), Systemic Sources of Variation in 
Regional Institutionalization in Western Europe, East Asia, and the Andens. In: Mansfield, Edward D.; 
Milner, Helen V. (ed.), The Political Economy of Regionalism. New York. 
21
 See: http://guam-organization.org/node/1288, access: 20 February 2013.  
22
 The official from the foreign ministry attends relevant meetings concerning Azerbaijan’s energy 
export and is hence a reliable source on the question of how GUAM impacts decision-making on 
energy exports. (AZ_MFA_5)  
23
 An official from the Ministry of Economics in charge of co-ordinating GUAM economic activities in 
Azerbaijan described answering to the bureaucracy as a core task. The aim is to show that Azerbaijan 
is active in GUAM, but not to achieve any additional gains. (AZ_MED_1) 
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An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Azerbaijani delegate to the 
GUAM secretariat are the core masterminds of the tourist initiative within GUAM. 
Their description implies that two questions informed the design of the project: 
How to most quickly materialise the project idea into tangible results? How to avoid 
any long-term commitment of the GUAM states’? In this light, the project was 
designed to widely circumvent the states’ ministerial structures. They considered it 
more feasible to realise the project on time when the responsible ministries of the 
four states are not involved. The project also avoids discussing intergovernmental 
legalised agreements that potentially would bind the GUAM states. The project was 
realised initially by the GUAM secretariat and four private tourism companies from 
the GUAM states.24 In the course of its development, the participating companies 
and GUAM officials identified a set of problems that concern the national tourism 
policies and interstate co-operation. They argue that Azerbaijan has, for example, a 
deficit of hotels for middle-class tourists. A representative of the GUAM secretariat 
depicted this aspect as a matter to be discussed in the country’s tourism-related 
ministries. The problem could be solved by creating legal incentives for 
entrepreneurs to improve the tourism infrastructure. But the Azerbaijani side did 
not involve the tourism ministry or develop a domestic law that would incite a 
diversification of Azerbaijan’s tourism infrastructure. An official from the foreign 
ministry announced that one of the Azerbaijani entrepreneurs in this sector would 
be charged with building the desired infrastructure. This strategy allows Azerbaijan 
without intensive co-ordination with the GUAM states to present GUAM as active 
and constructive. 
A similar strategy is observable in the security sphere. Azerbaijan’s intermediary 
goals imply that the country has to be active in VLEC for two reasons. It helps keep 
the US interested in GUAM and stabilises communication with the US about security 
matters. But the US representatives want to see VLEC as a law enforcement 
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 The summary rests on the narratives of an official from the foreign ministry, who described the 
development and aims of the tourism project and related information about a GUAM project 
planned in the field of transport infrastructure outside the GUAM area. Another official from the 
foreign ministry and also a GUAM official described the tourism project in the same way. They 
mentioned a wine commerce project, which they planned to develop by the same logics.(AZ_MFA_1, 
AZ_MFA_7, GUAM_Official_1)  
211 
 
structure.25 In their view GUAM partners should commit to close co-operation in 
operations on irregular migration and other non-traditional security challenges. 
Azerbaijan, instead, commits to these activities in a way that signals its relatively 
reliable participation, but does not demand the co-ordination of investigations and 
detection Azerbaijani security agencies with GUAM partners. The interviews in the 
Azerbaijani VLEC branch revealed the following strategy. The VLEC employees are 
ready to support the operative investigations of GUAM members by sharing 
relevant information. This means that they keep the VLEC communication channel 
open most of the time. If they receive a request they try answering it in a short 
amount of time. In many cases they manage to do so by circumventing the 
bureaucratic barriers within the security agencies in Azerbaijan. One VLEC official 
explained how s/he often just contacted former colleagues or acquaintances from 
various security bodies directly to smooth the process. In the course of his/her 
professional career the official had established plenty of contacts.  An example of 
success via VLEC is provided by a case from the drug-trafficking field. In response to 
a Moldovan request, the Azerbaijani side delivered intelligence that enabled the 
Moldovan forces to detect a drug-laboratory and detain the Azerbaijani instigator.26 
The Azerbaijani VLEC branch managed to fill document files with similar requests. At 
the same time, officials report that they only to react to such requests from GUAM 
states but not to employ VLEC for investigations made by Azerbaijan’s security 
agencies. By using VLEC only in one direction and only for exchanging information, 
Azerbaijan avoids more substantial co-ordination with other GUAM states.27 
As chapter 6.1.2 argued, Azerbaijan aims above all to improve its international 
leverage via GUAM. The Azerbaijani ministerial department in charge of GUAM 
intends to use this leverage primarily to gain international support for Azerbaijan’s 
position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The department explains two ways of 
achieving this aim. One way is to simply maintain GUAM as an active body that 
works on globally relevant security matters such as human trafficking, international 
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 Interview with an official from the US Embassy in Kyiv who is responsible for US-GUAM 
collaboration (US Embassy) 
26
 The official at VLEC explained the procedure in case of a request on the basis of this example. 
(AZ_MoI_2) 
27
 This applies to the staff from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise.  
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terrorism and drug-trafficking. The idea is to link into with two discourses that 
prevail in the rhetoric of international actors like the UN: first, that these global 
challenges require regional rather than merely national remedies; second, that 
regional organisations are adequate formats for addressing such challenges. States 
that are active in regional organisations can therefore expect rewards from Western 
actors that also promote these ideas. Maintaining GUAM requires Azerbaijan mainly 
to attend GUAM meetings and to ensure that these meetings are communicated 
with strong outreach. Most co-ordination is necessary at the early stage of these 
meetings when Azerbaijan needs to ensure the participation of all GUAM states. 
This degree of co-ordination is acceptable for Azerbaijan.  
More efficient, however, are the GUAM activities within the UN General Assembly. 
As mentioned in chapter 6.2.2, in communiques on behalf of GUAM but also by a 
draft resolution submitted in 2006, the organisation tries to raise international 
awareness of Nagorno-Karabakh and other protracted conflicts in the GUAM area. 
With these statements and resolutions Azerbaijan primarily seeks to obtain 
international statements which support Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. Azerbaijan 
might refer to these statements if Nagorno-Karabakh were to make progress in 
gaining international recognition as an independent state.28 Azerbaijan relies for the 
following reasons heavily on the lead of the GUAM partners in this regard. First, 
promoting the conflict topic on behalf of GUAM amplifies Azerbaijan’s international 
voice. Azerbaijan expects groups of states gain more attention than a single state 
alone. Secondly, the choice of advocates is important. Ukraine made more 
statements on behalf of GUAM than any other member.29 Since Ukraine is an 
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 This was stated by AZ_Analyst_6. The UN background offers the following possibilities: A UN 
resolution might inter alia be of value if Nagorno-Karabakh were to apply for membership of UN 
bodies as an independent entity. The UN charter stipulates the possibility for de facto states to apply 
for member status in UN bodies. This decision has to be taken by a vote in the General Assembly. 
Hence a prior resolution of the GA on the territorial integrity of the states concerned might help 
prevent a positive vote for UN member status of the secessionist territories. The GA has to adopt the 
application with a 2/3 majority and the proposition could, in any case, be vetoed by one of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. See Rule 136 of the UN General Assembly. U.N. 
General Assembly, 2008, (A/520/Rev.17) Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. 
29
 In the period 2003-2006 Ukraine made 11 statements on behalf of GUAM in the General Assembly. 
These statements touch primarily on the protracted conflicts in the GUAM area: international 
terrorism, poverty reduction and GUAM-UN co-operation. See appendix 2 for an overview of the 
activities at UN level. See the statements in: U.N. General Assembly, 59st Session, 38 Plenary 
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important regional player which is not confronted with actual threats of 
secessionism, statements made by this country are hoped to receive more 
attention. Another crucial player is Georgia, the country that has ensured that the 
joint GUAM resolution draft has remained on the agenda of the UN General 
Assembly. Georgia submits resolutions about the situation in Georgia that include 
the demand to discuss the pending GUAM resolution draft in the following session 
of the Assembly.30 The Azerbaijani officials interviewed emphasised an additional 
aspect that makes it attractive to convince Georgia and Ukraine to lobby for 
Azerbaijan's position the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They both have a very good 
international image due to their democratisation efforts and, at least in the mid-
2000s, their pronounced pro-Western foreign policy. Bandwagoning on this 
reputation, it is hoped, will eclipse international criticism of Azerbaijan’s human 
rights situation and authoritarian regime.31 This dependence on the voices of 
Ukraine and Georgia encourages Azerbaijan to co-ordinate GUAM activities in a way 
that keeps its GUAM partners favourably disposed to these activities shortly before 
UN General Assemblies. However, Azerbaijani officials have made sure that GUAM 
does not develop more direct conflict resolution activities that would require the 
actual co-ordination of Azerbaijan’s conflict policy with GUAM.32  
An example of indirect co-ordination from which Azerbaijan profits substantially will 
round off this sub-section. Chapter 1.5.3 highlighted that GUAM established one 
binding rule on its interaction, namely to pursue only projects in which all four 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Session, 21 October 2004, (A/59/PV38) Agenda Item 56: Cooperation between the United Nations 
and Regional and Other Organizations. 
30
 See: U.N. General Assembly, 66st Session, 12 July 2012, (A/RES/66/283) Status of Internally 
Displaced Persons and Refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, 
Georgia. 
31
 Such statements have been made in the foreign ministry and the Ministry of Interior. All 
interviewees also considered Georgia’s good reputation as inadequate and unfair vis-à-vis 
Azerbaijan. They claimed Georgia to be less democratic and Azerbaijan more democratic and just 
than is internationally perceived. However, the ability to take advantage of Georgia's good 
reputation has decreased after the Russo-Georgian war when Georgia was deemed as the aggressor. 
(AZ_MFA_1, AZ_MFA_2, AZ_MoI_1, AZ_MoI_2, AZ_ Gov_Analyst_1, AZ_Analyst_6) See on Georgia’s 
reputation: Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Report of 
the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Traynor, Ian, Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakashvili Blamed for Starting Russian War. The Guardian, 30 September 2009.. 
32
 The officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an analyst argue that they had never 




parties are involved. While Azerbaijan categorically rejects binding rules, it is able to 
benefit from this in material terms. Azerbaijan’s increasingly bad human right 
records prevent the country from obtaining US aid in all security-related matters. 
Since 1997 the so-called Leahy Law has restricted security co-operation with states 
that breach human rights. This means that the country is eligible to receive neither 
security equipment nor training, in order to prevent both from being used against 
the country’s own citizens.33 Due to the fact that the US is eager to make GUAM 
work as even a weak security player in the region, the individual from the US 
responsible for GUAM is willing to establish productive infrastructure and projects 
for security matters within GUAM. The GUAM formula all or nobody makes it 
necessary to seek ways to widely interpret the Leahy Law in order to be able to 
include Azerbaijan in the projects funded.34 In this case, Azerbaijan’s GUAM 
membership thus comes with technological and methodological benefits. The VLEC 
equipment is only one example of this. At the same time, Azerbaijan persists in its 
resistance to international co-ordination and is more willing to receive technological 
equipment than attend training sessions run by international actors on how to 
employ the equipment. 35  
7.1.3. CONCLUSION 
The two previous sections have disclosed that Azerbaijani officials accept the 
multilateral environments of GUAM and CIS as supportive of the country’s regional 
and international policy as long as the activities are not based on durable co-
ordination between the member states. As a rule, Azerbaijan does not co-ordinate 
its domestic policy with other CIS or GUAM members. But the country has agreed to 
temporarily co-ordinate its position with other member states and to make 
temporary commitments in favour of these states. Doing so permits the country to 
maximise the advantages gleaned from the multilateral constellation. Only a few 
officials perceive it as beneficial to co-ordinate Azerbaijan’s policy in certain areas 
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 ‘The Leahy Law prohibits US military assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights 
with impunity.’ http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ429/html/PLAW-106publ429.htm 
(accessed 20 November 2012) According to the representative from the US Embassy, the law also 
applies to support for border guards and other security forces. (US_Embassy_1) 
34
 The room for manoeuvre of US delegates is in any case very limited. Ultimately the rule provides 
strong constraints on US support of GUAM security cooperation. (US_Embassy_1) 
35
 The interviewee from the US Embassy in Kyiv advanced this argument.  
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with colleagues from other states. Even though this idea does not require any 
commitment to multilateral legalised rules, as the case of cross-border co-operation 
has argued, this idea does not fit with the general lines of Azerbaijan’s CIS policy. 
The following section will discuss how Ukraine also primarily benefits from weakly 
co-ordinated activities, but wants also to set up more durable channels for co-
ordination.  
7.2. UKRAINE: SEEKING TEMPORARY CO-ORDINATION 
This section explores how Ukrainian officials make the most of CIS and GUAM 
activities. The analysis will highlight that the policy-makers, similar to their 
Azerbaijani colleagues, do not support these activities in order to gain a multilateral 
outcome. In fact, they try to derive beneficial outcomes from the fact that multiple 
regional players gather together. This allows them to intensify and improve 
Ukraine’s relations with core partners, to evaluate domestic practices in comparison 
with solutions established in other CIS states and to enhance the state’s 
international recognition as a crucial regional player. Ukraine, unlike Azerbaijan, is 
also eager to lay a more permanent foundation that enables Ukraine to temporarily 
co-ordinate activities with other former Soviet republics on an ad hoc basis. This 
foundation is rooted in selectively applicable agreements but, more importantly, 
personalised ties with officials from other member states. The example of the CIS 
and GUAM analysed in the following two sub-sections will show that Ukrainian 
officials seek the same advantages from the CIS and GUAM, but are more successful 
within the CIS.  
7.2.1. CIS ACTIVITIES  
As in Azerbaijan, state officials from the trade and security-oriented ministries in 
Ukraine have identified several ways to exploit the multilateral environment of the 
CIS for domestic, regional and international policy ends. These mechanisms mostly 
require the temporary co-ordination of Ukraine’s policy with other CIS members. 
However, Ukrainian officials have also described a number of strategies for using 
the CIS multilateral environment independently of other CIS countries. These build 
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on basically the same mechanisms that section 7.1.1 discussed in relation to 
Azerbaijan. They will therefore only briefly be recalled for the case of Ukraine.  
Ukrainian officials share with their Azerbaijani colleagues the perception that the 
CIS gathers enough relevant states to significantly enhance knowledge of trade and 
drug-trafficking related developments in the neighbourhood. Negotiations and 
council meetings allow Ukrainian actors to discuss specific issues with the 
representatives from other countries both in the official discussions and bilaterally 
on the fringes of the meetings.36 To a greater extent than their Azerbaijani 
colleagues, the Ukrainian officials draw advantages from the CIS debates on a 
common legislation. Knowledge about changes in the economy-related legislation 
of core trade partners may, for instance, induce Ukraine to alter its bilateral policy 
vis-à-vis these states. Examples from the anti-drug-trafficking council sustain this 
idea. The CIS action plan concerning counter drug-trafficking measures reportedly 
served as a template for Ukraine’s national programme against drug-trafficking.37 In 
addition the councils in this field offer the opportunity to exchange opinions about 
the best practices of counteracting drug-trafficking in each country. As the 
technologically most capable country, Russia attracts most interest on the part of 
Ukraine in this regard.38 These strategies primarily support Ukraine’s capacity to 
independently handle domestic and regional trade and security issues.  
Additionally, Ukrainian officials intend to gain the reputation as an influential 
regional player on the basis of activities in the CIS that do not need to be co-
ordinated with other members. This applies to the security area in the following 
regard. Officials from the Ministry of Interior occasionally put the discussion of 
international model laws or best practice on the agenda of the councils that work 
on drug-trafficking. They seek to discuss how best to incorporate into domestic 
legislation and implement the international provisions to which Ukraine has 
committed itself in UN or other international forums. The officials are cautious 
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 An official from the Ministry of Interior and one from the foreign ministry share this assessment. 
(UA_MoI_1, UA_MFA_5)  
37
 An official from the Ministry of Interior reported that the CIS document served among others as 
template for Ukraine's national strategy. (UA_MoI_2) 
38
 The explanation refers to the council meetings but also to the CSTO operation ‘Kanal’ as source of 
inspiration regarding the best practice. (UA_MoI_2, UA_MoI_1) See section 1.5.2 for details about 
the operation.  
217 
 
about adopting international provisions without adjusting them to the domestic 
situation. If other CIS members have already implemented them, Ukraine can derive 
valuable conclusions from experiences of these states. The CIS neighbourhood is a 
particularly fertile ground for this since the societies, legal systems and political 
regimes share a number of features.39 Discussing these matters in the CIS helps 
Ukraine to fulfil its international obligations. At the same time, Ukraine can take 
such discussions as an opportunity to diffuse in the CIS the model laws and practices 
promoted by Western actors. By doing so, officials hope that Ukraine will be 
recognised as a country with some influence on its neighbourhood, in order to raise 
the country’s international visibility. Advertising Ukraine's security practices as 
solutions for other CIS partners also fulfils another function. It is hoped to diverting 
the picture that Russia is the only country with security capacity in the post-Soviet 
space and present Ukraine as strong security player. This effect builds on the 
ambiguous relations that most CIS countries have with Russia. On the one hand, 
Russia is seen as a protective power willing to materially support the other states’ 
security forces. On the other hand, most states strongly suspect that Russia might 
interfere in domestic affairs. In this light, officials report to successfully attract the 
attention of players, for instance from Central Asia, if they discuss alternative 
sources of funding for security equipment or offer pass on some knowledge about 
specific methodologies. An official described with particular satisfaction the 
displeasure of the Russian delegation when the interviewee advertised Ukraine’s 
new security equipment that had been provided by the GUAM secretariat.40   
As chapter 6.2.1 has outlined, Ukraine also intends to develop additional 
multilateral agreements that may enable Ukraine to stipulate some trade 
regulations in a more favourable way than Ukraine can achieve in bilateral 
negotiations, in particular with Russia. Like their Azerbaijani colleagues they see ad 
hoc coalitions as a possibility to achieve this aim. The interviewees mentioned 
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 All three interviewees from the Ministry of Interior emphasise this opportunity. A concrete 
example in the sphere of drug-trafficking is the programme on providing drug addicts with substitute 
drugs such as methadone. The Ukrainian side is sceptical towards the European experience and 
welcomed insights from Russia’s experience in this field. (UA_MoI_1, UA_MoI_2, UA_MoI_3) 
40
 After the council meeting the official discussed the possibilities to link the Central Asian states, 
especially Kyrgyzstan, to the GUAM VLEC communication network. (UA_MFA_5)  
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another rationale in addition to those invoked by Azerbaijani officials. They argue 
that it is important for Ukraine to present itself as majority-changing actor in the 
negotiations of initiatives like the FTA. Within the CIS the Ukrainian consumer and 
production market is considered as important. Accordingly, Ukraine carries more 
weight than several other CIS states. Regional agreements which lack the signature 
of Ukraine often lack weight for Russia.41 Two consequences emerge from this. 
First, Russia is desperate to gain Ukraine’s support for initiatives, such as the FTA, in 
order to make the Russian regional projects more convincing. Second, the smaller 
CIS members welcome the Ukrainian delegation as a leader in opposing Russian 
proposals. If Ukraine does not support a proposal, according to the Ukrainian 
officials, at a minimum half of the CIS members would take the opportunity to also 
oppose it. This gives Russia less power to ignore Ukraine’s interests and to insist on 
its proposals. Officials hence argue for Ukraine’s ability to reduce the relevance of 
Ukraine’s strong economic dependence on Russia through the country’s ability to 
influence other CIS members’ decisions. By openly opposing Russia and submitting 
alternative proposals the officials, of course, also hope to strengthen Ukraine’s 
attractiveness as a partner in bilateral trade relations to other capable CIS 
countries. In this regard, the hope rests on energy-rich Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, which are also anxious to withstand Russia’s attempts to force 
unfavourable regulations upon them.42  
Ukrainian officials intend to establish more durable intergovernmental channels 
that can be employed to temporarily co-ordinate activities with other CIS states. 
Two examples, one from the sphere of trade and one from security-related 
activities, will illustrate two varying mechanisms for this. In the field of trade, the 
instrument is the FTA itself. As chapter 6.2.1 argued, already during the 
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 This was observable in Russia's eagerness to get Ukraine to enter the Single Economic Space in 
2002. It is since 2011 visible in Russia's pressure on Ukraine to become a member of the Customs 
Union. Ukraine is an important market for the CU. Souza, Lúcio Vinhas de (2011), An Initial 
Estimation of the Economic Effects of the Creation of the EurAsEC Customs Union on Its Members. 
Economic Premise [Online], p 5; Dragneva and Wolczuk, Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the 
EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry?, 2. 
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 On the one hand this is described as the general capacity of Ukraine in the CIS format by a 
Ukrainian official who has participated at expert level in all basic CIS councils since the early 1990s 
(UA_MFA_4). When asked about Ukraine’s negotiating strength, a staff member from the foreign 
ministry and two from the economics ministry responded with this narrative. (UA_MED_1, 
UA_MFA_2, UA_MED_2)  
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negotiations Ukraine did not plan to fully implement the CIS FTA. In contrast to 
Azerbaijan, however, the officials considered it important to sign the agreement for 
the following reasons. During the negotiations Ukraine successfully accelerated the 
diffusion of the WTO regulations to which it agreed in the 2008 trade agreements 
with core CIS partners. The most relevant WTO regulations were incorporated in the 
legal text of the FTA. The FTA provided an ideal opportunity to harmonise the 
regulations with several CIS members at once instead of reformulating the many 
bilateral FTAs according to Ukraine’s new obligations. Being a party to the FTA 
permits Ukraine to monitor their implementation or to demand changes in cases 
where the established provisions appear insufficient.43 In this case the agreement 
allows Ukraine to temporarily call for co-ordination of the domestic policies 
according to the FTA, in order to induce other states to comply with provisions that 
are relevant for Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian officials agree that the best option 
is to use the FTA as a reference point for re-negotiating bilateral agreements 
without co-ordinating the negotiation with all parties of the FTA.  
In the security-related councils Ukrainian officials identify another permanent 
channel that is temporarily intended to trigger intergovernmental co-ordination. 
They argue that they often need information or other operational support from CIS 
partners, especially Russia, Belarus and Moldova, but also from Central Asia and the 
South Caucasus in their fight against regional drug-trafficking networks.44 According 
to the interviewees, the formally established communication routines between the 
Ukrainian and other CIS governmental agencies do not suffice. Bureaucratic barriers 
delay the exchange of information, retard mutual assistance and, thus, foil a 
smooth investigation. High-level officials often refuse to exchange intelligence. But 
direct collaboration with colleagues at expert level in the neighbouring countries is 
hardly envisioned in the established formal communication channels. In this light 
Ukrainian practitioners see direct personal relations with the delegates from other 
CIS countries as a remedy. Such relations provide information on who is the 
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 This was especially stressed by the official from the State Service for Technical Regulation in 
Ukraine, but also by the officials from the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
who attended the negotiations. (UA_SSTR_1, UA_MED_1, UA_MED_2, UA_MFA_1, UA_MFA_2).  
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 The extent to which the officials perceive drug-trafficking as a phenomenon calling for multilateral 
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individual in charge of a certain matter in the partner country. If enough trust is 
built, they facilitate making contact with these individuals in the course of an 
investigation and increase the probability of a meaningful exchange of intelligence. 
The most relevant tools are, accordingly, the names and personal contact details of 
the staff members of the security agencies in the CIS.45 These rationales explain why 
the interviewees are interested in discussing anti-drug-trafficking issues in several 
councils and not in a single co-ordination body. It would reduce the potential 
number of contacts to make in course of the meetings, the main function of the 
councils. With these personalised networks, Ukraine is able to create a durable 
instrument that can be activated for bilaterally or multilaterally co-ordinated 
activities.  
According to the interview narratives, state officials from time to time form short-
term coalitions in the CIS councils and negotiations for two reasons. The first is 
similar to an example discussed for Azerbaijan. Ukraine uses the CIS councils as a 
platform to more efficiently pressure CIS states into adopting policies that 
strengthen Ukraine’s domestic security. An example was given in the field of drug-
trafficking. In cases where Ukraine suspects that the Central Asian states, e.g. 
Tajikistan, have problems controlling incoming drug-flows, the Ukrainian side tries 
to discuss how to improve their capacity with the states affected. The officials seek 
get several CIS members to collectively advocate potential solutions in order to urge 
the states in question to take appropriate measures. Ukraine has not developed 
specific programmes to support the country’s neighbourhood in relation to these 
aspects. It leaves the adoption of Ukraine’s best practices to the individual states.46 
Finally, multilateral agreements adopted in the CIS may help Ukraine to ‘break free’ 
from bilateral conflicts with mainly, Russia. Chapter 6 has already discussed that 
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Ukraine is eager to stipulate newly negotiated veterinary-sanitary standards in the 
FTA. According to an official from the Ukrainian Ministry of Economics, Russia’s 
motivation for this conflict does not originate in concerns over deficient production 
standards, but in other political and economic considerations.47 Russia is therefore 
hardly prepared to compromise when re-negotiating the standards bilaterally. The 
multilateral FTA is an opportunity for Ukraine to lay new and stronger foundations 
for solving this conflict. The new veterinary-sanitary standards were negotiated 
after Russia had provoked the conflict with Ukraine. Ukraine is thus able to refer to 
a recent provision that bears the signature of both Russia and Ukraine. This ideally 
should strengthen Ukraine’s arguments vis-à-vis Russia.48 Another official described 
it as a lengthy and undesirable procedure to fight over juridical specifics of trade 
contracts to solve a conflict with CIS partners. It is often easier to create a new legal 
basis that may redefine the conditions from which the conflict emerged.49 The tactic 
obviously rests on several weakly enforced legal frameworks more than on the strict 
enforcement of legal instruments. In this light, it becomes rational to create the 
often quoted ‘spaghetti bowl’ of agreements.50 The condition for this practice is, 
however, to ensure that the number of provisions which are unfavourable to 
Ukraine is low, or else they will not be fully enforced. According to an official, the 
CIS members therefore negotiate agreements in a Slavonic style. The term Slavonic 
style specifies that agreements do not go into detail and in large parts simply state 
the intention to develop the application of a certain provision, rather than present 
commitments to precisely defined rules. The Slavonic style is explicitly seen as more 
favourable than the EU style that requires a more precise negotiation of all details.51 
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 The interviewee, however, also saw enough leeway for non-compliance in EU style agreements. 
The argument here is the more legal text exists, the more possibilities exist to discuss the 
interpretation of legal provisions. In case Ukraine does not want to comply with a certain regulation 
in a certain period, it can refer to a specific interpretation. It will take a longer period to agree on a 
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It permits the flexible interpretation of legal provisions according to Ukraine’s 
needs.52 
Overall, this section has outlined how Ukraine seeks to create more durable 
structures for smoothly co-ordinating activities in cases where the need arise by 
means of agreements and personalised intergovernmental networks. But Ukraine 
rejects the permanent co-ordination that a multilateral legalised institution would 
require. As the study on GUAM will show, Ukrainian officials and private economic 
actors have identified possibilities to set up similar permanent structures in 
Ukraine. But these have not been established so far.  
7.2.2. GUAM ACTIVITIES  
The previous chapters have already indicated that until 2010 it was primarily actors 
at presidential and governmental level who were pushing for Ukraine’s participation 
in GUAM. Ministerial experts working on Ukraine’s trade and security relations with 
the neighbouring states initially hardly took any interest in GUAM. Their interview 
narrations mirror the fact that they hardly expect substantial benefits from GUAM 
activities. In particular, regarding trade state officials and analysts share the 
perception that the organisation is primarily a tool for emulating a commitment to a 
European style of multilateralism. In line with the low interest in GUAM trade 
activities state officials concerned Ukraine general foreign policy and experts from 
the Ministry of Economics prefer GUAM activities that do not require co-ordination 
with other GUAM states. Ideally, they do not even make co-ordination within 
Ukraine’s state structures necessary.53 An official explained that Ukraine lobbies for 
trade activities with reference to the internationally promoted idea of regional 
integration. European states, for instance, often invoke the functionalist argument 
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of free trade as a first step towards successful integration. In this light, initiating a 
multilateral FTA promises rewards from these international actors, and attention on 
the states involved. The economic effect of the agreements is of secondary 
relevance.54 It is therefore reasonable that Ukraine has adopted the FTA but never 
committed to permanently co-ordinating trade activities through this legal 
framework. Beyond the negotiations in which Ukraine had to co-ordinate its 
position with the GUAM states, Ukraine hardly commits to co-ordinated activities in 
the economic sphere. Ukraine attends the meetings and is engaged with GUAM’s 
bureaucracy. The latter means processing the rare inquiries of the GUAM 
secretariat on changes in Ukraine’s trade policy.55 This helps to strengthen GUAM’s 
international recognition and to maintain GUAM as a policy tool.  
The interviews reveal two ways in which the security activities produce benefits by 
weakly co-ordinated activities. First of all, GUAM’s international support is 
appreciated as a gateway to training on law enforcement methods. Such training is 
often initiated by the secretariat and receives financial support from the US or 
Japan. The basis of this support is GUAM’s existence as a regional grouping and the 
participation of all states. Ukrainian officials report that it is sometimes necessary to 
convince other members to participate. But beyond this no other joint efforts are 
necessary. The multilateral context is in this regard a stepping stone to training 
opportunities for Ukraine’s security forces.56 Secondly, the GUAM working group 
against drug-trafficking is seen as producing valuable intelligence concerning drug-
trafficking developments and investigation methods. The low number of states 
involved creates an atmosphere of trust that allows the participants to share more 
sensitive data. A participant of the GUAM council argued that most benefits were 
gleaned from the exchange of investigation methods concerning, for example, the 
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 Even here GUAM is not a necessarily reliable context, as the following instance indicates. The 
funding is usually provided on the condition that all GUAM members participate. But some states, 
for example, Georgia do not always send the individuals with the required knowledge or do not 
complete the necessary paper work. In consequence it already happened that the funding 
commitment was withdrawn. (UA_MoI_1) 
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detection of drug-processing laboratories.57 The annual joint drug-trafficking 
operations, Narcostop, provide occasions to deal with these topics.58 Both activities 
primarily strengthen the individual capacities of Ukraine’s security forces.  
Ukraine has, however, always been eager to lay the foundations for a more durable 
policy co-ordination between the GUAM member states. The intention has less 
been to develop a joint policy in a certain issue-area than to support each state in 
its individual sensitive issues. Chapter 6 has mentioned the example of Ukraine’s 
support for Azerbaijan’s conflict issues in exchange for energy supplies from 
Azerbaijan. GUAM functions as framework for expressing that Azerbaijan’s and 
Georgia’s economic support for Ukraine may positively impinge on Ukraine's 
readiness to internationally discuss the country's secessionist problems. GUAM is, 
however, not the main stage for negotiating economically beneficial projects with 
the GUAM states. These are bilaterally negotiated.59 From this perspective, 
permanent but still weak co-ordination would produce benefits for all GUAM states. 
However, as previously mentioned, Ukraine has hardly succeeded in luring 
Azerbaijan into permanent co-ordination. 
Ukrainian representatives from the Ministry of Interior are willing to gain 
permanent structures for temporary co-ordination through the GUAM measures 
against drug-trafficking as well as the respective CIS activities. An official depicts 
GUAM’s Narcostop operations as a positive step in this direction. Narcostop has not 
developed joint activities but consists of operations that simultaneously take place 
in all four GUAM countries. They more or less follow a previously agreed strategy. 
While the countries exchange information, they do not, however, provide mutual 
support during the operations.60 According to a Ukrainian official, these operations 
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result nevertheless in some mutual support. It happens that an investigation starts 
in one country and is followed up in another country with successful detention. 
However, in the study period such operative outcomes were rather rare.61 More 
important, therefore, has been the creation of an environment for co-operative 
support beyond these operations. The core instrument for this ambition is the same 
as in the CIS: a trust-based personalised network between officials from the 
individual security agencies. The interviewees also acknowledge the potential 
power of VLEC to reduce the intergovernmental bureaucratic thresholds described 
in chapter 7.2.1. They, however, they did not regard VLEC as an efficient tool for 
this, since they perceive VLEC as working unreliably and not being equipped to 
transmit confidential data. The official who works with GUAM reported that VLEC 
has only a 50/50 chance of being able to successfully establish a connection to the 
VLEC branches in other countries. It is therefore not worth the still substantial effort 
to interpolate VLEC.62 Two colleagues were not even aware that VLEC will soon 
enable the exchange of confidential, even top-secret data.63 Only the Ukrainian 
delegate to the GUAM secretariat reported a successful deployment of VLEC in 
2011. An officer from the Ukrainian police contacted the delegate and enquired 
how to get in touch with the Moldovan security agencies. The officer needed help in 
a human trafficking investigation. Since the bureaucratic hurdles in Ukraine for 
accessing the VLEC structures that are placed in the Ukrainian Security Service are 
still high, the delegate to GUAM decided to use the VLEC equipment of the GUAM 
secretariat.64 This exemplifies the way that the GUAM VLEC structures in Ukraine 
are not capable of facilitating interstate co-operation so long as they are not 
accessible to the staff of all Ukrainian law enforcement actors. 
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A few private economic actors likewise depicted GUAM as a promising instrument 
for fuelling trade relations that, however, did not realise its potential in 2011. They 
see GUAM as a potential support for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
that seek trade with the GUAM states. Participant observation and background talks 
in the GUAM business council conveyed the idea that Ukrainian businesses do not 
see the FTA as helpful as at all. But they see a steering committee for free trade 
matters as potentially promising. If such a committee were able to overcome 
bureaucratic and other hurdles and to broker business deals, GUAM would become 
an attractive player for Ukraine’s SMEs. These businesses need substantial support 
to cope with customs procedures for exporting their products. The interplay of 
unfavourable formal rules and subversive informal rules creates significant barriers 
to trade with GUAM partners.65 The core tool of the committee would be direct 
contacts to individuals from all relevant state agencies in the member states. These 
trust-based personal contacts would as a first step bridge the still weak connections 
between GUAM and the national state bodies. The GUAM committee would then 
be capable to establish contacts between the domestic agencies and SMEs from the 
GUAM countries. So far, however, even the business actors who interact with 
GUAM do not trust that GUAM possesses the necessary contacts to the 
governments.66 
7.2.3. CONCLUSION 
Ukraine’s strategy within the CIS and GUAM activities is driven by the desire to 
benefit from weakly co-ordinated activities and to build networks that, on selected 
occasions, facilitate co-ordination with the neighbouring states. The officials prefer 
activities that offer, firstly, to mobilise the support of other countries to negotiate 
more favourable security and trade relations with core partners, primarily Russia; 
secondly, to establish productive non-formalised contacts to relevant bodies of the 
state administration in the neighbouring countries; thirdly, to establish favourable 
economic deals and to enhance Ukraine’s domestic security capacities through 
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technology or methodological trainings; and, fourthly, to emulate Ukraine’s 
compliance with the idea of regional integration to elevate the country’s 
international reputation. The CIS is more applicable in the case of achieving the first 
three aims. GUAM comes with more international funding and support and 
therefore supports aims three and four.  
7.3. CONCLUSION: A SPECIFIC NOTION OF MULTILATERALISM 
This chapter has examined the impact of the most distinctive features of a regional 
organisation, namely the multilateral environment. The analysis tried to identify 
how policy-makers in Azerbaijan and Ukraine frame the advantage of the 
multilateral context of the CIS and GUAM. It sought to identify the mechanisms they 
use to achieve their intermediary goals. The chapter can infer that neither 
Azerbaijan nor Ukraine strive for a variant of multilateralism as defined by Keohane. 
They hardly commit to the ‘practice of co-ordinating national policies’.67 
Nevertheless, they significantly exploit the multilateral environment.  The states 
promote activities that strengthen their capacities to handle economic and security 
issues single-handedly and build on no or temporary co-ordination between the 
member states. The chapter has found the following 11 mechanisms that make 
uncoordinated and temporarily co-ordinated activities in the multilateral context 
attractive.  
In at least three ways the CIS and GUAM improve Azerbaijan’s and Ukraine’s 
capacities without co-ordinating their policy with the other member states. First, 
mere participation in the organisations and in the bureaucratic procedures provides 
the opportunity to emulate commitment to regional co-operation and integration. 
GUAM serves to signal to Western players that Azerbaijan and Ukraine support the 
idea of regional governance and integration. Through the CIS they reply to Russia’s 
idea of regional governance. Secondly, in more pragmatic terms, the CIS and GUAM 
create access to crucial information on changes in the domestic laws or security 
situation in the neighbourhood. This helps Azerbaijan and Ukraine to take these 
changes into account when formulating their domestic and foreign policy. Thirdly, 
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both states use the CIS as forum to ensure that the neighbourhood does not diverge 
too strongly from their domestic policy. Neither Azerbaijan nor Ukraine is eager to 
adjust to a common CIS policy, but they try to influence the other states’ policy by 
diffusing model laws and best practices.  
Temporarily co-ordinated activities are beneficial through 6 mechanisms. Both 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine use the interplay of different states which have varying 
power-relations to build a basis for negotiating better conditions with core 
partners. They make use of the fact that powerful partners enter into negotiations 
with other rationales if they have to consider not only their relation with Azerbaijan 
or Ukraine, but have to factor in other states. Azerbaijan seeks to make use of joint 
CIS agreements by referring to them in bilateral negotiations without being party to 
them. Ukraine prefers to sign, but only selectively apply them. Within GUAM 
Ukraine tries to alter for instance Azerbaijan’s rationales by supporting Azerbaijan’s 
needs in security matters. Second, both states rely on the fact that the multilateral 
environment changes power-dynamics. Taking leadership in opposing a core 
regional player such as Russia gives the states more leverage vis-à-vis Russia. It also 
encourages less powerful states to intensify the relations with Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. Raising problematic issues in the multilateral environment also permit the 
states’ to easily pressure other states’ to alter their policy if necessary. For these 
activities the CIS is the better playground. Third, GUAM in particular paves the way 
for additional external funding of security technology and methods’ trainings. The 
domestic security agencies benefit from this without co-ordinating more than the 
collective participation in these activities. Fourth, Azerbaijan intends to persuade 
GUAM members to act jointly on international level, in order to increase 
Azerbaijan’s room for manoeuvre in matters of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The 
state relies on the improved international reputation of the members that might 
fuel the readiness of international actors to give more thought to this conflict. Fifth, 
Ukraine uses the CIS in particular as a platform to diffuse crucial international laws 
and practices in its neighbourhood. Doing so requires Ukraine to accept CIS 
agreements as tools for temporary policy co-ordination. The strategy enables 
Ukraine to fully implement these international laws. It permits Ukraine to reconcile 
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its international and regional policy. Sixth, Ukraine uses the CIS and GUAM as an 
arena for evaluating the potential domestic impact of international laws and best 
practices with the same aim. It steers the exchange of experiences made by other 
members with their implementation. The officials only co-ordinate the discussion. 
Finally, Ukrainian officials are anxious to set up personalised networks with their 
colleagues from other CIS states. The idea is to activate these for a smooth bilateral 
or multilateral co-ordination of activities if the case arises. The analysed 
interpretation of advantages of the multilateral framework conveys the impression 
of a multilateralism light. 
Two aspects in these findings call for explanations. According to the chapter it is 
rational for Azerbaijan and Ukraine to participate in sectoral activities particularly in 
GUAM, even though the ministerial officials involved do not see any immediate 
benefit of these activities. At the same time, both in Ukraine and Azerbaijan some 
ministerial officials identify productive ways of temporarily co-ordinating policies 
with CIS and GUAM members. If this requires more intensive co-ordination they 
have, however, little chance to establish these mechanisms. An example from 
Azerbaijan is the idea to intensify CIS cross-border activities. An example from 
Ukraine is the hope to accelerate transnational collaboration in non-traditional 
security matters. This picture poses the question of how Azerbaijan and Ukraine are 
able to continue this shallow commitment to GUAM activities. Also, why are the 
policy-makers not able to exploit the multilateral framework more substantially, if 
they see strategies to do so? The chapter also substantiated the observation 
discussed in chapter 5 that neither Azerbaijan nor Ukraine is interested in 
establishing multilateral legalised institutions. The adopted agreements have a 
primarily instrumental function. Ukraine instead strives to establish personalised 
intergovernmental networks for temporarily co-ordinating its policy with the region. 
Chapter 5 has argued that Azerbaijan and Ukraine do not want to increase their 
interdependencies with other former Soviet republics via multilateral agreements 
that become institutions. But why do they not make the effort to negotiate 
favourable agreements that weaken unfavourable dependencies? Why do they 
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prefer less stable mechanisms such as personalised ties? The final empirical chapter 




8. DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE 
CIS AND GUAM 
Chapters 5 to 7 analysed two elements that constitute ways in which policy-makers 
in the case country conceptualise the CIS and GUAM: the aims of participation and 
the preferred type of activities. The aim of this chapter is to discuss why policy-
makers in Azerbaijan and Ukraine conceptualise the organisations in this specific 
way. Understanding this background will permit an evaluation of the possibilities 
that the officials will in the future conceptualise the CIS and GUAM as tool for more 
intensive co-operation. 
State officials from Azerbaijan and Ukraine conceptualise the CIS and GUAM as 
follows. The multilateral framework of the organisations generates tools that 
improve the states’ bilateral policy with the neighbourhood and other international 
actors. The tools also strengthen the states’ domestic capacities to unilaterally solve 
trade and security issues. These intentions rest on the perception that Azerbaijan 
and Ukraine are dependent from or interdependent with some former Soviet 
republics. Given these mutual relations the neighbouring states are perceived as a 
source for gaining support in solving domestic issues that have a regional 
dimension. It is noteworthy that the case countries did not develop the idea to be 
collectively responsible for developments in the region. These underlying ideas 
influence which activities the officials prefer. Azerbaijani and Ukrainian actors 
prefer activities that do not at all or only temporarily are co-ordinated with other 
former Soviet republics. Ukraine is more in favour of durable co-ordination tools, if 
they can be applied occasionally. The states re-interpret the function of established 
CIS and GUAM activities according to their interest to avoid any permanent co-
ordination. This produces a gap between the aims sought by the states and those 
proclaimed by the organisations. In consequence, the states participate in some 
activities for instrumental purposes that are not related to the matter under 
discussion in the activities. Nevertheless, officials who participate in these activities 
have found ways in which the activities may be beneficial. However, in Azerbaijan 
especially these officials have little chance to materialise their ideas.  
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In this light the questions emerges as to how the ruling elites in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine manage this instrumental participation? Why do they not exploit the 
opportunities provided in the CIS and GUAM more intensively? Finally, the analysis 
summarised above raises interest in the question why the policy-makers reject 
permanently co-ordinated solutions. The literature discussed in chapter 2 draws 
attention to various potentially explanatory factors in the domestic political regimes 
such as domestic veto players, informal rule or the impact of non-elite actors.1 This 
chapter will draw on these suggestions and will substantiate the nexus between the 
political regimes and the analysed conceptualisations.  
The chapter will argue as follows. The ruling elite’s ability to pursue instrumental 
participation in the organisations depends on its power to formulate CIS and GUAM 
policy in a top-down manner. The degree to which the policy-makers can efficiently 
exploit CIS and GUAM activities for the state's trade and security policy depends on 
the horizontal communication between the ministries involved. An element of the 
domestic political regime that shapes the conceptualisation of the regional 
organisations is, hence, the process of policy-making. Another element is practices 
which the political regime has established for dealing with international trade and 
with security challenges. Such practices are oriented towards what a regime needs 
to survive and shape the type of multilateral activities preferred by the states 
concerned. The cases of Azerbaijan and Ukraine will show that variances in the 
political regimes lead to varying conceptualisations of the function of regional 
organisations.  
The chapter will illustrate the argument and highlight the differences between 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine with reference to the secondary literature, interviews with 
primary policy actors, analysts and private economic actors from the countries. It 
will first explore the case of Azerbaijan and then turn to Ukraine. 
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8.1. AZERBAIJAN: POLICY-MAKING AND ESTABLISHED PRACTICES 
This section will show how the arguments sketched above manifest themselves in 
the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan. The discussion intends to explain the 
following puzzling observations of the previous chapters. The first observation is 
that most state officials actively engage in CIS and GUAM sectoral activities with the 
purpose of generating additional tools for Azerbaijan’s domestic, regional and 
international policy. But they refrain from engaging in more intensively co-
ordinated activities, even if these would, according to some officials, be supportive 
of Azerbaijan’s policy. Chapter 6.1.1.1 mentioned the following example of this. An 
official sought to intensify relations between state officials from Russia and 
Azerbaijan in the border region in order to fuel improved co-ordination that would 
promote the development of this region. Another example is GUAM security 
activities. Azerbaijani security agencies attend them, but do not use them for 
exchanging information or gaining operative support. The section will ask why the 
state officials do not exploit the opportunities of the CIS and GUAM more 
intensively. The second observation in focus is that even officials from lower level of 
the ministries seek achievements that allow the state administration to 
independently adjust its policy. They also accept to temporarily co-ordinate their 
policy with other members. But no official strives for collective solutions. What 
makes permanently co-ordinated activities unattractive?  
The following sub-section will first highlight that it is the nearly exclusively top-
down approach to decision-making in Azerbaijan that overrides the intentions of 
low-level officials to derive greater advantage from the CIS and GUAM. Also, the 
policy in CIS and GUAM sectoral activities is only weakly co-ordinated with other 
state bodies that work on the same issues. Two sub-sections will discuss that the 
practices which are established to deal with regional trade and security matters 
stabilise the domestic sovereignty of the current political regime. Permanently co-
ordinated activities in the CIS and GUAM would rather challenge it. This will explain 
why the ruling elite seeks other advantages from the organisations. 
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8.1.1. THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE CIS AND GUAM POLICY 
The interviews in the ministries have revealed four practices in the co-ordination of 
the CIS and GUAM policy that significantly determine the extent to which 
Azerbaijan uses the opportunities provided in the organisations. These practices 
become apparent in the decisions which officials delegate to the CIS and GUAM 
councils, in the mandate of these delegates and their influence on the 
implementation of the agreed sectoral activities. The paragraphs below will 
illustrate these four practices. First, decision-making builds on strong hierarchies 
that allow high-level officials to put across their priorities without considering the 
preferences of lower ranking officials. Second, decisions are taken without 
informing the officials that attend the CIS and GUAM bodies and only weakly 
influence their work in the sectoral bodies. Third, the approach to sectoral activities 
is not necessarily developed by the ministerial departments that primarily deal with 
the sectoral activities under discussion. Fourth, the rubber stamp parliament 
facilitates intensive participation in the CIS and GUAM in absence of any interest in 
multilaterally co-ordinated policies. 
8.1.1.1. TOP-DOWN POLICY-MAKING 
Policy co-ordination towards the CIS and GUAM is constituted by patterns that are 
generally characteristic for the co-ordination of Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign 
policy. A strong top-down approach guides policy formulation and decision-making. 
Azerbaijan’s constitution paves the way for such foreign policy-making. Foreign 
policy lies almost entirely in the hands of the president.2 Analysts and policy-makers 
agree that meaningful decisions are taken by Ilham Aliyev, while the ministries and 
the presidential administrations are in charge of little more than the PR for the 
presidential agenda abroad and at home.3 These bodies have, however, some 
                                                          
2
 According to the constitution the president represents the country in foreign affairs and assumes 
the main executive power. Republic of Azerbaijan, 1995, The Constitution of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
3
 The description of ministerial activities as PR is taken from an interview with an analyst. However, 
not only analysts but also state officials agree that the decision-making competences of high-level 
officials like the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs are limited. (AZ_Analyst_5, 
AZ_Analyst_2, AZ_Private_Business_2, AZ_MP_1, AZ_MP_2, AZ_Gov_Analyst_4, AZ_Gov_3, 
AZ_MED_1, AZ_MFA_4) See also the following article that argues that already Heydar Aliyev reduced 
the foreign policy-making to a small group of individuals. Alieva, Leila (2000), Reshaping Eurasia: 
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leeway in shaping the details of the varying policy directions. However, the official 
position and portfolio of policy-makers does not necessarily reflect their actual 
competences in doing so and their power to influence the decisions.4 Accordingly, it 
is characteristic for Azerbaijan that decision-making and the specific design of a 
policy are rather detached from each other. Two examples from the CIS and one 
from GUAM illustrate how these patterns shape the co-ordination of policies 
towards the CIS and GUAM. 
Some insights into the co-ordination of Azerbaijan’s commitment to CIS migration 
activities underscore how the top-down approach creates a policy that is only in 
parts driven by Azerbaijan’s migration-related needs. Responsibility for the co-
ordination of Azerbaijan’s migration policy rests to a large degree with the State 
Migration Service (ASMS). The ASMS officials also specify and implement 
Azerbaijan’s policies towards participation in CIS migration activities, but they are 
not the actors that define the core agenda. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the 
Cabinet of Ministers negotiate the CIS agreements that determine the main 
parameters of Azerbaijan’s involvement in the migration activities. Only after these 
are adopted the ASMS is contacted and asked to specify priorities and acceptable 
activities in the CIS councils. The core interest of the ministries is to activate the 
agreement, hence, to provide some substance to it. They pay less attention to the 
question of how Azerbaijan can exploit these activities for its migration policy. 
Accordingly, state officials who directly work on migration issues hardly have the 
opportunity to influence the decisions which agreements to sign. This leads in some 
cases to a mismatch between the interest of the ASMS and the CIS participation 
stipulated from above. ASMS officials do not consider this mismatch as problematic, 
since the agreements do not contain any binding provisions. The ASMS can, as 
presented in chapters 6.1.2 and 7.1, identify helpful CIS activities within the 
framework defined from above, but also participate in some activities only for the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in Post-Soviet South Caucasus. Berkeley Program in 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, No. 1, p 25. 
4
 Guliyev makes the general observation that formal positions hardly mirror the de facto 
competences of the position holders. Guliyev, Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic 
Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization. 
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sake of fulfilling their duty.5 This top-down agenda-setting foils a CIS policy that is 
primarily directed towards migration-related priorities. 
A similar procedure has determined Azerbaijan’s priorities in the CIS economic 
strategy and the FTA negotiations. Participation in both has been decided by higher 
officials in the Ministry of Economics and by the Prime Minister. But low-level 
officials who work as experts in the ministries influence the form of concrete 
participation. The pivotal point is that these officials have neither meaningful 
competences to take decisions, nor are they in regular communication with the 
involved superiors. To be more precise, the officials report back to their superiors, 
but receive hardly feedback from them and are not involved in the decision-making 
process. This has two consequences. On the one hand, officials design Azerbaijan’s 
participation in the bodies and negotiations based on the aims defined in the 
agreements. In the case of the FTA, they indeed ensured that Azerbaijan could sign 
the FTA without any negative externalities. In other activities of the economic 
strategy such as the already mentioned cross-border co-operation, they try to 
establish initiatives that indeed encourage intensified policy co-ordination with 
Russian counterparts. On the other hand, as chapter 7.1.1 has already indicated, 
these officials lack the capacity to push through their priorities. Some officials who 
negotiated the CIS FTA were not included in the decision of whether to sign the 
agreement and had no chance to promote the benefits of the FTA.6 After the 
decision has been taken, an official who participated in the CIS was puzzled by the 
president’s rejection of the FTA. Even the interviewee’s colleagues were apparently 
not able to disclose the rationality of this decision.7 In the case of cross-border co-
ordination the officials did not receive the necessary support from above to pursue 
activities that would indeed strengthen the personal ties between Azerbaijani and 
Russian officials in the border region. Hence, the desired effects on the prosperity of 
                                                          
5
 This narrative is provided by two officials from the State Migration Service, who are involved in the 
CIS council. As already discussed in chapter six, they do not see the council as a chance to pursue 
their agenda but engage in many migration-related activities due to the order from above. 
(AZ_ASMS_1, AZ_ASMS_2). 
6
 None of the interviewees, neither analysts nor the staff of the Ministry of Economics, felt capable 
of giving reliable information on the de facto power of the prime minister and the relation between 
the Cabinet of Ministers, the prime minister and the president.  
7
 This is stated by an expert from the foreign ministry, who apparently has discussed this question 
with colleagues. (AZ_MFA_8)  
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the region remains weakly realised, despite the fact that opportunities for 
increasing it are available.8 The describe mechanisms detach the formulation and 
realisation of a policy in the CIS from the final decisions on CIS and GUAM related 
matters. It is noteworthy that the lack of influence does not create discontent 
among the ministerial experts. The officials see their primary duty in accomplishing 
their assigned tasks. They voice trust in the decisions taken at higher level, even 
though they are not informed about the basis of decision-making.9 The officials thus 
accept that the decision-making is almost entirely detached from the CIS pursued by 
ministerial experts. This permits Azerbaijan to pretend strong interest in the CIS by 
intensively participating without the actually supporting of the aims proclaimed by 
the CIS. This is, thus, a crucial mechanism for instrumental participation.  
The following GUAM example highlights that due to the top-down approach even 
ministries that are entirely uninterested in certain sectoral initiatives steadily and 
actively participate. They even send high-level officials to these initiatives. The 
responsibility for Azerbaijan’s GUAM policy resides with the section of the foreign 
ministry in charge of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and of Azerbaijan’s 
representation in international organisations. The head of the department ranks as 
the figure in the ministry with most influence on Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.10 His 
influential position ensures that high-level policy-makers support GUAM enough to 
maintain and advance the organisation. Most likely it is via his mediation that 
GUAM receives the support from the president of Azerbaijan, if necessary. It is 
                                                          
8
 The interviewee was able to provide a number of arguments as to why and how the CIS programme 
on cross-border co-operation may be helpful for Azerbaijan. The agenda has been developed in 
exchange with representatives from the target country, Russia. Nevertheless, the willingness of high-
level officials to commit to the agenda is weak. Being asked for the reasons, the interviewee has not 
been able to name them. The interviewee also stated he was not invited as consultant to the 
meetings where such support is decided at higher level. The decisions are made based on written 
reports. (AZ_MED_2) 
9
 This impression is confirmed by an economist who had previously organised training with individual 
departments of the economics ministry. The interviewee gave some examples from this training that 
illustrated the predominant orientation of the officials to the agenda defined in higher ranks. Their 
interest in individually finding and presenting solutions to existing problems was low. 
(AZ_Private_Business_2) 
10
 To the question of who is the strongest player in foreign policy formulation, most of the analysts 
close to the political circles gave his name. The argument was that he is the most creative head in 
the foreign ministry and has the best resources at hand. The individual confirmed this assessment in 
the interview. (AZ_Private_Business_2, AZ_MP_1, AZ_Analyst_5, AZ_Gov_Analyst_3, 
AZ_Gov_Analyst_4) According to Thomas Goltz, the head of department has belonged to the 
ministerial staff since the early 1990s. See: Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary, 65. 
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obvious that the department is able to find enough material and ideational 
resources for GUAM’s development. At least the department is ready to fund 
GUAM meetings in very representative settings in Baku.11 In ideational terms, this 
head of department is eager to develop GUAM’s flagship projects and takes most 
decisions concerning their implementation. Despite the fact that he does not work 
on economic issues, for instance, the decision on a new co-ordination committee 
for implementing the GUAM FTA rests in his hands.12 The decision is therefore not 
primarily taken according to trade considerations. Decisive is the idea that GUAM 
should serve as an additional tool for Azerbaijan’s international diplomacy 
concerning Nagorno-Karabakh.13 Given that the trade-related departments are not 
involved in such decisions, it is scarcely surprising that the Ministry of Economics 
widely disregards the GUAM trade activities.14 Nevertheless, a relatively high-
ranking official from the Ministry of Economics attends the GUAM working group on 
trade. The readiness to attend the meetings is most likely triggered by the strong 
personal relationship between the official and the head of the GUAM co-ordinating 
department.15 Generally, officials from the foreign ministry report that their 
personal relations with the individuals who attend the GUAM bodies are crucial. 
They are a core resource for ensuring that all ministries stay involved in GUAM and 
indeed send delegates to the working groups.16 In a nutshell, Azerbaijan’s active 
participation in GUAM strongly depends on the power of one ministerial 
department and personal ties to other departments that have to attend GUAM’s 
sectoral activities. The next sub-section will show that also the horizontal co-
ordination of the CIS and GUAM policy between the ministries and departments in 
charge of certain issue-areas influences how strongly the organisations are 
exploited for benefits in a specific issue-area. 
                                                          
11
 Taken from the author’s observation at a GUAM event in Azerbaijan. Also, a GUAM official 
reported that Azerbaijan is always rather eager to host GUAM meetings in Azerbaijan and pay for the 
event rather than send the officials to the GUAM headquarter in Ukraine. (GUAM_Official_2) 
12
 This was reported by AZ_MFA_1, AZ_MFA_2 and AZ_MFA_6.  
13
 In this way the head of the department represents GUAM vis-à-vis analysts in Azerbaijan. It was 
also the predominant framing in the interview in 2011. (AZ_MP_1, AZ_Gov_Analyst_4, AZ_MFA_1)  
14
 This has been stated by AZ_MED_1.  
15
 Several background talks confirmed the close relation between the mentioned individuals.  
16
 One official from the foreign ministry described this process in detail. The interview of another 
official roughly confirmed this narrative. (AZ_MFA_2, AZ_MFA_6) 
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8.1.1.2. HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION 
This sub-section argues that is crucial how intensively Azerbaijan’s co-ordinates its 
participation in the CIS sectoral activities with other state bodies that work on the 
issue-areas discussed in the CIS. Chapter 6 has already indicated that the intention 
to exploit a sectoral activity for some general gains in foreign policy or for specific 
sector-related gains varies across the organisations and sectors. So does the 
horizontal co-ordination of these activities. An example of intensive horizontal co-
ordination in the CIS is the FTA negotiation. The Ministry of Economics co-ordinated 
participation in the CIS negotiations. It included all trade-relevant departments in 
other ministries. Also, high-ranking officials with decision-making powers in the 
respective ministries represented Azerbaijan in the core negotiations.17 Thus, 
officials who strongly shape Azerbaijan’s trade policy defined the parameters of 
Azerbaijan’s position in the FTA negotiations. As the preceding section outlined, this 
does not mean that the negotiations are carried out with the aim of employing the 
resulting FTA as a multilateral tool for regulation trade. But it ensured that the 
negotiations were approached with a plan how to take the optimal advantage of 
the FTA for Azerbaijan’s trade. The opposite is the case in CIS migration activities. A 
department that does not work on migration issues co-ordinates Azerbaijan’s 
attendance in CIS migration councils. It primarily communicates with the Azerbaijani 
States Migration Service. Other departments of the foreign ministry that also deal 
with migration issues hardly receive any information about the activities in the 
CIS.18  The Azerbaijani State Migrations Service (ASMS) functions as second body in 
charge of specifying the participation in CIS migration activities. When specifying 
the forms and priorities of participation in the CIS bodies, the ASMS, however, also 
defines the programme concerning irregular migration matters. They hardly invite 
the Ministry of Interior and the security agencies to define the agenda according to 
priorities in the field of irregular migration.19 This shows that Azerbaijan’s 
involvement in CIS migration activities runs in parallel with policy-making in crucial 
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 These officials assume other relevant tasks like the WTO negotiations. (AZ_MED_1)  
18
 The official even received the core interview questions in advance and obviously took some time 
to prepare the answers. But the official stated that he was not able to give any information about CIS 





areas of migration policy. It has few intersections with the main policy on irregular 
migration and also with the migration regulations that are negotiated with other 
partners such as the EU. Only labour migration aspects are defined by the ASMS 
which is primarily responsible for these matters. 
An even lower degree of horizontal co-ordination marks participation in GUAM, as 
an example from the trade activities will show. The previous sub-section has already 
indicated that the GUAM co-ordination hub in the foreign ministry takes most 
decisions concerning GUAM trade-related activities. The interviews with officials 
from this and related ministries present agenda-setting in GUAM as a ‘one man 
show’. An official from the foreign ministry appears to be the single driving force 
behind the FTA.20 The official sees it as sufficient that the FTA was adopted. 
Accordingly, the official was not eager to discuss the problems concerning the FTA 
implementation with the colleagues from the Ministry of Economics. The GUAM 
tourism project provides another example for the tendency to keep the 
involvement of other ministries to a minimum.21 Until 2011 the project included the 
foreign ministry and an Azerbaijani tourism company. Chapter 7.1 has already 
discussed that the project disclosed some problems in Azerbaijan’s tourism 
infrastructure. The foreign ministry declined to discuss these problems with the 
ministerial structures that work on tourism. An official suggested solving with the 
help of individual business-men and individual officials from the relevant ministries. 
This decision reflects that the official aims at the most workable solutions and not at 
improving Azerbaijan’s regional tourism co-operation in general terms.22 Thanks to 
the power and resources of the department in charge of GUAM it is easier to 
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 The official depicted himself as the sole individual who has done something for the FTA. It would 
now be time that other ministries also did something for the FTA. However, there is little intention to 
indeed get other ministries involved. This report was confirmed by other interviewees. (AZ_MFA_1, 
AZ_MFA_2, AZ_MED_1)  
21
 Similar mechanisms apply to the GUAM VLEC activities against irregular migration. All GUAM 
security activities are more constructively integrated into Azerbaijan’s security, mainly Nagorno-
Karabakh related agenda, since the GUAM co-ordinators in the foreign ministry are in charge of 
conflict resolution. The VLEC structures, however, only weakly co-operate with other branches of the 
Ministry of Interior or state agencies that deal with irregular migration. The interviewees from the 
state migration service and an interviewee from the foreign ministry were not able to describe VLEC 
capacities. (AZ_MFA_3, AZ_ASMS_1, AZ_SMS_2) There are hardly any requests from the Azerbaijani 
side to use VLEC. This was reported by the official who works in VLEC. The interviewee reported that 
he informs other colleagues about VLEC from time to time and raises their interest. (AZ_MoI_2) 
22
 All examples are given by AZ_MFA_1.  
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implement the project without much co-ordination instead of co-ordinating it with 
other state structures.  
Overall, CIS and GUAM activities are only intensively horizontally co-ordinated if 
they support Azerbaijan's trade or security policy directly. The CIS trade activities 
include the most relevant trade partners in the post-Soviet space and therefore 
attract most attention. Often, however, the sectoral activities are only weakly co-
ordinated with the ministries that are primarily in charge of the issue-area in focus. 
This explains why participation in these activities does not generate more 
substantial policy co-ordination. If a department that is most informed about 
Azerbaijan’s needs in an issue-area is not involved in the activities, it cannot exploit 
the CIS and GUAM activities for Azerbaijan’s policy.  
8.1.1.3. CO-ORDINATION WITH THE PARLIAMENT 
A crucial foundation for Azerbaijan’s often instrumental CIS and GUAM policy is the 
co-ordination with the parliament, Millis Majlis. Chapter 5 has mentioned that 
primarily the CIS but also GUAM works with multilateral legalised agreements. 
Some of these have to be ratified by the national parliaments. Azerbaijan’s 
leadership thus needed to get the support of the parliament for CIS and GUAM 
membership. They also needed to ensure that the CIS and GUAM agreements are 
ratified so that they could pave the way for Azerbaijan’s participation in the 
organisations’ activities. The fact that since 1994 the Millis Majlis has been barely 
more than a rubber stamp parliament facilitates this.23 The parliament lacks a 
strong opposition. A former Member of Parliament stated that it was already rare 
to reject laws submitted under Heydar Aliyev and that this is impossible under 
Ilham Aliyev.24 An opposition delegate relates that in foreign policy matters the 
opposition apparently tends to trust the presidents’ decisions. The argument is that 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and other dependencies on former Soviet republics 
make it hard to develop an appropriate strategy. In some cases it is therefore better 
to agree to the ratification of an agreement that principally does not reflect the 
delegates’ foreign policy orientation, since such agreements may have some 
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 Ergun, Ayça (2009), The Presidential Election in Azerbaijan, October 2008. Electoral Studies, No. 
28. 
24
 The interviewee is still in contact with current delegates. (AZ_Private_Business_2) 
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positive strategic effects for the resolution of the conflict. With this argument the 
delegate who generally rejects any rapprochement with the CIS is ready to ratify a 
CIS agreement if this increases Russia’s support in matters related to Nagorno-
Karabakh.25 This readiness is built on the assumption that international agreements 
function as a communication tool and have limited domestic impact.26 Thus, the 
majority of pro-Aliyev parties in the parliament and the high level of trust among 
opposition delegates concerning the foreign policy of the president limit the 
possibility of an agreement being rejected, if its content is not supported by the 
delegates.  
Analysis of the core mechanisms in the domestic co-ordination of CIS and GUAM 
activities disclosed the basic conditions for pursuing intensive participation that is 
only partially driven by the desire to improve Azerbaijan’s policy in the issue-areas 
discussed in the organisations. The following two sub-sections will highlight why 
policy-makers prefer no or only weakly co-ordinated activities in the areas of trade 
and security.  
8.1.2. ESTABLISHED TRADE PRACTICES WITH NEIGHBOURING 
COUNTRIES 
This sub-section presents selected practices that dominate Azerbaijan’s trade with 
neighbouring countries and spotlights two aspects: why the ruling elite does not 
desire multilateral legalised institutions and why private business actors also do not 
push for establishing such institutions in the CIS and GUAM. The following 
paragraphs will develop the core argument that Azerbaijan’s ruling elite needs to be 
able to flexibly introduce measures to protect the domestic market in order to 
stabilise the current political regime. The strongest form for the co-ordination of 
trade policies that is discussed in the CIS and GUAM, namely the potential trade 
institutions discussed in the FTA, would challenge this flexibility. Entrepreneurs who 
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 A current Member of Parliament, who is also represented in the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly, 
elaborated this narrative. It was in large part supported by another current and a former Member of 
Parliament.  (AZ_MP_1, AZ_MP_2, AZ_Private_Business_2) 
26
 In terms of practice, international agreements are often simply not considered in the policy 
processes. Domestic forces who claim their comprehensive implementation are generally weak. 
Additionally, a legal mechanism exists that renders international agreements harmless. In case of 
conflict with domestic legislation, international agreements do not have primacy over domestic law. 
See: Abdullahzade, The Status of International Treaties in the Legal System of Azerbaijan, 242. 
243 
 
desire to overcome the negative effects of the protectionist measures do not view a 
multilateral FTA as an efficient tool.  
Chapter 5.1.1.2 has already noted that the current economic regime in Azerbaijan 
builds strongly on import monopolies.27 These monopolies are a vital tool for the 
ruling elite to stabilise the elite’s authority and, hence, to consolidate domestic 
sovereignty. The monopolies help political actors to establish bonds to potential 
veto-players. Expressed in simplified terms, the ruling elite rewards the loyalty of 
individual potentially powerful veto-players with monopolies on the import of 
specified commodities. A potential veto-player is allowed to control the import of a 
certain commodity, if the player supports crucial figures in the ruling elite.28 
Accordingly, the leadership needs to be able to maintain the monopolies and to 
flexibly distribute them among influential individuals in Azerbaijan’s elite. Further, it 
needs to protect these monopolies by preventing producers from abroad from 
entering the Azerbaijani market in an uncontrolled way. Rigidly legalised FTAs, 
especially of a multilateral nature, are rather hostile to such a protectionist 
approach. Multilateral FTA negotiations make it more difficult, compared to 
bilateral ones, to put across the necessary exemptions of certain commodities from 
free trade.29 Moreover, if FTA provisions that allow sanctioning excessive 
protectionist measures indeed become an institution, such provisions challenge 
Azerbaijan’s flexibility. It complies more with the needs of Azerbaijan’s ruling elite 
to resolve trade conflicts in bilateral consultations than through international 
arbitrage institutions. The latter are addressed only in rare cases.30 Not only 
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 Related by AZ_Analyst_6, AZ_Aanalyst_1. See also: Ibadoglu, Current State of Azerbaijan's 
Economy: Myth and Realities, 429. 
28
 Several independent analysts explained this linkage as presented above. (AZ_Private_Business_1, 
AZ_Private_Business_2, AZ_Analyst_2, AZ_Analyst_6) This principle is also indicated in: Radnitz, Oil 
in the Family: Managing Presidential Succession in Azerbaijan. 
29
 The argument that multilateral negotiations are generally disadvantageous for Azerbaijan’s trade 
priorities was also emphasised by interviewees from the economics ministry. The link to the non-
formal structures of the Azerbaijani economy is explicated by independent analysts, who have 
economic competence and are in contact with political and economic actors. They also claim this 
structure also as decisive for Azerbaijan’s delay in the WTO negotiations. (AZ_MED_1, 
AZ_Gov_Analyst_2, AZ_MP_1, AZ_Private_Business_2, AZ_Analyst_2)  
30
 This again complies with the unambiguous rejection of strong international arbitrary mechanisms 
by an official from the economics ministry and the foreign ministry. The former describes the most 
considered mechanism to solve trade conflict with former Soviet republics as bilateral consultation. 
Only in rare cases does the government turn to judicial authorities. (AZ_MED_1) The background is 
reasoned by independent analysts. 
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Azerbaijan but also core partners in the post-Soviet space tend to introduce ad-hoc 
protectionist measures beyond internationally accepted extent.31 These are often 
established via technical or quality standards. Especially the agriculture and food 
production sectors in Azerbaijan need good access to sales markets in the former 
Soviet republics, as chapter 5 has pinpointed. In order to stabilise these sectors, 
Azerbaijan’s leadership has an interest in influencing changes in these standards 
which inter alia may be induced through regional FTAs. This interest creates 
incentives for Azerbaijan to shape the FTA negotiations. But the required flexibility 
concerning protectionist measures rules out that the ruling elite fully implements 
and enforces the FTA. 
Given that the ruling elite has no interest in comprehensively implementing the 
multilateral FTAs, even entrepreneurs that need access to the markets in former 
Soviet republics do not perceive legalised multilateral FTAs as an adequate 
instrument. Primarily big business and only a minor part of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) have the capacities to engage in transnational trade. Their main 
obstacles in the trade with former Soviet republics are the frequently changing 
protectionist measures and corruption. According to the entrepreneurs, at least two 
phenomena reduce the capacity of an FTA to reduce these barriers. Firstly, insiders 
from the ministries rule out that the countries would indeed give up control of 
domestic custom regulations, which would be necessary. They assume that the 
ruling elite prevents such initiatives for the sake of its vested interests. The 
agreements, if negotiated among the former Soviet republics, provide only vague 
legal instruments for solving trade conflicts. These can easily be undermined in the 
post-Soviet environment where the rule of law is weakly consolidated.32 In this 
situation the most reliable tools to foster transnational trade are contacts with 
entrepreneurs and governments in the target countries. Big business has access to 
the domestic government which may establish links to the counterparts in the 
former Soviet republics. But SMEs lack such channels. Thus, the vague ambitions 
developed within GUAM to act as a hub between businesses and the members’ 
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state agencies would play more in the hands of entrepreneurs. However, most 
SMEs in Azerbaijan are not informed about such GUAM intentions and would not 
contact the organisation, since the government hardly advertises it.33 The 
established practices hence induce both state and private actors to employ the 
multilateral frameworks to improve their bilateral trade relations, but not to 
establish multilateral legalised institutions.  
8.1.3. ESTABLISHED PRACTICES TO REGULATE MIGRATION  
This sub-section will subsequently discuss three factors that prevent state 
structures in Azerbaijan from seeking more transnational co-ordination of migration 
policies in the multilateral contexts of the CIS and GUAM. First, Azerbaijani policy-
makers define migration issues as a matter for domestic security forces that does 
not need to be co-ordinated transnationally. Secondly, efficient solutions exist for 
the few aspects that require co-ordination with other states. Finally, the affected 
population can build on societal linkages for dealing with migration problems in the 
post-Soviet space. This reduces the pressure on the government to protect society 
in these regards.  
Azerbaijan’s migration policy has so far concentrated on incoming labour and 
irregular migration, since these are most challenging for the domestic stability of 
the country. As already mentioned in chapter 5.1.1.1, outgoing migration rather 
contributes to Azerbaijan’s stability and strengthens the domestic sovereignty of 
the ruling elite. The strongest irregular migration flows emerge from Azerbaijan’s 
underdeveloped regions. They relieve demand for employment, ease the economic 
pressure in these regions through incoming remittances and thus support domestic 
stability. There are hence few incentives for Azerbaijan’s leadership to invest money 
in preventing outgoing migration.34 Generally, Azerbaijan wants to open emigration 
opportunities to the few target countries in the post-Soviet space, but reduce 
incoming labour migration. This is easier to implement in bilateral negotiations with 
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 Stated by AZ_Private_Business_3, who demanded a better advertisement in Azerbaijan  
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 This was emphasised by an analyst, who is in contact with NGO’s that work on migration. A 
representative from the International Migration Organisation gave a similar picture. The state 
agencies are open to discuss the prevention of irregular migration and human trafficking with 
international partners and implement certain activities. But they are generally rather inert and not 
pro-active. (AZ_Anlayst_1, AZ_Analyst_8) 
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the core emigration target countries. Multilateral formats may produce more 
pressure on Azerbaijan to open for incoming migration. Countries that are not 
important for Azerbaijan have, for instance, better chances to demand that 
Azerbaijan open its labour market for their migrants to the same degree as for 
migrants from Azerbaijan’s core migration partners.35 The general interest of 
Azerbaijan is thus to reduce the multilateral co-ordination of migration issues. It is 
rather depicted as crucial to strengthen Azerbaijan’s security forces. These are said 
not to be reliant upon wider regional co-operation.36 
According to the concepts of Azerbaijan’s state bodies that work on migration, 
there is little need for transnationally co-ordinating migration. Azerbaijan has only 
to co-ordinate the re-admission of detained irregular migrants with the former 
Soviet republics and other states. The interviewees described these undertakings as 
unproblematic, especially concerning Russia, the Central Asian states and China. In 
their eyes, the established bilateral ties with the security agencies in these countries 
permit the smooth transfer of detainees. The officials therefore do not desire any 
bilateral or multilateral agreements for their re-admission. On the contrary, re-
admission agreements according to international standards would require 
additional expenditures from Azerbaijan.37 They might oblige Azerbaijan to support 
other states in their migration policy and to spend more money on the repatriation 
of emigrants and on the sustenance of detainees. The migration agencies consider 
these measures as unnecessary and therefore prevent such arrangements. It 
appears to be a common attitude to argue that a country has no grounds to care 
about citizens who left the country, or about individuals who trespass in 
Azerbaijan.38  
Apparently, the officials do not consider the potentially bad labour conditions or 
violence that irregularly emigrating Azerbaijani citizens may experience as a 
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 Two officials who deal with migration issues made respective statements. (AZ_MFA_3, 
AZ_ASMS_1) 
36
 At least, this is the reasoning of all interviewed officials with knowledge about migration. Some 
caution with regard to the capacities of the security forces may be recommended. These statements 
nevertheless reflect the fact that the national security forces do not seek a more co-operative 
approach.   
37
 The official referred to EU standards in the example (AZ_MFA_3) 
38
 This statement is taken from the interview with an official from the foreign ministry. (AZ_MFA_3) 
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challenge for Azerbaijan. The society only weakly presses the ruling elite to protect 
Azerbaijani emigrants from abuse abroad. The following two factors may explain 
this. Several non-governmental organisations in Azerbaijan work on migration and 
human trafficking, since it is a pressing topic in the regions. However, they lack 
efficient communication channels with government structures and often also with 
the affected population.39 Therefore, the societal groups affected try to solve 
migration-related problems without appealing to state authorities. One incident 
exemplifies the opportunities. In 2006 Russia imposed a ban on workers from the 
Caucasus at Russian produce markets.40 Selling their goods at these markets is the 
main source of income for most Azerbaijani migrants to Russia.41 Consequently, the 
ban strongly affected the Azerbaijani community. Since the government was 
reluctant to solve the issue immediately in CIS or bilateral consultations, the 
affected individuals found some non-formal solutions to this situation.42 One 
strategy was to employ workers from Ukraine as straw men, in order to continue 
the business. Other families sent the wives to the markets with the expectation that 
the Russian authorities would treat women less severely than men.43 Likewise 
families affected by human trafficking hardly appeal to any state authorities and 
often not even to NGOs. Social, often religiously inspired, norms might lead to the 
social isolation of families with a human trafficking victim. This induces individuals 
affected to keep silent about their experiences.44 Given the weak societal pressure, 
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 Since the early 2000s a limited pluralism can be observed in Azerbaijan, which led to the 
foundation of several NGOs. These, however, lack formalised lobbying channels. Their influence 
depends on the personal ties of the leadership to stakeholders in the state apparatus. See: Valiyev, 
Parliamentary Elections in Azerbaijan. A Failed Revolution, 22; Rasizade, Azerbaijan in Transition to 
the ‘‘New Age of Democracy’’, 353. 
40
 See: Ergosheva, Nina, Proshchanie s Migrantom [Farewell from Migrants]. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 24 
March 2007; RFERL Newsline, New Law Banning Foreign Sales People on Russian Markets Takes 
Effect. 
41
 Yunusov, Migration Processes in Azerbaijan, 89-90. 
42
 An official from the economics ministry reported that no specific measures have been undertaken. 
The issue was just raised in some ordinary intergovernmental consultations, but was considered to 
be of temporary character anyway. (AZ_MED_1) 
43
 The first strategy was recounted by an analyst working on migration to Russia. The second strategy 
was reported by an analyst, who claimed to have heard of such strategies from several small 
businesses. (AZ_Analyst_4, AZ_Private_Business_2) The dominance of informal practices in response 
to Russian activities against this group of migrants is discussed also in: Yunusov, Migration Processes 
in Azerbaijan, 90-2. 
44
 AZ_Analyst_1,working with migration NGOs gave several examples whereby border guards or 
police officers appear to be involved in organising the trafficking. The interviewee also described 
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state officials rather concentrate on domestic policies in order to avoid the 
additional burden described above that multilateral co-ordination could potentially 
impose.  
8.1.4. CONCLUSION 
In sum, three aspects permit the Azerbaijani leadership to pursue aims within the 
CIS and GUAM that are not immediately link to the issue-areas in focus. These are, 
first, the ability to decide on the participation in CIS and GUAM sectoral activities 
from above, second, to get the parliament to ratify nearly any international 
agreement submitted, and, third, to give officials in relevant ministries the mandate 
to specify how Azerbaijan participates in the sectoral activities. Two factors prevent 
Azerbaijani officials who participate in CIS and GUAM activities from being 
socialised into a more positive attitude towards regional policy co-ordination. These 
are the possibilities to exclude these officials from the decision-making and to 
exclude ministries that deal with a certain issue area from defining the CIS and 
GUAM policy in this area. Thus, the organisations are only exploited for Azerbaijan’s 
policy in specific issue areas to the degree to which high-level officials in Azerbaijan 
agree to it. Much of the organisations’ potential remains therefore unused.  
The state is, nevertheless, eager to ensure favourable trade conditions and that the 
domestic stability is not challenged by incoming migration. The domestic practices 
for regulating trade that prevail in Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet countries direct 
the attention of state officials and private business to bilateral relations with 
stakeholders in the CIS and GUAM countries. As discussed in chapter 7, these can be 
fuelled by various effects of the multilateral environment of the CIS and GUAM. 
When it comes to migration issues, state officials see multilateral regulations as 
producing an unnecessary burden. Since the pressure from society for more 
efficient prevention of irregular migration and protection of outgoing and incoming 
migrants is low, there is little incentive to accept this burden. The following section 
will highlight what priorities the political regime in Ukraine produces.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
social norms as a core problem. The main line of argument was supported by the other migration 
specialist interviewed. (AZ_Analyst_4) 
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8.2. UKRAINE: POLICY-MAKING AND ESTABLISHED PRACTICES 
The case of Ukraine brings a political regime into the discussion that is, as 
mentioned in chapter 1.5.1, marked by a strong pluralism and features of 
democratic rule, but has not consolidated democracy. Characteristics of hybrid 
regimes shape Ukrainian politics. These are the limited impact of the formal rules of 
the polity, and the strong relevance of non-formalised institutions in the policy 
processes.45 This section will analyse how this political regime influences the way in 
which Ukrainian policy-makers conceptualise the function of the CIS and GUAM. It 
will disclose that the prevalence of informal institutions in the more authoritarian 
Azerbaijan and in the pluralist Ukraine have similar effects. Both lay the foundations 
for a CIS and GUAM policy that is strongly instrumental and only incomprehensively 
exploits the opportunities provided. While in Azerbaijan most policy-makers intend 
this effect, it is often an unintended one in Ukraine. Ukrainian policy-makers have to 
consider the rationales of non-elite actors in society more strongly. Therefore 
Ukrainian policy-makers are open for more intensively co-ordinated activities in the 
CIS and GUAM. But weak policy co-ordination at domestic level and competition 
between individual state bodies often prevent the officials from optimally using the 
opportunities for co-ordinated activities. The same factors, however, also permit 
interested officials to continue an active CIS and GUAM policy in times where the 
president did not support the organisations. Finally, this section will discuss why 
Ukrainian officials support temporarily co-ordinated activities but reject permanent 
co-ordination via multilateral legalised rules. It will argue that this, similar to the 
Azerbaijan case, is a consequence of economic protectionism and the weak 
application of the rule of law in Ukraine and the post-Soviet space. The section will 
proceed in a similar way to the study on Azerbaijan. A sub-section will first highlight 
crucial aspects of domestic policy co-ordination. The second sub-section will reflect 
on common practices for regulating trade and security issues.  
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Puglisi, Rosaria (2003), Clashing Agendas? Economic Interests, Elite Coalitions and Prospects for Co-
operation between Russia and Ukraine. Europe-Asia Studies,Vo. 55, No. 6; Malygina, Ukraine as a 
Neo-patrimonial State: Understanding Political Change in Ukraine in 2005-2010. 
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8.2.1. THE CO-ORDINATION OF THE CIS AND GUAM POLICY 
Chapter 5.1.2 revealed that Ukrainian officials have steadily participated in the CIS 
and GUAM. Even if the presidents have radically revoked support for the CIS or 
GUAM, participation has continued. This sub-section argues that several 
mechanisms account for this continuity. First, support – if not necessarily from the 
president then from high-level officials in the ministries – has allowed interested 
officials to meaningfully exploit the organisations. In the absence of such support, 
policy-makers may use personal ties with other actors in the government to ensure 
Ukraine’s continuing active participation. These ties also help to induce state 
officials to take advantage of the organisations’ opportunities in their daily work. 
Nevertheless, as chapter 7.2 has pinpointed, the officials do not exploit all 
opportunities, especially in GUAM. This section will argue that bureaucratic barriers 
between Ukraine’s state bodies impede the smooth co-ordination of CIS and GUAM 
activities. Since several state bodies are involved in certain activities the lack of co-
ordination reduces the chances to consistently use the opportunities. Finally, the 
CIS and GUAM policy is weakly co-ordinated with other areas of Ukrainian policy. 
This primarily produces problems when it comes to the ratification of relevant 
multilateral agreements. In Ukraine the parliament is often a veto-player that 
makes the adoption of agreements more problematic. Three sub-sections will 
illustrate these mechanisms.  
8.2.1.1. TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP POLICY-MAKING 
Ukraine’s policy in the CIS and GUAM both benefits from and is negatively affected 
by the fact that Ukraine’s foreign policy-making is generally weakly co-ordinated. 
This creates obstacles to the smooth implementation of the policy agenda.46 An 
example from the CIS and one from GUAM activities will highlight how this feature 
impinges on CIS and GUAM policy in two ways. It provides some guarantees that 
participation in both organisations continues in times where the leadership neglects 
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 See for example: Wolczuk, Kataryna (2009), Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of 
EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighborhood Policy. Europe Asia Studies,Vo. 61, 
No. 2, pp. 199-207; Fischer, Sabine (2006), Integrationsprozesse im post-sowjetischen Raum: 
Voraussetzungen, Erwartungen und Potenziale [ Processes of Integration in the Post-Soviet Space: 
Suppositions, Expectations and Potentials. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 1, pp. 121-25; 
D'Anieri et al., Politics and Society in Ukraine, 207. 
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the organisations. But it limits the scope to use the organisations efficiently for 
Ukraine’s foreign policy.  
Chapter 5.1.2 briefly mentioned that the CIS was a non-topic in foreign policy 
discussions in Ukraine in the late 1990s when President Kuchma promoted GUAM 
and between 2004 and 2010 under President Yushchenko. During these periods the 
Ukrainian leadership did not entirely relinquish participation in the CIS, but it 
reportedly paid significantly less interest in co-ordinating Ukraine’s participation in 
the individual CIS bodies. This, however, only slightly slowed down Ukraine’s 
involvement in CIS activities. The division in the foreign ministry, which since 1991 
has been responsible for Ukraine’s CIS policy, was able to continue its work. It 
belongs to the department for the bilateral relations with the former Soviet 
republics. This department is of utmost relevance regardless of whether the foreign 
policy compass points eastwards or westwards. Therefore the division did not 
experience significant cuts in resources in the periods where the CIS activities were 
not supported by the president. Representatives of this division explained that they 
are independent enough from the president and from the highest department in 
the foreign ministry, the section for foreign policy planning, to continue their daily 
work when the presidents were largely ignorant of the CIS.47 Their room for 
manoeuvre allowed them to make sure that delegates from various ministries and 
state bodies regularly attend all CIS councils. It was primarily this that paved the 
way for state officials working as experts in the various ministries to take advantage 
of the basic CIS activities, namely the council meetings and working groups. As 
chapter 6.2 and 7.2 have highlighted, these activities provide several benefits for 
the officials even without committing to any co-ordination with CIS members. The 
latter would have required a stronger degree of support from the government. In 
this period, it was the first priority of the CIS co-ordinating division that 
representatives from Ukraine attend the CIS councils. In case a department lacked 
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 This was stated by an official who has worked in this department since the early 1990s. The 
interviewee explained that not only did the activities not stall under President Yushchenko, they 
were also not necessarily intensified under Yanukovich or in earlier periods. (UA_MFA_4) 
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interest in a council, the CIS co-ordination hub often sent delegates who had no 
expertise in the topics under discussion in the meetings.48 
As this indicates, the CIS co-ordination hub had little power to ensure that individual 
CIS activities were the object of intensive engagement. It required the backing of 
high-level officials to exploit the CIS activities more purposefully. The participation 
in the FTA negotiations exemplifies this. President Yushchenko and the government 
were, according to some officials, initially reluctant towards the Russian proposal to 
negotiate a new CIS FTA. But the CIS FTA attracted the attention of powerful 
officials in the Ministry of Economics even in this ‘orange period’. The ministry was 
therefore also able to pro-actively prepare the CIS FTA negotiations under 
Yushchenko in 2008. The intensity of participation in the negotiations continued 
unchanged under president Yanukovich. Hence, the outspoken pro-Russian stance 
of Yanukovich did not induce more commitments to the negotiations.49 The 
interviews revealed that the officials from the Ministry of Economics who attended 
the CIS negotiations have more influence on decision-making than their Azerbaijani 
colleagues. They appeared to be relatively confident of being able to influence the 
final decision to adopt the FTA. They admit that it is easier to publicly discuss the CIS 
FTA under Yanukovich, but are sure that a way of adopting the CIS FTA would also 
have been found under Yushchenko. The confidence rests on the understanding 
that the CIS FTA was never planned as a direct multilateral tool for regulating the 
trade with the CIS countries.50 
GUAM similarly experienced the way that strong backing from top officials 
strengthens the intensity of Ukraine’s commitment. It is, however, crucial which 
state body provides the support. Whenever the support of powerful political actors 
faded away, the officials involved in GUAM used their mandate and their personal 
ties to keep the Ukrainian ministries in favour of GUAM. The central co-ordination 
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 This was reported by an official from the foreign ministry, who had on one occasion to attend a CIS 
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of Ukraine’s GUAM activities has been less stable than that of the CIS. It strongly 
depended on the attitude of individual high-level officials. Until GUAM developed 
permanent organisational structures in the 2000s there was no specific GUAM 
division in the foreign ministry. In 2005 then foreign minister Borys Tarasyuk 
established a GUAM department in the foreign ministry. This department was 
assigned the task of enhancing GUAM activity and developing Ukrainian projects for 
GUAM. With these steps Tarasyuk planned to activate the organisations as a tool in 
Ukraine’s foreign policy. After Tarasyuk resigned in 2007, the permanent delegate 
reported losing the direct contact to higher-ranking officials in the foreign ministry. 
This significantly weakened the delegate’s capacity to develop GUAM. It has ever 
since been the task of the Ukrainian officials involved in GUAM to convince the 
ministry of GUAM’s advantages. They strongly draw on their own and other GUAM 
participants’ personal relations with influential Ukrainian officials.51 Therefore the 
situation even eased when Yanukovich came to power. Yanukovich came with an 
anti-GUAM attitude but brought Konstyantyn Hryshchenko to the government. 
Hryshchenko was foreign minister from 2010-12 and since 2012 has been a vice 
prime minister. Since 2010 he has been a core guarantor of Ukraine’s continued 
GUAM membership for the following reasons. Hryshchenko attended the 
conference on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in 1996 and 
supported the first joint statement of GUAM. He then lobbied for GUAM in the 
1990s.52 According to several interviewees his former link with GUAM and his good 
relations with the GUAM secretary and the Azerbaijani key driver of GUAM increase 
his readiness to keep a place for GUAM in Ukraine’s policy.53 Primarily strategic 
rationales informed his efforts, while GUAM’s impact on Ukraine’s policy in specific 
issues areas was of secondary relevance. Hryshchenko did not prevent the shifting 
of responsibility for GUAM to the economics ministry in the course of the 
comprehensive administrative reforms in 2011. Thus, since 2011 a ministry has 
been in charge of GUAM that has little interest in GUAM as strategic foreign policy 
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 Reported by GUAM_Official_1 and UA_MFA_6 
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 Reported by GUAM_Official_1 and AZ_MFA_1 
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 An official from GUAM and one from Azerbaijan stated with relief that Hryshchenko is the ‘buddy’ 
of the secretary general and of the ‘godfather of GUAM’ in Azerbaijan, so it will be easy to convince 
him that it is not the time to leave GUAM. Indeed, Hryshchenko paid the GUAM secretariat several 
visits between 2010 and 2012.  
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tool. As the previous chapters have shown, the economics ministry sees least 
benefits in the organisation. It will according to its mandate send officials to the 
GUAM meetings. However, the GUAM officials, who are eager to see GUAM 
progressing, doubt that the economics ministry would support new projects. Again 
they argue that they will employ their personal ties to ensure Ukraine’s 
participation in GUAM. 
These personal ties may even trigger interest in GUAM’s sectoral activities and 
allow state officials to exploit the activities more beneficially. Since 2008 the 
Ukrainian delegates to GUAM have preferred to directly interact with the individual 
ministries instead of interacting with Ukraine’s GUAM co-ordination hub. In the 
eyes of the interviewees their network to state officials which the delegates 
established during their career is a core source for triggering interest in GUAM’s 
activities. It is hoped that more interest in the sectoral activities will better embed 
GUAM in Ukraine’s foreign policy. Since 2011 the strongest ties exist to sections of 
the Security Service and the Ministry for Emergency Situations. These bodies are 
therefore envisioned as core partners for new GUAM projects. The Ukrainian 
delegate to GUAM pro-actively approaches acquaintances in these bodies and 
advertises GUAM as a framework in which projects can be implemented with 
external funding. Together with these colleagues they develop feasible projects for 
GUAM. This procedure thus fosters a commitment to GUAM in order to achieve 
outcomes that indeed support Ukraine’s security capacity. 
The examples given demonstrate that state officials in Ukraine possess enough 
scope to pursue participation in specific CIS and GUAM activities, if the Ukrainian 
leadership disregards the organisations. This leeway allows the departments to 
concentrate on strategic priorities. These are inter alia to send officials to the 
meetings simply to indicate the country’s interest, or to develop projects which 
primarily should add some substance to the organisation. In case the ministerial 
officials show interest in a specific sectoral activity such as the CIS FTA or GUAM 
security initiatives, the freedom of officials to lobby for these projects allows them 
to exploit the activities more substantially. However, as the following sub-section 
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will show, barriers in the horizontal co-ordination of the activities constrain their 
ability to derive optimal benefits from the organisations.  
8.2.1.2. HORIZONTAL CO-ORDINATION 
Three examples will illustrate the impact of the generally weak horizontal co-
ordination of Ukraine’s CIS and GUAM policy. A first example from GUAM will 
highlight that the power of individual departments to push through a project 
without involving the relevant ministries makes this project vulnerable to personnel 
changes in this department. The Trans-Danubian Energy and Transport Bridge 
described in chapter 1.5.3 highlights this. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated 
the development of this trade and energy related project. The necessary economic 
and energy expertise was primarily delivered by a governmental think-tank and 
selected departments of the energy ministry in Ukraine. However, an official 
recollects that the implementation of this project was weakly co-ordinated with 
core officials from the energy, transport and also the economics ministry. Hence, 
the project never gained strong support from the ministries that are primarily in 
charge of Ukraine’s energy and trade policy. As long as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs co-ordinated the implementation of the project, the interested officials from 
the energy ministry were able to promote their ideas in the project.54 When the 
ministry lost interest in GUAM with Tarasyuk’s resignation, the project fell into 
oblivion.55 Hence, on the one hand an individual ministerial department has the 
resources to start implementing a project without including the ministries that 
primarily deal with the matter under discussion. This helps to give the impression 
that an organisation like GUAM develops prosperous economic initiatives. This 
impression has, however, little chance of continuing if this department re-considers 
its strategy. The lack of co-ordination prevents the implementation of projects that 
more substantially reflect the interests of the sectoral ministries. 
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 The same happened to the GUAM free trade agenda. The idea to employ GUAM as a mean to 
facilitate Ukraine's adjustment to EU trade regulations bears the hallmark of the foreign ministry. 
The Ministry of Economics was barely consulted. Accordingly, the relevant officials from the 
economics ministry never took this idea into account. However, an official attends reliably the GUAM 
trade working groups. This shows that the foreign ministry has at least the power to make an official 
from another ministry attend the GUAM sectoral body, even though the ministry lacks interest in it. 
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However, even in cases where officials from a ministry intend to use CIS and GUAM 
activities to improve their daily work, it is not a given that they will be able to do so. 
A glance at the domestic co-ordination of security activities reveals that domestic 
bureaucratic barriers prevent interested officials from taking advantage of the 
opportunities provided by the organisations. The previous chapters argued that 
officials from the Ministry of Interior are indeed interested in the drug-trafficking 
related CIS and GUAM activities. They report being able to influence Ukraine’s 
contributions to the agenda of the CIS councils on drug-trafficking. But they can 
hardly influence who will be sent to the respective meetings. The decision is taken 
by the officials’ superiors usually without consulting the officials who have regularly 
attended the council.56 Often not always the most interested and most qualified 
individuals attend the meetings. This hampers the efforts of interested officials to 
optimally use the council meetings to inter alia strengthen personal ties with staff 
from the security agencies in CIS countries. Such ties are, however, relevant when 
the officials want to co-ordinate activities with the neighbouring countries, as the 
following statement indicates. The interviewees reveal that their ability to address 
other Ukrainian security agencies such as the Prosecutor’s Office or the Security 
Service is low. Strong contacts with these agencies are, however, necessary to 
transmit relevant information to other countries. According to one official, it is a 
lengthy process to submit a request to Interpol, since this can be done only via the 
Prosecutor’s Office. The time that it takes to get a high-level official from the 
Ministry of Interior to transmit the request to the Prosecutor’s Office and eventually 
receive an answer makes it inefficient to appeal to Interpol in minor cases.57 The 
officials therefore not only welcome direct ties to the security agencies abroad and 
the GUAM VLEC structures that directly exchange information with GUAM states. 
However, the Ukrainian branch of VLEC is incorporated into the Ukrainian Security 
Service. Therefore the interviewees from the Ministry of Interior have no direct 
access to VLEC. They do not even have sufficient information about VLEC 
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capacities.58 The interviewees argue that there is strong competition between the 
staff of the Ministry of Interior and the Security Service which complicates any 
interaction.59 Apparently, this competition creates strong barriers for officials from 
the ministry of interior to employ VLEC structures. Chapter 7.2.2 related that the 
Ukrainian delegate to GUAM received a request to use VLEC to establish a contact 
to security forces from Moldova. Even this delegate perceived it as too difficult to 
arrange this via the Ukrainian VLEC branch and instead set up the connection via 
the VLEC technology in the GUAM secretariat in Kyiv. This example highlights the 
barriers that exist between state bodies in Ukraine for co-ordinating their GUAM 
activities. The insufficient co-ordination of the policy priorities and activities with 
other relevant state bodies thus weakens the extent to which CIS and GUAM 
activities are optimally utilised.  
A final example will, however, show that the absence of comprehensive horizontal 
co-ordination may also support the viability of a project. The preceding section has 
indicated that officials from the Ministry of Economics managed to co-ordinate the 
CIS FTA negotiations relatively well with all potentially affected ministries.60 This 
ensured that the relevant structures could make the best of the negotiations and 
the agreement. However, the CIS FTA activities have been strikingly weakly co-
ordinated with the departments in charge of another strand of foreign trade policy, 
namely the departments that are involved in the negotiation of the EU Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Even in 2011, just six months 
before the CIS FTA was adopted, a leading representative from the department of 
the foreign ministry that is in charge of the foreign policy planning was not able to 
                                                          
58
 An official who investigates transnational crime stated that he had no direct contact with the SBU 
and, accordingly, did not have the chance to hear about VLEC. The other official asked after the 
interview, if I would pass some information on VLEC, if I were to get more details in the GUAM 
headquarter. (UA_MoI_3, UA_MoI_2) 
59
 All three officials from the Ministry of Interior relate to this phenomenon. One of them expressed 
the desire for stronger exchange in order to be able to intensify the operative capacities. The 
Security Service takes part in some CIS activities but does not report back on the results, which is 
unsatisfying. This is confirmed by an official from the foreign ministry. (UA_MFA_6)  
60
 These include, according to the statements of several interviewees, amongst other the legal and 
economic experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economics, the Customs Service 




give information about the FTA. The official was only informed about the DCFTA.61 
At the same time, the officials interviewed involved in the CIS FTA negotiations 
were not up-to-date regarding the DCFTA.62 This lack of co-ordination does not 
create substantial problems for the two negotiations. Both projects do not mutually 
interfere with one another, especially since the CIS FTA was never perceived as 
strongly legalised trade regulation tool. Two officials implicitly state that the low 
degree of co-ordination with departments in charge of the DCFTA negotiations 
rather contributed to the CIS FTA negotiations. They report the departments to be 
rather ignorant concerning the CIS and unsupportive with regard to the FTA. 
Interference from this side would have most likely generated difficulties in the CIS 
negotiation process.63 The next sub-section will highlight a more negative outcome 
of the missing horizontal co-ordination of the CIS FTA. 
8.2.1.3. CO-ORDINATION WITH THE PARLIAMENT 
The fact that the CIS FTA negotiations and the DCFTA negotiations were carried out 
in parallel prevented the CIS FTA from being constructively integrated into the 
public presentation of Ukraine’s foreign economic policy. The public rhetoric has 
since 2004 been dominated by a strong pro-EU orientation. During this period the 
CIS has often been depicted as contradictory to Ukraine’s EU ambitions. With 
Yanukovich the focus shifted in 2010 more towards Russia, but the new leadership 
has hardly undertaken measures to conciliate the EU and the CIS-oriented policy in 
public statements. In consequence, actors from the pro-EU camp in the government 
and parliament reacted with hostility to the adoption of the CIS FTA. They framed it 
as a contradiction to Ukraine’s EU policy. This debate jeopardised the ratification of 
the CIS FTA agreement in 2012.64 State officials argued that they intended to avoid a 
debate in parliament and in the public arena that would complicate the FTA 
negotiations. They therefore presented the CIS FTA in the Verkhovna Rada only 
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after the last round of negotiations.65 By doing so they, however, risked a rejection 
of the FTA by the parliament. This would have nullified some of the efforts put into 
the FTA negotiations. The example shows that the Verkhovna Rada is potentially a 
strong veto-player that makes it harder to participate in agreements for primarily 
instrumental purposes.  
This section detailed that instrumental participation is primarily facilitated by the 
fact that Ukraine’s policy towards the CIS and GUAM is often weakly co-ordinated 
with the main lines of Ukraine’s foreign policy, with ministries that formulate 
Ukraine’s policy in the individual issue areas and with the officials who attend the 
sectoral councils. Such an approach neglects the opportunities for Ukraine’s policy 
that lie in the sectoral activities. However, the same structures allow officials that 
are interested in the sectoral activities to nevertheless shape their policy within the 
CIS and GUAM in a beneficial way. The following sub-sections complete the picture 
of the constraints and opportunities for Ukraine’s officials by exploring why they 
prefer no or temporarily co-ordinated over permanently co-ordinated activities. 
8.2.2. ESTABLISHED TRADE PRACTICES  
This sub-section will give an overview of why state officials and private actors in 
Ukraine are eager to improve their trade policy with the former Soviet republics 
through the previously analysed instruments: selectively applicable multilateral 
trade agreements and intensified ties with trade related state bodies in the 
neighbourhood. It will argue that the core reason is the prevalence of protectionist 
measures in Ukraine and the post-Soviet neighbourhood. The fact that multilateral 
trade agreements are not a reliable legal tool induces state actors to resolve trade 
conflicts through bilateral negotiations and to use multilateral agreements 
selectively in these negotiations. It induces private economic actors to strive for 
direct contacts with officials in the trade-related ministries of the former Soviet 
republics.  
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For Ukraine’s ruling elite it is crucial to be able to flexibly impose economic 
protectionist measures. The current political and economic regime in Ukraine shows 
features of a liberal market democracy. But the ruling elite is, nevertheless, 
substantially dependent on the loyalty of big business actors. Political and business 
actors are mutually dependent. These relations tend to undermine the rule of law. 
In the early 1990s Ukraine’s rather authoritarian regime was strongly shaped by 
oligarchs who assumed political functions or substantially influenced the decisions 
of the government. In the early 2000s the capacity of the oligarchs to control 
political processes was weakened. Economic reforms led to more pluralism and 
replaced the predominant power of a single oligarch with competition between the 
oligarchs.66 With Viktor Yanukovich’s seizure of power analysts again observe a 
concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small group of 
oligarchs.67 It is therefore important for especially high-level politicians to ensure 
the loyalty of the oligarchs by shaping economic conditions in a way that is 
favourable to the oligarchs’ businesses. As discussed in chapter 5.1.2, many of these 
businesses, especially in the heavy and chemical industry, still rely on trade with 
Russia or other former Soviet republics. It is, accordingly, crucial for the Ukrainian 
leadership to maintain a good access to these sales markets. At the same time it 
needs to support the competitiveness of the big businesses. This is often done via 
protectionist measures such as suspending export deliveries due to domestic 
considerations. According to an official from the economics ministry, Ukraine avoids 
international legal commitments that efficiently constrain such unilateral measures 
but which often breach agreed trade arrangements. In this light also the WTO 
arbitrage mechanisms to which Ukraine had to commit when it became a member 
are problematic and require a strategy to be circumvented.68  
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Given this attitude, Ukrainian officials prefer to resolve trade conflicts with former 
Soviet republics exclusively in bilateral consultations. The necessary instruments for 
these consultations are primarily bilateral agreements, as well as multilateral 
agreements that are selectively employed according to the logic described in 
chapter 7.2. The idea is to avoid legal measures for the following reasons. It usually 
takes more time than consultations. Also, economically weaker partners will not 
necessarily comply with the verdict of an international arbitrage body, especially if 
they lack the economic capacity to do so and if the rule of law is in general weak in 
the country. In relations with powerful partners such as Russia appealing to such 
arbitrage bodies may lead to a confrontation that develops wider political 
implications.69 Since Ukraine strongly depends on imports and exports from the 
neighbourhood, the country needs a sophisticated tool box to protect against ad 
hoc protectionist measures in other former Soviet countries. Under these 
conditions it is rational to aim for multilateral agreements as additional 
instruments, but to avoid strong enforcement mechanisms.  
Due to the relevance of the CIS markets private economic actors from agriculture 
and heavy industry expressed their general interest in the new CIS FTA. The interest 
is limited, however, since they do not trust the FTA’s immediate effect for Ukrainian 
companies. They do not expect the agreement to become an instrument to which 
SMEs can effectively refer in conflict situations, since such intergovernmental 
agreements are weakly enforceable in the post-Soviet space. In addition, they argue 
that the existing bilateral agreements have actually already formally abolished trade 
barriers. Mainly technical barriers exist and are often newly raised according to the 
trade developments in the CIS countries.70 The SMEs do not credit the new 
multilateral FTA with the power to reduce these technical barriers and prevent the 
open and hidden protectionist measures that are frequently imposed. For reliable 
                                                                                                                                                                    
case. This often leaves Ukraine enough time to continue with the economic practice in focus as long 
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access to CIS markets on stable trade conditions good contacts to state officials in 
Ukraine and the CIS countries are more promising. Some SMEs have already 
problems gaining access to the relevant governmental structures in Ukraine, since 
there are only a few formalised channels for it.71 Hence, for the time being the 
SMEs seek better channels to influential players in the government and the business 
community in Ukraine and the former Soviet republics rather than multilateral 
legalised agreements. Accordingly, the Ukrainian private business actors who 
attended the GUAM economic council responded rather positively to the suggestion 
to introduce an FTA committee. The committee is welcome if it is capable of 
establishing direct contacts with the officials responsible in the GUAM states in case 
a business intends to export to the country. They primarily demand the 
appointment of a contact person in the GUAM secretariat to whom SMEs can 
appeal if they need support in brokering a trade deal. This requires that the GUAM 
secretariat have strong trust-based ties to the ruling elites in the GUAM countries.72 
Both state and private actors, hence, prefer bilateral and non-legalised instruments 
in the trade relations with the former Soviet republics.  
8.2.3. ESTABLISHED PRACTICES AGAINST DRUG-TRAFFICKING 
The analysis practices to handle drug-trafficking will highlight that Ukrainian officials 
perceive it as necessary to improve the opportunities to co-ordinate their 
investigative and operative policies with the neighbouring countries. This priority 
originates in the fact that preventing and eliminating drug-trafficking in the long-
term perspective is part of their agenda against drug-trafficking. It has already been 
mentioned in chapter 5.2.1.2 that the officials interviewed perceive drug-trafficking 
as a phenomenon that potentially affects global, regional and domestic security. 
The most problematic aspect is, in their eyes, the transit of drugs through Ukraine. 
This transit may destabilise other drug-consuming societies and fuel international 
crime. Accordingly, it is their duty not only to protect the domestic society but to 
fight against drug-transit. Acting only against drug-trafficking when it relates to 
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activities within Ukraine’s borders is not satisfactory. The idea is to derail the entire 
trafficking network rather than only detaining selected individuals involved. Ukraine 
lacks the technical and legal capacities to do so independently. The officials are 
therefore eager to intensify interaction with the corresponding security structures 
in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. 
The interviewees see the following three deficits in interaction with former Soviet 
republics. First, it is hard to gain information regarding who is responsible for 
concrete tasks in a state security organisation. Most former Soviet republics, 
including Ukraine, do not publish an internal structure of such state bodies or the 
contact details of the staff members. This lack of information forces Ukrainian 
officials to rely entirely on the readiness of the central contact in this agency to 
indeed transfer a request to the individual responsible. The often prevailing 
bureaucratic inertia in these agencies decreases the likeliness of a timely and 
efficient information exchange.73 The exchange of information is, secondly, 
hampered by the fact that the national security agencies conceal internally gained 
information. An international expert who works on security co-operation with the 
former Soviet republics described this attitude as ‘old Soviet style’.74 The main 
problem is the diverging benchmarks for classifying information as confidential and 
top-secret. In many former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan, information is 
said to be top-secret and therefore not exchangeable which in Ukraine would 
simply be confidential.75 The third obstacle are the bureaucratic barriers described 
in chapter 8.2.1 that stand between Ukraine and its neighbours. They make it 
difficult to involve the security agencies in the neighbourhood in the detention of 
criminals if these operate outside of Ukraine’s borders. 
Shared legalised regulations would, according to the officials, not mitigate these 
problems. They see particularly the security related legislation as an exclusively 
domestic matter and do not expect any former Soviet republic to harmonise 
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legislation with its neighbours.76 To lower bureaucratic barriers and stimulate the 
smooth exchange of information Ukrainian officials aim to create trust. This is done 
by the instrument identified in chapter 7.2: personalised transnational networks to 
actors from the state security bodies in the neighbourhood. Hence, personalised 
networks qualify as a permanent mechanism that can be activated for the 
temporary co-ordination of investigations and detentions.  
8.2.4. CONCLUSION 
The previous analysis has revealed that the interplay of three factors defines how 
state officials in Ukraine make use of CIS and GUAM sectoral activities. Economic 
dependence on other former Soviet republics and the prevailing protectionism in 
Ukraine and its neighbourhood shape the attractiveness of multilateral agreements. 
Such agreements are a welcome tool if they can be selectively applied. But strongly 
legalised and enforceable agreements would rather harm the incumbent regime. 
Ukrainian officials strive to co-ordinate the fight against transnational criminal flows 
such as drug-trafficking with the post-Soviet neighbours. However, regulating such 
co-ordination permanently via multilateral agreements would contradict Ukraine’s 
and the other CIS states’ understanding of sovereignty. Given that in most of its 
neighbouring states the rule of law is weakly applied, legal instruments, especially 
international law, has limited power anyway. Trust-based personalised networks 
are therefore more efficient. The degree to which these tools can be achieved 
within the CIS and GUAM depends on the scope of the interested officials to 
influence domestic policy vis-à-vis the organisations. Weak co-ordination with the 
superiors and with other relevant state bodies often limits their capacity to realise 
the priorities. The possibility to loosely co-ordinate a policy with other foreign policy 
strands paves the way for endeavours that aim at achievements detached from the 
declared aims of a given project. 
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This chapter intended to explain why policy-makers in Azerbaijan and Ukraine 
conceptualise the function of the CIS and GUAM as the introduction to this chapter 
described it. Three questions were foregrounded. First, how do both states manage 
to intensively participate in activities which declare aims that do not comply with 
the states’ intentions? This practice, which the thesis called instrumental 
participation, is the basis for exploiting CIS and GUAM activities for alternative 
purposes. It is therefore crucial to understand how the ruling elite manages 
instrumental participation without triggering conflicts with domestic societal actors. 
The second question posed, namely concerning the reasons as to why some policy-
makers are not able to take optimal advantage of the sectoral activities. Finally, the 
chapter investigated why the states avoid permanently co-ordinated activities. 
The origins of these approaches to the CIS and GUAM are rooted in two dimensions 
of the political regimes in Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Patterns in which the ruling elite 
co-ordinates CIS and GUAM policy explain the first two questions. In both countries 
primarily low-level ministerial experts develop an agenda for employing the sectoral 
activities for the domestic approach to issues in these sectors. In Azerbaijan high-
level officials have the power to instruct their subordinates to pursue Azerbaijan’s 
intensive engagement in the organisations’ activities without involving these 
executing officials in the decision-making process. Accordingly, the experts do not 
have the chance to influence the state’s CIS and GUAM policy. Azerbaijan’s ruling 
elite is assertive enough to ensure that its top-down model of rule is not questioned 
by less powerful ministerial employees. Ukraine’s instrumental CIS and GUAM 
participation rests in the ruling elites' weak capability to formulate and implement 
foreign policy in a top-down manner. Powerful state officials have the scope to 
circumvent formal hierarchies in policy-making by avoiding co-ordinating a policy 
with them. Another possibility is to influence them by activating personal networks. 
This gives some state officials leeway to pursue activities that appear, according to 
their declared aims, not to comply with Ukraine’s foreign policy priorities and 
produce seemingly little results. At the same time, the often weak co-ordination 
between state officials in varying hierarchical positions and with other state bodies 
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decreases the possibility for an official to exploit the CIS and GUAM activities 
optimally.  
The domestic political regimes in Azerbaijan and Ukraine strongly diverge, but 
similar characteristics induce the state actors to prefer temporarily co-ordinated 
activities. The ruling elites need to be able to flexibly impose measures to protect 
the country’s economic actors in international trade. The regime in Azerbaijan with 
its strong informal institutions and loyalty based on personalised relations and 
economic or power rewards is far more dependent on this ability. It, however, also 
plays a role in Ukraine. The relevance of protectionism motivates policy-makers to 
use multilateral legalised agreements only indirectly and selectively, and to reject 
transforming them into legalised institutions. Due to a similar logic neither 
Azerbaijan nor Ukraine wants to be bound by multilateral legalised institutions in 
security matters. In authoritarian Azerbaijan it is feasible to fight against security 
challenges only in Azerbaijan and to neglect the wider regional dimension. Pluralist 
Ukraine cares more about the regional dimension of the phenomenon and is ready 
to co-ordinate its policy with its neighbours. The better instruments for intensifying 
co-ordination between states that weakly apply the rule of law are informal 
personalised relations instead of legalised agreements. In Azerbaijan non-elite 
societal actors hardly have the power to press the ruling elite to activate regional 
co-ordination. Their impact is higher in Ukraine. Especially in the field of trade, 
private actors also demand that the regional organisations in the post-Soviet space 
shift the focus from multilateral legalised agreements to establishing direct contacts 
with state and business structures in the neighbourhood.  
The chapter revealed similarities in the impact of the authoritarian regime in 
Azerbaijan and the pluralist regime in Ukraine on the country’s conceptualisation of 
the CIS and GUAM. A pluralist society in which a wider range of societal actors 
influence policy-making is, hence, not necessarily more capable of extensively co-
ordinating its policy with other regional players.77 Azerbaijan's efficient top-down 
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approach towards foreign policy-making and  the ability of policy-makers' to pursue 
policies that deviate from the grand strategy due to the fact that the policy-making 
process is not efficiently controlled top-down explain the similarities. To understand 
how a political regime shapes a state’s conceptualisation of a regional organisation 
it is therefore necessary not to refer to the categories authoritarian and democratic, 
but to investigate the state’s domestic policy co-ordination and the de facto 
influence and preferences of societal actors according to the prevailing state-society 
relations. It is important to consider not only the domestic political regime but also 




9. CONCLUSION: A POST-SOVIET VARIETY OF REGIONALISM 
To round off the analysis this chapter draws together the theoretical discussion 
and empirical findings. It will establish the link between the explorative study 
undertaken and the debates on regionalism in the post-Soviet space and beyond. 
This is done in the manner of Grounded Theory methodology by first clarifying 
the findings for the previously empirical study. Then some hypotheses will be 
deduced from the case studies that propose a focus for studying regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space and beyond. By doing so the thesis 
acknowledges that the results are not generalisable to a broader case universe. 
With the hypotheses that are grounded in empirical data the thesis nevertheless 
intends to contribute to the theoretical and empirical debates on regionalism. 
They offer theoretical considerations the validity of which can be explored in 
future research. The chapter will proceed in four steps.  
The first section will specify how the empirical findings are reflected in the 
framework that chapter 3.5. It will then deduce some hypotheses from the case 
studies that propose how different political regimes imply varying 
conceptualisations of regionalism. A second section will clarify what the thesis 
can add to the existing literature on regionalism in a post-Soviet and comparative 
perspective. The discussion concentrates on the nexus between regionalism and 
political regimes. Section three will discuss how the findings may inform policy 
debates on the implications of regional organisations for the post-Soviet space 
but also for global developments of regionalism. The last section will critically 
reflect on the future research that is needed to enhance the validity of the 
research findings. 
As the literature review specified, this thesis is primarily interested in the 
question of how regional organisations in the post-Soviet space align with the 
diverse conceptualisations of regional organisations that exist in the world. The 
research also intended to contribute to the comparative regionalism literature by 
substantiating the nexus between political regimes and varieties of regionalism. 
Therefore, the presented study has, first, explored how policy-makers in a hybrid 
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regime with characteristics of authoritarianism and a hybrid regime with strong 
political pluralism conceptualise the function of two regional organisations. 
Second, it has shed light on the impact of political regime features on the 
identified conceptualisation. The research findings support the argument that 
the cases studied in the post-Soviet space add new variety to the concepts of 
regional organisations.  It is not the organisational structure and the types of 
activities which are new. These are well-known from inter alia Western European 
organisations. New is their function. The member states studied have altered the 
function of these activities according to the needs of their domestic political 
regimes. In some regards the former Soviet republics re-interpret the function of 
the regional organisations in a way known from regional organisations beyond 
Europe and Northern America. In other regards the post-Soviet conceptualisation 
appears to be unique. The theoretically oriented in-depth analysis has generated 
some new insights which cannot be considered to hold true for other cases. They 
can, however, serve as orientation in terms of where to focus when studying the 
function of a regional organisation. The findings imply that it is important to 
investigate the notions and practices of regime survival that exist in the varying 
political regimes. These determine which aims a state pursues and how it does 
so. Another relevant aspect is the co-ordination of policy-making. It influences 
how ruling elites manage pursuing a policy in these organisations that complies 
with their specific conceptualisation of regional organisations. The following 
section will detail these findings through a discussion of the analytical 
implications of the empirical research.  
9.1. EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL FINDINGS 
The endeavour of the PhD research presented here has been to gain additional 
knowledge about the function of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. 
The review of empirical and theoretical literature in chapter 2 and 3 has 
concluded that the existing deliberations do not convincingly explain the regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space. The thesis has therefore adopted an 
inductive strategy. It has studied the policy of Azerbaijan and Ukraine in the CIS 
and GUAM to highlight how the policy-makers in these states conceptualise 
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these organisations and why they do so. The findings pose the question of how 
the specifics which manifest themselves in the post-Soviet space vary from what 
the literature depicts as characteristic for regionalism in other areas of the world. 
This question can be answered more precisely if the empirical findings for 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine are translated into abstract terms. With regard to the 
comparative regionalism debate the research results also ask if there are other 
states with similar characteristics that have developed a grasp of regional 
organisations. The interpretivist approach adopted by this thesis dismisses 
generalisations of empirical findings. The thesis can, thus, not answer this 
question. It has, however, developed findings which have not yet been 
considered to this extent in the debate. As contribution to the empirical and 
theoretical discussion the thesis therefore develops an analytical model from the 
empirical cases which can be used for further empirical studies.1 Evidences from 
other cases will either strengthen or weaken the plausibility of the hypotheses. 
The following sections will show that the research findings can contribute to 
systematise the study of varying functions of regional organisations.   
 The findings imply two aspects to give insights of the expected function: the 
goals actors pursue and the activities they prefer to employ for achieving these 
goals. It can be hypothesised that both the aims and the preferred activities 
depend on the state’s domestic background, against which the ruling elites 
formulate and implement foreign policy. The next paragraphs will pinpoint the 
analysed function of the regional organisations and its domestic origins in the 
following steps. They will first express in abstract terms how Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine define the aims and preferred activities they pursue in regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space according to their domestic political 
regime. A final subsection will take another step of abstraction and formulate the 
findings in a parsimonious way that facilitates their enhancement or testing in 
future studies. 
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9.1.1. AIMS AND DOMESTIC ORIGINS 
Two empirical observations inspired the thesis to distinguish two categories of 
policy goals: ultimate and intermediary goals. Ultimate goals describe in our case 
what the states generally hope to achieve through the regional organisations. 
Intermediary goals are the means or steps by which the states intend to 
approach the ultimate aims. This differentiation originated in the following. First, 
Azerbaijan’s and Ukraine’s foreign policy rhetoric invokes self-reliance and 
independence. It objects to integration in the post-Soviet space. At the same 
time, the states engage in activities that purport to indicate interest in some 
degree of integration, but they do not employ them to this end. Hence, the 
declared policy aims of Azerbaijan and Ukraine and their commitment to 
activities, which are declared to serve integration, do, at first glance, not point in 
the same direction. Instead the states appear to waver between non-integration 
and potentially integrative activities. Differentiating between the ultimate and 
intermediary goals permits to explain how the participation in integration-
oriented CIS and GUAM activities is in line with the rejection of integration.  
In order to grasp the ultimate goals the analysis turned to the notions of 
sovereignty which determine policy-making. The decision was, as stated in 
chapter 3.3.7, inspired by the interview narratives and authors who argue that a 
state’s reluctance to surrender sovereignty is a crucial intervening variable in the 
conceptualisation of regionalism.2 The study employed Krasner’s three notions of 
sovereignty. He argues that states in a globalised world consider the strength of 
their domestic, Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty when making 
foreign policy choices. This disaggregation of sovereignty concerns helped to 
disentangle what sovereignty notions predominate in the case countries. Some 
characteristics of the post-Soviet situation in Azerbaijan and Ukraine give insights 
into core sovereignty concerns. The ruling elites have only recently, namely with 
the states’ independence in 1991, gained the chance to establish Westphalian 
sovereignty. They have to consolidate their ability to exert authority, hence their 
domestic sovereignty, according to the domestically established political 
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regimes. As with all states in this era of globalisation, they also face challenging 
cross-border flows that are difficult to control. These flows require strong 
control, and hence strong interdependence sovereignty. 
As the study revealed, the ruling elites in Azerbaijan and Ukraine prioritise the 
three notions of sovereignty as follows. The primary ambition of the leadership 
in Azerbaijan and Ukraine is to consolidate the domestic sovereignty. To this end 
both states concentrate on achieving uncompromised Westphalian sovereignty. 
Uncompromised Westphalian sovereignty helps consolidate their domestic 
sovereignty due to two factors. First, remaining interdependencies between the 
newly independent states create undesired channels for external interference 
into domestic affairs. Secondly, the hybrid regimes are vulnerable to external 
interference, since the leadership is strongly accountable to selected powerful 
domestic economic and political players. The ruling elites have to primarily serve 
the vested interests of these domestic players. Committing to regional 
institutions that grant external players a say in the domestic and foreign policy 
might challenge the ruling elites' capacity to do so.3  
The prioritisation of interdependence sovereignty varies in Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s ruling elite perceives its domestic sovereignty as only 
weakly dependent on trade and other societal flows between Azerbaijan and the 
other former Soviet republics. In addition, the ruling elite faces little pressure to 
improve their way to cope with transnational flows from elites and other societal 
actors. It is therefore not interested in further strengthening its interdependence 
sovereignty. Ukrainian policy-makers assess Ukraine’s ability to independently 
settle transnational challenges as weak and deem it necessary to protect the 
domestic and international society from harmful transnational flows. Ukrainian 
society is perceived to be more reliant upon other former Soviet republics in its 
economic welfare and security. Therefore Ukrainian officials also intend to 
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strengthen the interdependence sovereignty through the regional organisations. 
This aspect, nevertheless, ranks last among Ukraine’s priorities. Figure 12 
visualises the sovereignty priorities of Azerbaijan and Ukraine. 
Figure 12: Ranking of Sovereignty Priorities Pursued in Regional Organisations 
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The priority-setting described informs the intermediary goals, that is the aims 
pursued in the various sectoral activities of the regional organisations. The 
ambition to improve the sovereignty concern which is most important for regime 
survival guides the ruling elites' interpretation of the aims of established 
activities in the organisations. In our case it is the domestic and Westphalian 
sovereignty. The specific post-Soviet environment, which as outlined in chapter 5 
is characterised by persisting perilous dependencies as well as productive 
interdependencies, and the international promotion of regionalism prompt the 
two former Soviet republics to pursue the following three intermediary goals. 
The first is to enhance the states’ capacity to independently cope with domestic 
and regional challenges. A second intention is to improve the states’ regional and 
international leverage. The final ambition is sub-ordinated to the others, namely 
the effort to maintain the organisations as a vehicle for promoting the first two 
intermediary goals. The next paragraph will spell out how the state officials in 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine link the identified intermediary and ultimate goals. 
The above mentioned aim to gain stronger capacities on the part of domestic 
policy-makers to unilaterally handle challenges linked to the neighbourhood has 
the following implications. Strong state capacities reduce interdependencies 
from the neighbouring states and consolidate Westphalian sovereignty as 
examples from the security and trade sector show. Efficient national security 
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forces diminish the necessity of co-operating permanently with the neighbouring 
countries and decrease dependencies on the others’ security policy. In the field 
of trade it is helpful to improve the chances for favourable bilateral trade 
negotiations. This helps manage productive economic interdependencies. It also 
weakens the preponderant weight of some core trade partners like Russia, may 
result in better trade conditions and, hence, reduces dependence. Both 
measures stabilise domestic sovereignty by improving the states’ economic 
situation without compromising Westphalian sovereignty. The, as above 
mentioned, envisioned improved regional and international leverage supports 
the states’ ability to make their weight felt vis-à-vis powerful regional players, 
such as Russia. It diminishes their vulnerability to interference by the neighbours. 
The third intention, to keep the regional organisations alive, is a necessary 
condition for achieving the previously mentioned aims. First, the opportunities 
for strengthened capacities and international leverage emerge from the 
multilateral interaction in these organisations. Secondly, states that commit de 
facto or allegedly to regional organisations gain international credibility, since 
international players like the UN, the US or the EU diffuse the idea of regionalism 
internationally as best practice. The higher a state’s international credibility, the 
stronger its scope to advance domestic and regional matters internationally and 
to diminish the power of regional opponents. Figure 13 visualises the 
relationship between the ultimate and intermediary goals. 
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9.1.2. PREFERRED ACTIVITIES AND DOMESTIC ORIGINS 
The CIS and GUAM have not established unique forms of activities but draw on 
the repertoire of most regional organisations: bureaucratic procedures, 
multilateral negotiations, intergovernmental agreements and co-ordinated 
activities. But Azerbaijan and Ukraine define the expected function of these 
instruments in a specific way that is distinct from, for instance, European 
concepts. The analysis identified a number of mechanisms with which policy-
makers in Ukraine and Azerbaijan expect to pursue their intermediary goals 
through these activities. Characteristic of these mechanisms is that they require 
the states to co-ordinate their activities with other member states to varying 
degrees. The activities can be clustered into the following two groups of activities 
with varying degrees of co-ordination.  
The first cluster includes activities that require no multilateral co-ordination. 
Such activities are to follow bureaucratic procedures and to participate in 
councils. The support of bureaucratic practices includes the response to requests 
from the organisations and suggestions for a joint agenda. Supporting these 
practices enables the states to keep both membership and the organisation as 
such alive without intensive multilateral interaction. Such activities rely on the 
state’s individual decision to contribute and do not require any a priori 
multilateral co-ordination. The same applies to participation in council meetings. 
Attending council meetings enables delegates to monitor developments in the 
neighbourhood states. Such monitoring does not require multilateral co-
ordination. The intelligence gained may inform the domestic policy of Azerbaijan 
and Ukraine. 
The second cluster covers activities that rest on temporary multilateral co-
ordination; a degree of intensity that is still acceptable to both Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. Such activities are attempts to influence the negotiation of agreements 
with the support of other member states. This support can be enlisted in the 
negotiations without prior arrangements, but may also be directly steered 
through temporary coalitions. Another option is to co-ordinate activities in joint 
operations. In these activities the delegates try to co-ordinate the expression of 
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their preferences with other states in order to influence an agreement or an 
operation in line with the domestic interests of their respective states. They use 
the multilateral environment to increase their leverage vis-à-vis powerful 
counterparts by the support of other states. They promote a joint agenda vis-à-
vis international actors in order to gain more ideational or material support from 
these actors. But the states do not commit to any permanent form of co-
ordination. It is noteworthy that the co-ordination refers to the negotiations in 
the multilateral context only. Neither Azerbaijan nor Ukraine intends to co-
ordinate their domestic policy in the discussed matters with the other member 
states. The states agree, for instance, to co-ordinate their negotiation position 
with other states but not to co-ordinate their policy according to the negotiated 
agreements. 
Only some Ukrainian officials strive to establish permanent mechanisms that 
allow the co-ordination of Ukraine’s trade and security policy temporarily with 
other former Soviet republics. They intend to activate these permanent 
mechanisms in selected cases only. The co-ordination thus remains temporary. 
Such commitment has been observed in the trade and security matters. In the 
field of trade Ukraine has ratified the CIS FTA, which potentially requires co-
ordination in its implementation. Ratification permits, for example, state officials 
to appeal to other signatories’ for support in urging another state to act 
according to certain FTA provisions. To continue to multilaterally negotiate the 
FTA’s implementation is also crucial in order to underscore the credibility of the 
agreement. Only if the agreement is tangible Ukraine can employ it as a strong 
tool in the negotiation of bilateral trade deals or conflicts. This multilateral co-
ordination is, however, not permanent, since Ukraine employs the FTA primarily 
to improve its bilateral trade policy. The intention is not to comprehensively 
subordinate Ukraine’s trade with the neighbourhood to this multilateral 
agreement. Ukraine ensured that the domestic impact of the FTA remained 
limited by not committing to any strong monitoring mechanisms. In the security 
sphere, Ukrainian officials aim to establish a permanent network to officials from 
the security forces in the neighbouring states. The idea is to temporarily activate 
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this network, if a domestic investigation or operation requires operative support 
from the neighbouring countries.  
The fact that the ruling elites prefer less intensive multilateral co-ordination 
roots in at least three factors of the domestic political regimes. First, as 
mentioned above, the ruling elites especially in Azerbaijan are strongly 
accountable to powerful political and economic elites in the state apparatus and 
beyond. Accordingly, the policy hardly follows the formally defined rules, but is 
characterised by non-formalised power relations. This undermines formal 
domestic and international rules. It weakens the application of the rule of law. 
Similar processes are in place in Ukraine, though the rule of law and formal 
policy-making procedures are stronger. Under these circumstances any official 
who intends to co-operate with the neighbourhood on a long-term basis would 
prefer a form that does not imply permanent co-ordination as would be the case 
with multilateral legalised institutions. Transnational personalised networks are 
more helpful. Secondly, it is crucial how strongly state officials from the lower 
expert levels can influence the policy. High-level officials who are part of or 
closer to the centre of the ruling elite tend to avoid any co-ordinated activities. 
According to the logic of regime survival they do not at all consider co-ordination 
with external players as helpful. Low-level officials, in contrast, primarily aim at 
fulfilling their assignment defined by their superiors. They may recognise the 
potential that rests with co-operative approaches to fulfilling their duty. The 
degree to which these officials may realise their co-operative ambitions strongly 
depends on their power to influence policy formulation. In authoritarian 
Azerbaijan the scope to do so is narrow since the ruling elite is able to put across 
its policy in a top-down fashion. In Ukraine, the domestic policy-making is weakly 
co-ordinated and low-level officials have more influence on the policy 
formulation. Accordingly, these actors can better pursue activities that require a 
temporary policy co-ordination beyond the GUAM and CIS councils. It is 
noteworthy that not only the domestic political regime but also the political 
regimes of the other member states’ play a role. The empirical findings showed 
that the states conceptualise the organisations as a tool to improve the states’ 
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sovereignty in the interplay with the other members. They consider patterns 
according to which other member states commonly act when defining the goals 
and preferred activities in regional organisations. Most relevant is the prevalence 
of authoritarianism and informal practices in the politics of many former Soviet 
republics. 
9.1.3. A MODEL FOR ANALYSING CONCEPTS OF REGIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
Based on the previous deliberations on the cases of Azerbaijan and Ukraine this 
section can formulate more abstract hypotheses. The thesis argues that these 
hypotheses are valid for the cases studied. The empirical findings are further 
abstracted to introduce them to the theoretical debate. How strong their validity 
is beyond the case sample needs to be examined in additional studies. In focus 
are hypotheses that propose how political regime characteristics influence the 
conceptualisation of the function of regional organisations. The hypotheses are 
visualised in the matrix below (Figure 14). The thesis consulted the empirical 
findings about the hybrid regime with authoritarian face in Azerbaijan and the 
hybrid but strongly pluralistic regime in Ukraine. In order to add insights of the 
most researched cases, namely the conceptualisation of regional organisations 
by democracies, the matrix includes assumptions of the old regionalism. The 
matrix does not reproduce the above outlined ultimate and intermediary goals 
and the preferred activities, since these are specific for the post-Soviet space. 
Instead it concentrates on three categories that more generally inform the 
regimes’ conceptualisation of the regional organisations. The matrix seeks to 
indicate under which conditions states tend to commit to multilateral 
interactions of different intensities. The influencing factors are linked to political 
regime types. To provide a more precise analytical focus they concentrate, 
however, on specific elements of these political regimes. The first category is 
how the regimes prioritise the three notions of sovereignty: domestic, 
Westphalian and interdependence sovereignty. The second category refers to 
domestic policy-making practices. It varies between top-down and integrative 
approaches. Integrative approaches build on the bottom-up accumulation of 
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preferences, as is ideal-typically characteristic for democracies.4 The third 
category is the application of the rule of law, which is assumed to be strong in 
democracies and weak in authoritarian states and also in hybrid regimes as 
section 3.4.3 has outlined.  Reading the matrix leads to three hypotheses.  
1) States which prioritise the protection of their Westphalian sovereignty 
over enhanced interdependence sovereignty aim for low intensity in their 
multilateral interactions, which rests exclusively on non-co-ordinated or 
temporarily co-ordinated activities. Strong top-down policy-making 
reduces the likelihood of a turn towards co-ordinated activities. Weak 
rule of law in these states decreases the attractiveness of permanently 
co-ordinated activities.  
2) If the policy-making allows sufficient leeway for bottom-up influences 
states which prioritise the protection of their Westphalian sovereignty 
over enhanced interdependence sovereignty tend towards long-term but 
not permanently co-ordinated multilateral interactions. Weak rule of law 
in these states decreases the attractiveness of permanently co-ordinated 
activities. 
3) States which are ready to compromise their Westphalian sovereignty for 
the sake of interdependence sovereignty and have an integrative 
approach to foreign policy-making and strong rule of law, tend to opt for 
intensive permanently multilaterally co-ordinated activities.  
These hypotheses intend to stimulate the research focus of studies on regional 
organisations in areas of the world in which different political regime types 
dominate. In order to investigate intermediary goals, preferred activities and 
underlying rationales of states that fit into the first and second hypothesis, 
future research may consult the more detailed findings for Azerbaijan and 
Ukraine. These have been detailed above and are visualised in Figure 2. 
                                                          
4
 This assumption builds on the general concept of legalised bureaucratic rule. Authors like 
Graham Allison incorporated in the institutionalist approaches of foreign policy-making. See: 
Weber, Economy and Society, 215; Allison, Graham T and Philip Zelikow (1999), Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Longman. 
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Figure 14: Domestic Factors and Preferred Intensity of Interaction 
Priorised notion of 
sovereignty 
Application of rule of 
law






























9.2. CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
With the summarised research results the thesis intends to contribute to area-
specific and comparative regionalism research. The research is driven by the 
ambition to provide additional knowledge about the varieties of regionalism with 
an analysis of regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. Another aim was to 
contribute to the debate on the domestic conditions that foster the varying 
conceptualisations of regional organisations. This sub-section will now clarify 
whether and how the thesis kept these promises. It will proceed in two steps: 
firstly the section will discuss additional insights concerning varying outcomes of 
regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and beyond. Secondly, it will 
discuss how the findings enhance knowledge about the impact of political regime 
characteristics on regionalism.  
9.2.1. FUNCTION OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE POST-SOVIET 
SPACE 
In chapter 2.4 the study promised to enhance the literature on regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space by changing the analytical perspective. The 
analysis deflected the focus from the organisations’ failure to produce 
integration which most articles have thus far discussed. The presented study 
asked instead what function the member states expect the organisations to 
assume. It was hoped that this would explain why most member states do not 
stop participating in organisations like the CIS and GUAM. The research question 
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chosen has, as argued in chapter 2.3, so far hardly triggered the attention of 
scholars who work on the post-Soviet space. Therefore the thesis consulted 
literature on regional organisations in Asia and South America for guidance. 
These studies advised to reconsider factors that the old regionalism literature 
has identified as obstacles to integration. The factors might not be weaknesses 
but rather constitutive features of the regional organisations that contribute to 
the viability of the organisations. The discussion includes the hollowness of 
multilateral agreements or the states’ unwillingness to cede sovereignty.5 
Indeed, the function of the organisations comes into sharper relief when using 
the factors mentioned as a yardstick of the analysis. 
The theoretically informed but strongly inductively driven case studies have 
unveiled a number of functions that have so far not been reflected in the 
literature.  The findings permit the argument that organisations like the CIS and 
GUAM are relatively robust, since they offer a variety of benefits for the 
members’ domestic and foreign policy. The preceding section has already given a 
full account of the organisations’ perceived function and its origins. This sub-
section will therefore present only three aspects that underscore where the 
findings may most significantly add to the debate. First of all, the findings show 
that primacy of the states’ eagerness to consolidate their Westphalian 
sovereignty does not detract from interest in the regional organisations.6 
According to policy-makers in the case countries, the CIS and GUAM help 
consolidate domestic and Westphalian sovereignty. The organisations offer a 
variety of activities which the members can exploit to this end. These include 
ideational effects such as an improved regional and international reputation. This 
permits the states to develop their policies more independently from the 
regional hegemon Russia. The sectoral activities also generate new instruments 
such as agreements, technology and enhanced knowledge. The instruments help 
the ruling elites to independently protect themselves against external 
interferences and challenges to their domestic authority.  
                                                          
5
 Carranza, Can Mercosur Survive? Domestic and International Constraints on Mercosur, 77; 
Nesadurai, Globalisation, Domestic Politics and Regionalism, 40. Dent, Taiwan and the New 
Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 388. 
6
 As assumed inter alia by Sakwa, The CIS: Conflicts of Space and Time. 
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Secondly, the results highlight that participating in the negotiation of multilateral 
legalised rules is not a merely communicative act or an action without purpose.7 
The results indicate that the member states benefit from such negotiations even 
without being interested in implementing the resulting agreement. The 
agreement may instead be an instrument for influencing the other members’ 
domestic legislation. States can, for example, take the negotiations as occasion 
to diffuse their domestic legislation as a model law in the region. They also can 
benefit from the fact that partner states which are more powerful when it comes 
to bilateral negotiations may be ready to make concessions in the multilateral 
agreement. In this case, the states sign and selectively implement the 
multilateral agreement. Alternatively they refer to the provisions agreed as 
model law in future bilateral negotiations without being a party to the 
agreement.  
Thirdly, it became evident that the states take advantage of the organisations’ 
multilateral environment even though they are not interested in multilateralism 
and shape relations with their neighbours predominantly bilaterally.8 The 
multilateral constellation provides the necessary knowledge about developments 
in the region. It reduces the costs that influencing core developments in the 
region would imply when undertaken merely bilaterally. It allows a country to 
increase its leverage vis-à-vis core partners from the region by forming 
temporary coalitions. The last mentioned aspect complies with the neo-realist 
idea of power-balancing. The thesis agrees with the authors who see this as a 
core aim in the CIS and GUAM. The existing literature often plays down the 
opportunities for doing so to gaining membership in an organisation or to benefit 
from bilateral incentives given by a regional hegemon when agreeing to further 
                                                          
7
 The interpretation of inter alias the following authors goes in this direction: Moroney and 
Konoplyov, Ukraine, GUUAM, and Western Support for Subregional Cooperation in Europe's 
Gray Zone, 180; Willerton and Beznosov, Russia's Pursuit of its Eurasian Security Interests: 
Weighing the CIS and Alternative Bilateral-Multilateral Arrangements, 50; Libman, 
Regionalisation and Regionalism in the Post-Soviet Space: Current Status and Implications for 
Institutional Development, 416. 
8
 The lack of multilateralism has inter alia been observed by Cooper, Russia’s Trade Relations 
within the Commonwealth of Independent States, 179; Willerton and Beznosov, Russia's Pursuit 




develop the organisation.9 The findings, however, revealed that the mechanism 
also determines more substantial interactions. Finally, as the last three 
statements indicated the organisations are more than talking shops or 
presidential clubs.10 They produce tangible results even if these do not comply 
with the declared aims of the organisations. It needs, however, to be admitted 
that especially Ukraine cannot take full advantage of the opportunities provided 
by the CIS and GUAM. The following paragraphs will discuss what makes the 
findings insightful for the study of comparative regionalism.  
9.2.2. GLOBAL VARIETIES OF REGIONALISM 
The ambition to also contribute to the comparative regionalism research agenda 
builds on the call to improve knowledge about the functionality of regional 
organisations in different areas of the world.11 Hardly any empirical study on 
regional organisations has so far informed this debate. The empirical study 
undertaken encourages the depiction of the post-Soviet space as yet another 
work area where states emulate the European model of regional organisations, 
but do not aim to integrate into multilateral legalised institutions. This 
observation strengthens the argument that integration is rather the exception 
than the rule in regional organisations. 
The insights gained in this thesis provide constraints for the following 
assumption of the new regionalism. Authors of new regionalism have argued 
that social flows which are induced by globalisation and are increasingly 
uncontrollable would urge the states of a region to find collective solutions for 
                                                          
9
 See inter alia: Muzaffarli, Politico-Economic Complementarity and Compability between GUAM 
Member States, 16; Godzimirski, Russia and the CIS: Spaces, Paradigms and Patterns, 36; Flikke, 
Balancing Acts: Russian–Chinese Relations and Developments in the SCO and CSTO. 
10
 See inter alia: Gordienko, Anatoly, Poslednyi karnaval SNG [The last carnaval of the CIS]. 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 August 2005; Flikke, Balancing Acts: Russian–Chinese Relations and 
Developments in the SCO and CSTO, 6; Kembayev, Legal Aspects of the Regional Integration 
Processes in the Post-Soviet Area, 90-1; Olcott et al., Getting it Wrong : Regional Cooperation 
and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
11
 This is part of the research agenda proposed by Alex Warleigh-Lack and Ben Rosamond and 
also Tanja Börzel. For a more detailed discussion of the research agenda see chapter 2.2.2.  
11
 Marchand et al., The Political Economy of New Regionalism, 898; Fawcett, Regionalism in 
World Politics: Past and Present, 24. 
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controlling them.12 The cases studied highlighted that these flows do not 
necessarily prompt states to take collective measures. The readiness to do so 
depends on the ruling elite’s necessity to improve the state’s capacities to 
prevent negative externalities from the flows. It is also crucial, whether policy-
makers depict the transnational flows as an issue of regional or only domestic 
concern. 
The analysis also generated additional insights into how states may employ an 
organisation to strengthen state sovereignty. Analysts of Asian regionalism in 
particular claim this function to be constitutive for ASEAN or the SCO. They view 
the ASEAN consultations as preventing intergovernmental conflicts.13 According 
to Aris, the SCO empowers in particular the Central Asian members’ independent 
foreign policy.14 The thesis rather supports Aris’ interpretation and can 
substantiate this perspective by naming some mechanisms that lead to such 
empowerment. These are the above defined mechanisms inherent to the 
multilateral activities. The core ones are implicit or direct coalition-building, 
enhanced channels to influence regional developments or agreements that may 
inform the states’ bilateral policy. Knowing more about the most preferred 
mechanisms allows us to hypothesise what forms of policy co-ordination an 
organisation will develop. It may serve as yardstick for deducing from the 
observable activities some conclusions about an organisation’s efficiency. This 
may supersede the reflex, still particularly common with regard to the post-
Soviet space, to see unenforced agreements as an indicator of the organisations’ 
failure.  
Finally, the research results elucidate a phenomenon which is often observed in 
African and Asian regional organisations. The states adopt agreements which 
overlap, are often contradictory but anyways hardly implemented and produce 
the so-called ‘spaghetti bowl of agreements’. The literature rarely explains this 
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 Marchand et al., The Political Economy of New Regionalism, 898; Fawcett, Regionalism in 
World Politics: Past and Present, 24. 
13
 Nesadurai, 2009 #807@98}Arase, Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: The 
Institutionalization of Regional Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism, 
834; Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 64. 
14
 Aris, Eurasian Regionalism. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 179. 
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behaviour.15 However, the empirical study undertaken suggests three rationales 
as instructive. First, agreements may simply serve as communication tools 
directed at regional or international players. Committing to an agreement may 
induce the initiator to reward this loyalty. It may also emulate commitment to 
the globally diffused idea of regional governance. In this case the function of the 
agreement is entirely detached from its legal text. A second strategy builds more 
on the legal text. A state may claim that multilaterally agreed conditions should 
be incorporated into bilateral agreements. Individual provisions of the 
agreement may also function as a point of reference in the resolution of bilateral 
conflicts. Thirdly, the agreements may be a ticket for a state’s participation in all 
relevant negotiations in the regional organisation. As argued above, mere 
participation may offer benefits. Such a selective use presupposes that the 
agreements are de facto weakly legalised and that societal actors in the member 
states’ are not able to urge the ruling elite to comprehensively implement them. 
Both conditions are given in political regimes which weakly commit to the rule of 
law. This argument already refers to insights about the nexus between the 
conceptualisation of regionalism and the domestic political regime. The following 
sub-section will dwell on this aspect. 
9.2.3. POLITICAL REGIMES AND APPROACHES TO REGIONALISM 
The thesis announced its intention to explore the nexus between political 
regimes types and the ruling elites’ conceptualisation of regional organisations. 
The research findings provide an alternative perspective on two prevailing 
concepts. First, the literature on regionalism still often invokes the assumption 
that when ruling elites intend in times of globalisation to strengthen societal 
                                                          
15
 A strand of literature argues that the 'spaghetti bowl' is a phenomenon produced by the 
interplay of global and regional integration. Some authors argue the spaghetti bowl to produce 
obstacles to integration. Other scholars see it as potential progress for deeper regional 
integration. Most scholars, however, just note its existence. See: Petri, Peter A (2008), Multitrack 
Integration in East Asian Trade: Noodle Bowl or Matrix? Asia Pacific Issues. Analysis from the 
East-West Center No. 86; Abugattas, Luis (2004), Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for 
Developing Countries under the 'New Regionalism'. Policy Issues in International Trade and 
Commodities Study Series [Online], No. 27; Lloyed, Peter (2002), New Bilateralism in the Asia-
Pacific. The World Economy,Vo. 25, No. 9, p 1287. 
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welfare they would opt for regional integration.16 The empirical study has, 
however, provided two examples where ruling elites have an interest in 
improving societal welfare, but prefer other forms of regional interaction. In 
Azerbaijan to a lesser extent than in Ukraine societal welfare is an aspect of 
domestic stability. The Azerbaijani leadership tries to improve its capacity to 
single-handedly ensure the necessary degree of welfare via the organisations 
studied. Ukraine intends to develop structures that permit the temporarily co-
ordination of the respective policies with its neighbours. Obviously the two do 
not aim for integration. In line with authors like David Arase, this thesis therefore 
considers this link between welfare and integration as an unsatisfying short cut. 
More instructive for the question of why states opt for or reject integration are 
the following two factors. The first aspect is the flexibility of the ruling elites to 
sub-ordinate to multilateral institutions that are monitored by multiple external 
players. The more the survival of a regime depends on the loyalty of a non-
formalised network of elites, the more freedom the leadership needs to alter 
domestic policy in favour of these elites. Under such conditions it is rather 
harmful for the ruling elites to make themselves also accountable to external 
players through a commitment to policy co-ordination. Secondly, integration is 
often depicted as building on legalised agreements. As discussed above, the 
domestic and regional environment, however, decides whether legalised 
multilateral institutions are a feasible tool in regional relations. If the practices 
established for regional interaction do not rely on legalised rules, multilateral 
legalised agreements will hardly contribute to stabilising the interaction. 
Personalised ties that help to bridge intergovernmental bureaucratic barriers 
may be more adequate in this situation. In general, a deeper understanding of 
the practices that prevail in intergovernmental interaction in a specific region 
helps to discern the form and potential for multilateral policy co-ordination. 
The thesis, secondly, claimed to build on the concept of virtual regionalism 
proposed by Roy Allison to describe regional organisations in Central Asia. The 
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 Mansfield, Edward D.; Milner, Helen V., Pevehouse, Jon C. (2008), Democracy, Veto Players an 
the Depth of Regional Integration. World Economy,Vo. 31, No. 1, p 70.. Also discussed by: Arase, 
Non-Traditional Security in China-ASEAN Cooperation: The Institutionalization of Regional 
Security Cooperation and the Evolution of East Asian Regionalism, 811. 
287 
 
findings first suggest a slight re-formulation of the function and mechanisms of 
virtual regionalism when applying it to the CIS and GUAM. The concept roughly 
denotes engagement in a regional organisation for merely instrumental 
purposes. The argument remains on a relatively superficial level and declares 
that membership in the organisation serves the aim of balancing or 
bandwagoning with the regional hegemon. Participation in the organisations’ 
sectoral activities is primarily seen as means to emulate the membership’s 
substance.17 The thesis revealed that these rationales are part of the virtual 
approach that Azerbaijan and Ukraine take towards the organisations. However, 
as section 9.1 has argued, participation in the various councils produces more 
substantial results than depicted by virtual regionalism. The states do not seek 
for multilateralism in the sense of co-ordinating national policies but benefit in 
various ways from the multilateral environment in the organisations.18 The 
virtual commitment is often necessary, since the organisations’ rhetoric and 
activities formally aim at multilateralism. In order to take, nevertheless, 
advantage of the multilateral environment the policy-makers but also non-state 
actors desire to instrumentally participate in the organisations' activities. It is a 
meaningful way to adjust multilateral interactions to the established domestic 
and regional practices. In this light, the thesis agrees with Stina Torjesen’s 
argument that virtual regionalism is influenced by informal practices of rule 
which allow veto-players to interfere in integration. However, the thesis argues 
that virtual behaviour is rather a strategy of most actors than an undesired 
triumph of selected veto-players. The strategy can successfully be applied, if the 
ruling elite is able to downgrade the parliament into a rubber stamp body that 
ratifies international agreements regardless of their content.  
The thesis suggests future analyses to distinguish virtual participation from 
participation without substantial results. Virtual or instrumental participation is a 
strategy of actors from different societal levels. But in neither Azerbaijan nor 
Ukraine ministerial officials at expert level and also private business actors are 
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  Allison, Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central Asia. 
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 According to Keohane multilateralism is a 'practice of co-ordinating national policies'. Keohane, 
Multilateralism: an Agenda for Research, 731. 
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satisfied if this instrumental participation has little tangible results. As discussed 
above, they especially aim at permanent mechanism that can be temporarily 
used for co-ordinated activities. The officials' room for exploiting the 
organisations’ activities to these ends depends on the degree to which policy-
making is co-ordinated in a top-down manner. It is constrained if they lack the 
power to put across that they regularly attend the council meetings and have no 
influence on relevant decision-making, and if they are not able to co-ordinate 
their activities with other actors in the state administration. This is decisive for 
the ability of interested actors to optimally employ virtual participation. In the 
following sub-section the focus will shift from academic relevance to the policy 
implications of the research findings.  
9.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY DEBATES 
The research was not only inspired by academic considerations but also takes an 
interest in policy debates on regional organisations in the post-Soviet space and 
beyond. This section will consider the implications of the findings for the 
following three debates. The first discusses the assessment of regional 
organisations in the post-Soviet space. A second sub-section concentrates on the 
prospects of global governance through regional organisations. Finally, the 
prospects of the external promotion of regionalism receive some attention.  
9.3.1. THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE POST-
SOVIET SPACE 
Regional organisations have ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union been a 
sensitive issue for the former Soviet republics, since their rhetoric always 
includes the notion of integration. Integration bears the connotation of losing 
newly gained independence, of succumbing to re-integrative ambitions of Russia, 
and of a thwarted rapprochement with the EU. Such developments would, of 
course, be grave for all former Soviet republics except Russia. The anxieties that 
emerge from such a scenario induce policy analysts and practitioners in the 
former Soviet republics and beyond to depict developments in the CIS such as 
the multilateral FTA or the emergence of new regional organisations as alarming. 
In this light, CIS and EU oriented activities are often viewed as a zero-sum game. 
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Particularly in the case of Ukraine, public debates of its observer status or 
membership in the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (CU) 
cause apprehension. Indeed, formal membership in the CU would, according to 
EU regulations, erase Ukraine’s chance to sign an EU Association Agreement. The 
gained observer status does not formally conflict with Ukraine's EU ambitions.19 
Another consequence of the integration concerns is that in times when the 
organisations do not produce startling results policy analysts almost entirely 
ignore them. Thus the public debate tends to overestimate the impact of the 
regional organisations or to ignore them entirely. The following paragraphs will 
argue that a more balanced discussion of the organisations would be more 
constructive. 
The empirical study gave the example of a former Soviet republic that claims to 
be rather independent from the post-Soviet space, Azerbaijan, and of a republic 
that is well-known for its strong dependence on Russia, Ukraine. Both states, 
however, admit that they have no choice but to co-ordinate trade and security 
aspects with the post-Soviet neighbours. Hence, the ruling elites search for 
adequate tools to handle relations in the post-Soviet space which are, as 
outlined in chapter 5, characterised by an uneven distribution of power, 
economic resources and persisting (inter)dependencies. As the thesis has 
revealed the CIS and GUAM assume the function of additional instruments in 
Azerbaijan and Ukraine’s tool box for handling neighbourhood relations. It is 
hence crucial to take the processes within these organisations into account when 
discussing the states’ regional policy. For the same reason it is necessary to 
discuss full or associated membership in regional organisations in the post-Soviet 
space as complementary not contradictory to the republics’ independence and 
their EU-oriented policy. The findings of the thesis may stimulate the mitigation 
of the perceived contradiction. Most important is the conclusion that the former 
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 See for example Gucci, Freihandelsabkommen mit der EU oder Zollunion mit Russland? [Free 
Trade Agreement with the EU or Customs Union with Russia?]. The problem is also discussed by: 
Pryce, Paul (07 June 2006), Ukraine: Wagons West? [Online].The following analysis makes a step 
towards a more balanced perspective, but neglect Ukraine's economic interest behind the CU 
observer status. Iwanski, Tadeusz and Szymon Kardas (05 June 2013), Ukraine closer to the 
Customs Union? Eastweak [Online], Vo. 19, No. 337. 
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Soviet republics studied have never employed the organisations for the purpose 
of integration. The political regime characteristics that prevail in the former 
Soviet republics have so far rendered integration into multilateral legalised 
agreements unattractive. The former Soviet republics have altered the aims of 
their participation in the organisations according to the needs of their domestic 
political regime. They have introduced mechanisms in the organisations and in 
the bilateral communication with the former Soviet republics which have 
transformed multilateral legalised agreements into hardly legalised and 
selectively applicable instruments. Accordingly, the dynamics in the 
organisations by no means compete with EU associations and integration 
ambitions. Rather, they may facilitate this process when enabling the states to 
diffuse internationally adopted best practices in the region, to monitor and 
influence the regional developments and to integrate their post-Soviet and 
European foreign policy. A Ukrainian official argued that it would be helpful for 
Ukraine’s EU policy if European actors understood that organisations like the CU 
employ legalised institutions differently than the EU does. They could then 
accept a CU membership, according to Ukraine’s conditions, without losing the 
chance to associate with the EU.20 Of course, the EU as an actor that builds its 
policy on the rule of law will always have to take legal commitments made by 
potential partners seriously. But a better understanding of the mechanisms in 
post-Soviet regional organisations may make the debate on Ukraine’s potential 
membership in the CU more constructive.  
In this light adequate analytical instruments for assessing the developments in 
existing or new organisations in the post-Soviet space are crucial. In the course of 
the empirical study the thesis developed some assumptions that might help. 
Firstly it calls upon analysts not to interpret any successfully established legalised 
agreement or even supra-national regulations as step towards integration. Even 
if organisations like the CU managed to set up supra-national bodies and 
arbitrage mechanisms it would be necessary to wait and to observe whether 
these indeed fulfil their declared function. This note of caution is grounded in the 
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observation that the weakness of the rule of law and the importance accorded to 
the states’ flexibility in foreign and domestic policy decisions have so far induced 
the former Soviet republics to only instrumentally participate in such structures. 
A wide range of mechanisms exist in the domestic political regimes and 
established practices of interaction with the neighbours to undermine the 
agreed regulations. Not even Russia, the initiator of most CIS agreements, has so 
far committed to implementing the agreements. Thus, before speaking of 
integration successes, the analyst should carefully assess to what extent legalised 
rules indeed alter the established practices in and between the involved states. 
The second recommendation originates in the differences analysed between the 
proclaimed aims of sectoral activities and the actual aims and mechanisms. It is 
important to carefully evaluate whether the proclaimed activities and their 
mechanisms are indeed the driving force behind a regional organisation. The 
following questions may guide the analysis. Are relations between the members 
indeed regulated by the multilateral rules adopted or are, for instance, unilateral 
incentives provided by core players more significant? Is the relationship indeed 
shaped in the multilateral context or does the multilateral context serve to 
improve bilateral relations? Finally, do the states develop multilateralism in the 
organisations or do they only seek the identified multilateralism light? These 
questions may help to gain an adequate picture of the de facto dynamics in a 
regional organisation, of the members’ aims in the organisations, of the activities 
on which they build these aims and finally on the impact of the organisations. 
The analytical framework presented in chapter 2.4 may stimulate a more narrow 
research focus. The identified categories need, however, to be advanced 
according to new developments.  
9.3.2. REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
As stated in chapter 2.1, the question of whether a global network of regional 
organisations will gradually take over global governance functions is one of the 
drivers of comparative regionalism research. This sub-section will briefly respond 
to this question from the post-Soviet perspective. As in most other parts of the 
world regional organisations in the post-Soviet space have so far not assumed 
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regional governance functions. The thesis depicts this phenomenon not as a 
result of the organisations' failure. The former Soviet republics studied rather 
intend to prevent the organisations from assuming governance functions. In the 
given regional environment marked by newly independent states, persisting 
(inter)dependencies and political regimes that rely on non-formalised rule 
organisations that assume direct regional governance functions are unattractive. 
An organisation that is not a regional governance player cannot act as a partner 
in global governance matters. The members may, nevertheless, be eager to 
advertise an organisations’ recognition as a global governance partner, as the 
example of GUAM highlighted. By doing so, the members aim to improve their 
international position rather than transfer governance tasks to the organisation. 
When intensifying co-operation with the organisations it should therefore be 
carefully assessed how the de facto function of an organisation complies with 
the co-operation aims. 
9.3.3. EXTERNAL PROMOTION OF REGIONALISM 
International actors like the US, the European Union or even Japan promote 
regional co-operation in the post-Soviet space. They provide material and 
ideational support for existing organisations such as GUAM or BSEC or establish 
new co-operation formats, for instance within the EU Eastern Partnership policy. 
These external actors share the complaint that their ambitions do not lead to 
much co-operation.21 The research findings permit some recommendations on 
how to improve the promotion effect.  
An instructive starting point is the observation that most state actors shared the 
strategy to pursue a virtual approach towards the multilateral activities, but 
especially policy-makers at expert level sought tangible outcomes from 
multilateral interactions. Section 9.2.3 has argued that the tendency towards 
instrumental participation is in large part a response to activities that aim at 
establishing multilateral legalised institutions. These are not desired, since they 
do not qualify as a tool in the current situation in the post-Soviet space. Instead, 
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policy-makers prefer to intensify the temporary co-ordination of activities by 
establishing personalised trust-based networks with officials from the state 
agencies in the neighbourhood. This implies that platforms which involve a wide 
range of high and low-level officials from various state agencies potentially 
intensify intergovernmental co-operation. Also, activities such as collective 
training sessions may have a positive effect. As described in chapter 8, one of the 
obstacles to more intensive co-ordination of activities is the lack of knowledge 
about the capacities which other states have in certain issue-areas and about 
who is responsible for which task. Joint training discloses some of this 
information to the state officials involved. This knowledge may induce them to 
turn to other states with a request for support.  
The thesis has, however, revealed that insufficient communication both between 
superiors and ministerial officials who attend multilateral meetings and between 
relevant state agencies tends to prevent a more extensive use of the multilateral 
context. This may either be the result of a conscious strategy, as the case of 
Azerbaijan has shown, or an unintended obstacle as in the case of Ukraine. In 
order to avoid this barrier to intensified policy co-ordination it is desirable to 
involve both low-level ministerial experts and individuals with certain decision-
making powers in the multilateral interaction. It might also be supportive to 
gather not only one state agency that should domestically co-ordinate the 
implementation of a certain practice but most of the agencies potentially 
relevant to the issue in hand. In any case, to be more successful in the promotion 
of regional co-operation external actors have to adjust their expectations of the 
impact of such multilateral frameworks to the domestic conceptualisations and 
practices.  
9.4. FROM FINDINGS TO QUESTIONS – A FUTURE RESEARCH 
AGENDA 
It is joy and sorrow of every scholar that research inevitably poses more 
questions than it gives answers. Scholars are asked to engage with the questions 
raised by the shortcomings of their research and queries posed by the findings. 
This final sub-section will therefore reflect on three questions that emerge from 
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the research undertaken. How to enhance the validity of the empirical research? 
How do the research findings inform future research on regional organisations in 
the post-Soviet space? And how do they inform future research on comparative 
regionalism? 
A crucial concern of any qualitative empirical study is the question of how valid 
the findings are for other empirical cases, since qualitative studies draw 
conclusions on the basis of a small number of intensively studied cases. This 
thesis took two measures to reduce this vulnerability. It first tried to explore if 
and how the categories identified reflect themselves only in the policy-makers 
approaches towards the CIS and GUAM or also towards other regional 
organisations or policies. Secondly, it collected data on a wider set of within-
cases than presented in the empirical chapters, in order to enlarge the basis 
upon which the findings were deduced. With reference to these strategies the 
thesis can claim that are applicable to Azerbaijan and Ukraine’s approaches to 
other regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. However, original empirical 
studies of the states’ policies in other organisations would strengthen the 
findings. A better picture of the plausibility of the results could also be drawn by 
considering them when studying similar cases. These are first of all the other 
former Soviet republics that share the following characteristics: newly gained 
independence, persisting (inter)dependencies with the post-Soviet neighbours 
and hybrid political regimes with affinity towards authoritarianism or democracy 
and a dominance of informal institutions. Their validity may also be examined in 
cases beyond the post-Soviet space that share some of these characteristics. 
However, the less regime characteristics the cases share with Azerbaijan or 
Ukraine the weaker is the probability that the findings provide an adequate 
analytical frame.  
In addition a follow-up study on the same cases would help to define the 
research results more precisely and validate them further. Such a study should 
concentrate on exploring to what degree the case countries are able to employ 
the CIS and GUAM for the expected function. The analysis has only in selected 
cases been able to gain information of whether a policy was successful or not. 
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Mainly issues with access to relevant interviewees or to other insightful data 
constrained the thesis from comprehensively investigating this aspect. Also, in 
the case of the CIS FTA the process of adoption has still been ongoing, which has 
not allowed conclusions to be drawn about its effectiveness. The research would, 
further, benefit from including a stronger sample of private business actors and 
NGOs concerned with the issue-areas that are discussed in the regional 
organisations. Time and financial constrains made it impossible to broaden the 
sample. In a nutshell, the research needs more empirical data that give insights 
on the various perspectives mentioned. However, even in this deficient form the 
research may stimulate the debate and future research in the following regards.  
The thesis formulated in chapter 3.5 an analytical framework that mirrors how 
the case countries conceptualise regional organisations in the post-Soviet space. 
The relations and factors which it outlines call for a more precise formulation by 
including other cases. It would be intriguing to include how Russian or 
Kazakhstani state officials conceptualise the regional organisations. These states 
may provide a different picture, since they created a number of the new regional 
organisations. This is especially so since they call for more legalised integration in 
the new CU, but share with the other former Soviet republics the domestic 
features that are rather hostile to integration. To have a clearer idea on how they 
accommodate this call with the established practices would enhance the picture 
of the function of the regional organisations. It would, secondly, be interesting to 
explore how the cases studied alter their conceptualisations if they interact with 
a multilateral environment that is marked by consolidated democracies and 
strongly applied rule of law. Azerbaijan and Ukraine’s relations with the EU may 
serve as example for this. At first glance, the interactions appear to also show in 
parts patterns of instrumental participation. It needs, however, to be explored if 
these originate from the same rationales. Thirdly, the research would benefit 
from a deeper study of the nexus between the specific application of the rule of 
law and the conceptualisation of regionalism. The thesis has been able to give 
only a superficial record of this link. The interplay is, however, one of the aspects 
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that make the area-specific study interesting for comparative regionalism 
research.  
The proposed analytical model may induce comparative regionalism researchers 
to go beyond merely identifying varieties of regionalism. It may induce scholars 
to explore more intensively and in a comparative manner the mechanisms that 
produce such variety. The analytical frame of this thesis proposes a nexus 
between outcomes, instruments and three domestic conditions. This may inspire 
a more systematic approach towards analysing the variety of regionalism and its 
origins. Such a comparative model may enhance debates on the prospects that 
the varying conceptualisations of regional organisations will converge. It will also 
permit discussing a constructive interaction between regional organisations in 
different areas of the world. Such an analysis might also be instructive for the 
normative research on how to diffuse the European model of regional 
organisations. It might reveal how and under which conditions a transition from 




APPENDIX 1: CIS STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Figure 15: Organisational Structure of the CIS 
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Figure 16: Competences of the CIS Bodies 
Formal CIS decision-making structures 
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Source: overview made according to the CIS Charter 




Source: calculated by the author according to information from www.cis.minsk.by, June 2010 
Figure 18: Type of CIS Agreements in Trade and Security Matters 
 
Source: calculated by the author according to information from www.cis.minsk.by, June 2010 [strategy clusters agreements that define 
shared aims; action plan clusters agreements that define measures for implementing strategies; the third category includes all agreements 







































APPENDIX 2: GUAM STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Figure 19: Organisational Structure GUAM in 2012 
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Figure 20: Formal Decision-Making Structures: Competences of the GUAM Bodies 
GUAM body Competences 
Council of Head of States Highest decision-making body, decisions by consensus 
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Figure 22: GUAM Presentations at UN General Assembly or Security Council 
 
Source: GUAM presentations at UN indicating actor who represented the organisation. Table compiled by the author based on UN 
documents. Full references listed in bibliography. 
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